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1. Corporate responsibility and the governance of child 
labor and core labor rights 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
‘No amount of preparation could have lessened the shock and revulsion I 
felt on entering a sporting-goods factory in the town of Sialkot, seventy 
miles from Lahore, where scores of children, most of them aged five to ten, 
produce soccer balls by hand for forty rupees, or about $1.20, a day. The 
children work eighty hours a week in near-total darkness and total silence. 
According to the foreman, the darkness is both an economy and a 
precautionary measure; child-rights activists have difficulty taking 
photographs and gathering evidence of wrongdoing if the lighting is poor. 
The silence is to ensure product quality: “If the children speak, they are 
not giving their complete attention to the product and are liable to make 
errors.” The children are permitted one thirty-minute meal break each 
day; they are punished if they take longer. They are also punished if they 
fall asleep, if their workbenches are sloppy, if they waste material or 
miscut a pattern, if they complain of mistreatment to their parents or speak 
to strangers outside the factory. A partial list of “infractions” for which 
they may be punished is tacked to a wall near the entrance. It’s a document 
of dubious utility: the children are illiterate. Punishments are doled out in 
a storage closet at the rear of the factory. There, amid bales of wadding 
and leather, children are hung upside down by their knees, starved, caned, 
or lashed.’1 
 
One year after Jonathan Silvers painted such a grim picture of the working 
conditions in the soccer ball industry in Pakistan, an agreement was 
presented at the sporting goods industry’s annual Super Show in Atlanta, 
Georgia. Backed by the World Federation of the Sporting Goods Industry 
                                          
1 Jonathan Silvers, ‘Child Labor in Pakistan’, The Atlantic Monthly, February 1996. 
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and the vast majority of the world’s soccer ball-“producing” sporting 
goods companies, such as Adidas, Nike and Reebok, and with funding 
from the U.S. and British governments as well as the U.S. Soccer Industry 
Council of America, this ‘Partner’s Agreement to Eliminate Child Labour 
in the Football Industry in Pakistan’ was signed on February 14, 1997, by 
representatives of the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the ILO 
and UNICEF, marking – in the words of the ILO – ‘the first time that 
organizations representing multinational corporations and their local 
suppliers have joined with international organisations in a concerted effort 
to eliminate child labour from this specific industrial sector.’2  
 
On the one hand, this so-called Atlanta Agreement provided for the 
establishment of a prevention, monitoring and verification system, 
involving both internal and external compliance and verification elements. 
On the other, the Agreement consisted of a Social Protection Program, 
entailing the provision of non-formal education, vocational training, micro-
credit facilities, etc. to children and their families. By February 2003 
49,765 monitoring visits had been conducted, the project had ‘succeeded in 
cleaning up 95 per cent’ of the hand-sewn soccer ball industry in the 
Sialkot district, and it had led to ’educating 10,572 students through 255 
non-formal education centres, mainstreaming 5,838 of them and providing 
health cover to 5,408 students.’3   
 
We have, then, two fairly distinct ways of governing working conditions in 
this particular industrial sector. They did not involve a re-articulation of the 
dominant norms on childhood and child labor per se, nor were key 
elements of the conventional framework of governance - the nation-state 
and intergovernmental organizations, legislation and enforcement – 
rendered meaningless. But they constituted a marked change in the norms 
and practices of corporate responsibility, entailing a growing assumption 
of responsibility by the private sector. And they constituted a significant 
shift in governance, a redistribution of responsibility and political authority 
toward the private and the voluntary. 
 
                                          
2 International Labour Office, ILO unites with industry groups to combat child labour 
(Geneva: International Labour Office, press release, February 14, 1997 (ILO/97/2)). 
 
3 International Labour Office and UNICEF, From Stitching to School: Combating Child 
Labour in the Soccer Ball Industry in Pakistan (Geneva/New York: International 
Labour Office/UNICEF, 2004), pp. 4 and 15. 
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The Partners’ Agreement related to child labor in Sialkot is but one 
example illustrative of the change in corporate responsibility and the 
governance of child labor and labor rights during the 1990s, as profit-
seeking corporations in growing numbers adopted codes of conduct or 
ethical guidelines, governing – in rhetoric, if not always in practice – a 
growing list of issues: from the rights of indigenous peoples in the Amazon 
region to the depletion of the ozone layer and problems of global warming; 
from the rights of child and (sometimes) adult workers to animal welfare 
and bioethics; from bonded labor in Lahore, Pakistan, to the sweatshops of 
suburban Los Angeles or down-town New York City.  
 
Certainly, many of the issues were not new, nor was the idea of debating 
corporate responsibility an invention of the 1990s. Child labor had been 
debated and subject to legislation for centuries, as had the rights and 
working conditions of adult workers.4 Corporate responsibility and the role 
of business in society had also been subject to long-running debates. In the 
words of Blowfield and Frynas, ‘From a historical perspective, […] CSR is 
simply the latest manifestation of earlier debates on the role of business in 
society.’5 More than just an abbreviation, the use of CSR denotes that the 
shift which occurred during the 1990s was a historically particular re-
articulation of corporate responsibility, CSR, and that this latest 
manifestation was quite distinct from the most recent of its predecessors as 
well as from the prevailing framework of governance. During the 1970s, 
just a couple of decades earlier, these debates manifested themselves very 
much in a focus on regulation and standard-setting by state and 
intergovernmental bodies.6 During the 1990s, in turn, the face of corporate 
responsibility - and thereby the governance of those societal concerns 
                                          
4 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); Héctor B. de la Cruz, Geraldo von Pobotsky and 
Lee Swepton, The International Labor Organization: The International Standards 
System and Basic Human Rights (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996); Hugh 
Cunningham, Children and Childhood in Western Society since 1500 (London: 
Longman, 1995); Alec Fyfe and Michele Jankanish, Trade unions and child labour: A 
guide to action (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1997). 
 
5 Michael Blowfield and Jedrzej George Frynas, ‘Setting new agendas: critical 
perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility in the developing world’, International 
Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3, 2005, p. 500. 
 
6 Rhys Jenkins, Ruth Pearson and Gill Seyfang, ‘Introduction’ in Jenkins, Pearson and 
Seyfang (eds.), Corporate Responsibility and Labour Rights: Codes of Conduct in the 
Global Economy (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2002). 
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involved - changed in a direction quite distinct from that of the 1970s, as 
illustrated by the Partners’ Agreement above.  
 
Viewed against the backdrop of the “conventional” framework of 
governance dominant throughout the latter half of the 20th century as well 
as the wave of regulatory codification attempts of the 1970s, one of the 
central characteristics of the shift which occurred in the 1990s was that it 
constituted and embodied a shift toward the private and voluntary: ‘For 
many proponents and critics, a key distinguishing feature of CSR is the 
voluntary nature of the initiatives companies undertake in its name, in 
contrast to the formal regulatory mechanisms historically used to govern 
business.’7 In broader terms, CSR may be seen as one of many such shifts 
in the role of the private sector and private authority in the multiple aspects 
of governance, a phenomenon which has attracted growing scholarly 
attention well beyond CSR and the governance of child labor and core 
labor rights: ‘In an era when the authority of the state appears to be 
challenged in so many ways, the existence of alternative sources of 
authority takes on great significance, especially when that authority is 
wielded internationally by profit-seeking entities. […] we do not argue this 
phenomenon is entirely new; for instance, merchants of a century ago and 
more played a large role in governance. Our contributors do, however, 
point to the unique characteristics of current private governance activities. 
More importantly, they bring to the fore the increased contemporary 
significance of an upward trend in the management of global affairs by 
economic actors.’8  
                                          
7 Blowfield and Frynas, ‘Setting new agendas’, p. 502. 
 
8 A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler and Tony Porter, ‘Private Authority and 
International Affairs’ in A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler and Tony Porter (eds.), 
Private Authority and International Affairs (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1999), p. 3. See also James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), 
Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992); Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill 
(eds.),  Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (Ontario: Oxford University 
Press, 2000); Richard A. Higgott, Geoffrey R. D. Underhill and Andreas Bieler, Non-
State Actors and Authority in the Global System (London: Routledge, 2000); Geoffrey 
R. D. Underhill, States, Markets and Governance: Private Interests, the Public Good 
and the Democratic Process (Amsterdam: Vossiuspers UvA, 2001); Virginia Haufler, 
‘Crossing the Boundary between Public and Private: International Regimes and Non-
State Actors’ in Volker Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Virginia Haufler, A Public Role for the 
Private Sector: Industry Self-Regulation in a Global Economy (Washington, D. C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001). 
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The driving interest underlying this dissertation has been this: Why did we 
see this change in corporate responsibility and the governance of child 
labor and labor rights? Why did we see this particular form of change? 
After all, the problems and the solutions had been defined differently for 
decades. And why a change in the first place?  
 
1.2 The research questions 
 
In my pursuit of these rather broad questions and interests, I have focused 
in this dissertation on three in-depth empirical case studies. These are: 
 
i) The MOU: The Memorandum of Understanding concerning 
Child Labour in the Bangladeshi Garment Industry, signed by the 
Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association, 
the International Labour Organization, and UNICEF, July 4, 1995; 
 
ii) The Atlanta Agreement: The Partners’ Agreement to Eliminate 
Child Labour in the Football Industry in Pakistan, signed by the 
Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the International 
Labour Office, and UNICEF, February 14, 1997; 
 
iii) The AIP/FLA Agreement: The Preliminary Agreement 
between (some of the) members of the White House Apparel 
Industry Partnership Task Force, November 2, 1998. 
 
Referring to these three agreements, the research questions are formulated 
as follows: 
 
1. Why did these agreements come into existence? 
 
2. Why did they take on those particular forms? 
 
In the following section, I elaborate further on the research questions and 
provide some pointers about the nature and direction of this dissertation. 
Subsequently, the three agreements will be characterized in further detail 
in section 1.4, where they will also be situated within the broader 
contemporary shift in corporate responsibility. The final section of this 
chapter provides an outline of the dissertation at hand.   
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1.3 Definitions and delimitations 
 
The research questions and underlying research interests are inextricably 
tied to my conceptions of governance, corporate responsibility, the 
political and the economic – indeed, basic ontological premises concerning 
the social. I see governance, much as Cox and many other scholars see the 
State and other entities, as a social construction, and a multi-faceted and 
complex one at that.9 Governance relates, as I use it, to the ways in which 
societies define societal problems and the solutions to those problems, and 
governance is used deliberately to indicate that this involves more than 
governments and governmental mechanisms.10 These are undoubtedly 
important elements of the frameworks of governance related to child labor 
and core labor rights, which come into play in this dissertation. Central to 
this research project, however, governance also involves the norms and 
practices associated with corporations and a variety of different types of 
actors beside governmental ones.11  
 
Consequently, I use the concept ‘framework of governance’ as a deliberate 
alternative to regulatory framework and other similar concepts that carry 
too many connotations tied to government and governmental regulation. I 
use it instead to capture the premise that the governance of child labor and 
core labor rights includes the existing national and international regulation, 
patterns of enforcement, as well as the norms and practices of corporate 
conduct with regards to those issues. And I hope I have succeeded in using 
it in such a way as to also give room to the basic premise that both 
problems and solutions are always potentially conflictive and subject to 
politicization and change. The politicization of one element of the 
framework of governance is always, whether implicitly or explicitly, also a 
politicization of its other elements. In other words, a debate on corporate 
responsibility is also, perhaps implicitly, a debate about the societal 
concerns at stake and about the responsibility of other societal actors. 
                                          
9 Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of 
History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). 
 
10 Jon Pierre (ed.), Debating Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
 
11 Braithwaite and Drahos, for example, operate with no less than 9 key actor types in 
their seminal book: organizations of states, states, international business associations, 
national business associations, corporations, international NGOs, national NGOs, mass 
publics, and individuals. Cf. Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation, p. 
476. 
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Corporate responsibility, it follows, is seen as a social construction. The 
norms and practices of corporate responsibility in relation to child labor 
and core labor rights have demonstrably varied over the years, as have 
those pertaining to the State and other societal actors. Since debates on 
corporate responsibility often touch upon quite fundamental societal 
concerns and (implicitly or explicitly) involve the responsibility of other 
societal actors as well – indeed, basically relate to the configuration of the 
public and the private spheres, of the political and the economic – a re-
articulation of corporate responsibility is very much so a political 
phenomenon. Thus, CSR can neither be understood in terms of corporate 
responsibility alone nor in a-political or a-historical terms: ‘What may be 
labelled CSR issues today are often a product of many decades of conflict 
over resources that constitute ongoing historical struggles for corporate and 
state accountability and should be understood in this context.’12 Corporate 
responsibility is therefore also seen as contested terrain, a field on which 
conflicting views on the proper constitution of the corporate and other 
parts of society occasionally go into battle.13 The generic term ‘corporate 
responsibility’ is used to refer to the contested terrain of corporate 
responsibility, the contestation and debates over corporate responsibility, 
rather than the particular norms and practices of corporate responsibility 
prevailing during a certain period of time.  
 
As indicated above, this dissertation is concerned with the changes which 
occurred in the 1990s. In broad terms, these may be captured by the term 
Corporate Social Responsibility, or CSR: ‘Within a decade a whole new 
corporate language, championed by multinational corporations, has 
evolved around the notion of more ethical business practice. A new 
industry has grown up to help companies present, implement and monitor 
what they are doing in the name of CSR.’14 Corporate Social 
Responsibility, or CSR, is used in reference to the particular constitution of 
norms and practices of corporate responsibility in the 1990s, i.e. a 
historically specific manifestation.  
                                          
12 Niamh Garvey and Peter Newell, Corporate accountability to the poor: Assessing the 
effectiveness of community-based strategies, IDS Working Paper No. 227 (Sussex: IDS, 
2004), p. 3. 
 
13 Peter Utting, Rethinking Business Regulation: From Self-Regulation to Social 
Control, Technology, Business and Society Programme Paper Number 15 (Geneva: 
UNRISD, 2005). 
 
14 Christian Aid, Behind the mask: The real face of corporate social responsibility 
(London: Christian Aid, 2004), p. 4; note omitted. 
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The fact that two quite similar questions were posed in the previous section 
is very much related to the above as well as the empirical and theoretical 
interests forming the point of departure for this research project. Corporate 
responsibility and governance more broadly are seen as social 
constructions and subject to social change. Asking why the three 
agreements came into existence is akin to asking why corporate 
responsibility and the governance of child labor and labor rights more 
broadly changed at all and in the first place. Interest and attention are 
invested in certain parts of the empirical and conceptual universe, which 
might be ignored or less emphasized under the second question, e.g., what 
were the critical junctures, the preconditions, and the crucial factors?  
 
The second question, in turn, directs attention toward issues such as how 
and why conditions are politicized and problematized, how social problems 
are constructed and defined through more or less conflictive processes, and 
to the inclusions and exclusions of issues, concerns and actors. And it 
commands attention to the construction of solutions to those problems – 
the inclusions and exclusions of actors and issues, decisions on 
organizational forms, funding, mechanisms of control, enforcement and 
sanctions, etc. In many ways, this second question is similar to one of the 
basic questions within the international relations theory subfield, regime 
theory, where the characteristics of international policy regimes are sought 
explained.15 Of course, in the present dissertation, non-state actors and 
business in particular are much more central than has traditionally been the 
case within regime theory.  
 
As far as the second question is concerned, let me furthermore clarify what 
is meant by ‘those particular forms’. I aim at the specific and central 
characteristics of each of the agreements, and this can obviously be 
conceived of and operationalized in different ways.16 More specifically, I 
will focus on the scope of the agreements, where scope firstly refers to the 
boundaries of the agreement with respect to the issues covered, both in 
terms of the range of issues included or not, and in terms of the depth or 
                                          
15 For an overview, see Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, 
Theories of international regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
 
16 For a treatment of basic regime characteristics, see e.g. Lee E. Preston and Duane 
Windsor, The Rules of the Game in the Global Economy: Policy Regimes for 
International Business (Second Edition), (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 
p. 24. 
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substance involved. For example, is the agreement on child labor alone, or 
does it cover several issues? Does it merely prohibit the use of child labor, 
or does it address the underlying causes and/or the consequences? Second, 
scope also relates to the geographical boundaries, or lack thereof, of the 
agreements. Is the agreement confined to a particular physical and 
geographically delimited space, or is it in principle global? Third, scope 
refers to the sphere of business activities covered, where delimitations are 
most likely to be sectoral (the toy industry, the garment industry, etc.) and 
related to the activities at particular nodes in a commodity chain (e.g., in 
the manufacturing of soccer balls), but where they may also be product-
related (as in soccer balls as opposed to sporting goods generally, for 
example). 
 
In addition, ‘particular forms’ also refers to the organizational form, where 
this relates to the parties to an agreement (or, more broadly, a given 
solution) and the institutional set-up that this provides for. In general, 
which actors are involved – or not involved – is a central feature shaping 
the nature of an agreement. Why did these particular actors become 
involved (or excluded)? Are private sector actors involved? If so, more 
specifically which parts of the industry in question are formally involved 
(and which parts are involved informally or indirectly)? Are public sector 
actors involved? If so, are these intergovernmental agencies, national 
authorities, sub national entities, etc.? Moreover, how are these involved? 
And, finally, does the agreement contain provisions on monitoring, 
verification, enforcement and sanctions? 
 
Furthermore, ‘particular forms’ refers to the funding of the agreements and 
how this “burden” is distributed and decided upon. Who pays, how much, 
and for what? 
 
Finally, ‘particular forms’ refers to specific rules that the agreements 
establish with regards to those issues included. What are the rules, for 
example, on child labor? Does the agreement contain language on wages – 
what does the agreement stipulate?   
 
Now, before moving on, a few of comments on the focus and emphasis in 
this dissertation, on some of the main inclusions and exclusions. To begin 
with, the research questions focus on the three agreements, which are all 
concerned with child labor. This dissertation is not, and I would like to 
underline this, solely about child labor. It is about child labor and core 
labor rights. It is about the inclusions and exclusions of issues and 
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concerns in the struggles to define problems and solutions, and corporate 
responsibility. How and why do these inclusions and exclusions come 
about, and how does this affect the processes and the outcomes?  
 
The research questions and the focus on those three particular agreements 
do, of course, reflect some deliberate delimitations and choices. The 
operationalization and implementation of the agreements as well as their 
consequences are not a central concern. In other words, I will not focus on 
the consequences of the agreements, be it for the child and adult workers, 
for the companies, etc. These matters have been analyzed and debated 
extensively, and rightly so, whereas research focusing on explaining the 
changes is relatively scarce.17 I therefore consider this a reasonable and 
                                          
17 The most extensive treatments of the backgrounds to the three agreements, which I 
have been able to find during this research process, are: Susan Bissell and Babar 
Sobhan, Child labour and education programming in the garment industry of 
Bangladesh: Experiences and Issues (Dhaka: UNICEF Bangladesh, 1996); Elliott 
Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights Through Private Voluntary 
Initiatives: Public Relations or Public Policy? A Report to the U.S. Department of State 
on behalf of The University of Iowa Center for Human Rights (Iowa: University of 
Iowa Center for Human Rights, 2004); David Bobrowsky, Creating A Global Public 
Policy Network in The Apparel Industry: The Apparel Industry Partnership, (at 
www.gppi.net, accessed on January 12, 2004).  
It may be noted that the authors of the first two of these were centrally involved in the 
respective processes. Moreover, it may be noted that the Bissell and Sobhan text was 
not easily accessed, whereas the last two texts were not in existence at the 
commencement of the present research project.  
Examples of texts that do not have as their central concern – and consequently do not 
analyze or treat in depth – the background of the three agreements, their coming into 
existence and particular form, are: Christopher L. Avery, Business and Human Rights 
in a time of change (London: Amnesty International UK, 2000), pp. 53-55; Rachel 
Marcus and Caroline Harper, Small hands: children in the working world, Working 
Paper no. 16 (London: Save the Children, 1997 [October 1996]), p. 48; International 
Labour Organisation, International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour 
(ILO-IPEC), Action against Child Labour: Lessons and Strategic Priorities for the 
Future (Geneva, 1997); Madiha Murshed, ’Unraveling Child Labor and Labor 
Legislation’, Journal of International Affairs, Fall 2001, Vol. 55, No. 1; Susan L. 
Bachman, ’The Political Economy of Child Labor and Its Impacts on International 
Business’, Business Economics, July 2000, Vol. 35, No. 3; Rijk van Haarlem, ’The 
BGMEA/ILO/UNICEF Child Labor Project In The Garment Industry, Bangladesh: 
Lessons Learned’, presentation af symposium, Stanford University, California, 
February 7-8, 2001; at www.childlabor.org, accessed April 11, 2003; Samuel Grumiau, 
Garments “Made in Bangladesh”. The Social Reality Behind the Label (Brussels: 
ICFTU, 2000); Jay R. Mandle, ’The Student Anti-Sweatshop Movement: Limits and 
Potential’, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
AAPSS, 570, July 2000; M. Zahoor Awan, ’Pakistan: From denial to awareness and 
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justifiable decision on where to invest my efforts: in all of that which 
preceded these arguably important aspects of reality.  
 
1.4 CSR and the three agreements 
 
The three agreements will be characterized in further detail shortly. In 
order to better characterize these, let us briefly look at the broader shift of 
                                                                                                                           
action’ in Bjørne Grimsrud (ed.), The Next Steps: Experiences and analysis of how to 
eradicate child labour (Norway: Fafo/Centraltrykkeriet AS, 2002); Munir Quddus, 
’Child Labor and Global Business: Lessons from the Apparel Industry in Bangladesh’, 
Journal of Asian Business, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1999; M. M. Rahman, R. Khanam and N. U. 
Absar, ’Child Labor in Bangladesh: A Critical Appraisal of Harkin’s Bill and the 
MOU-Type Schooling Program’, Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 33, No. 4, 
December 1999; Brent McClintock, ’Trade as if children mattered’, International 
Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 28, No. 10/11/12, 2001; UNICEF, The State of the 
World’s Children 1997 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Save the Children, 
Big Business, Small Hands: Responsible Approaches to Child Labour (London: Save 
the Children Fund, 2000), pp. 38-42; David Husselbee, ’NGOs as development partners 
to the corporates: child football stitchers in Pakistan’, Development in Practice, Vol. 
10, No. 3 & 4, August 2000; Saadia Toor, ’Child Labor in Pakistan: Coming of Age in 
the New World Order’, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, AAPSS, 575, May 2001; Samuel Poos, The football industry: From Child 
Labour to Workers’ Rights (at www.cleanclothes.org, accessed March 1, 2002); Gary 
Gereffi, Ronie Garcia-Johnson and Erika Sasser, ’The NGO-Industrial Complex’, 
Foreign Policy, July/August 2001; Kiran Mehra-Kerpelman, ’Playing fair and still 
winning’, World of Work, No. 25, Juny/July 1998; International Labour Office, A 
Future without Child Labour: Global Report under the Follow-up to the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, Report of the Director-
General, International Labour Conference, 90th Session, 2002, Report I (B) (Geneva: 
International Labour Office, 2002); Robert J. Liubicic, ’Corporate codes of conduct and 
product labelling schemes: The limits and possibilities of promoting international labor 
rights through private initiatives’, Law and Policy in International Business, Fall 1998; 
Rob van Tulder and Ans Kolk, ’Multinationality and Corporate Ethics: Codes of 
Conduct in the Sporting Goods Industry’, Journal of International Business Studies, 
Vol. 32, No. 2, 2001; International Labour Organization, Sectoral Activites 
Programme, Labour practices in the footwear, leather, textiles and clothing industries, 
Report for discussion at the Tripartite Meeting on Labour Practices in the Footwear, 
Leather, Textiles and Clothing Industries, Geneva, 2000 (Geneva: International Labour 
Office, 2000); International Labour Office and UNICEF, From Stitching to School; 
International Labour Office and UNICEF, Addressing Child Labour in the Bangladesh 
Garment Industry 1995-2001: A synthesis of UNICEF and ILO evaluation studies of 
the Bangladesh garment sector projects (Geneva/New York: International Labour 
Office/UNICEF, 2004). 
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which they were not merely illustrative, but indeed played an important 
role in shaping.  
 
Situating the three agreements 
 
Among critics and advocates of CSR alike, there is widespread agreement 
that one of the most visible features of the shift in corporate responsibility 
was the spread of voluntary codes of conduct and ethical guidelines. These 
were not an invention of the 1990s, but during the early 1990s the 
promulgation of individual company codes slowly began picking up pace, 
with Levi Strauss and Reebok often mentioned as the pioneers.18 In the 
mid-1990s there was a literal spur of codes, and the development of multi-
party codes and similar instruments by non-industry actors started 
becoming more visible and significant.19 In the mid-1990s, monitoring and 
verification became an increasingly important aspect of the debate as well 
as the concrete initiatives, and there was a related growth in the number of 
companies engaging in social and environmental reporting.20  
 
In the second half of the 1990s, notions of “stakeholder dialogue” and 
“public-private partnerships” had become increasingly prominent in the 
discourse, and there were growing signs of an emerging institutionalization 
of CSR: ‘However interpreted, the broad idea of ‘voluntary’ mechanisms 
to regulate business behaviour is winning support from policy-makers in 
national governments and intergovernmental organizations, underpinned 
by the assumption that firms are capable of policing themselves in the 
absence of binding international and national law to regulate corporate 
                                          
18 Cf. Jem Bendell, Barricades and Boardrooms: A Contemporary History of the 
Corporate Accountability Movement, UNRISD Technology, Business and Society 
Programme Paper Number 13 (Geneva: UNRISD, 2004); Oliver F. Williams (ed.), 
Global Codes of Conduct: An Idea Whose Time has Come (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2000); Michael K. Addo (ed.), Human Rights Standards and the 
Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1999). 
 
19 Cf. Bendell, Barricades and Boardrooms. 
 
20 See e.g. contributions in John V. Mitchell (ed.), Companies in a World of Conflict: 
NGOs, Sanctions and Corporate Responsibility (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs/Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1998). 
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behaviour.’21 In the very late 1990s these developments culminated – in the 
eyes of some – in the announcement by UN General Secretary Kofi Annan 
of the UN Global Compact.22 There was also, however, a growing 
skepticism toward – and criticism of – CSR as an increasingly dominant 
manifestation of corporate responsibility and as a modality of governing 
societal concerns.23  
 
In this rough picture of the developments, the Bangladesh MOU – the 
agreement being signed in mid-1995 and the controversy erupting in late 
1992 – was clearly situated in the early stages of the shift, and it did not 
take the form of a code of conduct. The Atlanta Agreement, in turn, was 
announced in the wake of the spur of codes and the “Year of the 
Sweatshops”. It did not take the form of a code of conduct either – but it 
came into existence shortly after FIFA and international trade unions had 
agreed to the so-called FIFA Code of Labour Practice. The AIP/FLA 
Agreement, in contrast, was one of the most prominent multi-party code 
initiatives at the time. Having been formally established in mid-1996, the 
task force negotiated at a time when a considerable number of both 
individual and multiparty codes were in existence and in the process of 
being developed.  
 
Hence, we may situate the three processes and agreements historically with 
respect to some of the major developments in CSR in the 1990s, as 
illustrated below. The three arrows pointing to the agreements are intended 
to illustrate the duration of the processes leading to these. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
21 Blowfield and Frynas, ‘Setting new agendas’, p. 502. Cf. also Bendell, Barricades 
and Boardrooms, p. 16. 
 
22 John G. Ruggie, ’The Theory and Practice of Learning Networks: Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Global Compact’ in Journal of Corporate Citizenship, Issue 5, 
Spring 2002; John G. Ruggie, Remarks on the Global Compact to the NGO 
Community, Speech, March 13, 2000, Geneva (at www.unglobalcompact.org, accessed 
on June 2, 2002). Cf. also Peter Utting, Rethinking Business Regulation. 
 
23 See e.g. Bendell, Barricades and Boardrooms, pp. 17-18; Christian Aid, Behind the 
mask. 
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Figure 1.1 CSR and the three agreements: a rough timeline 
 
 
 
 
As far as monitoring and verification, which became a prominent issue in 
the mid-1990s, was concerned, it is worth noticing that the Bangladesh 
MOU actually preceded the agreement of late 1995 by the GAP to allow 
for independent monitoring of its facilities in Central America. Moreover, 
the MoU was the first time that the ILO became involved in this type of 
activity, and it was the first instance of large-scale collaboration between 
the ILO and UNICEF of this kind. The Atlanta Agreement subsequently 
saw the replication in adjusted form of the main elements of the MOU. 
Monitoring and verification was also a key issue in the AIP/FLA 
Agreement and process, the negotiations occurring at a time when the 
debate had evolved and the strife surrounding internal vs. external and 
“independent” was much more pronounced. 
 
The MOU 
 
On the 4th of July, 1995 - after more than two and a half years of 
controversy and going to and from the negotiating table – a Memorandum 
of Understanding (the MOU) concerning child labor in the Bangladeshi 
garment industry was signed by the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers 
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and Exporters Association (BGMEA), UNICEF Bangladesh, and the 
International Labour Office (ILO) Bangladesh.  
 
Briefly put, the MOU entailed a phasing out of child labor in the garment 
industry, where all underage workers - defined as those who had not 
attained 14 years of age - were to be taken from their work and placed in 
schools on or before October 31, 1995. As envisaged by the parties, 
external funding subsequently flowed from the U.S. Department of Labor 
through the ILO’s International Programme on the Elimination of Child 
Labour (IPEC), and the MOU consisted of four key components: 
 
- An initial fact-finding survey to identify the child workers. In 
relation to this, the agreement stipulated ‘that no underaged workers 
be terminated before the survey can be completed.’ The survey, to 
be funded by UNICEF and the BGMEA, was to be conducted by 
survey teams to be established by the BGMEA, and the agreement 
allowed representatives of UNICEF, the ILO, and the U.S. Embassy 
in Bangladesh to accompany these teams; 
 
- A special education component to be arranged by UNICEF in 
cooperation with local NGOs and in consultation with Bangladeshi 
authorities. UNICEF would contribute USD 175,000 in 1995 and 
additional funds later, whereas the BGMEA would contribute USD 
50,000 per year; 
 
- An income maintenance component, which - primarily through 
stipends of what was then approximately USD 7 per month - was to 
compensate (in part) for the lost income of the child workers that 
were to be terminated. The ILO would ‘contribute a portion of the 
funds under the expanded IPEC action programme’, whereas the 
BGMEA would ‘contribute 50 percent of the cost of such stipends 
up to a maximum of USD 250,000 per year for three years’; 
 
- A monitoring and verification component led by the ILO, providing 
additional technical assistance and financial support of initially USD 
250,000. While the agreement stated that verification ‘may involve 
unannounced factory visits’, it contained no language on violations 
and sanctioning mechanisms. 
 
The MOU was novel in several respects. To begin with, the MOU was the 
first time that an entire industry entered into a partnership with two 
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intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to eliminate child labor and 
provide alternatives for the displaced children.24 Moreover, it was the first 
‘first large-scale collaboration between the ILO and UNICEF in the 
elimination of child labour.’25 Subsequently, UNICEF and the ILO 
announced an intention to cooperate more, and a number of similar 
partnerships involving the two have been formed - replicating, with 
modifications, the Bangladesh program in a number of other contexts, 
including the Atlanta Agreement described below.26 
 
The MOU was also novel in two ways as far as another key feature is 
concerned, the monitoring and verification component. In this respect the 
MOU actually preceded some of the “groundbreaking” agreements and 
thereby much of the subsequent debate over independent monitoring.27 
Moreover, the MOU was the first time that the ILO (through the ILO-
IPEC) accepted to become involved in monitoring and verification in this 
way. 
 
The absence of trade unions and labor rights organizations of any kind was 
also noteworthy, the noteworthiness relating less to any novelty than to the 
similarity of absence which was characteristic of many other “new” 
partnerships and agreements, including the Atlanta Agreement and to some 
extent also the AIP/FLA Preliminary Agreement. 
 
Obviously, the “traditional” approach to child labor - characterized by an 
emphasis on international standard-setting and technical assistance through 
                                          
24 International Labour Organisation, International Programme on the Elimination of 
Child Labour (ILO-IPEC), 15 examples of Selected Successful Action Programmes (at 
www.ilo.org, accessed on September 8, 2001). 
 
25 International Labour Office and UNICEF, Addressing Child Labour in the 
Bangladesh Garment Industry 1995-2001, pp. 16-17. 
 
26 See e.g. International Labour Organisation, International Programme on the 
Elimination of Child Labour (ILO-IPEC), Pakistan - IPEC successfully applies model 
programme in football-making industry (at www.ilo.org, accessed on September 8, 
2001). 
 
27 For example, the agreement (of December 1995) between The GAP and the National 
Labor Committee over independent monitoring in El Salvador is often highlighted as 
being the first time that a US apparel company agreed to independent monitoring. See 
e.g., Kitty Krupat, ‘From War Zone to Free Trade Zone: A History of the National 
Labor Committee’ in Andrew Ross (ed.), No Sweat: Fashion, Free Trade, and the 
Rights of Garment Workers (New York: Verso, 1997). 
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the ILO and national legislation and enforcement by national governments 
- was not rendered obsolete by the MOU and similar initiatives. Quite the 
contrary, the MOU and similar initiatives by and large concerned the 
enforcement gap, i.e., the gap between the standards and reality. A marked 
difference between the traditional approach and these initiatives, however, 
lay in the way in which the responsibility for enforcement, both 
normatively and practically, was distributed - towards a much lower 
emphasis on the nation-state and a much greater responsibility on other 
societal actors, most notably corporations. In the process, however, the 
MOU actually went beyond international law in terms of not allowing the 
older children to perform light work.  
 
The MOU in itself did not, in turn, redefine the boundaries of the 
responsibility of the international buyers, although the process did play an 
important role in relation to a number of specific companies as well as 
more broadly in relation to the emerging wave of codes of conduct. The 
MOU in formal terms focused instead on the local industry. More than 
anything, however, the MOU entailed a shift from condoning practices 
which were illegal under national and international laws towards 
emphasizing compliance with these. This, I would argue, was a central 
characteristic of many CSR initiatives - and yet CSR was and is very often 
defined and characterized as something moving or being “beyond the law.” 
As for the scope of the MOU, it was quite comprehensive in the sense of 
incorporating components aimed at addressing the underlying causes of 
child labor as well as the consequences of eliminating this. At the same 
time, however, the MOU was also very narrow and limited: it covered only 
the Bangladeshi garment industry and only the formal sector BGMEA 
members - thus excluding not only thousands of clothing workshops in 
Bangladesh but also the vast majority of child laborers in Bangladesh, 
many of whom were in much worse situations - and moreover it did not 
include any of the other basic labor rights issues.28 In these respects, the 
MOU was similar in kind to a number of “focused” initiatives (and served 
to inform many of these), but different from e.g. codes of conduct, which 
tend to operate with different inclusions and exclusions. 
 
                                          
28 For a critique of the MOU, see e.g. Grumiau, Garments “Made in Bangladesh”. 
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The Atlanta Agreement 
 
As mentioned above, this agreement was backed by the World Federation 
of the Sporting Goods Industry (WFSGI) and the vast majority of the 
world’s soccer ball-“producing” sporting goods companies. The agreement 
was formally signed on February 14, 1997, by the Sialkot Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (SCCI), the ILO and UNICEF.  
 
With the stated aims of eliminating ‘the practice of stitching by children 
under 14 years within 18 months’ and of ensuring that this ‘does not create 
new and potentially more serious dangers to the affected children or their 
families’, the Agreement established a project consisting of the two 
programs mentioned earlier. 
 
The Prevention and Monitoring Program involved both internal and 
external compliance and verification elements. The technical advice and 
support for this Program was to be provided by the ILO. Manufacturers 
were to be invited to join this voluntary program which, for the 
participating manufacturers, entailed that they agreed to: 
 
- a required formal registration of all contractors, all stitching 
locations (to be identifiable and open to unannounced inspection 
visits), and all stitchers (including documentation verifying the age 
of stitchers); 
 
- establish an internal monitoring system, to designate a senior 
manager as responsible, and to provide training of employees 
involved in this function; 
 
- independent third party verification of their compliance with the 
Program. The Independent Monitoring Body was to provide periodic 
reports to the Coordinating Committee and to the WFSGI, and the 
reports ‘shall be made public.’ 
  
The Social Protection Program, in turn, committed the Partners to develop 
a series of initiatives:  
 
- a rehabilitation initiative to place the children under 14 years 
removed from the industry into appropriate education programs; 
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- an educational initiative to discourage children from becoming child 
workers; 
 
- an in-kind assistance initiative to provide in-kind assistance to 
children involved in education programs; 
 
- an awareness-raising initiative aimed at various local 
constituencies; 
 
- an income generation initiative to enable families of former child 
workers to replace the lost income, including through replacing 
these child workers with older family members. 
 
The project was initially estimated to cost a little over USD 1,000,000 over 
the first two years. The main share was to be provided by the ILO’s USD 
500,000 in IPEC programmatic funds, contributed by the U.S. 
Government. UNICEF, in turn, pledged USD 200,000 in funding, whereas 
the Soccer Industry Council of America agreed to contribute USD 100,000 
to support the Social Protection Program. Finally, all costs associated with 
the development and implementation of the Prevention and Monitoring 
Program was to be borne by the participating manufacturers, an amount 
estimated to total USD 360,000 over the following two years.29  
 
The fact that the Atlanta Agreement showed a strong resemblance to the 
Bangladesh MOU was not coincidental. The MOU did become a model, 
and the Atlanta Agreement drew considerably on the lessons and solutions 
from Bangladesh: ‘[The MOU] has served as an important model and its 
major elements have been applied and replicated elsewhere in other export 
sectors. A case in point is the soccer ball stitching industry in Pakistan that 
followed a similar agreement in 1997.’30 Many of the above characteristics 
thus apply to the Atlanta Agreement as well, with a few minor differences: 
 
- Again, UNICEF and the ILO partnered with a local industry 
association; neither trade unions nor labor rights organizations were 
parties to the agreement;  
 
- The Atlanta Agreement also included an independent monitoring 
component, again with the ILO in charge; unlike the MOU, 
                                          
29 International Labour Office, ILO unites. 
 
30 International Labour Office and UNICEF, Addressing Child Labour, p. 18. 
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however, it also placed a pronounced emphasis on internal 
monitoring; 
 
- Again, a sizeable share of the funding for the initiative came from 
the U.S. government through the ILO-IPEC; 
 
- The Atlanta Agreement, too, embodied a shift from illegality to 
legality and a going beyond international law in terms of not 
allowing older children to perform light work;  
 
- It too placed the local manufacturing industry in focus, with the 
Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industry as a formal partner to 
the agreement, and with the local manufacturers as participants and 
partially funding the project. As in the MOU, the international 
buyers were not directly partners to the agreement. However, SICA 
did contribute funds for the project, and in this case the WFSGI and 
the international buyers were intricately involved in the process 
leading to the Atlanta Agreement, and they publicly supported and 
publicized it; 
 
- Again the scope of the initiative i) covered a geographically limited, 
local manufacturing industry, and ii) it was a narrow agreement in 
the sense that it was focused on child labor and did not include other 
basic labor rights.  
 
The AIP/FLA Agreement 
 
The so-called White House Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP) was an 
anti-sweatshop task force consisting of a small number of private actors. 
Announced by U.S. President Bill Clinton in early August of 1996, the task 
force was given two mandates by the President:  
 
‘First, they will take additional steps to ensure that the products they make 
and sell are manufactured under decent and humane working conditions. 
Second, they will develop options to inform consumers that the products 
they buy are not produced under those exploitative conditions.’31  
                                          
31 President Clinton at the Rose Garden ceremony on August 2, 1996; cited from  
Thomas A. Hemphill, ‘The White House Apparel Industry Partnership Agreement: Will 
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On April 14, 1997, the AIP members presented the Apparel Industry 
Partnership’s Agreement – referred to as the AIP Agreement – on a 
Workplace Code of Conduct as well as Principles of Monitoring. This 
agreement was only a first step, and the task force was to continue working 
on a final agreement.  
 
The so-called Preliminary Agreement of November 2, 1998, henceforth the 
AIP/FLA Agreement (as distinct from the April 1997 AIP Agreement), 
was reached by a subgroup of task force members: representatives of Nike, 
Phillips Van Heusen, Reebok, Liz Claiborne, Business for Social 
Responsibility, the International Labor Rights Fund, the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, the National Consumers League, and the 
Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights. Three other task 
force members - the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile 
Employees (UNITE) and the Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store 
Union (RWDSU) of the AFL-CIO as well as the Interfaith Center on 
Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) – rejected the Agreement, joining the 
massive choir of criticism that soon followed.  
 
The AIP/FLA Agreement basically comprised a Workplace Code of 
Conduct, a set of Principles of Monitoring, and an agreement to establish 
the Fair Labor Association (the FLA). 
 
The Workplace Code of Conduct (the Code) went significantly further 
than the voluntary industry code adopted earlier in 1998 by the U.S. 
industry association, the American Apparel Manufacturers Association 
(AAMA), the so-called Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production 
(WRAP) principles. The latter were formulated in very general terms 
compared to the AIP/FLA Code, mentioning neither collective bargaining 
nor overtime compensation, and requiring wages and working hours to be 
in accordance with the local legal minimum or maximum, respectively. 
The AIP/FLA Code, in turn, included ‘all internationally recognized labor 
rights […]’32 The Code contained provisions prohibiting the use of forced 
labor and of child labor (no employment of persons younger than 15 – or 
                                                                                                                           
Self-Regulation Be Successful?’ in Business and Society Review, Vol. 140, No. 2 
(Summer), 1999, pp. 123-124. 
 
32 International Labor Rights Fund, Assessment of the Fair Labor Association 
Agreement of November 2, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: ILRF, 1998). 
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14 where local and international law allow – or younger than the age of 
completing compulsory education), harassment and abuse, and 
discrimination, and it also contained health and safety requirements.  
 
More specifically, let us briefly review the Code’s requirements 
concerning freedom of association and collective bargaining, wages, hours 
of work, and overtime compensation: 
 
- Freedom of association and collective bargaining: Requiring 
employers to recognize and respect the right of employees to 
freedom of association and to collective bargaining, the Code 
contained special country provisions to ‘hold companies and their 
subsidiaries, contractors and subcontractors accountable for 
recognizing worker organization for the purpose of collective 
bargaining, and for not collaborating in official or unofficial 
suppression of such worker organizations.’33 While one of the 
nonindustry parties to the agreement, the International Labor Rights 
Fund (the ILRF), listed this as one of the strengths of the AIP/FLA 
Code, and while this was going further than the AAMA’s WRAP 
principles, the ILRF also listed as one of the Code’s weaknesses the 
fact that it ‘does not force companies to leave a country where laws 
don’t respect freedom of association, although actual production in 
that country must meet the standards of the FLA for the company to 
be certified.’34 Indeed, the special country provisions were soft and 
vague, compared to a mid-1998 proposal by some of the labor and 
NGO task force members: ‘If, despite the best efforts of employers 
to adhere to these and other appropriate special guidelines approved 
by the Association, no Participating Company is able to demonstrate 
progress toward implementation of those provisions of the Code 
addressed by the country guidelines, the Association shall determine 
whether production under such circumstances is consistent with the 
Workplace Code and Principles of Monitoring.’35  
 
                                          
33 International Labor Rights Fund, Assessment. 
 
34 International Labor Rights Fund, Assessment. 
 
35 Cited from Alan Howard, ‘Why Unions Can’t Support the Apparel Industry 
Sweatshop Code’ in Working USA, July/August 1999, p. 41. 
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- Wages: The Code required companies to pay the legal minimum 
wage or the prevailing industry wage, whichever was higher. The 
payment of a sustainable living wage was not stipulated in the Code. 
Instead, the living wage issue was to be addressed later on in a 
review of a study to be conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor 
of ‘prevailing wages, minimum wages and poverty lines in the 
garment and footwear-producing countries.’36 Again, while the 
AIP/FLA agreement went further than the WRAP principles, the 
inclusion by postponement of the living wage issue in somewhat 
vague terms was a compromise too weak for some of the task force 
members. The Workers Rights Consortium (WRC), established in 
the wake of the AIP/FLA agreement, in turn defined and included a 
requirement to pay a living wage.37 
 
- Hours of work: The Code limited work to 60 hours per week 
(including a maximum of 12 hours overtime) or to the legal 
maximum, whichever was the lower. Again, this went beyond the 
WRAP principles’ stipulations of legal limits, of particular relevance 
in countries where the law established no limit at all, such as the 
U.S. The WRC went still further, though, setting the weekly 
maximum at 48 hours, with overtime being voluntary. 
 
- Overtime Compensation: The Code required that overtime 
compensation be at least the normal rate of pay. While the WRAP 
principles did not include mention of this point, the WRC stipulated 
an overtime compensation rate of at least 1.5 times the normal 
hourly rate. 
 
The Principles of Monitoring (the Principles) provided, in quite elaborate 
terms, for a two-tier system of internal and external compliance monitoring 
and reporting, with the Fair Labor Association (FLA) undertaking a range 
of related functions. Internal monitoring, the plans for which required the 
FLA’s approval, was to cover all applicable facilities over a period of two 
years. Factories, where less than 10 per cent of the production was for the 
                                          
36 International Labor Rights Fund, Assessment. 
 
37 For a comparison of the WRAP principles, the AIP/FLA agreement, and the WRC, 
see Rhys Jenkins, ‘The political economy of codes of conduct’ in  Jenkins, Pearson and 
Seyfang (eds.), Corporate Responsibility and Labour Rights: Codes of Conduct in the 
Global Economy (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2002). 
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participating brand or company, were not applicable. Findings were to be 
reported to the FLA along with accounts of how the problems had been 
remedied. The internal monitors were moreover required to consult with 
local human rights, labor and community groups in the process.  
 
As for the external monitoring, the agreement required that the FLA be 
provided with a complete list of the applicable facilities, and – while the 
participating companies were allowed to nominate factories for external 
monitoring – the FLA was furthermore to determine which facilities were 
to be externally monitored. Not surprisingly, however, internal monitoring 
was to do most of the job: the agreement required 30 per cent of applicable 
facilities to be subject to external monitoring over an initial period of two 
or three years. Thereafter the sample of facilities would be 10 per cent 
annually. Subject to a reassessment by the FLA of the necessary level of 
external monitoring based on the first years of experience, the latter 
percentile could then be adjusted downward to no less than 5 and upward 
to not more than 15 per cent. In the words of one of the parties to the 
agreement, the ILRF, this implied that potentially ’85% of applicable 
facilities are without external monitoring in any one year […].’38 Or, as a 
representative of UNITE (that left the task force) put it, this meant that ‘a 
company could be declared in compliance with the code even though 
nobody outside the company had inspected 95 percent of its facilities.’39  
 
The agreement furthermore required that this external monitoring be 
conducted by organizations accredited by the FLA, and that the FLA be 
provided a copy of the contract between the monitoring organization and 
the company. Moreover, the companies were allowed to select and pay the 
external monitors directly, something for which the agreement was 
subsequently criticized. Again, UNITE’s Alan Howard captured the 
concerns of many critics: ‘And who are these external monitors? The same 
accounting firms companies have been hiring all along to monitor the 
internal company systems routinely declared to be working just fine. The 
difference now is that the companies will report the findings of these 
monitors to an Association in which they have veto power over the most 
critical decisions.’40 
                                          
38 International Labor Rights Fund, Assessment. 
 
39 Howard, ‘Why Unions Can’t Support’, p. 42. 
 
40 Howard, ‘Why Unions Can’t Support’, p. 42. 
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The Fair Labor Association, in terms of basic structure, was to be 
established as a non-profit entity, with a governance structure balancing 
the number of industry and non-governmental organization representatives 
on the Board of Directors, with a mutually acceptable Chair. A system of 
super-majority voting was agreed upon, implying that the votes of two-
thirds of both industry and non-industry Board members were required to 
make basic changes. On the one hand, this made drastic changes very 
unlikely, thus not only assuring participating companies against a 
wholesale transformation of the requirements, but also assuring against a 
subsequent roll-back of the requirements already stipulated in the 
agreement. On the other hand, the super-majority rule also gave ‘any three 
companies or three groups the ability to block action on key questions 
[…]’41  
 
Unlike the two agreements above, the AIP/FLA Agreement was not a time-
limited “elimination” of a given problem. Rather, the Code, the system of 
monitoring, and the establishment of the FLA, as opposed to the setting up 
of a temporary project coordination committee, were parts of an agreement 
intended to be an on-going and running solution to existing and future 
problems. This, of course, was a quite significant difference between the 
AIP/FLA Agreement and the two described above. A difference not only 
setting the potential implications of these respective agreements apart, it 
was also a difference which might be said to apply more broadly to the 
world of CSR initiatives: the circumscribed and (intendedly) final solutions 
to specific problems and the broader and usually more prescriptive 
principles for practice and conduct that we know from codes and 
guidelines. 
 
As far as the actors included were concerned, unlike the two agreements 
above, no intergovernmental or governmental entity was a party to it. 
There was, however, an explicit mandate from the U.S. President to the 
task force. Moreover, the Clinton Administration supported the task force 
during the process, and once more the U.S. Department of Labor was 
involved in the background. Trade unions were part of the task force but, 
again, conspicuously absent in the end as parties to the Agreement and in 
the Board of Directors of the FLA: with organized labor refusing to sign on 
                                          
41 Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Interfaith Center on Corporate 
Responsibility’s Analysis: White House Apparel Industry Partnership Agreement, Nov. 
3, 1998 (New York: ICCR, press release, November, 1998). 
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to the Agreement, the ILRF was the only of the NGO parties to the 
Agreement that I would characterize as a labor rights NGO.  
 
Unlike the two earlier agreements, moreover, major international brands 
were formally parties to the Agreement and clearly centrally involved; 
smaller companies were also represented in the task force, but none of 
them were part of the subgroup negotiating and agreeing to the Preliminary 
Agreement. Thus, in this Agreement it was the boundaries of the 
responsibility of the international buyers that were explicitly shifting, and 
in this sense, of course, the ‘going beyond the law’ phrase is obviously a 
relevant and central characteristic of this Agreement, as it is of CSR more 
broadly.  
 
However, once more I will maintain that the shift from illegality to legality 
in labor practices, in the potential ramifications of Agreement, was an 
equally significant characteristic. Finally, the intention of the parties, of 
course, was that a growing number of apparel companies would become 
participating companies, through the FLA, and that organized labor would 
eventually join in again. In that sense the initial group of partners to the 
Agreement – while not irrelevant to an analysis seeking to explain it – was, 
of course, open rather than fixed. 
 
Like the two other agreements, the requirements set in the Code in some 
respects went beyond international law, for instance on child labor. 
Whether this applied to all of the standards in the Code, however, is 
debatable, as illustrated in the following quote on the living wage issue, 
which was a central matter in the process:  
 
‘Some workers’ rights are very controversial. There is debate, for example, 
as to whether business should be required to pay a “living wage” to its 
employees or (as many standards say) only the legal minimum in the 
country or prevailing industry wage, whichever is the higher. These may 
be lower than a living wage. Opponents argue that it is impossible to 
define the living wage, especially across borders. Nevertheless, a human 
rights perspective leads inevitably towards it. The Universal Declaration 
(Article 25) recognises that: “everyone has the right to a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including 
food, clothing, housing and medical care.” Article 23 speaks of “just and 
favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence 
worthy of human dignity”, while Article 7(a)(ii) of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights refers to a wage which 
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provides “a decent living for themselves and their families”, basing this on 
the minimum conditions of life provided for in the convention itself.’42 
 
As for the scope of the Agreement, the earlier description of the Code 
provides an excellent illustration of the characteristics of the Code: it 
included more issues and it went substantively further than many other 
codes did at the time. Yet, in the eyes of many it could and should have 
gone further.  
 
Compared to the MOU and the Atlanta Agreement (and many other 
“focused” initiatives), moreover, the AIP/FLA Agreement in its Code 
included a much broader range of labor rights issues on the one hand. On 
the other, the requirements in the Code were comparatively shallower in 
the sense of not including provisions and requirements aimed at resolving 
underlying or deeper problems and potential consequences of the 
provisions and requirements set forth. For instance, with regards to child 
labor, the Code “merely” established a prohibition, but it contained no 
language on those additional aspects so central to the two agreements 
above – aspects reflecting the concerns and lessons which appear so 
important in other similar agreements and much of the discourse 
surrounding these and, more broadly, child labor. Similarly, the Code 
prohibited discrimination, but it included nothing on underlying structural 
issues in relation to e.g. women workers.  
 
Moreover, unlike the MOU and the Atlanta Agreement, the AIP/FLA 
Agreement was not confined to a specific geographical location. Quite the 
contrary, although being negotiated by a task force in the U.S., it was 
global in the scope of its potential implications for working conditions in 
facilities across the globe. Moreover, as mentioned, the Agreement was not 
limited to the initial industry partners to it, but was open to many more 
companies wishing to sign up with the FLA.  
 
As for the monitoring and verification element, the combination of internal 
and external, third party monitoring and verification was much more 
elaborate, but basically similar to two agreements above. As noted, 
however, the AIP/FLA was essentially open-ended in terms of time and 
                                          
42 International Council on Human Rights Policy, Beyond Voluntarism: Human rights 
and the developing international legal obligations of companies (Versoix, Switzerland: 
ICHRP, 2002), pp. 30-31. 
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geography and, therefore, markedly different not merely in terms of the 
sheer number of the facilities to be monitored.43 
 
1.5 Outline 
 
In chapter 2, Philosophy of science and social science, central issues within 
philosophy of science and basic questions in social science are addressed, 
as I endeavor to account for my deliberations and decisions, their 
circumstances and consequences for the research undertaken.  
 
In chapter 3, Methodology and the research process, I endeavor to provide 
an account similar to that of chapter 2, only in this chapter I focus on 
issues of a methodological nature. The chapter contains a discussion of the 
case study approach, both in general and in the concrete research project at 
hand. This is followed by a description of the data collection and analysis 
and a section on the research process. 
 
Chapter 4, A theoretical framework, opens with a condensed review of the 
regime theory literature. In the following sections I specify the theoretical 
elements within each of the broader categories: the specific preconditions 
and the processes and interaction. In the final section I summarize the 
explanatory framework.  
 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 contain the in-depth analyses of the three agreements. 
Each chapter opens with a short introduction, followed by an analysis of 
the specific preconditions in each case at the beginning of the process – the 
characteristics of the industry, the characteristics of the existing framework 
of governance (including prevailing norms and practices of corporate 
responsibility), and the characteristics of the problem. Before analyzing the 
processes, I then provide a detailed and chronologically ordered, 
tentatively descriptive overview of each process. The subsequent part of 
the empirical analyses focus on different aspects of the processes leading 
up to the agreements: the struggles to define the problem, targeting, 
economic coercion, and the modelling of the solution.  
 
Finally, in chapter 8 the conclusions are presented. Annex I, after the 
Bibliography, contains a list of interviews conducted. 
                                          
43 The AIP/FLA Agreement was also very elaborate and detailed on the monitoring 
part, compared to the MOU and the Atlanta Agreement. In the latter two cases, the 
detailed terms of reference were laid out later. 
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2. Philosophy of science and social science 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In the example used by Djurfeldt, the Swedish 19th Century philosopher 
Boström would ask his students whether the fire place in front of them was 
inside or outside of them. If the student claimed the fire place was outside 
of him, Boström would not approve as he believed the material world did 
not exist, that reality was identical to God and his ideas.44 Posing questions 
and providing responses to them, whether in a conversation about fire 
places or in a doctoral dissertation about corporate responsibility, are 
discursive events which are based on a range of more or less explicit 
premises. What is reality? Can we know it? Can we explain it? How?  
  
In the present chapter I present some of the more meta-theoretical 
foundations of this study, i.e. the ways in which I have chosen to deal with 
some of the big questions. My point of departure in the next section is 
made up of three basic premises from the critical realist philosophy of 
science. In section 2.3 I turn to questions concerning truth and knowledge. 
In sections 2.4 and 2.5 I will discuss two of the dualisms within the social 
sciences, the materialism-idealism dispute and the agent-structure problem 
(including the related levels-of-analysis matter), respectively. Section 2.6 
concerns ‘Causation, explanation and understanding’ and ends with a 
generic explanatory framework.  
 
2.2 Three basic premises 
 
During the first stage of this research process, considerable emphasis was 
deliberately placed upon philosophy of science. In particular critical 
realism and three basic premises (shortly below) forwarded by this 
                                          
44 Göran Djurfeldt, Boström och kaminen (Lund: Arkiv förlag, 1996). 
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tradition have been important in working through some of the 
philosophical and basic social science issues.45  
 
Briefly put, critical realism developed in the context of the major debates 
on philosophy of science during the 1960s and 70s as the hyper-naturalistic 
positivism that had dominated in the mid-20th century came under 
increasing attack. Particularly associated with the works of Roy Bhaskar 
and Rom Harré, critical realism emerged as a third way with its promises 
to be able to transcend the rivaling polar positions of positivism and 
hermeneutics/critical theory and combine and reconcile ontological 
realism, epistemological relativism and judgmental rationality.46 Bhaskar 
argues that both essentially share a positivist account of natural science 
that he argues to be false. In addition, hermeneutics is argued to operate 
with an implicitly empiricist ontology.47 Thus, critical realism proposes, in 
contrast to the empirical-analytical perspective, that actors’ accounts form 
the indispensable starting point in any social scientific inquiry. In contrast 
to hermeneutics, in turn, critical realism argues for an explicitly realist and 
‘deep’ ontology and for a judgmental rationality, i.e. that actors’ accounts 
are both limited and corrigible.48 Furthermore, in contrast to hermeneutics, 
critical realism insists on the necessity and possibility of causal 
explanations and a notion of causation, which, in contrast to the empirical-
analytical perspective, is based on the ontological depth above and on a 
subsequent rejection of actual regularities as the basis for causality.  
                                          
45 The term ‘critical realism’ arose from the combination and further development of 
two major parts of the work of Bhaskar – his ‘transcendental realist’ philosophy of 
(both natural and social) science and his ‘critical naturalist’ philosophy of social 
science, the latter sharing the basic ontological and epistemological premises of the 
former but contributing further to a specifically social ontology, epistemology and 
methodology, cf. Roy Bhaskar, ’General introduction’ in Archer et.al. (eds.), Critical 
Realism: Essential Readings (London: Routledge, 1998), p. ix. In addition, the term 
critical realism may include the theory of explanatory critique and the dialectics of 
Bhaskar. I use critical realism in reference to the three basic premises at the end of the 
present section. 
 
46 Bhaskar, ’General introduction’, p. xi; Peter Wad, ’Mellen enhedsvidenskab og 
flerhedsvidenskab,’ GRUS, vol. 21, no. 60, p. 10; Andrew Sayer, Realism and Social 
Science (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2000), p. 4. 
 
47 Bhaskar, ’General introduction’, pp. xii and xiv; Wad, ’Mellen enhedsvidenskab og 
flerhedsvidenskab’, p. 14. 
 
48 Bhaskar, ’General introduction’, p. xii. 
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Hence, critical realism portends to be a third way transcending or, at least, 
providing a strategy for moving beyond some of the fundamental disputes 
and dichotomies within the social sciences, i.e. the opposition of 
nomothetic and ideographic, the separation and opposition of explanation 
and understanding, and the objectivism-subjectivism divide.  
 
Critical realism rests on three basic ontological premises:  
 
- World Independence: the ontological, intransitive dimension of 
being exists outside, before and independently of and is not 
reducible to the epistemological, transitive dimension of knowing;  
 
- Stratification of reality: reality is stratified/layered in three domains: 
the real, the actual, and the empirical;  
 
- Transfactuality of mechanisms: generative mechanisms are 
transfactual, i.e. they exist as real phenomena irrespective of their 
being actualized or unactualized (the actual), perceived or not 
perceived (the empirical).  
 
In the following sections, as I move closer towards the actual 
conceptualization and methodological considerations, these three relatively 
abstract premises and their potential and actual implications for the present 
dissertation will be illustrated and discussed in further detail. 
 
2.3 Truth and knowledge 
 
As mentioned above, the intransitive dimension is held to exist outside, 
before and independently of the transitive dimension.49 The former 
includes the latter but is not reducible to it, and conflating the two, i.e. 
                                          
49 Bhaskar, ’General introduction’, p. xi. As Ougaard notes, this is a philosophical point 
of departure which is impossible to prove right, but which may nevertheless be 
justified; Morten Ougaard, ‘Det kommer an på hvor man begynder: Roy Bhaskars 
kritiske realisme som erkendelsesteoretisk strategi’ in GRUS, vol. 21, no. 60, 2000, p. 
21. Bhaskar’s justification is that in order for science to be possible, intransitive objects 
must exist, and, given that science is possible, there must be an intransitive domain; 
Roy Bhaskar, ‘Philosophy’ in Archer et.al. (eds.), Critical Realism: Essential Readings 
(London: Routledge, 1998), p. 23. 
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reducing the question of what is to the questions of what we know and how 
we can know it, is to commit ‘the epistemic fallacy.’50  
 
The distinction between these two dimensions leads to two key questions. 
The first question has to do with the ontological distinction and its validity 
in the social domain, i.e. to what extent do social forms exist outside, 
before and independently of the human perceptions, activities and practices 
on which they rely for their reproduction? Social science is different from 
natural science, not because society is less real than nature, but because 
society is characterized by three particular kinds of emergence: a) in 
contrast to the structures of nature, social structures depend on the very 
activities and practices that they produce and inform; b) social structures 
depend on human actors’ perceptions of their own practices and their 
conditions; c) social structures are less permanent, i.e. more temporally and 
spatially limited, than are those of nature.51 To hold that a social reality 
exists outside and independently of our perception of it, however, does not 
amount to a claim that society exists independently of human cognition 
and practice. The point is simply that social phenomena are not just in our 
heads and that they may exist regardless of whether we study them or not, 
regardless of what we may think of them, etc. This is different from the 
position that perceptions, including social science theories, cannot 
influence the social – clearly, they can. 
 
The second matter is how do we handle the “epistemological problem” 
arising from the recognition that there are real objects, that our perception 
of these is not identical to them, and that our perception of them is 
concept-dependent? In a simple form, Djurfeldt illustrates the 
epistemological problem in this way (where S is the subject, “O” is the 
subject’s perception of O, and O is the object): 
 
Figure 2.1 The epistemological problem52 
 
 
                                          
50 Bhaskar, ’General introduction’, p. xii. 
 
51 Peter Wad, ’Kritisk realisme’ in GRUS, vol. 21, no. 60, p. 58. 
 
52 From Djurfeldt, Boström och kaminen, p. 14. 
S  →  “O”  ⎪  O 
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Critical realism highlights the epistemological problem and, because of its 
realist ontology, promises53 an approach to epistemological relativism that 
neither empiricism nor hermeneutics provide for: while 
empiricists/positivists often fail to see a problem (i.e. disregard the 
significance of the “O” – O relation and conflate the two, thus rejecting the 
explanatory significance of ‘understanding’ and constructivist insights 
generally), and hermeneutics and post-structuralist approaches frequently 
entail a judgmental relativism in which questions of Truth are replaced by 
an emphasis on Verstehen as opposed to explanation and/or are turned into 
matters of knowledge, power and ‘truth effects’54 - frequently on an 
implicit Humean or positivist ontological basis55 - critical realism opens up 
for an explanatory approach in which actors’ accounts and understanding 
form an important element.  
 
In other words, hermeneutics and understanding, whether recognized or 
not, is part of scientific practice, and critical realism is, as I see it, open to 
many arguments of post-structuralism. I.e., as a consequence of 
recognizing the epistemological problem, the critical realist view of 
causation also includes – in principle, at least - the causal and constitutive 
effects of interpretation, meaning, reason and discourse (concepts are used 
rather indiscriminately and randomly). Discourse is not only 
representational and denotative, but also performative and constitutive of 
social phenomena:  
 
‘Those who dismiss discourse as ‘just talk’ are usually rightly reminded 
that it can have real effects: but then if it can have effects, it must also be 
capable of being causal [...] Those who reject talk of causes as essentialist 
and instead assert the play of difference and ‘repetitivity’ within discourse, 
but then treat the latter as responsible for the patterns and processes of 
social life, also implicitly readmit causation by another route.’56  
                                          
53 It should be noted, though, that the extent to which this promise has actually been 
realized in terms of theoretical and methodological ventures into investigating the 
interplay between “O” and O on a critical realist basis is limited – and Bhaskar himself 
is accused of disregarding the importance of significant social constructivist elements in 
his own work. See Finn Collin, ’Kritisk realisme og socialkonstruktivisme: En kritik af 
Roy Bhaskars videnskabsfilosofi’ in GRUS, vol. 21, no. 60, p. 70. 
 
54 Sayer, Realism and Social Science, pp. 47-48. 
 
55 Bhaskar, ’General introduction’, p. xiv. 
 
56 Sayer, Realism and Social Science, p. 96. 
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Thus, the conception of causation is broadened, and understanding and 
explanation cease to be regarded as opposites and mutually exclusives.57 
 
Now, working from this foundation has had a number of implications for 
the ways in which conceptualization and methodology have been 
approached in this research project. Most importantly, I have strived to 
fathom the “epistemological problem” in conceptualizing the preconditions 
and the processes leading up to those changes which I seek to explain. For 
example, there have been widely diverging representations of the reality of 
soccer ball production in Sialkot, as demonstrated in the findings reported 
by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) in their 1995 
report, Child labour in Pakistan: Sialkot, Kasur. Presenting the replies of 
the football producers, the HRCP wrote the following:  
 
‘In answer to a direct question as to whether children did stitch footballs, 
it was admitted that child labour was involved in this process, but the ages 
of children were not below fifteen and they worked at home to help their 
parents. […] Now this work was performed in an informal and casual 
environment where the children worked in the evening while watching 
television.’  
 
And, a few pages later, the HRCP’s own empirical observations:  
 
‘While those children seen working in the workshops (small shops, mainly 
in the city area, with 5 to 6 workers stitching footballs) were usually over 
twelve years of age, children as young as 6/7 were seen stitching footballs 
or related sports items in homes and small village workshops.’58  
 
The “epistemological problem” implies that the ontological dimension is 
open to a range of conflicting and competing representations, and that the 
dynamics associated with this multiplexity, with the openness of the 
ontological toward discursive struggles between actors and their different 
knowledges, truths and representations thereof, have been taken to be an 
important element in social change and, consequently, in seeking to 
explain this. The HRCP report, then, ceases to be a mere source of 
                                          
57 Djurfeldt, Boström och kaminen; Sayer, Realism and Social Science, p. 18. 
 
58 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Child labour in Pakistan: Sialkot, Kasur. 
HRCP Rights of the Child series, No. 9 (Lahore: Human Rights Commission of 
Pakistan, 1995), pp. 7 and 11. 
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information. Instead, it also comes to be seen as a discursive event, one of 
many, the interaction between which becomes an important element in the 
conceptual work.59 In logical extension, in my approach (conceptually and 
methodologically) to the preconditions for these processes, the openness of 
the ontological has similarly been emphasized.  
 
However, epistemological relativism inevitably raises questions of truth 
and truthfulness, and in contrast to some variants of post-structuralism 
critical realism explicitly argues that judgmental rationality is both possible 
and necessary:  
 
‘[…] we can never justifiably claim to have discovered the absolute truth 
about matters of fact. Our knowledge must be admitted to be fallible. 
However, we must beware of two common non-sequiturs here, both of 
which have appeared in social science from time to time: first, from the 
fact that knowledge and the material world are different kinds of thing it 
does not follow that there can be no relationship between them; and 
second, the admission that all knowledge is fallible does not mean all 
knowledge is equally fallible.’60  
 
That is, for epistemological relativism to make any sense, the ontology 
must be realist.61 As an intermediate between either of the two absolutes – 
Truth and judgmental relativism – (some) critical realists opt for the 
concept of ‘practical adequacy.’ Practical adequacy has been 
operationalized in various ways. Whereas Sayer emphasizes the generation 
of expectations about the world and about results of actions, the 
intersubjective intelligibility and acceptability, and the (cognitive and 
practical) contextual nature of practical adequacy, elsewhere the matter has 
been treated in terms of three relationships to be interrogated: the 
relationship between meaning/interpretation and i) material realities, ii) 
intentions and desires, and iii) situational, normative appropriateness, 
respectively.62  
                                          
59 It has also been a source of information, and the issues concerning the multiple roles 
of sources will be discussed further in the following chapter. 
 
60 Sayer, Method in Social Science, p. 65; emphasis in original. 
 
61 As Bhaskar puts it: ‘To be a fallibilist about knowledge, it is necessary to be a realist 
about things.’ Cf. Bhaskar, ‘Philosophy,’ p. 32. 
 
62 Sayer, Realism and Social Science, pp. 43 and 66; Norman Fairclough, Bob Jessop 
and Andrew Sayer, Critical Realism and Semiosis. Paper presented to the International 
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Thus, I have strived to capture the openness of the ontological and the 
dynamics associated with this and the epistemological problem, without 
throwing overboard the notion that not all knowledge is equally fallible. It 
is both possible and reasonable, although not necessarily easy, to seek to 
capture the empirical dynamics arising from the “epistemological problem” 
while maintaining some judgmental rationality. In the example above, the 
HRCP disputes the statements of the producers. Taking this dispute and the 
two statements seriously when conceptualizing and analyzing the 
preconditions and the process, however, does not necessarily entail taking 
everything at face value. Some statements are simply factually incorrect: a 
range of additional sources corroborating the findings of the HRCP may, 
for exampled, be used when attempting to analyze the preconditions in this 
particular case, and the number of children benefiting from the Atlanta 
Agreement (see Introduction) might also be taken as an indication. And, in 
extension, one may inquire into the potential reasons for such differences 
of opinion and expression, e.g. culture and tradition, economic interests, 
etc. 
 
Finally, as a consequence of this, the present dissertation is also a truth 
claim and a piece of scientific knowledge, the fallibility of which I alone 
cannot be the judge. Conceptual and methodological considerations and 
decisions are quite important in this regard, and I shall therefore return to 
this matter in the following chapters. Thus, at present suffice it to say, that 
I am well underway laying bare the basic premises of this research project, 
and that in conducting it I have taken practical adequacy to entail a 
commitment to account for the radical historical contingency and the 
constitutive effects of knowledge claims and knowing subjects, to a critical 
and reflexive praxis for recognizing my own ‘semiotic technologies’ for 
making sense, and a no-nonsense commitment to strive for faithful 
accounts of a ‘real’ world. 63 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
Association for Critical Realism Annual Conference, Roskilde, Denmark, 17-19th 
August 2001, p. 2. 
 
63 Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer, Critical Realism and Semiosis.  p. 2, drawing on 
Habermas; cf. also Mats Alvesson and Kaj Sköldberg, Reflexive Methodology: New 
Vistas for Qualitative Research (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2000). 
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2.4 Materialism and Idealism 
 
More than the debates on structure and agency (below), perhaps, the 
materialism-idealism discussions have tended to take an adversarial or 
dichotomous form, with both material and ideational aspects being 
forwarded as ultimately determining the other and social praxis as such. 
This is compounded and partially explained by the fact that, although at the 
core this is really an ontological matter and a question of what reality is 
like, the binary form of the debate has been markedly shaped by 
epistemological divisions within the social sciences in general and within 
specific theoretical fields. Thus, the materialism vs. idealism debate is 
embroiled within and reflects larger meta-theoretical struggles between 
positivisms and constructivisms in their various forms.64 In large part, this 
explains why, according to Alexander Wendt, a ‘truly synthetic position is 
hard to sustain.’65  
 
In its crude and binary form, the strife may be represented as follows:  
 
- ‘Materialists believe the most fundamental fact about society is the 
nature and organization of material forces.’66  
 
- ‘Idealists believe the most fundamental fact about society is the 
nature and structure of social consciousness.’67 
 
Now, it may be observed that most agree that – coined as an a priori 
theoretical matter of ultimate primacy or final instance – this dispute is 
seemingly unsolvable. As Laclau and Mouffe have put it, the question of 
relative weights ‘cannot be determined at the level of a general theorization 
of the social.’68 This has the effect of shifting the problem (of relative 
                                          
64 See e.g. Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane and Stephen D. Krasner, 
’International Organization and the Study of World Politics’, International 
Organization, vol. 52, pp. 645-685. 
 
65 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), pp. 24-25. 
 
66 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 23. 
 
67 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 24. 
 
68 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985), p. 77. Cf. also Wendt, Social 
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weight) from a level of general theorizing to the more substantial 
theorizing and the a posteriori empirical level. 
 
In an attempt to move on and clarify my position and point of departure a 
little further, however, it may also be observed that there is some common 
ground between the two extreme positions above: that reality necessarily 
comprises both material and ideational elements. As mentioned earlier, 
critical realism also implies that both material and ideational aspects may 
be causally relevant,69 and, considering the research questions and my 
interest in writing a nuanced history of the three agreements on the basis of 
a multi-faceted conceptual framework and explanatory approach, there are 
good reasons to seek to embrace both material and ideational aspects in 
what follows: ‘[…] any specific event or set of events limited in time and 
space can and should be explained as the result of a combination of factors, 
some of which are economic and some not. Sometimes economic causes 
are decisive, sometimes ideational ones are, and often explanations have to 
identify the unique constellation of economic, political and ideational 
factors that only taken together make up the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the event to happen.’70 Moreover, there are, in my view, 
good reasons for allowing not just an intermediate but also a constitutive 
role to ideational aspects of social praxis: if critical realism is right in 
claiming intransitivity and stratification, then perceptions and ideas – 
whether individual or collective and shared, subjective or intersubjective – 
are intrinsic to our acting upon the material and cannot in principle be 
relegated to an isolated secondary position.  
 
At the same time, there is a material basis to life and this sets certain 
boundaries on social praxis, forms an important part of structured interests, 
and has certain effects on the non-material, regardless of the meanings 
attached to this material basis. This is not inconsistent with maintaining a 
                                                                                                                           
Theory, p. 112; Morten Ougaard, Political Globalization: State, Power and Social 
Forces (Palgrave Macmilland: Basingstoke, 2004), p. 25; Roy Bhaskar, ’Societies’ in 
Archer et.al. (eds.), Critical Realism: Essential Readings (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 
222. 
 
69 This is, however, one of the weaker or less developed areas within critical realism, 
and critical realist writers may be found to be leaning toward either of the two – while 
e.g. Bhaskar and Porpora may be characterized as predominantly materialist, others 
such as Harré, Sayer, Outhwaite, and Wendt to varying degrees lean toward some form 
of moderate constructivism/idealism. 
 
70 Ougaard, Political Globalization, p. 25. 
 39
constitutive and causal role of ideas as an inherent and fundamental aspect 
of reality and social praxis (and, hence, of theorizing).71 For example, even 
if a given economic space may have been constituted largely by political 
ideas in a given material context, once constituted the relations and logics 
of that economic space cease to be merely ideational – they are 
materialized too. Thus, while the ideational is granted a constitutive role, 
the relationship between material and ideational aspects works both ways 
in the reproduction or transformation of this economic space, i.e. as 
complex processes of interaction and mutual constitution that implies 
neither a purely material, mechanistic determination nor an unrestricted 
(and equally unwarranted) slide into a vision of the world as a free play of 
signs.  
 
So, I wish to allow theoretically for the constitutive role of ideas while 
maintaining an emphasis on the material aspects of social praxis and on the 
causal significance of both of these. Acknowledging that this is a difficult 
position to sustain does not, in my view, render the position any less 
problematic than either of the two vulgar extremes and the materialist 
intermediate variable solution. My approach, then, may be characterized as 
moderately constructivist, and material and ideational aspects of reality are 
seen as partially and mutually constitutive. 
 
2.5 The agent-structure and levels of analysis problems 
 
Following Wendt, it may be useful to begin by distinguishing between two 
different but interrelated issues.72 In the agent-structure problem the basic 
question involved in the individualism vs. holism debate has to do with 
how one relates agents and structures and which unit of analysis to focus 
on. The second - levels of analysis – problem concerns which level of 
                                          
71 Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods (New York: New 
York University Press, 1982), p. 200; Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social 
Change (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992). 
 
72 For an exchange of different views on these two problems and their interrelations, see 
e.g., Alexander Wendt, ‘Bridging the Theory/Meta-theory Gap in International 
Relations Theory,’ Review of International Studies, vol. 17, pp. 383-392; Alexander 
Wendt, ‘Levels of analysis vs. agents and structures: part III,’ Review of International 
Studies, vol. 18, pp. 181-186; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, ‘Beware of gurus: 
structure and action in international relations,’ Review of International Studies, vol. 17, 
pp. 393-410;  Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, ‘Structure and action: further comment,’ 
Review of International Studies, vol. 18, pp. 187-188. 
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social aggregation to focus on, i.e. where to locate one’s emphasis in terms 
of independent variables. I proceed by clarifying first what I see as the 
more fundamental or principled issue of the two, the question structure and 
agency. 
 
The agent-structure problem 
 
Individualism and holism – as two stereotype approaches – form the two 
opposites of the old debate, the dualism. One quite influential contribution 
to the agent-structure debate and a proclaimed alternative to the traditional 
dualism is Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory.73 As Kaspersen notes, 
although many sympathize with Giddens’ ambition to transcend the 
structure-agency dualism, his theory has been severely criticized on a 
number of fundamental points.74 Going to the core of Giddens’ theory are a 
number of objections challenging the inseparability of structure and agency 
and Giddens’ resolution of the activity- and concept-dependence of 
society: Giddens posits structure and agency to be inseparable. An analysis 
therefore includes institutional aspects (the structural properties of social 
systems) and strategic conduct (how agents draw upon structural 
properties), where these are seen as ontologically inseparable, and can for 
practical reasons only be methodologically bracketed.75 By contrast, 
Bhaskar and other critical realists hold the opposite to be true: that society 
and people, structure and agents/agency ‘refer to radically different kinds 
of thing.’76  
 
This separation marks a fundamental ontological parting of the ways 
between this approach and Giddens’ structuration theory. In other words, 
                                          
73 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984). 
 
74 These concern the agent bias and the under-emphasis on the constraining aspects of 
structure, the definition of structures as rules and resources, and the lack of a concept of 
structural differentiation. See Lars Bo Kaspersen, Anthony Giddens: An Introduction to 
a Social Theorist (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2000), pp. 161-162. Cf. also 
Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 18; Douglas V. Porpora, ’Four Concepts of 
Social Structures’ in Archer et.al. (eds.), Critical Realism: Essential Readings (London: 
Routledge, 1998),  pp. 344-346. 
 
75 Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 285; Kaspersen, Anthony Giddens, p. 48. 
 
76 Bhaskar, ’Societies’, p. 214. 
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the dualism in sociology and social science in general can be seen to reflect 
that reality (ontology) is stratified and that structures and agents are 
ontologically – and not just methodologically – distinct objects. Thus, in 
contrast to structuration theory, the dualism and its implications ought to 
be embraced.77 Given ontological autonomy, Bhaskar and Archer see the 
relation between structure and agency as an inherently tensed 
phenomenon:  
 
‘It is still true to say that society would not exist without human activity 
[…] But it is no longer true to say that agents create it. Rather one must 
say: they reproduce or transform it. That is, if society is always already 
made, then any concrete human praxis […] can only modify it […] Society 
stands to individuals, then, as something they never make, but that exists 
only in virtue of their activity.’78  
 
In other words, action and structure are characterized by relations of 
priority and posteriority – by before, during, and after – in cycles of 
structural conditioning, social interaction, and structural elaboration 
reproducing or transforming the reality resulting from previous cycles.79  
 
Levels of analysis 
 
This brings me to the question of which level(s) of analysis to focus on in 
seeking to explain the three agreements. Clearly, researchers have different 
inclinations in this regard, and one’s inclinations and interests obviously 
influence the ways in which one poses questions and defines research 
topics and purposes. My interest, which I have tried to capture in the 
formulation of the research questions, lies in the relations and processes of 
interaction between corporations, states and non-state actors. Moreover, 
the research questions, flavored by my levels-interest, determine how I 
would characterize approaches that focus on other levels. Thus, proceeding 
to emphasize structures, relations and processes within the individual 
corporation (or several corporations) might be characterized as a micro-
                                          
77 Margaret Archer, ’Realism and morphogenesis’ in Archer et.al. (eds.), Critical 
Realism: Essential Readings (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 370. 
 
78 Bhaskar, ’Societies’, p. 214. 
 
79 Margaret Archer, ’Introduction: Realism in the social sciences’ in Archer et.al. (eds.), 
Critical Realism: Essential Readings (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 202. 
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level, inside-out explanation of the agreements, that – given the questions 
and the underlying interests they reflect  – would imply some problematic 
features of atomistic, individualist approaches. While such micro-level 
aspects are undoubtedly highly relevant, they can form only part of an 
answer to the questions as I have posed them - they cannot alone provide a 
proper explanation to research questions directed at a higher level of 
analysis.  
 
At the other extreme, one might seek a macro-level explanation and focus 
on the broader structural tendencies of the global (political, economic, etc.) 
system. Indeed, this too is an important focus and undoubtedly contains 
aspects relevant to the research questions at hand. One major difficulty – 
given the questions – associated with such a macro-level approach would 
be to move beyond the broad lines to include more specific relations and 
agential aspects in the explanation of particular outcomes and events. To 
the extent that one does not successfully deal with this difficulty, the 
resulting analysis can form only part of an answer to the questions as I 
have posed them. And, to the extent that one does actually succeed in 
handling the difficulty, one may actually have ended up with something 
other than a macro-level approach! 
 
Thus, I would argue that the most appropriate focus of the approach in the 
present research project, given the questions, is to be found at what may be 
characterized as the meso-level. In principle, however, this does not entail 
the entire exclusion of all micro and macro aspects. Rather, seeking to 
provide an explanation of the agreements centered on the meso-level 
preconditions and the processes of interaction between corporations, state 
and non-state actors, the question is whether and how to incorporate 
relevant aspects of what I referred to as micro and macro above.  
 
2.6 Causation, explanation and understanding 
 
As mentioned, reality is seen as stratified or layered in three domains: the 
real, the actual, and the empirical.80 ‘The real’ is whatever exists, the 
domain of objects, their structures and powers, physical or social. ‘The 
actual’ is the domain of events, i.e. what happens if and when these powers 
are activated. Finally, ‘the empirical’ is the domain of experience, more or 
                                          
80 Bhaskar, ’General introduction’, p. xi. 
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less successfully referring to the actual and the real.81 The empirical is part 
of both the actual and the real, but exhaustive of neither. Likewise, the 
actual is part of the real, but not exhaustive of it.  
 
This ontological depth leads to a conception of causation that is markedly 
different from the standard Humean account.82 First of all, the distinction 
between the real, the actual and the empirical implies a rejection of a 
purely observational criterion for making ontological claims about the 
existence of causal laws: there is more to reality than what is immediately 
observable and what happens to be observed. Secondly, there is a 
categorical ontological distinction between a sequence of events and the 
causal law(s) involved: ‘[...] laws cannot be the regularities that constitute 
their empirical grounds.’83 Thus, even though in controlled experiments 
sequences of events may be manipulated and studied, the produced 
regularities are ontologically distinct from the causal laws that may be 
deduced from such experiments. Thirdly, the notion of (actual and 
empirically experienced) regularity as the indicator of causality is 
discarded by the argument that reality is characterized by emergence and 
by varying degrees of systemic openness/closure rather than by closed 
systems of experiments.84 Thus, although constant conjunctions and 
consistent regularities may be produced and found within the closed 
systems of experiments, reality rarely meets the conditions of such closure. 
Where regularities do occur in social systems, they ‘are approximate and 
limited in duration and are usually the product of deliberate efforts to 
produce them [...]’85  
 
                                          
81 Sayer, Realism and Social Science, p. 11-12. 
 
82 Briefly put, Hume held that relations between causes and effects form the basis for 
all our reasoning about matters of fact, causation being understood as universal, 
empirical regularities between sequences of events, and causal laws as (defined and 
confirmed) statements about the constant conjunction of events, often in the form of ‘if 
a, then b.’ Cf. Robert S. Hill, ‘David Hume’ in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (eds.), 
History of Political Philosophy (Third Edition), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987), p. 537; Bhaskar, ‘Philosophy’, p. 25; Sayer, Method in Social Science, p. 115. 
 
83 Bhaskar, ‘Philosophy’, p. 26. 
 
84 Wad, ’Kritisk realisme’, p. 66. 
 
85 Sayer, Realism and Social Science, p. 15. 
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Instead of the traditional Humean “successionist” view of causation, then, 
in critical realist terms explaining a phenomenon entails seeking to identify 
the “real” causal mechanisms and structures of objects, the conditions 
necessary for the existence of these mechanisms, and the conditions and 
other mechanisms involved in producing the “actual” phenomenon to be 
explained. Andrew Sayer has illustrated the two views of causation as 
follows.  
 
Figure 2.2 Two views of causation86 
 
 
 
Thus, in terms of the explanatory approach and conceptual work (and, 
consequently, methodology and analysis), it might be said that the second 
and the third premise (stratification and transfactuality) entail en emphasis 
on the real and the transfactual. This does not, however, resolve all the 
tricky questions of philosophy and basic social theorizing, cf. the previous 
sections.  
 
Furthermore, the illustrations (as well as many of the discussions and 
examples) are extremely simplified. Literally hundreds of such 
“causations” illustrated above were required for each of the three 
agreements to come into existence. In other words, there were innumerous 
“small” effects/events before each of the “events” to be explained, as I 
have sought to illustrate below. 
 
  
                                          
86 Figure based on Figure 1.1 and 1.2 in Sayer, Realism and Social Science, p. 14 and 
15, respectively. Cf. also Sayer, Method in Social Science, p. 102. 
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Figure 2.3 Plural causations 
 
 
 
Perhaps as a consequence of writing on causation with recurring references 
to the “other” view, effects and events tend to be treated, by Sayer and 
others, as that which is to be explained, whereas structures and 
mechanisms are highlighted as that which is needed in order to do so:  
 
‘There is more to the world, then, than patterns of events. It has 
ontological depth: events arise from the workings of mechanisms which 
derive from the structures of objects, and they take place within geo-
historical contexts. This contrasts with approaches which treat the world 
as if it were no more than patterns of events, to be registered by recording 
punctiform data regarding ‘variables’ and looking for regularities among 
them.’87  
 
Yet, while “actual” sequences of events and regularities cannot amount to 
an explanation, explanation and abstraction ought to include process and 
not be reserved for “structure” alone. Processes of interaction are not only 
part of the “actual” story, but also structured or patterned, and – given the 
complexity of reality and the multiplicity of causations (my illustration 
above) – abstraction ought to involve an attempt at conceptualizing this 
patterning of ontologically different forms of interaction, at identifying and 
                                          
87 Sayer, Realism and Social Science, p. 15. 
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describing the generic logics and tendencies associated with these (and 
concrete conceptual elements ought subsequently to be defined).  
 
In a sense, processes and interaction are already present in the above 
illustration of plural causations. Seeking to incorporate the above concerns 
more clearly, I use a generic explanatory framework consisting of the 
categories illustrated below and serving as the basis for the conceptual 
labor in the following chapter. 
 
Figure 2.4 Explanatory road map 
 
 
 
- where P and X designate different types of (specific structural) 
preconditions and the different powers, liabilities and dispositions 
associated with each of these, and where I and Y designate the different 
forms of (patterned) processes and interaction and the generic logics and 
tendencies associated with these.  
 
Finally, as noted above, the stratification and transfactuality premises 
entail a considerable emphasis on the “real” in terms of conceptualization 
and, consequently, methodology and analysis. The point here is not, of 
course, that methodologically and analytically less emphasis is placed on 
the “actual” and the “empirical”, both of which are part of the “real”. Quite 
the contrary! Depending on the research object and purpose, one may put 
more or less emphasis on these. In the present research project, for 
example, it will be important to build up quite detailed chronologies of 
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events (chronological accounts of the processes, encompassing the actual 
and empirical): if one has only a faint idea of what actually occurred (and 
in which order) in terms of concrete events and the ways in which these 
were perceived during the process, one is in a relatively weaker position to 
analyze and explain that which is to be explained. 
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3. Methodology and the research process 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
There is a striking discrepancy between the number of actual, in-depth 
investigations to explain changes in corporate responsibility during the 
1990s – including the three agreements on which this dissertation focuses –  
and the number of explanations offered. The latter is far higher, the reason 
seemingly being that explanations and accounts are often provided in 
passing, on journeys departing from questions seeking something other 
than an explanation, thus ultimately seeking different answers and 
therefore traversing different terrains on the way.88 One of the ambitions of 
this dissertation is to contribute, theoretically and empirically, to 
explaining the existence and form of the three agreements and writing 
three concrete histories of how corporate responsibility changed during the 
1990s.  
 
Obviously, the above has considerable bearing on matters of research 
design and methodology, with which this chapter is concerned. In the 
following section I present some considerations and reflections on the 
research design and process, the preconditions and predispositions 
involved, and some reflections on how things actually turned out. This 
includes the basic arguments and considerations concerning the case study 
approach employed in this dissertation, the more concrete aspects of which 
are treated in section 3.3. In section 3.4 I turn to issues concerning data 
collection and analysis. 
 
                                          
88 Morten Ougaard with Michael E. Nielsen, ‘Beyond Moralizing: Agendas and 
Inquiries in Corporate Social Responsibility’ in Sumati Reddy (ed.), Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Contemporary Insights (Hyderabad: ICFAI University Press, 2004). 
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3.2 The research design and process 
 
The basic design of this research project may be characterized as rather 
intensive, as opposed to extensive.89 The two are characterized and 
contrasted in the figure below. 
 
Figure 3.1 Intensive and extensive research90  
 INTENSIVE EXTENSIVE 
Research 
question 
How does a process work in a 
particular case or small number of 
cases? 
What produces a certain change? 
What did the agents actually do? 
What are the regularities common 
patterns, distinguishing features of 
a population? 
How widely are certain 
characteristics or processes 
distributed or represented? 
Relations Substantial relations of connection Formal relations of similarity 
Types of 
groups studied 
Causal groups Taxonomic groups 
Type of 
account 
produced 
Causal explanation of the 
production of certain objects or 
events, though not necessarily 
representative ones 
Descriptive ‘representative’ 
generalizations, lacking in 
explanatory penetration 
Typical 
methods 
Study of individual agents in their 
causal contexts, interactive 
interviews, ethnography, 
qualitative analysis 
Large-scale survey of population 
or representative sample, formal 
questionnaires, standardized 
interviews, statistical analysis 
Limitations Actual concrete patterns and 
contingent relations are unlikely to 
be ‘representative’, ‘average’ or 
generalizable. 
Necessary relations discovered 
will exist wherever their relata are 
present, e.g. causal powers of 
objects are generalizable to other 
contexts as they are necessary 
features of these objects 
Although representative of a whole 
population, they are unlikely to be 
generalizable to other populations 
at different times and places. 
Problem of ecological fallacy in 
making inferences about 
individuals. 
Limited explanatory power 
Appropriate 
tests 
Corroboration Replication 
 
In designing the present research project, my design preferences stemmed 
from a combination of factors. To begin with, while critical realism is not a 
                                          
89 As Andrew Sayer has pointed out, this is not merely a matter of surface design 
features, however: ‘Superficially, this distinction seems nothing more than a question of 
scale or ‘depth versus breadth’. But the two types of design ask different sorts of 
question, use different techniques and methods and define their objects and boundaries 
differently […]’ Sayer, Method in Social Science, p. 221. 
 
90 From Sayer, Method in Social Science, p. 222. 
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method,91 there is a close relation between the basic premises presented in 
the previous chapter and the basic types of questions one is inclined to 
pose as well as the basic type of research design this may point to as the 
more feasible. As Danermark et.al. have put it:  
 
‘[…] reality has an ontological depth, which implies that an empirical 
correlation can neither establish which mechanisms are at work nor 
provide any deeper information about the interplay of forces behind the 
registered empirical conditions. Rather, such interplay can be revealed 
through intensive, focused studies of deliberately selected cases. In other 
words, empirical regularities are puzzle pieces in the search for 
mechanisms, not the control and judge. Empirical regularities may also 
generate fruitful questions, but in the search for causal explanations, the 
quantitative analyses play a less important role.’92  
 
The ontological realism and depth combined with the particular view of 
causation, in other words, not only makes one more inclined to venture 
into the world of explaining social phenomena: the basic premises 
presented in the previous chapter have strongly influenced this project on 
those points included in the figure above, as will be clear in this chapter. 
 
The seeming lack of studies seeking to explain the changes in corporate 
responsibility, cf. above, as well as the relatively embryonic conceptual 
work on this matter, i.e. what might be termed the explanation oriented 
literature on CSR, both suggest that research – and, in my view, intensive 
research in particular – is both needed and relevant. Further, on a broader 
note and with reference to international relations theory, the growing and 
relatively recently renewed interest in the role of private actors and private 
authority in international affairs, transnational politics and political 
globalization also played in, both inspiring and stirring my research 
interests and influencing my point of departure and chosen path. Thus, 
while the above might also be seen as calling for more studies of both an 
abstract as well as of a relatively extensive nature, I see this as clearly 
warranting more intensive research seeking to explain and account for the 
changes in corporate responsibility.  
                                          
91 Berth Danermark et.al., Att förklara samhället (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1997), p. 220. 
Cf. also Henry Wai-chung Yeung, ‘Critical realism and realist research in human 
geography: a method or a philosophy in search of a method?’ in Progress in Human 
Geography, vol. 21, 1997, no. 1. 
 
92 Danermark et.al., Att förklara samhället, p. 223 (my translation from Swedish). 
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Having said this, I did fall into the same trap as so many others before me: 
I got caught up in the details and complexities of my empirical cases, and 
the sensation of being in the process of making an important contribution 
through these empirical and concrete histories only added fuel to the fire. 
This made the analyses and writing of the case study chapters more 
demanding, on the one hand, and in the end resulted in some delimitations, 
on the other, that were first and foremost based on practicalities. 
Specifically, these delimitations primarily concerned the broader context of 
these cases. I had envisioned a fuller analysis, which has not been 
produced, of the following: major shifts in social relations of production 
and the spread of global commodity chains; major shifts in the “domestic” 
politics of dominant nation-states, focusing on the United States; major 
shifts in state-market relations; and major shifts in the global security 
climate. While an analysis of these in the dissertation would, in my view, 
have further enhanced the results of this research project, however, this 
result would have come at the price of a lesser contribution on the concrete 
in-depth case aspects.  
 
In the following sections the more concrete deliberations on and 
manifestations of this intensive design will be discussed further. Before 
moving on, however, let us consider the research design and process in 
terms of the relations between the theoretical and the empirical. I have 
approached this as an iterative process, where the purpose was not so much 
the testing of already existing theory, but rather the development of a 
conceptual framework through an on-going iteration between the empirical 
and the theoretical, which began before this research process and which 
continued well into the process. Thus, we might say that the intention was 
to conduct theoretically informed and informative concrete research. 
 
The figure below provides a graphic illustration of the differences between 
different types of research and shows that in intensive research, such as in 
the present dissertation, elements of abstract research as well as 
generalization are involved. The figure also illustrates how intensive 
research – unlike generalization and abstract research – encompasses both 
the concrete and the abstract. In this lies the possibility of iteration between 
inductive-deductive descriptions of the empirical phenomenon and 
retroduction, the latter entailing (critical) abstractions on that which 
produces the phenomenon or constitutes a condition for it.93 
                                          
93 Yeung, ‘Critical realism and realist research’, p. 59. 
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Figure 3.2 Types of research94 
 
 
 
While my abstractions have been grounded in concrete, empirical data, this 
iteration has also involved a critique of and work from existing theories, 
the thought processes often involving counterfactual thinking and, 
recalling the basic premises in the previous chapter, a focus on the 
stratification of reality and the transfactual nature of causal mechanisms. 
The purpose, therefore, has been neither to make the empirical fit the 
theoretical nor to paint a nicely worded “theoretical picture” resembling 
the empirical. Rather, given the practical limitations and the existing 
theoretical work on the subject matter as well as my aim of contributing to 
the theoretical development on this, I have seen this as the most feasible 
way of building and refining a conceptual framework through (while also) 
conducting valuable and relevant empirical work.  
 
As Yeung has put it in his more general argument, ‘The role of the realist 
researcher is to achieve a harmonious synchronization between deductive 
                                          
94 From Sayer, Method in Social Science, p. 215. 
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abstraction and inductive grounding of generative mechanisms. Under this 
argument, a realist researcher should not simply ‘borrow’ an existing 
theory and fit it into empirical data; nor should the theory emerge solely 
from concrete data. The most practically feasible method of theorization is 
an iterative process of abstracting theories based on an immanent critique 
and the grounding of abstractions in concrete data […]’ 95    
 
The research process may be described broadly in terms of different 
“moments”.96 First, the initial phase was primarily focused on philosophy 
of science and the basic premises treated in the previous chapter. Second, 
in the following phase the emphasis was primarily on the abstract, i.e. on 
reading and reviewing existing theories and the process of abstraction and 
retroduction. In part this emphasis was determined by my previous 
experiences and work as a student, entailing a fairly extensive and 
substantial insight into the empirical field.97 On the one hand, this made it 
possible to begin working on the theoretical part quite early on, as opposed 
to conducting pilot empirical studies, for example. On the other hand, 
while placed early on in the process, the initial abstractions were not based 
on the three cases or the empirical in a very narrow sense, but – later on in 
this phase, as I worked through international relations theory and theories 
of international regimes – drew from the numerous inductive and deductive 
moments in the preceding work on my masters thesis in particular.  
 
Third, having formulated a conceptual framework, during the following 
phase the emphasis was to a large extent on the empirical, i.e. data 
collection, analysis and writing on the three case studies. More than a year 
into this, the continuous reflections and thinking on the abstract led to a 
short interlude of revising the conceptual framework, before the analysis 
and writing continued.  
 
This interlude entailed the exclusion of a few explanatory factors, which I 
had realized were less relevant, given the research questions and chosen 
                                          
95 Yeung, ‘Critical realism and realist research’, p. 63. 
 
96 See e.g. Danermark et.al., Att förklara samhället, pp. 250-253 for a discussion of a 
concrete research process in terms of moments. 
 
97 As a student of international business and development studies at the CBS, I had 
been working on corporate responsibility since the mid 1990s, including a confidential 
bachelor project during the first half of 1997 which concerned the Atlanta Agreement, 
and a master’s thesis on the oil industry and corporate human rights responsibility, 
including field work in Ecuador. 
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empirical focus (for example, physical coercion). For the most part, 
though, it entailed what I would characterize as a change of formulation, 
emphasis and precision of some of the (remaining) elements, rather than a 
wholesale transformation of the earlier framework. This revision was based 
both on a better insight into the concrete and empirical (including, but not 
exclusively, the three cases) as well as additional theoretical readings (for 
example, readings on framing and social problems theory in relation to 
‘struggles to define the problem’). Finally, this interlude constituted the 
cutting-off point after which the conceptual framework has not been 
changed any further. 
 
3.3 A case study approach 
 
Having presented in the previous section a number of reasons for adopting 
an intensive, concrete case study approach in this dissertation, this section 
addresses my considerations and decisions involved in the concretization 
and operationalization of this basic design. It might be recalled, as a point 
of departure in the following, that the broader research interest underlying 
this was not an interest in explaining the three agreements per se, but rather 
an interest in explaining the changes in corporate responsibility and the 
governance of child labor and core labor rights during the 1990s, which 
was then concretized in my focus on the three agreements. 
 
To begin with, the combination of this interest and the more abstract 
aspects concerning an intensive, concrete research design does not directly 
translate into a decision concerning the proper level(s) of analysis on 
which to focus. Given the broader research interest, I could have decided to 
work from a much broader research question and pursue a macro-approach 
focusing on the broader structural tendencies and processes at work and 
defining my cases correspondingly. As argued in section 2.5, however, 
while these broader tendencies and processes were certainly relevant in (re-
) shaping the broad frameworks for action, an analysis primarily focused 
on these would entail an exploration and explanation of the broader 
contours of the changes in corporate responsibility – i.e., it would not 
emphasize the more specific and particular features. And it was from some 
of the particulars of changes, such as the three agreements, that the 
particulars of CSR more broadly arose. Moreover, by analyzing the 
production of change in corporate responsibility and the governance of 
child labor and core labor rights in the more concrete, it seemed to me I 
would be in a better position to emphasize the contextual, historical and 
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political nature of the change. This was an important concern, and one that 
is highly relevant, I would argue, considering the often quite ahistorical 
and apolitical nature of the CSR discourse.98 
 
As would be clear by now, I have defined my cases in terms of agreements 
– the outcomes, the preconditions and processes leading to these. Referring 
back to Sayer’s distinctions (figure 3.1), this definition might be said to 
entail an understanding and approach based on substantial relations of 
connection. The benefit of this is that time, place, space, actors and 
relations are introduced in a very different way than, for example, with a 
definition based on industry, without losing sight of broader industry-
related dynamics.99  
 
Moreover, and in very basic terms, the overall strategy was to conduct a 
relatively low number of case studies which were to be analyzed in depth, 
the aim being to provide an account, holding considerable explanatory 
power, of those three agreements. In itself, this may be of both empirical 
and theoretical value.100 Moreover, the analysis of these unique and 
important agreements may be of considerable relevance to our 
understanding of both the broader shift in corporate responsibility and 
more specifically of other agreements related to corporate responsibility 
and the governance of child labor and core labor rights in the 1990s.  
 
But, more specifically, why did I decide to focus on those three agreements 
in particular?  
 
First of all, unlike the emphasis upon generalizability and statistical 
representativity, which is generally typical of extensive research designs, 
in an intensive research design the cases are strategically hand-picked 
                                          
98 Blowfield and Frynas, ‘Setting new agendas,’ p. 510. 
 
99 For example, focusing on the Atlanta Agreement rather than the sporting goods 
industry more broadly, Sialkot is a more important place than it might otherwise have 
been, the period between 1994 and 1997 is central, and specific organizations and 
individuals were more important and involved compared to others, etc. It is then 
obvious how this more substantial fleshing out of the important and central causal 
groups and relations of connection provides some quite tangible and direct input to data 
collection methods, priorities and sampling criteria. 
 
100 As Sayer has put it, ’we must avoid the absurd dogma that no study of individuals, 
in the broad sense, is of interest except as a representative of some larger entity.’ Sayer, 
Method in Social Science, p. 226. 
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based on a combination of one’s overall strategy and research interests – 
translated into more concrete criteria – and an assessment of the expected 
informational value of the case(s).101  
 
My basic requirement was that, focusing on corporate responsibility and 
the governance of child labor and core labor rights, the cases be unique and 
important, in terms of involving the production of significant changes in 
corporate responsibility and the governance of child labor and core labor 
rights, i.e. cases involving the formation of particular new elements in the 
norms and practices of corporate responsibility and the ways in which 
child labor and core labor rights were governed, and cases that set new 
precedents and made significant marks on the subsequent developments. In 
addition, an aspect of their uniqueness and importance relates to the nature 
of the political processes and outcomes.102 
 
Secondarily, the selection of case studies was based on several criteria. For 
one, the overall strategy was to select cases that involved processes and 
agreements situated at different points in time during the 1990s. In the 
broader historical view, the three agreements are all contemporaries (from 
the 1990s), and the study does, in this broader historical sense, employ a 
“most similar” cases approach. At the same time, the intentions behind 
stretching over the 1990s were i) to allow for the possibility of being able 
to point to some significant changes in the preconditions for concrete 
processes of producing changes in corporate responsibility during the 
1990s, and ii) to contribute, in a modest way, to writing a sort of history of 
the rise of CSR in the 1990s by writing my histories from the very concrete 
and particular. The three cases, as it were, reflect this concern (see section 
1.4).  
 
Moreover, I focus on cases related to child labor and core labor rights. 
Clearly, child labor and labor rights issues were central in the contests over 
and changes in corporate responsibility during the 1990s, but so were 
                                          
101 See e.g. Danermark et.al., Att förklara samhället, p. 243; cf. also Bent Flyvbjerg, 
Rationalitet og magt, Bind 1: Det konkretes videnskab (Denmark: Akademisk Forlag, 
1991). 
 
102 As mentioned, I was in part inspired by the growing interests within international 
relations theory in the role of private actors in international affairs, in the transnational, 
multi-layered and trans-sectoral nature of politics and governance, which seemed 
particularly relevant as an in-way to studying the nature of political and economic 
globalization and the nature and (re-)articulation of the state-market relationship, the 
public-private dichotomy, etc. See n. 8. 
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environmental issues and the broader human rights issues, e.g. beyond-the-
workplace issues such as community rights and the rights of indigenous 
peoples.103 The decision to focus on a sub-group of concerns, an issue area, 
was based on the premise that e.g. environmental issues involve concerns 
and problems, material relations, ideational structures and histories, 
institutional frameworks, etc. that are different from, if not entirely 
unrelated to, those related to child labor and labor rights and the social 
aspects of corporate responsibility.104  
 
Finally, in spite of the above and all that has been said and written about 
these three processes and agreements, I was moreover – and this was an 
additional selection criteria – unable at the time to find any systematic and 
in-depth analyses of an academic sort (involving conceptual work and 
empirical data collection and analysis) seeking to shed light on the 
processes and explain the outcomes.105  
 
3.4 Data collection and analysis 
 
In collecting data to enable me to explain the three agreements at hand, two 
types of methods have been employed: I have conducted a number of 
interviews, and I have compiled and reviewed a vast amount of different 
                                          
103 Cf. e.g. John V. Mitchell (ed.), Companies in a World of Conflict; Williams (ed.), 
Global Codes of Conduct; Addo (ed.), Human Rights Standards; Sigrun I. Skogly, 
‘Complexities in Human rights Protection: Actors and Rights Involved in the Ogoni 
Conflict in Nigeria’ in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1997; 
Alison Brysk, ‘Turning Weakness Into Strength: The Internationalization of Indian 
Rights’ in Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1996; Douglas Cassell, 
‘Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution?’ in Fordham International 
Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 5, 1996; Judith Kimberling, Crudo Amazónico (Quito: 
Ediciones Abya Yala, 1993). 
 
104 Clearly, the writing of three concrete histories  is relevant in the empirical sense, but 
there are a number of deeper differences: global warming and the use of child labor in a 
certain factory are two different kinds of phenomena, presumably involving 
dramatically different kinds of necessary relations and potentials for politicization and 
regulatory outcomes. Conversely, there are also a number of similarities, from the 
broader structural tendencies related to the globalization patterns of production and 
consumption to the basic logics and patterns of interaction, as in the struggles to define 
the problem. 
 
105 At the time refers to the period of late 2001 to early 2002 when the project 
description was prepared and the research project subsequently began to be refined. 
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types of documents.106 The interviews have contributed significantly to my 
insight into the cases, although it must also be stated that the detailed and 
retrospective nature of the project has influenced the purpose of, approach 
to, and use of the interviews conducted. The documents collected and 
reviewed have played a correspondingly greater role.  
 
Specifically, during the research project I have conducted a total of 21 
interviews, each of a duration of between 45 minutes and 2½ hours (see list 
in Annex I). In addition, I had actively been working on setting up another 
10, most of which were “cancelled” (due to saturation and/or access to 
published material, cf. below).107 Moreover, I made another 23 inquiries or 
contacts that did not result in interviews.108 Altogether, I have spoken to 
the vast majority of those individuals that I would want to contact for an 
interview, were I beginning my field work today, and by late 2003 I felt 
that I had reached a certain saturation point, where additional interviews 
                                          
106 Obviously, given the rather historical and retrospective nature of the research 
question, observation-based methods were less relevant. 
 
107 One key individual could not be located (Dan McCurry, who headed the 
International Labor Rights Fund’s Foul Ball campaign), whereas another had passed 
away (David Husselbee, formerly Save the Children, Pakistan). I also telephoned 
Bangladesh and Pakistan a number of times to set up interviews with representatives 
(“back then”) of the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industry as well as the 
Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association. The telephone 
connections were of quite poor quality, and it was difficult to identify and track down 
the specific individuals that I wanted to speak to. Finally, I would have liked to talk to 
several current and former ILO-IPEC officials, and I spent months communicating with 
a Geneva official who promised to try to set up meetings in Geneva between myself 
and a small group of persons centrally involved in the first two of my cases back then. 
An upcoming review of, and conference on, the past ten years’ efforts and collaboration 
between UNICEF and the ILO-IPEC, however, apparently resulted in some 
uncertainties concerning dates and planning in Geneva.   
 
108 In some cases, the representatives of the organization simply refused to say 
anything, let alone participate in an interview. In cases where I received no reply or 
calls back, the organization was contacted at least one more time. In two cases, the 
individual confirmed a certain presence or involvement in specific activities, but also 
stated that no leading or active role was played in these, and instead referred back to 
individuals which I had already interviewed. The remaining 21 non-interviews are 
rather unproblematic in my view. In some cases, I had already accessed sufficient 
written material by/on the individual and/or organization. In several other cases, the 
non-interviews were unproblematic because the organization had been less centrally 
involved “back then” and/or because I had already conducted one or more interviews 
with actors in a similar structural position. 
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seemed marginally less useful than other types of data collection and 
processing – or I had quite simply come across or been referred to 
published material.109    
 
The aim of conducting interviews in this research project has been to 
engage in a conversation with a considerable number of key individuals 
that were “there”. I.e. that were involved in the turn of events “back then” 
and not just happen to be representing organization X or Y on CSR “now” 
– not to mention unknown respondents to a questionnaire a number of 
randomly selected companies within a given industry.110 I sought to engage 
these key individuals in a conversation in which they would share their 
experiences and recollections, and where I would also be able to table a 
number of inquiries which the available secondary sources were not very 
helpful in illuminating. Moreover, the interviews were very important in 
terms of shedding light on the chain of events and, in some cases, the 
identity of other individuals involved “back then”. 
 
The interviews were predominantly non-structured and with mainly open-
ended questions, in which I sought to strike a balance between letting the 
conversation flow and steering the direction and topics based upon an 
interview guide, which involved the following themes: i) background of 
the individual and the organization; ii) the situation of the organization at 
the time; iii) the involvement of the organization/individual (how, why, 
perceptions of the situation/the issues/the other actors); iv) key events and 
the agreement (how, why, perceptions of the situation/the issues/the other 
actors – including the non-events, the non-issues, etc.); v) miscellaneous. 
In those cases were the interviewed had been involved in more than one of 
the case studies below, themes ii)-iv) were talked through for each of the 
cases.  
 
                                          
109 Elliott Schrage, who had – as we shall see – been centrally involved in the soccer 
ball case, in our email correspondence referred to his recently published report which 
included a comprehensive treatment of that case. Cf. Schrage, Promoting International 
Worker Rights Through Private Voluntary Initiatives. 
 
110 As a sampling strategy, this is far removed from the random selection of 
respondents: ‘Intensive research focuses mainly (though not exclusively) on groups 
whose members may be either similar or different but which actually relate to each 
other structurally or causally. Specific, identifiable individuals are of interest in terms 
of their properties and their mode of connection to others. Instead of relying upon the 
ambiguous evidence of aggregate formal relations among taxonomic classes, causality 
is analysed by examining actual connections.’ Sayer, Method in Social Science, p. 221. 
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For a number of reasons, including the emphasis on the specific 
preconditions and processes and a relatively high degree of detail as well 
as the lack of available, in-depth material on the backgrounds to the 
agreements, the early interviews were rather explorative and open in 
nature. Because much of the existing literature on the cases did not 
generally go into details with the backgrounds to the agreements – the 
preconditions, the actors involved, the processes, the chains of events and 
the order in which these occurred – however, some of these early 
interviews were just as rewarding as the later ones, where I had rather 
substantial chronological and other types of overviews. I soon realized, 
however, that 5 to 10 years is a long time when it comes to thinking back 
and recalling different aspects of the past.  
 
Because a considerable number of the organizations (and individuals) 
involved in the processes back then are situated in the U.S., I decided to 
conduct the main of my field work in the U.S. This was also, by 
implication, a decision not to go to Bangladesh or Pakistan, which were 
obvious alternatives. Given the limited time and financial resources, this 
was a choice that had to be made, and I made it based upon an assessment 
of where I would be able to access as many centrally involved individuals 
and their organization archives as possible – undoubtedly, D.C. was the 
place to be.  
  
As mentioned I have, in addition to conducting interviews, also collected 
and reviewed a vast amount of different types of documents. The purpose 
of this has been two-fold. First of all, the interviews can only do so much 
in terms of bringing insight into the different perspectives, perceptions, and 
nuances being sought, and different types of documents are therefore 
important and useful supplements in building a richer picture and 
understanding of these matters, plus in some cases even working as 
correctives to the sometimes less than perfect recollections brought up 
during the interviews. Second, while an interview situation may be suitable 
for providing points of departure for document searches, for example, it is 
not ideal for working through the preconditions and processes in greater 
detail and thematic or chronological order. In particular I found that the 
numerous and often complex situations and events “back then”, and 
especially their chronological order, were quite difficult, not to say 
practically impossible, to deal with in detail in the interview situations. 
Thus, different types of documents were sought for. First of all, numerous 
reports, press releases, hearing transcripts, legislative records, etc., were 
collected from a number of different organizations. Such documents were 
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useful in terms of understanding the positions and perspectives of different 
actors at different points in time. Moreover, in many cases the documents 
served as important remnants, constituting points of departure for 
additional document searches.111 Second, I collected a sizeable body of 
documents such as telefaxes, emails, meeting summaries and personal 
notes, the access to which was an important additional purpose of 
conducting interviews. These documents were especially important and 
useful for building up a detailed chronology of events (again, constituting 
important points of departure for additional document searches and 
interview questions) and for gaining invaluable insight into the perceptions 
and behind-the-scenes going-ons, on which the existing literature shed a 
relatively sparse light. This was particularly so in relation to the 
Bangladesh case. Third, I conducted a large number of online database 
searches to compile a substantial body of news agency reports and news 
paper and magazine clippings. Many of the documents have been 
important as narrating sources, including – as many of them do – 
statements by key actors involved in the respective processes, and as a 
whole this body of documents has been invaluable in building the detailed 
chronological overviews of the processes. Fourth, existing literature from 
journals and books was sought for through a variety of database searches. 
Finally, while the above provided me with most of the needed statistics and 
other quantitative data, I also consulted various reports and online services 
for statistical information. 
 
As indicated above, the retrospective and explanatory focus in this project 
has certainly had an impact on the matters discussed here. As narrating 
sources the interviews have been helpful in terms of bringing insights as 
far as the main contours of the picture as well as key situations and aspects 
were concerned. The different types of documents, in turn, have been an 
invaluable supplement to the interviews, enabling me to build a thicker, 
more nuanced, more detailed and historically precise picture. The limited 
                                          
111 As illustrated by Alvesson and Sköldberg, the same source can be regarded as both a 
remnant and a narrating source: ’[…] it can easily be seen that the same source can be 
both a remnant and a narrating source, depending on the researcher’s choice of aspect. 
The pyramids of Egypt, to take another example, are for most of us mute testimony to 
the building activities of the pharaohs, and hence remnants; for a pyramidologist, their 
construction expresses secret messages which have not yet been (entirely) decoded, and 
so in this perspective they are narrating sources. Or, to take an example closer to hand, 
(authentic) minutes constitute a remnant of a meeting, but a narrating source about the 
same meeting. As a remnant they testify to the fact that a meeting has taken place; as a 
narrating source they tell us how it has taken place.’ Alvesson and Sköldberg, Reflexive 
Methodology, p. 71; italics in original. 
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time available for each interview simply did not allow for a lengthy 
discussion of each and every question that I would have liked to raise, nor 
were those interviewed generally able to recall in great detail and with 
some precision the situation and going-ons on a particular date several 
years ago. The documents, moreover, often served to corroborate the 
statements presented during the interviews.  
 
Many of the documents have, of course, also been important as remnants, 
i.e. as traces of events occurred. Without these, I could not have 
constructed the detailed chronologies of events that I have found necessary 
to map out and analyze the processes. Not so much from an empiricist 
point of departure or from an infatuation with “events” in the critical realist 
terminology, but rather from the notion that in order to explain the 
existence and nature of the three agreements, an analysis of the processes 
of producing the three agreements is necessary, and this must necessarily 
be based upon an overview of and a relatively detailed knowledge of the 
actual events and the perceptions of the empirical held by key actors at 
various points in time. Thus, my collection of documents has been driven 
by a search for narrating sources, but also by a search for remnants for this 
purpose. 
 
A note on bias 
 
I have taken it to be an unavoidable fact that all of my sources were more 
or less biased. Thus, I have been cautious with single sources on key 
matters, evaluating as critically as possible the source as well as seeking to 
corroborate or counter the statement by finding other sources on the same 
matter. With respect to more recent sources in particular, I have generally 
been more cautious, both because they are more remote in time and space 
from the matter at hand (distance), and because they are more likely to 
have passed through more hands (dependence).112 Moreover, I believe to 
have been aware of the possibility of post-rationalizations and the 
potentially distorting effects that might flow from the fact that 
constructions of the past include constructions of the individuals’ and/or 
the organizations’ past and present identities.  
 
Although some of this also applies to the older sources, i.e. that date back 
to the processes at hand, a different kind of bias awareness has been central 
                                          
112 On distance and dependence, see Alvesson and Sköldberg, Reflexive Methodology, 
pp. 73-74. 
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when it comes to these sources. Seeing as the bias, the “tainted” and more 
or less conflicting sources (“authors” and statements), has to some extent 
been incorporated into the conceptual framework, the search for additional 
sources on the same matter has been more than a methodological, source 
critical exercise: bias, in this perspective, is not merely a methodological 
difficulty, but indeed a conceptual and methodological positive rooted in 
the basic premises discussed in the previous chapter. As Alvesson and 
Sköldberg have put it:  
 
‘A certain established bias – for instance, an ideological one – can, on the 
other hand, contain very valuable information from the perspective of 
ideology research: what message is being conveyed? What is crucial to the 
criticism of bias is always to ask who is speaking, and with what 
purpose.’113  
 
For instance, in the Bangladesh case, a variety of actors presented 
numerous, widely diverging estimates of the number of child workers that 
would be affected by the Child Labor Deterrence Act, which was 
introduced in the U.S. Congress in that period. Instead of viewing the 
biased sources and pieces of information as a problem, a difficulty faced 
when seeking to uncover the true figure from those ‘damned lies and 
statistics,’114 I consider bias and contradictions as very telling and useful in 
trying to appreciate the views, perceptions and intentions of different 
actors, in trying to grasp the nature and dynamics of the political situation 
and process.  
 
                                          
113 Alvesson and Sköldberg, Reflexive Methodology, p. 72; emphasis omitted. 
 
114 Joel Best, Damned Lies and Statistics: Untangling Numbers from the Media, 
Politicians, and Activists (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 
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4. A theoretical framework 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
‘Unfortunately, most regime theory to date has assumed that states are the 
main – even only – participants in regimes.[…] Even the more liberal 
variants of regime analysis place more emphasis on the sovereign state 
than on important nonstate actors. To date, the literature on regimes has 
remained stubbornly state-centric.’115 
 
The study of international regimes is conventionally regarded as part of the 
broader field of international relations, its “baptism” as a sub-field dating 
back to the mid-1970s when John Ruggie first introduced the concept to 
political science.116 Rather than a theory, “international regimes” were 
introduced as cross-cutting variables centered on the formation, 
characteristics, development, and effects of international regimes. Thus, in 
spite of the state-centrism referred to in the quote above, the general 
research interests of regime theory indicate that this body of theory could 
constitute a highly relevant and useful point of departure for pursuing the 
research questions and interests at hand. Furthermore, regime theory is a 
field with fairly strong theoretical developments, developments which have 
– for better and for worse – in part been fuelled by inter-perspectival and 
paradigmatic strife and debates. Finally, there have been some exceptions 
to the state-centrism mentioned above. 
 
                                          
115 Cutler, Haufler and Porter, ’Private Authority and International Affairs’, pp. 13-14. 
 
116 John G. Ruggie, ‘International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends’, 
International Organization, vol. 29, p. 570. See also Katzenstein, Keohane and 
Krasner, ‘International Organization and the Study of World Politics’, p. 660. 
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In this chapter I present the arguments and deliberations behind the 
explanatory framework illustrated below.  
 
Figure 4.1 Explanatory framework 
 
 
 
In doing so, I begin by providing a brief overview of the theoretical field 
constituting my point of departure, regime theory, commenting upon the 
main points of interests – questions or concepts – to which I shall return in 
later sections of this chapter. In the last part of the following section, I 
return to some of these in a more elaborate discussion of certain basic 
conceptual issues. In sections 4.3 and 4.4 I then turn to conceptualizing the 
preconditions and the processes. Finally, section 4.5 contains a summary. 
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4.2 Regime theory: a theoretical point of departure 
 
Broad characteristics and comments 
 
Following Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, regime theory may be 
categorized in terms of four broad explanatory perspectives:117  
 
- the neoliberal or interest-based perspective;  
- the neorealist or power-based perspective;  
- weak cognitivism;  
- strong cognitivism.  
 
The two dominant perspectives for many years, the neorealist118 and the 
neoliberal perspective,119 have in common a number of basic assumptions. 
                                          
117 Actually, the authors distinguish between the neoliberal, the neorealist and the 
cognitivist perspectives, but then proceed to distinguish between weak and strong 
cognitivist approaches. Cf. Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, Theories of 
international regimes, p. 136. 
 
118 See Joseph M. Grieco, ‘Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: 
The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory’ in David A. 
Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993); Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: 
Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1990); Joseph M. Grieco, ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique 
of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’, International Organization, vol. 42, 1988, pp. 
485-507; Joseph M. Grieco, ‘Realist Theory and the Problem of International 
Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoner’s Dilemma Model’, The Journal of 
Politics, vol. 50, 1988, pp. 600-624; Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Sovereignty, Regimes, and 
Human Rights’ in Volker Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Westphalia and All 
That’ in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: 
Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); 
Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Global Communications and National Power’, World Politics, 
vol. 43, 1991, pp. 336-366; Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Structural causes and regime 
consequences: regimes as intervening variables’, pp. 1-21, and ‘Regimes and the limits 
of realism: regimes as autonomous variables’, pp. 355-368, both in Stephen D. Krasner 
(ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). 
 
119 See e.g. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the 
World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Arthur A. 
Stein, ‘Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world’, pp. 115-140, in 
Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
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The state is seen as a rational utility maximizer and as the primary actor 
within the international system, which – in the absence of a central 
authority – is characterized as inherently anarchical. In spite of these 
shared assumptions, thinking within the two perspectives has also 
developed on the basis of other, diverging assumptions related to state 
concerns and actions, about the obstacles to international cooperation and 
the role of powerful states in this. These are presented below. 
 
Figure 4.2 Anarchy and… 
Neorealism Neoliberalism 
States are primarily concerned with 
their survival, security and policy 
autonomy. 
States are concerned with these matters, 
but they should not be privileged vis-à-vis 
other important interests. 
States engage in power-balancing out 
of a concern with relative gains. 
States develop growing interdependencies 
and cooperation out of a concern with their 
own gains. 
State actions are determined by the 
distribution of power and by 
distributional conflicts. 
State actions are primarily determined by 
the existence of shared interests and 
mutual gains. 
There are significant obstacles to 
cooperation: anarchy entails a fear of 
cheating; the concern with survival and 
autonomy entails reluctance towards 
developing interdependencies; the 
primacy of relative gains becomes 
central as gains are rarely evenly 
distributed. 
The obstacles are exaggerated: cooperation 
entails growing transparency and ability to 
coordinate sanctions in cases of cheating; 
relative gains rarely constitute a threat to 
survival, and areas of mutual interests are 
expanding; the concern with absolute gains 
entails a diffuse reciprocity. 
Cooperation is determined by the 
power structure, and powerful states are 
key to both the creation and the nature 
of the cooperation. 
Cooperation is primarily a function of the 
patterns of mutual interests; power 
relations do influence the nature of 
cooperation and the distribution of 
benefits. 
 
The above points to a number of questions or key issues relating to basic 
assumptions of consequence to the following conceptual discussions. 
                                                                                                                           
1983); Duncan Snidal, ‘The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory’, International 
Organization, vol. 39, 1985, pp. 579-614; Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), Cooperation under 
Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Michael Zürn, ‘Bringing the 
Second Image (Back) In: About the Domestic Sources of Regime Formation’, pp. 282-
311, in Volker Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993); and Volker Rittberger, ‘Research on International 
Regimes in Germany: The Adaptive Internalization of an American Social Science 
Concept’, pp. 3-22, in Volker Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and International 
Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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There is the matter of material and ideational forces, upon which I have 
already touched. Moreover, in seeking to explain changes in corporate 
responsibility and the governance of child labor and core labor rights, how 
do I relate to the entrenched absolute vs. relative gains debate, i.e. the 
divisive question of assumptions stressing either mutual interests or power 
and distributional conflicts? I return to these assumptions shortly. 
 
The third of the above perspectives, labeled ‘weak cognitivism’ by 
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, is a category resting on the common 
tendency of the included works to incorporate so-called cognitive variables 
– ideas, knowledge, etc. – primarily as supplement or intermediate 
variables rather than positing an ontological and/or epistemological 
alternative to the first two perspectives. Thus, an increasing number of 
scholars within the field explicitly accept the key premises of more 
constructivist approaches, e.g. that (state) actors and the international 
system are socially constructed. Nevertheless, many opt for a 
predominantly rationalist, ‘intermediate variable’ solution, where actors 
are perceived of as rational utility-maximizers whose strategies/means may 
change as a result of ‘cognitive’ change (conceptualized in various ways), 
but whose interests and identities remain unaffected by this, i.e., interests 
and identities are given and stable. Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 
explain:  
 
’This seeming paradox clears up when we take into account the rationalist 
strategy of separating the constitution of states as central actors in 
international politics from issue-area specific institutional choices. While 
it appears to be accepted that states are ultimately constituted by the 
fundamental norms and rules of an international society, the same states 
are expected to proceed as utility-maximizers once they have to decide on 
the creation and maintenance of international regimes.’ 120  
 
I return to this later in this section. 
                                          
120 Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, Theories of international regimes, p. 161. In 
addition to those discussed here, other prominent works focus on types of ideas and 
causal pathways (see in particular Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Ideas 
and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1993), on epistemic communities (see especially Peter M. Haas (ed.), 
‘Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination’, special issue of 
International Organization, vol. 46, 1992, no. 1), and on perception and felt normative 
obligation of individual actors (e.g. Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, ‘The Foreign 
Policy Beliefs of American Leaders: Some Further Thoughts on Theory and Method’ in 
International Studies Quarterly, vol. 30, 1986, pp. 473-484). 
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One strand of work, categorized within this perspective, focuses on 
“learning”, a concept which Virginia Haufler has also posited as one of the 
three factors driving the contemporary rise in corporate self-regulation.121 
According to Haufler, three broad factors – i) political risk (of activism and 
regulation), ii) reputation as an asset, and iii) information, knowledge, and 
learning – are driving the contemporary rise in corporate self-regulation. 
While clearly incorporating relations of power, distributional conflicts and 
relative gains concerns, Haufler’s work is closer to the neoliberal or 
interest-based perspective. Furthermore, information, knowledge, and 
learning, are incorporated by Haufler as an ‘intermediate’ variable within a 
largely rationalist, materialist framework. Learning will serve as a point of 
departure in my discussion of Modelling the solution in section 4.4. It is 
not an entirely unproblematic concept, however, as I argue below.     
 
Another strand of work, which is less easily categorized but included here, 
is that on “institutional bargaining”, personified by Oran Young in 
particular.122 In his work on institutional bargaining over the years, Young 
has persistently sought to theorize process. In doing so, Young has 
forwarded some significant criticisms of the ways in which process in 
broad terms is treated within regime theory, suggesting that processes 
generally involve different stages, the political dynamics of which ‘are by 
                                          
121 Virginia Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector. See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 
‘Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes’, International Organization, vol. 
41, 1987, pp. 371-402; Ernst B. Haas, ‘Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and 
International Regimes’, World Politics, vol. 32, 1980, pp. 357-402; Jack S. Levy, 
‘Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield’, International 
Organization, vol. 48, 1994, pp. 279-312. 
 
122 Oran R. Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Oran R. Young, ‘The Politics of International 
Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment’, International 
Organization, vol. 43, 1989, pp. 349-376; Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko (eds.), 
Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1993); Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko, ‘Testing Theories of 
Regime Formation: Findings from a Large Collaborative Research Project’, pp. 223-
251, in Volker Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993). In their Theories of international regimes, 
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger place Young under the interest-based perspective 
while acknowledging the marked constructivist elements in Young’s work. This seems 
somewhat unwarranted to me, especially considering their categorization of e.g. 
Goldstein and Keohane’s edited volume (Ideas and Foreign Policy), which is just as 
interest-based, under weak cognitivism. 
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no means the same.’123 Moreover, in the work on institutional bargaining, 
several more specific concepts and arguments have been presented, which 
I shall draw upon in the later parts of section 4.4, having returned to some 
of Young’s broader arguments in the opening of that section.  
 
Finally, the fourth of Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger’s perspectives - 
strong cognitivism – comprises a number of quite diverse contributions, 
which pose more or less radical epistemological and/or ontological 
alternatives to the other perspectives. Prominent in this vein is the 
international society approach124 along with a Habermasian 
“communicative action” approach,125 “modernist constructivism”126 and 
Gramsci-inspired contributions127 as well as postmodernist and feminist 
approaches.128  
                                          
123 Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords, p. vii. 
 
124 Hedley Bull, ‘Society and Anarchy in International Relations’, pp. 75-93, in James 
Der Derian (ed.), International Theory: Critical Investigations (London: MacMillan 
Press Ltd., 1995); Andrew Hurrell, ‘International Society and the Study of Regimes: A 
Reflective Approach’, pp. 49-72, in Volker Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and 
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
 
125 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of 
Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Friedrich V. Kratochwil and John G. 
Ruggie, ‘International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State’, 
International Organization, vol. 40, 1986, pp. 753-775. 
 
126 Notably Alexander Wendt, Social Theory; Alexander Wendt, ‘Collective Identity 
Formation and the International State’, American Political Science Review, vol. 88, 
1994, pp. 384-396; Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization, vol. 46, 1992, pp. 391-
425; Alexander Wendt, ‘Levels of analysis’; Alexander Wendt, ‘Bridging the Theory / 
Meta-theory Gap’; Martha Finnemore, ‘Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights 
from Sociology’s Institutionalism’, International Organization, vol. 50, 1996, pp. 325-
347; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change’, International Organization, vol. 52, 1998, pp. 887-917. See also 
John G. Ruggie, ‘What Makes the World Hang Together? Neoutilitarianism and the 
Social Constructivist Challenge’, International Organization, vol. 52, 1998, pp. 855-
885. 
 
127 E.g. Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order, and a range of Cox’ 
articles compiled in Robert W. Cox (with Timothy J. Sinclair), Approaches to World 
Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Craig N. Murphy, 
International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994); Stephen Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World 
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As Geoffrey Underhill has noted, the work of Robert W. Cox offers ‘a 
flexible analytical tool of considerable promise for our understanding of 
international political economy across levels of analysis.’129 This promise 
resides, in part, in the fact that Cox’ framework not only stresses the 
interplay between material, ideational and institutional forces, but 
moreover specifies an ontology of three interrelated spheres: social 
relations of production, forms of state, and world order.130 In other words, 
Cox’ alternative to the mainstream perspectives constitutes one of the most 
significant exceptions to the previously mentioned state-centrism, the 
                                                                                                                           
Order (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Stephen Gill, ‘Two concepts of 
international political economy’, Review of International Studies, vol. 16, 1990, pp. 
369-381. 
 
128 E.g. Richard K. Ashley, ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, International Organization, 
vol. 38, 1984, pp. 225-286; Richard K. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, ‘Introduction: 
Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in International Studies’, 
International Studies Quarterly, vol. 34, 1990, pp. 259-268 (and other contributions in 
that issue); Mark Neufeld, ‘Interpretation and the ‘Science’ of International Relations’, 
Review of International Studies, vol. 19, 1993, pp. 39-61; Roxanne L. Doty, ‘Foreign 
Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency 
Policy in the Philippines’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 37, 1993, pp. 297-320; 
J. Ann Tickner, ‘On the Fringes of the World Economy: A Feminist Perspective’, pp. 
191-206, in Craig N. Murphy and Roger Tooze (eds.), The New International Political 
Economy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991). 
 
129 Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, ‘Introduction: Conceptualizing the Changing Global 
Order’, p. 16, in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds.), Political 
Economy and the Changing Global Order (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
Obviously, disagreements are multiple concerning the precise meaning of Gramsci’s 
concepts and their interrelation (in part due to the circumstances under which most of 
them were developed). Cf. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (eds.), Antonio 
Gramsci: Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., 
1971). See also the thematically organized volume by David Forgacs (ed.), The Antonio 
Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935 (New York: New York University 
Press, 2000). 
 
130 In short, Cox argues for an ontology consisting of three broad, interrelated 
categories of forces: i) material capabilities and relations, productive and destructive 
potentials, in their dynamic form existing as technological and organizational 
capabilities, in their accumulated forms as stocks of equipment and wealth; ii) 
ideational forces understood as widely shared collective images or intersubjective 
meanings and the rationalities of certain social groups; and iii) institutional forms that 
tend to reflect the power structure at their point of origin, to legitimate, stabilize and 
perpetuate a given order, including through the institutionalization of conflict/serving as 
a battleground (along the way, however, institutions take on a life of their own). See 
e.g. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order, pp. 11-33. 
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incorporation of social relations of production within the framework being 
particularly relevant to the dissertation at hand. Moreover, the promise in 
part stems from the marked analytical emphasis on exploring the limits, 
inherent contradictions and sources of conflict and potential transformation 
inherent in different historical orders. This emphasis, I would argue, is 
particularly helpful when seeking to understand and explain social change. 
Thus, while the strengths of Cox’ and other Gramsci-inspired contributions 
generally lie in the conceptualization and analysis of broader structural 
tendencies and historical transformations, I have also found notions of 
state, power and hegemony to be quite useful and relevant to the discussion 
of mutual interests vs. distributional conflicts below, and they have 
influenced the basis for the more concrete conceptualization of more 
specific processes and struggles in the following sections.  
 
A discussion of key issues 
 
The above points to a number of central and basic questions within the 
field, some of which it may be helpful to confront before proceeding. As 
mentioned, there is the matter of material and ideational forces, and there is 
the absolute vs. relative gains debate, i.e. the divisive question of 
assumptions stressing either mutual interests or power and distributional 
conflicts.  
 
In beginning to approach these questions, let us consider Zacher and 
Sutton’s illustrative example of an application of the neoliberal perspective 
– with its emphasis on increasing interdependence, mutual interests, and 
market failures – to the study of the international regimes governing four 
industries.131 Here, the authors emphasize the importance of growing 
interdependencies, implying both expanding mutual interests in 
cooperation, especially in the economic realm, as well as increasing gains 
from such cooperation.132 The core of the subsequent argument may be 
outlined as follows. To begin with, Zacher and Sutton define states’ 
concerns as two-fold – to increase their populations’ economic welfare and 
to maintain their policy autonomy in critical issue areas – implying that a 
great number of important regimes either function to facilitate the flow of 
commerce or to protect state sovereignty and decision-making powers. 
                                          
131 Mark Zacher and Brent A. Sutton (eds.), Governing global networks: International 
regimes for transportation and communications (Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
 
132 Zacher and Sutton, Governing global networks, p. 3 and 21. 
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Following from this, and from the characterization of international politics 
as comprising both shared and conflicting interests, the authors go on to 
argue that in some cases conflicting interests do override any common 
interest and possibility of cooperation. However, the ‘existence of 
important mutual interests in cooperation in particular issue areas generally 
assures the creation and durability of international regimes’, and divergent 
interests, distributional conflicts, and power relations ‘usually’ do not 
block cooperation.133 The conditions in which such mutual interests are 
likely to be shared by states are defined in terms of market failures 
according to neoclassical economic theory, i.e. as situations where 
governmental intervention to regulate a market that cannot operate 
effectively will enhance total welfare gains.134  
 
Ideational forces have often been explicitly acknowledged, but just as often 
excluded or assumed away by scholars within the neoliberal perspective, 
and this appears to be the case in Zacher and Sutton’s work as well.135 
There are examples of alternative approaches to market failures, though. 
Meyer et.al., for example, combine a largely materialist approach to 
environmental market failures with more constructivist insights on the 
changing knowledges, discourses and rationalities about the environment, 
and adding also the significance of changing institutional frameworks and 
the UN in particular.136 Still, this tends toward an ‘intermediate variable’ 
solution, cf. above. 
 
As mentioned above, the Gramsci-inspired contributions offer another 
alternative, as illustrated in Cox’ argument explicitly referring to the work 
of Gramsci:  
 
‘The juxtaposition and reciprocal relationships of the political, ethical, 
and ideological spheres of activity with the economic sphere avoid 
                                          
133 Zacher and Sutton, Governing global networks, p. 16 and 35. 
 
134 The conditions that, according to the theory, must be satisfied for an allocation of 
scarce resources through market mechanisms to result in a socially optimal outcome 
are: perfect information; zero transaction costs; atomistic markets; perfect factor 
mobility; and actor rationality in the pursuit of utility maximization (Zacher and Sutton, 
Governing global networks, p. 24). 
 
135 See e.g. Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 6, 66-67, 121, 126-127, 132. 
 
136 John W. Meyer et. al., ‘The Structuring of a World Environmental Regime, 1870-
1990’, International Organization, vol. 51, 1997, No. 4. 
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reductionism. It avoids reducing everything either to economics 
(economism) or to ideas (idealism). In Gramsci’s historical materialism 
(which he was careful to distinguish from what he called “historical 
economism” or a narrowly economic interpretation of history), ideas and 
material conditions are always bound together, mutually influencing one 
another, and not reducible one to the other. Ideas have to be understood in 
relation to material circumstances. Material circumstances include both 
the social relations and the physical means of production. Superstructures 
of ideology and political organization shape the development of both 
aspects of production and are shaped by them.’137 
 
Following from the discussion of basic premises in Chapter 2, however, in 
constructing the conceptual framework here, ideational forces are neither 
assumed away, nor have I sought to employ a priori assumptions relegating 
ideational structures and forces to secondary positions. Rather, I have 
sought to incorporate both and the interplay between them. 
 
Another question is that of mutual interests vs. power and distributional 
conflicts. Neither the general tendency within the neoliberal perspective, 
followed by the Zacher and Sutton, to downplay the significance of 
distributional conflicts and power relations, nor the general assumption 
that actors’ utilities and interests do not incorporate the gains and positions 
of other actors, seem entirely reasonable. For example, with a 
transformation in the relational configuration pertaining to certain 
(working) conditions and social relations of production and consumption –
and the market and/or governance failures that may be said to exist – the 
ways in which different actors relate to those conditions and that market or 
governance failure, and thereby the interests they might have in (de-) 
politicizing it change, implying a potential (and likely) change in both the 
configuration of mutual interests and distributional conflicts involved in 
concrete cases. Under such circumstances, and quite contrary to e.g. 
Zacher and Sutton, it is reasonable to assume that actors involved in the 
struggles to shape or re-shape corporate responsibilities in relation to child 
                                          
137  Robert W. Cox, ‘Gramsci, hegemony, and international relations: an essay in 
method (1983)’ in Cox (with Sinclair), Approaches to World Order, pp. 131-132. Or, as 
Gramsci put it: ‘It may be ruled out that immediate economic crises of themselves 
produce fundamental historical events; they can simply create the terrain more 
favourable to the dissemination of certain modes of thought, and certain ways of posing 
and resolving questions involving the entire subsequent development of national life… 
The specific question of economic hardship or well-being as a cause of new historical 
realities is a partial aspect of the question of the relations of force at their various 
levels.’ Cited from Forgacs, The Antonio Gramsci Reader, p. 208. 
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labor and core labor rights are very much so concerned with other actors’ 
positions and gains, and that relations of power and distributional conflicts 
thus are central to explaining the changes at hand. Certainly, as I will argue 
below, this does not entail that the existence of mutual interests in 
resolving problems in one way rather than another are irrelevant. It does 
mean, however, that it might be of interest to consider in greater detail the 
arguments why power and distributional conflicts should be privileged. 
 
Grieco and Krasner – both of which tend to conceptualize power and 
conflicts in terms of material capabilities – are two of the more prominent 
voices here. While Grieco has sought to develop his argument through an 
’amended’ version of Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) (taking into account both 
absolute and relative gains) and in his model is mostly concerned with 
power as an end, Krasner has taken a somewhat different route, tending 
toward a view of power as a means. Krasner’s argument is two-fold. First 
of all, using PD to analyze what is defined as market failures entails the 
assumption of (rational) egoism, by virtue of which moving to Pareto-
efficiency – making at least one actor better off and none worse off – is 
primarily a question of information and monitoring and the intelligence of 
actors to find a solution to cheating. If, however, relative gains are 
relevant, then even ‘making at least one actor better off and none worse 
off’ obviously involves an entirely different, and possibly more important, 
problem: distributional conflict in which relations of power play a central 
role.138 Secondly, in many cases, dilemmas of common aversion (beyond 
simple coordination problems) are claimed to be more characteristic of 
international politics than the situation depicted by PD. Thus, if the 
collective action problem involves several efficient equilibrium outcomes – 
as opposed to PD – but the actors prefer different ones, ‘The problem is not 
how to get to the Pareto frontier [as in PD] but which point along the 
frontier will be chosen.’139 Again, a distributional conflict in which 
relations of power play a central role. Krasner subsequently specifies three 
ways in which power may be relevant in the resolution of distributional 
conflicts: power may be used to determine who can play in the first place, 
to dictate the rules of the game (e.g. who moves first), and to change the 
payoff matrix (e.g. through tactical issue-linkage or threats).140 
 
                                          
138 Krasner, ‘Global Communications and National Power’, p. 336. 
 
139 Krasner, ‘Global Communications and National Power’, p. 340. 
 
140 Krasner, ‘Global Communications and National Power’, p. 340. 
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Following Krasner, then, the problem in achieving the “proper” change in 
corporate responsibility and governance vis-à-vis certain problems does 
not merely involve a problem of coordination between different parties 
which are assumed to ultimately prefer that “proper” change (the 
equilibrium outcome in PD). Rather, the different parties prefer more or 
less diverging outcomes and are from the outset not prepared to enter into a 
demanding compromise: rather than a mutual interest in reaching a certain 
outcome, what the parties have in common is a shared aversion toward 
compromise from the outset. That corporations and activists may 
occasionally prefer different outcomes cannot come as a major surprise, 
but the argument applies to intra-industry differences as well.141  
 
In seeking to conceptualize the preconditions and processes involved in 
bringing about changes in corporate responsibility and governance, 
relegating power relations and the uses of power during a process of 
politicization and (re-) solution to a secondary, less significant level does 
not seem acceptable. Conversely, it seems equally unreasonable as an a 
priori assumption to claim that the existence of mutual interests between 
different parties should not also be considered potentially significant. Yet, 
the two perspectives are not easily reconciled, cf. Grieco’s attempt at 
amending PD or Zacher and Sutton’s incorporation of power as a 
secondary element, presumably because of the hefty reliance on rigid 
game-theoretic models, the systemic approach and the one-dimensional 
conception of structures and interests as material. Once again, it may be 
useful to draw upon the historicist and more flexible work of Cox and, in 
particular, Gramsci’s notion of power and hegemony.  
 
In short, Gramsci – referring to Machiavelli’s The Prince – ‘took over from 
Machiavelli the image of power as a centaur: half man, half beast, a 
necessary combination of consent and coercion.’142 Gramsci 
correspondingly distinguished between two modalities of domination and 
power within the state-civil society complex,143 namely coercion or force 
                                          
141 See e.g. Jenkins, ‘The political economy of codes of conduct.’ 
 
142 Cox, ’Gramsci, hegemony, and international relations’, p. 127; cf. Gramsci’s own 
formulation in Hoare and Nowell-Smith, Prison Notebooks, pp. 169-170. 
 
143 The notions of power and hegemony are closely related to Gramsci’s understanding 
of the state: ‘Gramsci’s enlargement of the concept of the state includes the limited 
conventional idea of the state as the machinery of coercion or the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given country, i.e., legal structure and 
machinery for law making, policy formulating, and enforcement through 
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and hegemony as a consensual form of domination based on ‘the 
successful mobilization and reproduction of the ‘active consent’ of 
dominated groups by the ruling class through their exercise of intellectual, 
moral, and political leadership. This should not be understood in terms of 
mere indoctrination or false consciousness – whether seen as the reflex of 
an economic base or as an arbitrary set of mystifying ideas. For the 
maintenance of hegemony involves taking systematic account of popular 
interests and demands, shifting position and making compromises on 
secondary issues to maintain support and alliances in an inherently 
unstable and fragile system of political relations […]’144  
 
This suggests the possibility of conceptualizing and analyzing the 
preconditions and processes related to corporate responsibility and the 
governance of child labor and core labor rights in ways which move 
beyond the polar positions above: That preconditions and processes may 
be seen as more complex, as involving both shared ideas and material 
interests as well as distributional and ideational conflicts; that processes 
may be seen as constant struggles to reproduce or transform social 
problems and their solutions, identities and relations; that struggles may be 
seen as tugs of war involving fundamental conflicts, but simultaneously as 
“negotiations” entailing elements of accommodating and taking into 
account, of selectively domesticating (some of) the ideas and interests of 
other parties in making concessions and compromises, cf. the quote 
above.145  
 
                                                                                                                           
administration, police, and military. It also includes the machinery of organizing 
consent through education, opinion shaping, and ideology formation and propagation.’ 
Cox, Production, Power, and World Order, p. 409, n. 10. In addition to this general, 
content empty concept of the state, a more particularized and differentiated concept of 
what the state is in a concrete historical instance is contained in the notion of a historic 
bloc, i.e. the fit between material, ideational and institutional forces in a particular 
configuration of social forces upon which state power ultimately rests and which gives 
content to a historical state.  Cox, Production, Power, and World Order, p. 105 and 
409, n. 10. 
 
144 Jessop, The Capitalist State, p. 148. 
 
145 See also Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 217; William Roseberry, ‘Hegemony and the 
Language of Contention’ in Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent (eds.), Everyday 
Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), pp. 360-361. 
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4.3 Preconditions 
Characteristics of the problem 
 
A central precondition in any analysis seeking to explain a change in 
corporate responsibility and the way in which a certain problem is 
governed, as in the three agreements, is the problem itself. The facts of 
responsibility and a a framework of governance existing and being 
changed presuppose, in other words, the existence of some kind of social 
problem and a more or less widely felt need to act on this. Certainly, a 
dramatic or considerable shift (actual or impending) in the characteristics 
of the problem must be considered a potentially quite significant 
precondition for such changes. For this reason alone, analyzing the 
characteristics of the problem is necessary. 
 
Yet, this is not as straightforward as it might seem. First of all, problems 
do not automatically translate into their own solutions. Second, and more 
fundamentally, what is a social problem? As Goode has shown in his 
article on the sociology of social problems, there are different answers to 
that question. In the eyes of some, a social problem is defined by ‘the 
existence of an objectively-determinable, concretely-real damaging or 
threatening condition.’ Others prefer to distinguish between conditions and 
problems, holding that social problems exist only when certain conditions 
come to be socially defined as problems. In the extreme, the latter position 
implies that ‘a given condition need not even exist in the objective sense to 
be defined as a social problem.’146  
 
Referring back to the earlier discussion of the epistemological problem and 
world independence in chapter 2, the distinction between conditions and 
social problems is warranted. Conditions may or may not exist, and they 
may or may not be perceived of as problematic. In other words, conditions 
and problems should not be conflated, and a (social) problem, as I use the 
concept here, is a condition or set of conditions socially defined as 
problematic: ‘No condition is a social problem until someone considers it a 
social problem.’147 Furthermore, the processes of socially defining the 
                                          
146 Erich Goode, ‘The American Drug Panic of the 1980s: Social Construction or 
Objective Threat?’ in Violence, Aggression and Terrorism, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1989, p. 328. 
 
147 Joel Best, ‘Typification and Social Problems Construction’ in Joel Best (ed.), 
Images of Issues: Typifying Contemporary Social Problems (Second Edition) (New 
York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1995), p. 5. 
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problem and its solution occur (in part) on the basis of, and may relate in a 
variety of ways to, the potentially quite complex and multifaceted 
conditions which are open to varying interpretations and representations by 
different actors with more or less diverging, conflicting interest. It follows 
that “characteristics of the problem” does not refer to a problem defined 
but in these terms rather refers to these conditions, and that the 
preconditions so conceptualized comprise both the multifaceted conditions 
and the constraints and potentials that these provide for politicization, 
problematization and resolution.  
 
Thus, the characteristics of the problem are assumed to be potentially 
significant in two ways. First of all, dramatic or considerable changes, 
actual or impending, may be of central significance in setting in motion a 
series of events. In analyzing the characteristics of the problem, we need to 
ask: Did such dramatic changes occur or were they (perceived to be) 
impending? Second, in line with the argumentation in chapter 2, even in 
the absence of such dramatic changes, the characteristics of the problem 
contain part of the constraints and potentials for politicization, 
problematization and resolution, and as such may contribute significantly 
to shaping the process and outcome by being actively drawn upon in 
different ways in the interplay between different subjectivities in the 
process: What were the politicization, problematization and resolution 
constraints and potentials in the characteristics of the problem?  
 
Bearing this in mind, and with a view to the subsequent analysis of 
process, I have sought to focus more specifically on facets that must be 
considered potentially significant from an objectivist point of view and 
which tend to be central in the interplay between different perspectives in 
debates on corporate responsibility: 
 
- the existence and extent of the problem 
- the gravity of the problem 
- the breadth and depth of the problem 
- the il/legality of the problem 
 
 
To begin with, we need to consider the existence and extent of the 
problem, in factual terms (numbers, statistics). For example, was child 
labor being used? And what was the extent and proportions of this? We 
must proceed as if it does matter if certain conditions exist. Should it turn 
out that this was not the case, we will at least have reached an important 
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conclusion about the interplay of different perceptions of reality vis-à-vis 
that reality. Moreover, denials of the factual existence of certain conditions 
are not unusual reactions to attempts at problematizing those very same 
conditions. Beyond the mere existence, very often debates on social 
problems involve understatements and exaggerations of the extent or 
proportions of conditions – or, as I would put it, minimizations and 
maximizations in the process of claims-making (further below). While 
objectively measurable, analyzed as preconditions, the existence and extent 
in factual terms may, of course, have been fraught with considerable 
uncertainty or even lack of apprehension and awareness on part of the 
actors involved.  
 
In addition, the nature of the problem in terms of the gravity of the 
problem is assumed to be significant. Unlike the above, gravity is not 
conceived of as a numerical matter, as I use it: the number of sweatshop 
workers is a matter of extent, whereas gravity concerns the ‘qualitative’ 
aspects of the conditions. The a priori assumption is that it may be 
significant whether the conditions are akin to Bales’ descriptions of new 
forms of slavery or a one-off minor violation of the U.S. Fair Labor 
Standards Act.148 Like the above, debates on problems often involve 
minimizations and maximizations of gravity, and the gravity of conditions 
may constitute the basis for disputes between conflicting socio-cultural 
perspectives.149 Indeed, relativizing problem minimizations or denials are 
not unusual, be it out of genuine beliefs and/or because such minimization 
or denial cannot be sustained on factual grounds. As demonstrated by 
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s example of the issue of female 
genital mutilation, the gravity of the condition also includes the constraints 
and potentials related to (re-)naming the problem.150 
 
The characteristics of the problem in terms of breadth and depth is another 
facet assumed to be significant. By breadth I mean the range of related 
conditions or issues (focusing here on child labor and core labor rights, not 
all of which are necessarily part of concrete debates). For example, what 
                                          
148 Kevin Bales, Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999). 
 
149 See Goode, ‘The American Drug Panic’, p. 339 on severity and the ’materials’ that 
are drawn upon in constructing social problems. 
 
150 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy 
Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 20. 
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might be said about freedom of association, the right to collective 
bargaining, nondiscrimination, etc.? Conditions may be in keeping with 
international law on some counts and in blatant violation on others, for 
example. It may be that those violations apply to women workers only, 
whereas male workers have it differently. By depth I mean the main 
underlying structural pressures and constraints as well as the consequences, 
for the workers and the employers. For instance, does child labor exist 
within the context of household poverty, of unemployed adult family 
members, of socio-cultural and political traditions condemning and/or 
condoning the work of children, etc.?151 Do employers have political-
economic interests in employing child workers, directly or indirectly? 
Breadth and depth, as I will argue more extensively in the following 
subsection, are assumed to be central in shaping the processes, and the two 
are moreover dynamically related: breadth often comes at the expense of 
depth and vice versa.152  
 
Finally, the element of il/legality, both under local and international law, is 
assumed to be potentially significant as well. In the narrow sense, certain 
conditions come with a host of strictly legal constraints and potentials, 
such as possibilities of seeking redress, etc.153 In a broader sense, following 
Wilson, law may also be seen as a system of meanings that is constitutive 
of social realities, and law may serve as a form of power, e.g. providing 
legitimacy in concrete political processes.154 Thus, the ability to categorize 
certain conditions or practices as legal or illegal may be quite important in 
struggles to define the problem, just as such categorizations may influence 
the substance and pace of modelling of the solution(s). 
                                          
151 See Myron Weiner, The Child and the State in India: Child Labour and Education 
Policy in a Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). For 
a discussion of inclusions and exclusions from a gender perspective, see also Stephanie 
Barrientos, ’’Flexible’ female employment and ethical trade in the global economy’ in 
P. Newell, S. M. Rai and A. Scott (eds.), Development and the challenge of 
globalization (London: ITDG Publishing, 2002) 
 
152 Cf. e.g. Peter Utting, Business Responsibility for Sustainable Development, 
UNRISD Occasional Paper 2000 No. 2 (Geneva: UNRISD, January 2000), p. 23. 
 
153 See e.g. Halina Ward, Legal Issues in Corporate Citizenship (London: International 
Institute for Environment and Development, 2003); Garvey and Newell, Corporate 
accountability to the poor. 
 
154 Richard A. Wilson, ’Human Rights, Culture and Context: An Introduction’, pp. 14-
18, in Richard A. Wilson (ed.), Human Rights, Culture and Context: Anthropological 
Perspectives (London: Pluto Press, 1997). 
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To summarize, the characteristics of the problem – the existence and 
extent, the gravity, the breadth and depth, and the il/legality – are 
potentially significant in two ways: through a dramatic shift (actual or 
impending) and/or through the constraints and potentials forming the basis 
for potential politicization, problematization and resolution. In the 
following subsection I will suggest that process be analyzed in terms of 
four related aspects: struggles to define the problem, targeting, economic 
coercion, and modelling the solution. The potential significance of the 
characteristics of the problem relates to all four.  
 
First and foremost, the characteristics of the problem are assumed to be 
significant in triggering and shaping the struggles to define the problems, 
and the facets and dynamics alluded to above will be treated further in the 
following subsection. Second, seeing as problems and solutions are often 
closely related, the characteristics of the problem in this way hold an 
indirect significance to the modelling of the solution. Beyond this, 
however, modelling occurs not only on the basis of the constraints and 
potentials of the struggles to define the problem: regardless of how these 
struggles play out, modelling also occurs on the basis of the constraints and 
potentials inherent in the characteristics of the problem (further below). 
Third, the characteristics of the problem are potentially significant in 
relation to targeting as well. Consider the extent and gravity of the 
problem: theoretically I would not expect to find the top ten oil companies 
in the world targeted in a global campaign on the basis of an isolated and 
relatively minor oil spill. Nor would I assume a single sweatshop with a 
handful of employees to form a sufficient basis for a broad-based 
campaign targeting a number of clothing companies and retailers. Fourth, 
economic coercion (threatened or actualized) is often closely related to the 
characteristics of the problem, for instance through trade regulation.155 
 
Characteristics of the framework of governance 
 
As defined earlier (chapter 1), the framework of governance includes 
national and international legislation and patterns of enforcement, and it 
also includes the norms and practices of corporate conduct (focusing here 
on child labor and core labor rights). The characteristics of the already 
existing framework of governance must be assumed to be central to any 
                                          
155 Cf. e.g., Daniel S. Ehrenberg, ‘The Labor Link: Applying the International Trading 
System To Enforce Violations of Forced and Child Labor’ in Yale Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1995. 
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processes leading to a change therein. The outcome, the change, 
presupposes that these processes have involved the articulation of a need to 
act differently – an articulation that can only occur on the basis of that 
which is changed, a need and a difference that must be assumed to have as 
a central reference point that which is found in need of difference: the 
characteristics of the framework of governance.   
 
As with the characteristics of the problem, the framework of governance 
may be significant in more than one way. We may find that there have 
been significant shifts in the framework, or that such a shift was 
impending: regulatory oscillations may be significant in triggering a chain 
of events and in constituting (part of) the institutional basis and reference 
point during the processes. This may be in the form of labor market 
deregulation, whether through legislation or de facto changes in patterns of 
enforcement. Or we may find a shift in the opposite, (re-) regulating 
direction, where some of the problematized conditions are side-effects 
stemming from the introduction of new legislation, actual or impending, 
aimed at protecting the workers, the children, the endangered species, etc. 
And it may be that a significant shift has occurred in labor-related trade 
regulation, actual or impending.  
  
Moreover, in constituting (part of) the institutional basis and reference 
point during the processes, the framework of governance embodies a 
number of constraints and potentials that may significantly shape the 
processes that occur (or do not occur because of the framework). For 
example, it influences what may be categorized as legal and illegal (though 
it does not determine such categorizations entirely, of course). The 
potential significance of the framework is much broader, however, as it 
may provide constraints and potentials relevant to the legitimation of 
problems and solutions alike – a reference point for allegations, 
accusations, justifications, etc. And it may provide constraints and 
potentials of fundamental significance to targeting and economic coercion 
during the processes, for instance if the possibility of filing a multibillion 
dollar class-action law suit against a foreign TNC exists as an alternative to 
campaigning against unreceptive local state authorities. 
 
Furthermore, gaps may be particularly significant. We may assume that 
processes leading to a change in the framework of governance involve as a 
central facet the “deficiencies” of this framework, recognizing that the 
terminology employed (the market failures, the governance failures, the 
gaps between rhetoric and reality, the improvements, etc.) may vary as 
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much as the preferred outcome, cf. Krasner above. Whatever terminology 
one prefers, the change may draw heavily on and retain a number of facets 
of the existing framework, but – by definition – the need and difference 
above imply deficiencies or gaps. As Keck and Sikkink have argued in 
their discussion of accountability politics:  
 
‘Networks devote considerable energy to convincing governments and 
other actors to publicly change their positions on issues. This is often 
dismissed as inconsequential change, since talk is cheap and governments 
sometimes change discursive positions hoping to divert network and public 
attention. Network activists, however, try to make such statements into 
opportunities for accountability politics. Once a government has publicly 
committed itself to a principle – for example, in favor of human rights or 
democracy – networks can use those positions, and their command of 
information, to expose the distance between discourse and practice. This is 
embarrassing to many governments, which may try to save face by closing 
that distance.’156  
 
The gap between rhetoric and reality – the law, the norms and public 
statements of commitment vis-à-vis the patterns of enforcement and 
corporate labor practices – may come in different forms. In many (child 
labor/labor) cases, legislation may have been in place for decades or even 
longer, but the framework may be characterized by an ineffective or 
inconsequential pattern of enforcement on part of the public authorities 
charged with this task.157 In such cases, the gap may not be a new one and 
it may be formally associated with the responsible authorities. Yet, might 
we not expect to see a process pattern similar to Keck and Sikkink’s 
boomerang pattern in the sense that actors other than the local state 
authorities failing to enforce the existing regulation are targeted (with all 
that this entails in terms of struggles to define the problem, availability and 
application of mechanisms of economic coercion…)? And, moreover, 
might we not expect that those targets – when it comes to labor rights 
issues involving, to a considerable extent, global supply chains and 
business partners in other countries – be  the corporations that (appear to) 
dominate the supply chains? 
 
                                          
156 Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders, p. 24. 
 
157 See e.g. Myron Weiner’s characterization of ’The Rhetoric’ and ’The Reality’ of 
Indian politics on child labor and compulsory, universal, primary education; Weiner, 
The Child and the State in India, pp. 7-15. 
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Of course, the gap may also exist in the form of an absence of formal rules 
and public legislation. Such an absence, and its normative underpinnings, 
may be assumed to be as significant as any actual rules and regulations, in 
particular when it comes to the “non-regulation” of specific aspects or 
issues where such nonregulation may be held out as unreasonable by virtue 
of the characteristics of the problem as well as the characteristics of the 
framework of governance applicable to closely related aspects or issues. 
Consider the following statement by U.S. Senator Tom Harkin, for 
example:  
 
‘Our laws prohibit the importation of ivory, endangered species such as 
the spotted turtle, and products made from prison labor. Yet, our laws fall 
silent when it comes to goods made through the exploitation of children. 
We look out for animals and prisoners, but fail to protect youngsters from 
exploitive and abusive labor.’158 
 
Industry characteristics: power, control, vulnerability 
 
Finally, we must assume that certain industry characteristics may 
significantly contribute to shaping any process and outcome related to 
corporate responsibility and the governance of child labor and core labor 
rights. To begin with, the basic nature of the industry or business must be 
assumed to be related to the characteristics of problem and in particular to 
the types of issues potentially subject to a problematization. To this basic 
nature of the industry we might add the preferred mode of operation (e.g., 
do major TNCs often engage in joint-venture partnerships with foreign 
governments?), the degree of asset specificity, and the prime location 
factor (e.g., low-cost labor or market access?).159  
 
Extractive industries and companies, for example, generally have quite 
high asset specificity and long investment horizon but a relatively lower 
interest in low-cost labor. Their socioenvironmental (human rights) 
impacts, on the other hand, are often quite grave in material terms as well 
as being highly symbolic. Moreover, since the wave of decolonization and 
oil industry nationalizations in the late 1960s and 1970s, international oil 
companies have been partnering up with the national oil companies of 
                                          
158 Tom Harkin, ‘Put an End to the Exploitation of Child Labor’ in USA Today 
Magazine, January 1996. 
 
159 See e.g. Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector, p. 25. 
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various host countries. This can become problematic if the government 
partner is severely repressive, cf. the controversy over the trial and 
execution of Ken Saro-Wiva and the role of Royal Dutch/Shell in Nigeria, 
or when the government partner is more or less absent in the area in terms 
of social institutions and/or regulation of socio-environmental impacts, as 
in the case of Texaco in Ecuador.160  
 
When focusing on child labor and core labor rights, in turn, we are more 
likely to encounter industries involving labor-intensive and, often, fairly 
low-skill labor, the cost of labor tending to be an important location factor. 
Compared to extractive industries, moreover, there will be a relatively 
lower asset specificity and a comparatively shorter investment horizon. As 
Haufler notes, however, this combination – the relocation of production to 
exploit low-cost labor – is precisely what makes such companies likely 
targets for criticism, and – in some cases – susceptible to pressure. 
 
Yet, if these are assumed to be characteristics more generally applicable to 
this or that industry per se, how can we explain the involvement (or lack 
thereof) of some companies or groups of companies, whether in serving as 
targets or in their engagement in the struggles to define the problem and 
solution? If we are to analyze and explain more concrete processes and 
outcomes, we need to analyze more concretely the competitive dynamics 
and the positions of power, control and vulnerability embedded within 
industry structure. These positions (relations) of power, control and 
vulnerability hold constraints and potentials of potential significance to 
different parts of the processes to be analyzed. Following the Global 
Commodity Chains approach (GCC), an industry may be conceived, and 
analyzed, in terms of i) the territoriality of the chain, i.e. the spatial 
dispersions or concentration of production and distribution networks; ii) 
the input-output structure, i.e. a description of the sequence of value-
adding economic activities in terms of nodes, activities, roles and 
relationships; iii) the governance structure, i.e. the authority and power 
relations determining how financial, material and human resources are 
allocated and flow within the chain; iv) the institutional framework, i.e. 
                                          
160 See e.g. Mitchell (ed.), Companies in a World of Conflict; Jedrzej George Frynas, 
‘Political instability and business: Focus on Shell in Nigeria’ in Third World Quarterly, 
Vol. 19, 1998, pp. 457-477; Skogly, ‘Complexities in Human rights Protection’; 
Andrew Rowell and Stephen Kretzmann, All For Shell (San Francisco; Project 
Underground, 1997). 
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the framework of national and international regulation relevant to the 
chain, including state development strategies and trade policies.161  
 
Theoretically we may furthermore place considerable emphasis here on the 
third of these dimensions, the governance structure, which is also central in 
the GCC approach as such. The first two dimensions above are primarily 
descriptive in nature, and although they are relevant in the analysis as a 
basis for understanding and analyzing the third dimension, the potential 
significance in theoretical and explanatory terms may reasonably be 
captured in the analysis of the governance structure and the positions of 
power, control and vulnerability that this entails. For example, a marked 
concentration in territorial terms of some activities in a given chain may 
imply that companies are not only more likely to operate with similar labor 
practices and working conditions, under a similar governance framework, 
but that they may therefore also to some degree tend to have a shared 
problem and a shared vulnerability to e.g. trade sanctions. The same 
argument applies to the institutional framework. While characterizing the 
framework of governance separately has already incorporated a central part 
of this in the analysis, the constraints and pressures stemming from quota-
related dynamics, triangle manufacturing, etc., may be incorporated into 
the analysis of positions of power, control and vulnerability.   
 
More specifically it is the distinction in terms of governance structure 
between dominant and subordinate nodes that I find to be particularly 
                                          
161 See Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz (eds.), Commodity Chains and Global 
Capitalism (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1994); in particular the 
contribution therein by Gary Gereffi, ‘The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global 
Commodity Chains: How U.S. Retailers Shape Overseas Production Networks’. Cf. 
also Richard P. Appelbaum and Gary Gereffi, ‘Power and Profits in the Apparel 
Commodity Chain’ in Edna Bonacich et.al. (eds.), Global Production: The Apparel 
Industry in the Pacific Rim (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994); Gary 
Gereffi, ‘Global production systems and third world development’ in Barbara Stallings 
(ed.), Global change, regional response: The new international context of development 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Gary Gereffi, ‘Global Commodity 
Chains: New Forms of Coordination and Control Among Nations and Firms in 
International Industries’ in Competition and Change, Vol. 1, 1996; Gary Gereffi, 
‘International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel commodity chain’ in 
Journal of International Economics, Vol. 48, 1999; Gary Gereffi, ‘Shifting Governance 
Structures in Global Commodity Chains, With Special Reference to the Internet’ in 
American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 44, No. 10, June 2001; Philip Raikes, Michael 
Friis Jensen and Stefano Ponte, Global Commodity Chain Analysis and the French 
Filière Approach: Comparison and Critique, CDR Working Paper 00.3, February 2000 
(Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research, 2000). 
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relevant.162 To begin with, we may assume that there are inter-nodal 
differences and intra-nodal similarities in terms of the positions of power, 
control and vulnerability and therefore in terms of the constraints and 
potentials in relation to a problematization, politicization and resolution of 
certain conditions and corporate responsibility. In other words, dominant 
nodes face similar constraints and potentials, as do subordinate nodes, and 
the constraints and pressures faced by dominant nodes differ significantly 
from those experienced by subordinate nodes.  
 
Subordinate nodes are, by definition, the less powerful agents within the 
industry. They are dependent on their industry partners, the more dominant 
nodes. Moreover, they tend to be under pressure from these more dominant 
nodes, in part related to the often more fragmented market structure and 
fiercer competition that tend to be characteristic of the industry bottom of 
the hierarchy.163 In relation to controversies over corporate responsibility, 
child labor and core labor rights, the typical example would be developing 
country manufacturers, engaged in labor-intensive production, dependent 
on exports and foreign buyers (i.e., little power and quite vulnerable). 
Dominant nodes, in turn, are, by definition, the more powerful, key agents. 
They may wield considerable market power and have a strong influence on 
how production is organized and carried out, including where and by 
whom. They, too, may face severe pressures, albeit this tends to be from 
their nodal companions, their competitors, and the market structure tends 
to be comparatively more concentrated. These are, in other words, the 
agents that one would expect to have the power to influence and shape the 
practices of their partners and a controversy over corporate responsibility. 
                                          
162 Another common distinction is that between buyer-driven and producer-driven 
chains. While buyer-driven chains to a higher degree than producer-driven chains tend 
to be associated with labor intensive production, and therefore might be a useful and 
relevant distinction in this dissertation, it is not a distinction without problems. See e.g. 
Raikes, Friis Jensen and Ponte, Global Commodity Chain Analysis, p. 7 and 22, and 
Gereffi, ‘International trade and industrial upgrading’. Moreover, in theoretical and 
explanatory terms it is a less relevant distinction in that it is based on a broad 
typologization of industrial organization possibilities. In other words, although we may 
establish a broad, typological correlation between one type of chain and one type of 
corporate responsibility issues, for example, in order to analyze and explain concrete 
processes and outcomes, we need to go beyond the typology and theorize, analyze the 
positions of power, control and vulnerability in a given chain. This will, of course, 
show whether the given chain is a predominantly buyer-driven or producer-driven 
chain. 
 
163 E.g. Kate Raworth, Trading away our rights: Women working in global supply 
chains (Oxford: Oxfam International, 2004). 
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Yet, power is a double-edged sword, and the dominant position often 
comes with its own share of vulnerability and targetability: in 
problematizing conditions somewhere in a global commodity chain, 
Baptists and bootleggers alike generally acknowledge the social and 
symbolic power involved in focusing on the large, dominant and often 
well-known industry players involved – as well as recognizing that these 
are very often the actual power-holders of the global commodity chains 
and therefore have the capacity to impose changes in CSR on their 
subordinate GCC-partners.164    
 
In relation to struggles to define the problem, for example, I would assume 
that key agents within the dominant node(s) are more likely to be drawn 
into these, and that they are both more able and willing to engage in these 
than are subordinate industry players. The same applies to the processes of 
modelling the solution – not all companies are in a position where they are 
willing and able, not to mention even expected or invited, to negotiate with 
other non-industry players, perhaps on part of broader sections of the 
industry. The positions of power, control and vulnerability may also be 
significant in relation to targeting and economic coercion, the constraints 
and potentials relating both to the identity and quality of potential targets 
and the means of economic coercion available, but bearing also on the 
constraints and potentials of handling the spotlight (e.g., re-targeting by 
passing on the blame, which not all companies can allow themselves to do) 
and economic pressure, actual or threatened.  
 
We nevertheless have to assume that there are also significant intra-nodal 
variations within the dominant node(s) as companies within the same 
node may occupy quite different positions and therefore face different 
constraints and potentials when it comes to a process related to corporate 
responsibility.165 Not all companies have the same significance in terms of 
shaping industrial organization, and the same goes for corporate 
responsibility processes and outcomes. First of all, the sheer size of a 
company may be significant. Companies within a dominant node include 
larger and smaller ones, not all of which wield the same power over their 
                                          
164 See Utting, Business Responsibility for Sustainable Development, and Naomi Klein, 
No Logo (London: Flamingo, 2000) for a similar argument. Cf. also Haufler’s emphasis 
on reputation as one of three factors driving the shift in industry self-regulation 
(Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector). 
 
165 There are variations within all nodes in a chain, but theoretically the emphasis is on 
the dominant node. 
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subordinates and the market. The size of a company may thus be 
significant, both in terms of the impacts of corporate activities and in terms 
of the quality of the company as a target, and larger companies are 
presumably more likely targets, even if they are no better or worse than the 
smaller companies in the same industry. This makes sense in more than 
one way if seen from a critic’s point of view, and the symbolism involved 
is hardly a new phenomenon. Already in the 19th century had the large oil 
companies and industry in the U.S. come to symbolize ‘everything that 
was sinister and secretive in modern industrial society.’166 Yet, it is evident 
that size alone cannot add sufficient nuance. Indeed size may be leveled 
out by other variations or preconditions. For example, a comparatively 
smaller oil company such as the Atlantic Richfield Corporation has 
received much more attention than has e.g. Sinopec, the Chinese national 
oil company which ranks among top 10 oil companies in the world.167  
 
Thus, I would add that corporate branding and image – including 
corporate history – may be a significant characteristic.168 While branding 
and image, unlike size, does not imply much about the (real or perceived) 
power to alter labor practices within the chain, returning to the argument 
above, corporate branding and image may be a strength to a particular 
corporation in some respects, but it may also be a double-edged sword: 
being ‘branded to the bone’169 not only constitutes a – material and 
ideational – ‘asset’ to control and protect but also makes a corporation 
more identifiable and symbolically salient as a target, both for NGOs and 
trade unions, but also for certain politicians, the media, etc.: in some cases, 
it is the corporate image and history that acts like flypaper on a hot summer 
day.  
 
                                          
166 Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World 
They Made (3rd edition) (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1993), p. 57. 
 
167 See e.g. Project Underground, ‘Ecuadorian Indigenous Tribes March Against Oil 
Development Project’, Drillbits & Tailings, Vol. 4, No. 14, Sept. 8, 1999. 
 
168 Haufler suggests that the degree to which reputation and brand name are important 
as assets (A Public Role for the Private Sector, p. 26) is significant – the more 
important, the more likely a race to the top. 
 
169 Klein, No Logo, p. 335. Cf. also Graham Knight and Josh Greenberg, 
‘Promotionalism and Subpolitics: Nike and Its Labor Critics’ in Management 
Communication Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 4, May 2002. 
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Furthermore, while companies may be comparatively more powerful in 
their main markets, their main markets also potentially constitute their 
main vulnerability. In other words, companies have more to loose from a 
controversy raging in their main market, and they are therefore assumed to 
be more susceptible to pressure and more likely to become involved in 
different parts of the process. We may, moreover, add that the main 
markets likely to be most significant are the U.S. and/or Europe: in 
empirical CSR terms, there are many examples where this has been the 
case. The assumption is moreover warranted in that, in commercial terms, 
these do constitute the main markets for many products.  
 
Third, and finally, it is well-recognized within the GCC literature that 
power (and, I would add, control and vulnerability) may involve positions 
other than subordinate and dominant nodes.170 One could venture into a 
further gradation of corporate positions within the commodity chain, but – 
with a view to analyzing and explaining political processes and outcomes – 
there is a more relevant alternative: the power, control and vulnerability of 
industry associations must be incorporated into the analysis.171 Such 
entities  may be (perceived to be) in positions of considerable power and 
influence, potentially representing large sections of an industry/node and 
potentially with moral and material sanction or control mechanisms vis-à-
vis industry players. Moreover, such an entity may constitute a central 
point of constraints and potentials vis-à-vis collective action problems 
within an industry. For example, from an industry outsider’s perspective an 
industry association may be seen as a natural target, a target through which 
to strike at the entire industry, a target through which to achieve broad-
based changes, etc., and from an industry perspective an association may 
provide a way of addressing certain issues behind closed doors and under a 
name other than company’s. 
 
4.4 Processes and interaction 
 
As stated earlier, processes of interaction are not only part of the actual 
story. They are also structured and patterned, and given the complexity of 
reality and the multiplicity of causations, abstraction ought to involve an 
                                          
170 See e.g. a discussion of this in Raikes, Friis Jensen and Ponte, Global Commodity 
Chain Analysis. 
 
171 Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation. 
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attempt at conceptualizing different forms of interaction, at identifying and 
describing the generic logics and tendencies associated with these. Yet, 
conceptualizing processes is an inherently difficult task. While one may 
think of a process as a whole, this actually consists of, and may be 
conceptualized in terms of, several interrelated processes and different 
forms of interaction. In other words, a framework and analysis 
incorporating multiple and interrelated variables is demanding, and part of 
the challenge relates to the view that discursive struggles to define the 
problem and economic coercion, for example, are ontologically distinct, 
though interrelated.  
 
Furthermore, the difficulty of the task is compounded by the fact that, as 
Oran Young has argued, ‘a major source of the limitations afflicting our 
understanding of regime formation lies in the facts that the process through 
which new institutional arrangements come into existence virtually always 
encompasses several distinct stages and that the political dynamics 
characteristic of the different stages are by no means the same.’172 In other 
words, the existing literature on processes of regime formation is relatively 
sparse when it comes to conceptualizing processes in terms of stages with 
potentially different dynamics – a point where Young’s argument is quite 
in line with e.g. Archer, in that during a process of social construction and 
interaction, the preconditions change. If, for example, no companies in a 
given industry or locality had explicit policies on child labor and core labor 
rights from the outset, and a significant part of them had after an initial 
period of focus on their labor practices, certainly the preconditions had 
changed for a potentially ongoing process. Thus, conceptually and 
analytically this implies a need to consider the potential effects on 
dynamics from shifting preconditions. As Oran Young has put it, ‘because 
the three stages of regime formation differ from one another with regard to 
their political dynamics, efforts to explain success or failure in this realm 
on the basis of propositions or models that assume a seamless or uniform 
process are doomed to failure. A satisfactory account of regime formation, 
one that can explain actual occurrences convincingly, will require separate 
but interconnected propositions concerning the several stages of the overall 
process.’173 
 
                                          
172 Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords, p. 2. 
 
173 Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords, pp. 2-3. 
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Young’s distinction between three stages – agenda formation, negotiation, 
and implementation – may be difficult to maintain in practice, as Young 
himself acknowledges:  
 
‘The three stages can and often do overlap, making it difficult to define a 
neat chronological separation of the stages in actual cases of regime 
formation. The agenda formation stage, for instance, sometimes involves 
hard bargaining over the identity of the parties to be accepted as 
participants in the negotiations to follow or the functional scope of a 
proposed institutional arrangement. Similarly, those negotiating the terms 
of a constitutive contract may seek to redefine the nature of the problem, 
even while they are hammering out the terms of an international 
accord.’174 
 
The problem resides not only with methodologically maintaining the 
distinction in practice. What Young is intent on capturing with his 
distinction, as I see it, is the difference in dynamics between e.g. agenda 
formation and negotiation. These, however, are not chronologically 
ordered, as Young also suggests in the quote, as the first and second of 
three stages. Young has provided some very helpful insights concerning 
e.g. the fluidity and openness of the agenda formation stage and the shift in 
dynamics that may be significant once negotiations begin, and these will 
be drawn upon below. But rather than the chronologically loaded 
distinction above, I prefer to distinguish instead between early and later 
stages as well as between situations where no negotiations are going on 
and situations where negotiations are going on. Agenda formation may run 
through several stages, as Young acknowledges; struggles to define the 
problem may be pertinent at all stages, for example, and while the 
commencement of negotiations may be a significant shift from one stage to 
another in terms of changing dynamics, more important shifts may occur 
within the earlier, formative stages. Moreover, negotiations may indeed 
occur quite early in the process, just as several runs of negotiations may 
occur during a process.  
 
Below I argue that the framework and analysis ought to include i) the 
struggles to define the problem, ii) targeting, iii) economic coercion, and 
iv) modelling the solution. I present propositions concerning the generic 
logics of each of these, their interrelations and the link to preconditions. By 
generic logics I think of, and seek to specify, the more abstract and real 
                                          
174 Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords, pp. 5-6. 
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patterns of dynamic interaction, typically in terms of patterns of action and 
reaction, where i) actions and reactions are thought of as being grounded in 
preconditions and may relate to other parts of the process, and where ii) 
reactions may be similar in kind to the action (e.g. targeting leads to re-
targeting on part of the target) or  they may differ from this (e.g. the target 
succumbs to the pressures and initiates or engages in negotiations).  
 
Struggles to define the problem 
 
‘The President of the Chamber denied the use of child labour in any 
process of the manufacture of footballs.’175  
 
Who cannot recall similar denials, whether by corporate executives, 
government officials or relatives in an argument over certain conditions, 
perhaps in reaction to allegations and assignments of blame directed at 
them? In any debate over responsibility – indeed, over governance per se – 
struggles to define the problem are a central part of the process and, 
thereby, of an explanation of its outcome: governance presupposes 
conditions or practices deemed amenable to and in need of governing, just 
as responsibility presupposes something for which to be (held) responsible.  
 
In abstract terms, the struggles to define the problem may be thought of as 
a process of claimsmaking, i.e., as interaction between a variety of 
claimsmakers engaged in discursive actions and reactions, in presenting 
claims and counterclaims.176 The Chamber of Commerce President above, 
for example, presented a claim in response to the HRCP’s inquiries, but in 
part also a counterclaim reacting to the preceding controversy and 
allegations, cf. part of the HRCP’s summary of the antecedents to their 
own report: ‘While the prevalence of child labour in Pakistan has been of 
continuous concern, recent reports appearing in the national and 
                                          
175 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Child labour in Pakistan, p. 10. 
 
176 It should be noted that calling something a claim implies no evaluation of the 
statement per se, cf. e.g. Joel Best, ‘Constructionism in Context’ in Joel Best (ed.), 
Images of Issues, p. 347. Cf. also Frank B. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, ’Agenda 
Dynamics and Policy Subsystems’ in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 53, No. 4, 
November 1991, p. 1045; Joseph W. Schneider, ‘Social Problems Theory: The 
Constructionist View’ in Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 11, 1985; Deborah A. 
Stone, ‘Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas’ in Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 104, No. 2 (Summer), 1989. See also Keck & Sikkink’s treatment of 
the framing of problems in their Activists beyond Borders. 
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international media have drawn added attention to the issue. These reports 
have generated controversy not only on facts, but also attitudes towards 
child labour. […] The sports goods industry, concentrated mainly in 
Sialkot, was the most recent target of criticism. The veracity, objectivity 
and motivation of reports by foreign media were challenged on the one 
hand by the exporters and manufacturers of these goods and on the other 
by the government of Pakistan.’ Similarly, based on their survey, the 
HRCP presented the claim, countering the Chamber of Commerce 
President’s claim on the previous page, that ‘Stitching constitutes 10% of 
the manufacturing process of a football. It is our estimate that 20 to 25% of 
the labour in this process is performed by children.’177 
 
More specifically, the process of claimsmaking may be thought of as being 
patterned in terms of typical actor positions and as having its own generic 
dynamics or logics, because claims reflect the underlying interests and 
perspectives of actors:  
 
‘[…] political actors deliberately portray [conditions, difficulties, or 
issues] in ways calculated to gain support for their side. And political 
actors, in turn, do not simply accept causal models that are given from 
science or popular culture or any other source. They compose stories that 
describe harms and difficulties, attribute them to actions of other 
individuals or organizations, and thereby claim the right to invoke 
government power to stop the harm.’178  
 
Struggles to define the problem involve a dynamic of minimizations and 
maximizations of diverging claims masquerading as statements of fact 
(truth claims) about certain conditions and the characteristics of the 
problem, where minimization–maximization is understood in terms of a 
divergence of claims rather than an evaluation of the accuracy of these. 
Typically, those that stand accused – industry players, government officials 
– tend to have an interest in “minimization”. After all, the problem claim 
involves a statement on culpability and responsibility with both moral and 
material implications, and when did a corporate executive ever claim that 
the problem was twice as bad as the labor activist had stated? Similarly, 
those making allegations – e.g. trade unionists and labor rights activists or 
media reporters engaged in producing “negative publicity” – typically have 
                                          
177 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Child labour in Pakistan, pp. 1, 10, and 11, 
respectively. 
 
178 Stone, ‘Causal’, p. 282. Cf. also Best, Damned Lies and Statistics, p. 131. 
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an interest in “maximization”. After all, presenting a problem as serious 
may help grow awareness and support for a cause, and scandals may help 
sell more papers. As Erich Goode points out, ‘counting dead bodies is a 
resource for the “claims-maker”.’179 
 
Thus, the process of claimsmaking is not merely a free flow of ideas. As 
argued earlier, an important element in understanding the preconditions for 
this is the industry structure and relations of power, control and 
vulnerability, just as the existing framework of governance may be quite 
significant. Moreover, it may be that, as Young has argued, the struggles to 
define the problem in the early stages (of agenda formation) are 
characterized by a comparatively higher degree of fluidity and openness, 
compared to later (negotiation) stages (further below). Yet, struggles to 
define the problem also occur within a context of constraints and potentials 
tied to the complex and multifaceted conditions that make up the 
characteristics of the problem, and the minimization–maximization logic 
will manifest itself in claims and counterclaims revolving around and 
drawing on the facets defined previously under characteristics of the 
problem (i.e. the existence, extent, gravity, il/legality and breadth/depth). 
The minimization–maximization logic, then, must be analyzed in terms of 
these facets, asking a number of questions: 
 
- What were the focal points, and did significant shifts occur during 
the process? I.e., around which facet(s) did the struggles to define 
the problem revolve at different stages in the process? Were some 
facets nonissues?  
 
- Why? I.e., what were the underlying interests and concerns of the 
actors involved? How did the focusing of struggles to define the 
problem relate to the preconditions, in particular the conditions 
analyzed under the characteristics of the problem? For example, 
were categorical denials of the existence of a problem simply 
untenable even in the shorter run? 
 
- What were the effects of this? In particular, did this result in 
significant shifts in other forms of interaction, and how did this 
contribute to creating given issues and nonissues in the modelling of 
the solution (further below)? I.e., did this imply that certain 
                                          
179 Goode, ‘The American Drug Panic’, p. 341. 
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conditions came to be seen as natural elements in a possible 
negotiation and solution? 
 
In addition to the above, a number of more specific propositions may now 
be articulated with respect to the manifestation of this minimization-
maximization logic and the struggles to define the problem. First of all, 
because of the minimization-maximization logic, struggles will often take 
the form of a stat war:  
 
‘Some statistics – such as the number of children abducted by strangers – 
lead to public controversies, open debates over numbers and their 
interpretation. We are told that guns kept in the home are rarely – no, 
frequently – used in self-defense, that they often – no, only rarely – kill 
family members. Environmentalist scientists estimate that water 
contaminated by nuclear power plants will cause many cancer deaths; 
scientists employed by the power industry insist that such deaths will be 
very rare. Such stat wars also intimidate us.’180  
 
Numbers not only intimidate, they also lend credibility to the claimsmaker 
and the truth claims vis-à-vis other claimsmakers and claims, cf. the 
Chamber of Commerce President vs. the HRCP’s estimate above, for 
example.  
 
Yet, minimizations and maximizations are not necessarily numerical, and 
in the concrete struggles to define the problem relativizations are likely to 
be a frequent alternative or complementary manifestation to stat wars. This 
is particularly evident in the case of minimizations, as in the following 
statement by the Pakistani Minister of State for Labour, Manpower and 
Overseas Pakistanis in 1996: ‘Child labour is not a serious problem in 
Pakistan when compared to the countries of this region.’181 
 
Moreover claims evoke a variety of reactions, as Joel Best has pointed 
out,182 and I would argue that we may distinguish between two types of 
reactions. On the one hand, a problem claim may evoke a reaction that 
counters the problem claim by shifting to another of the above problem 
                                          
180 Joel Best, Damned Lies and Statistics, p. 129. 
 
181 Quoted from Moosi Raza and Ansarul Haque, ‘Child labour is not a serious problem 
in Pakistan – Lasi’ in Economic Review, April 1996, Vol. 27, No. 4, p. 13. 
 
182 Best, ‘Constructionism in Context’, p. 350. 
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facets. If denials are untenable, we may expect the minimization-
maximization logic to manifest itself in terms of struggles over the extent 
and/or gravity of the problem. If the claimed extent and gravity are 
difficult to contest with any semblance of credibility, we may see a 
reaction centered on the breadth and/or depth of the problem (or we may 
see a reaction of the second type).  
 
On the other, a problem claim does not necessarily result in a counterclaim 
focused on the problem. It may be that a claim triggers a different kind of 
reaction, a shift to another type of interaction. For example, a claim may 
have the effect of triggering the commencement of negotiations (and 
counterclaims may subsequently be posited in a different forum under 
different pretenses, e.g. the practicalities of finding a common solution). 
The actual occurrence of such second type reactions must be assumed to be 
influenced by i) the potential of credibly and directly countering the claims 
of extent, gravity and il/legality, and ii) the potential implications of claims 
seeking to broaden and/or deepen the agenda (further below). For example, 
if the cocoa industry is presented with solid and credible evidence that 
child slavery is part of the commodity chain, we may see a struggle over 
the exact number of children, but this may be of secondary significance 
compared to a reaction and shift that this claim may trigger in the 
modelling of a solution. 
 
Furthermore, how the minimization–maximization logic manifests itself in 
terms of the breadth and depth of the problem is of central and 
fundamental significance to the struggles to define the problem – and to 
explaining the outcome and particular form of change in which the process 
results. Human rights issues do not appear with the same frequency on the 
agenda. Furthermore, they vary in terms of the significance they hold 
within the rationality expressed in particular events and sometimes also 
with respect to the techniques with which they become associated. In other 
words, issues are excluded and included, prioritized, understood and 
eventually governed in different ways. This has to do with issues and 
nonissues, with exclusions and inclusions of different facets and concerns, 
with the selective domestication of some, but not all, facets or issues (cf. 
the earlier discussion of mutual interests and distributional conflicts). Once 
again there is a generic logic of minimization and maximization: problem 
claims that seek to broaden the agenda and understanding of the problem, 
that seek to define the problem by also including the underlying causes or 
the consequences of the condition(s), and there are problem claims seeking 
to narrow the agenda by focusing on some facets or issues (at the expense 
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of other, excluded ones) and/or to water down the agenda and its potential 
ramifications for those responsible.  
 
The argument that breadth and depth constitute a central facet in the 
struggles to define the problem finds support among other things in works 
that stress situations characterized by a relative fluidity and openness of  
the agenda and issues, by transforming hierarchy and roles of actor, cf. for 
example Cox’ discussion of ‘new medievalism’, Keohane and Nye’s work 
on ‘complex interdependence’183, or Braithwaite and Drahos’ observation 
of the growing number of players in the international system.184 Moreover, 
breadth and depth in the struggles to define the problem are conceptually 
akin to what is more broadly discussed as issue-linkage, as in Krasner’s 
argument above that power may be significant in changing the payoff 
matrix (e.g. through tactical issue-linkage or threats).185 In the regime 
theory literature, tactical issue-linkage refers to the coupling of issues 
through the use of threats or promises for the purpose of transforming the 
situation structure toward one that is more conducive to one’s interests.186 
Linkage derives its significance from the fact that regimes and negotiation 
processes – or struggles – are generally ‘nested’ within broader regimes 
and processes, and linkage may serve as a mechanism to constitute a ‘zone 
of agreement’ where none such existed before. Braithwaite and Drahos 
                                          
183 In their Power & Interdependence, Keohane and Nye forward an ideal type – that of 
complex interdependence – alternative to the realist one of world politics. Complex 
interdependence is characterized by: a) the existence of multiple channels and 
participation of actors other than states; b) the existence of multiple issues and absence 
of clear hierarchy on international agenda; and c) the ineffectiveness of military force 
as an instrument (pp. 23-29). Unlike in Keohane’s After Hegemony, the assumption that 
states are crucial actors is rejected, and more emphasis is put on the political processes 
associated with complex interdependence: issue linkage strategies and issue structures 
of power will become increasingly central in determining the shape of world politics 
and complex interdependence; agenda formation and control will become more 
important and politicized; transnational and –governmental relations and networks will 
increasingly affect political bargaining; and international organizations will 
increasingly affect issue-definition, linkage possibilities, agenda-setting, and coalition-
formation (Power & Interdependence, pp. 29-37). 
 
184 Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation, p. 292 and 564. 
 
185 Krasner, ‘Global Communications and National Power’, p. 340. 
 
186 See E. Haas, ‘Why Collaborate?’; Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business 
Regulation, p. 30; Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, Theories of international 
regimes, p. 51. 
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suggest that this may happen in either of two ways: through the linkage of 
two non-reciprocal externalities with the effect of transforming the 
situation-structure into one characterized by a reciprocal externality and 
process of adjustment; linkage by a hegemonic actor of issues on its own 
terms, creating a situation of non-reciprocal coordination.187 Examples of 
relevance to CSR include attempts to link trade and core labor standards at 
various levels, the linkage of property rights and trade, or – in the case of 
the pharmaceutical industry – of property rights and the rights to health and 
life of millions of South Africans.  
 
Braithwaite and Drahos suggest that trade issues and the trade regime are 
the most significant linkage targets for those seeking to strengthen their 
agenda on another issue.188 More narrowly conceived, it might be argued 
that child labor constitutes such a linkage target or focal point in relation to 
a number of other labor standards and human rights. Yet, one may also 
speak of de-linkage when exclusions of issues or concerns are involved. As 
the following quote illustrates, the power of focal points may be a double-
edged sword, both a resource with respect to placing something on the 
agenda, but potentially also so much of a focal point that other things 
remain nonissues or are more easily excluded:  
 
‘The particularization of children’s rights issues – isolating children’s 
rights issues from issues of class, race, and gender – has become a 
convenient means of avoiding direct engagement with the political and 
economic realities of the emerging global economy.’189  
 
Thus, while issue-linkage may serve a wide variety of interests, de-linkage 
is directly related to the selective domestication of certain “new” ideas and 
to the exclusion of others.190 
 
In the final part of this subsection, let me seek to clarify what has already 
been commented upon a couple of times above: how the struggles to define 
the problem relate to different stages in a process as well as to the other 
                                          
187 Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation, p. 292 and 317. 
 
188 Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation, p. 536. 
 
189 Jude L. Fernando, ‘Children’s Rights: Beyond the Impasse’ in The Annals of The 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, AAPSS, 575, May 2001, p. 12. 
 
190 Utting, Business Responsibility for Sustainable Development, p. 23. 
 101
types of interaction. As for the former, we may follow Young in seeing 
earlier stages, and certainly stages where no negotiations have yet begun, 
as being characterized by a comparatively higher degree of openness and 
fluidity with regards to the definition of the problem (among other things), 
where the struggles to define the problem to a considerable extent are 
shaped by i) the agency of maximizing claimsmakers – e.g. labor rights 
activists or trade unionists as well as media reporters – for whom symbolic 
focal points, issue-linkage and targeting are essential, and ii) either flat-out 
denials of the existence of the claimed conditions or the scattered and 
cautious minimizing counterclaims of some business, state and possibly 
some NGO actors. We may, of course, see a significant shift of the second 
type above – i.e., a problem claim is followed by a different type of 
interaction – for instance if the maximizing claimsmakers are successful in 
pushing a symbolic issue onto the agenda. Short of this, however, active 
and open counterclaims seeking to minimize the problem are not likely to 
be significant in the very early stages. Attempts at re-defining and 
minimizing the problem are likely to become more significant if/when 
agenda formation proceeds and/or industry actors are targeted or see a 
potential role in building a compromise. 
 
In the later stages, and if/when negotiations get underway, we may assume 
that certain givens concerning the definition of the problem have been 
established, and that the stakes have become more real for those involved 
or affected – both of which constitute a shift in the dynamics. The 
struggles to define the problem, now involving more clearly defined issues 
and nonissues, have now become more directly related to the modelling of 
the solution, and a variety of models may already be in play. Under such 
circumstances, struggles to define the problem are likely to continue, but 
they are likely to become more focused on a few points of contention, 
where a) activists and critics will continue to struggle for a broadening or a 
deepening of the agenda to incorporate more of their concerns, and where 
b) business and state actors, and possibly some moderate NGOs, will 
continue minimizing the problem by attempting to define the problem as 
less problematic or differently, while also struggling to narrow or water 
down the implications of the prevailing definition so as to be able to 
selectively domesticate the most prominent and/or less demanding aspects 
into a solution, and where c) back channeling and what may be termed the 
inside-outside dynamics – i.e., the struggles inside and outside the 
negotiation group are intertwined and deliberately aimed at influencing one 
another – significantly shape the struggles to define the problem. 
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It is obvious, then, that the struggles to define the problem are closely 
related to modelling in the process. First of all, the struggles to define the 
problem are central to the establishment of given issues and nonissues at 
the commencement of negotiations (but struggles to define the problem do 
not end here). Moreover, in addition to what was stated just above, the 
early and sometimes isolated and individual modelling efforts occur within 
the context of more open and less structured definitions of the problem. 
Yet, struggles to define the problem, even in the early stages, are often be 
shaped by the fact that actors are precipitating the process of modelling the 
solution later in the process.191 That this applies in particular to struggles 
over breadth and depth was argued above, yet (de-)linkage is more directly 
related to modelling than that: both linkage and de-linkage may seek 
and/or rely heavily on forum-shifting192 – and vice-versa – for the 
achievement of the underlying purpose (further below).  
 
Struggles to define the problem are moreover closely related to economic 
coercion. The availability of particular mechanisms of economic coercion, 
the potential application thereof as well as the potential ramification of 
such an application may i) have profound effects on how different actors 
seek to define the problem, and ii) be significant in terms of profoundly 
influencing the likely shape and success of different definitions, e.g. by 
forcing others to react to and/or accept certain problem claims rather than 
others. For example, if trade regulation bans the importation of goods 
made using slave labor, allegations of the use of slave labor may not only 
be a symbolically powerful way of framing the issue. It may also be a 
problem claim that forces others, in part through the potential economic 
implications of a stop to imports, to react and to react in certain ways. 
 
Targeting: struggles over blame and responsibility  
 
‘Problem definition is a process of image making, where the images have 
to do fundamentally with attributing cause, blame, and responsibility.’193 
 
                                          
191 Cf. e.g. Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords; Stone, ‘Causal Stories’, p. 283. 
 
192 As the word indicates, this has to do with shopping around and attempting to select 
or shift to the forum that will increase the possibility of achieving one’s interests. 
 
193 Stone, ‘Causal Stories’, p. 282; emphasis added. 
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Problem claims and the attribution of blame and responsibility, while 
intricately related, are two different things, and they ought therefore to be 
conceptualized and analyzed separately. Problem claims, as defined above, 
relate to the minimization-maximization logics and the multifaceted 
conditions, whereas targeting has to do with the focusing in on particular 
actors or groups of actors in attributing blame and ascribing responsibility 
during the process (including the possibility that blame and responsibility 
are attributed to a broader range of actors and/or systemic pressures). In 
short, my argument is that targeting may be of fundamental significance (to 
explaining the coming into existence and form of a particular piece of 
governance) in that it involves the selection of actors – the inclusion and 
exclusion of actors, the creation of “natural” participants in negotiations, of 
“obvious” partners to agreements – which may obviously have profound 
implications for modelling efforts and the particular form of agreement that 
may or may not subsequently be entered into.194  
 
In abstract terms, we may think of targeting as involving a generic logic 
consisting of actions or claims, focusing on particular actors or groups of 
actors in attributing blame and responsibility, and of reactions or 
counterclaims, which include various forms of rejections, denials and 
acceptances as well as potential re-attributions of blame and responsibility 
(further below). Moreover, struggles over the attribution of blame and 
responsibility revolve around and are partially determined by (causal 
beliefs and stories of) controllability and intentionality: blaming someone 
that was obviously well-intentioned and/or unable to control a certain event 
is unlikely to result in any negative evaluation and assignment of 
responsibility, whereas blaming the cynically ill-intentioned actor in full 
control stands a better chance of creating such an evaluation and 
assignment. Similarly, the demonstration of good intentions and/or 
uncontrollability – for instance by locating the “true” cause elsewhere 
(e.g., blaming others) or by claiming the cause to be unstable and 
temporary (e.g. isolated and short-lived incidents) – are conducive to less 
negative, if not sympathetic or positive, evaluations and a non-attribution 
of responsibility.195  
                                          
194 Cf. e.g. Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords, pp. 9-10, and Krasner (above) on 
the selection of participants and the use of power in determining who gets to play. 
 
195 See e.g. Bernard Weiner, ’An attributional approach to perceived responsibility for 
transgressions: Extensions to child abuse, punishment goals and political ideology’ in 
Ann E. Auhagen and Hans-Werner Bierhoff (eds.), Responsibility: The many faces of a 
social phenomenon (London: Routledge, 2001) , pp. 50-51. 
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As Deborah Stone has put it,  
 
’In politics, causal theories are neither right nor wrong, nor are they 
mutually exclusive. They are ideas about causations, and policy politics 
involves strategically portraying issues so that they fit one causal idea or 
another. The different sides in an issue act as if they are trying to find the 
“true” cause, but they are always struggling to influence which idea is 
selected to guide policy. Political conflicts over causal stories are, 
therefore, more than empirical claims about sequences of events. They are 
fights about the possibility of control and the assignment of 
responsibility.’196  
 
Yet, it is not the stories of controllability and intentionality per se that are 
central: we need instead to take the attribution-reaction logic above one 
step further in terms of patterns of attribution and reaction. In doing so, 
controllability and intentionality – in their capacity as prerequisite 
elements in targeting claims and as partial determinants (constraints and 
potentials) of the struggles over blame and responsibility –are helpful in 
conjunction with the preconditions discussed in the previous section. 
 
Let us begin by considering attribution. First of all, if we assume that there 
will always be more than one potential culprit to blame and hold 
responsible, it follows that we need to see the selection of targets as part of 
the pattern of attribution (it also follows that we need to incorporate the 
possibility of re-attributions as part of the pattern of reactions below). 
What determines the selection of targets? Short of coincidence and 
idiosyncratic reasons for attributions of blame and responsibility, in many 
cases the selection of targets will in part be determined by a combination 
of on-the-ground and “local” concerns and opportunities – for instance if a 
“local” NGO, trade union or reporter are not just thinking, but also acting 
and organizing locally (whether by need or volition).197 In many cases, 
however, even such “local” concerns will result in targeting that turns the 
                                          
196 Stone, ‘Causal Stories’, p. 283. 
 
197 That is, as opposed to linking up with transnational networks and to thinking and 
acting in the ways prescribed by Stefano Varese, ‘Think Locally, Act Globally’ in 
NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1991; cf. also Michael Kearney and 
Stefano Varese, ‘Latin America’s Indigenous Peoples: Changing Identities and Forms 
of Resistance’ in Sandor Halebsky and Richard L. Harris (eds.), Capital, Power, and 
Inequality in Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). 
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process into a transnational one, even if this is not necessarily ideal in the 
eyes of all “locals.”198  
 
In both local and transnational cases, however, the selection of targets is 
shaped by the quality of targets. It may be argued that the possibility of 
credibly claiming some degree of controllability and intentionality will 
vary across the range of potential targets: some are (seen to be) more 
powerful than others, some (seen to be) more closely involved in daily and 
practical management of those conditions concerned. In addition, the 
quality of targets depends on those industry characteristics treated 
earlier.199 So, the initial discussion of inter-nodal differences would suggest 
that actors within the dominant node are more likely targets, in part 
because of the power they hold or are seen to hold. In addition, the 
subsequent discussion of intra-nodal differences within the dominant node 
suggests that the more likely and prominent targets are i) companies within 
the dominant node of their particular commodity chain, ii) relatively large 
companies and/or industry leaders, iii) high-profile brands (reiterating that 
this includes corporate history, and that the profile may be a negative 
social responsibility track record), and iv) in particular U.S./European 
companies.  
 
As argued, such characteristics are double-edged swords in that they 
increase the likelihood of being targeted: symbolically powerful 
dichotomies appear to be a general feature of the discursive practices of 
those critical of business conduct, suggesting that targeting is shaped by 
the way in which these are drawn upon in combinations of characteristics 
of the problem and the above industry characteristics, for instance in 
victim-perpetrator dichotomies (e.g. young child laborer in poor 
developing country vs. giant branded corporation from the West) or in 
symbolic contrasts between facets of the labor conditions associated with 
the production processes and the use and/or marketing of the products 
made (e.g. slavery in production of leisure products, child labor in sports 
and kids’ products). The characteristics above imply that those to which 
they apply are likely to be of greater interest to the media, and the power 
implied in the characteristics also imply the power of acting as a setter of 
standards for practice (controllability, intent) as well as potential 
                                          
198 Cf. e.g. Henry Frundt, ’Cross-Border Organizing in the Apparel Industry: Lessons 
from Central America and the Caribbean’ in Labor Studies Journal, Spring 1999. 
 
199 See e.g. Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders, pp. 207 – 209, for a discussion 
of target characteristics, vulnerability and sensitivity. 
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ramifications of achieving a change in corporate practices, i.e. a spread of 
responsibility to their GCC subordinates, that industry critics may cherish. 
 
Yet, it also follows that actors in subordinate nodes may be likely targets if 
the problematized conditions are within their factory gates (i.e., they are in 
daily and practical control). In particular, they may be secondary targets in 
the sense that they are not the “real” culprits – they are simply part of a 
story where the blame and responsibility are actually attributed to more 
powerful economic agents and/or the economic system as such.  
 
Finally, the selection of targets may, in combination with the above, be 
significantly influenced by the availability to those attributing blame and 
responsibility of specific mechanisms of economic coercion.   
 
Secondly, the pattern of attribution may furthermore be specified and 
analyzed in terms of a number of characteristics of the targeting that 
influence the potential outcomes. More specifically, the persistency of the 
attributions may be significant, where persistency is understood in terms of 
the number of attributing acts and the period of time over which these 
attributions are actualized: the more attributing acts and the longer the 
period, the heavier the pressure.  In addition, the degree of unanimity in 
attributions may also be significant: if all fingers are pointing in the same 
direction, the heavier the pressure; in contrast, the more directions in which 
fingers are pointing, the easier to duck. Furthermore, the voices of 
attribution may be significant, both in terms of the position and 
prominence of the attributor (being hung out to dry on national television 
may be worse than an obscure web log that nobody reads anyway) and in 
terms of the number of voices (the more, the merrier – or, for the target, 
possibly the greater the number of voices, the worse).  
 
Third, the pattern of attribution may involve one or more potentially quite 
significant shifts, i.e. shifts in target selection and in the quality of 
targeting. For example, attributions may shift from subordinate to 
dominant node agents, from companies to industry associations, from 
industry players to governmental bodies. Such shifts, of course, may be 
significant if the selection of a new target that is more vulnerable and 
susceptible to pressure helps break futile targeting efforts (or, perhaps, a 
negotiation deadlock).  
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In moving on to the pattern of reactions, let us begin by considering the 
potentials for counterclaims and reactions by targets. Here, we may draw 
upon Leo Montada’s typology of a variety of reactions or counters to ‘deny 
or reduce an actor’s responsibility’:200 
 
i) Denial of agency 
ii) Lack of foreseeability of consequences 
iii) Lack of intent 
iv) Assigning co-responsibility to others 
v) Displacing responsibility 
vi) Mental retardation and developmental immaturity 
vii) Lack of adequate socialization and education 
viii) Denial of having caused damages or harm 
 
The last reaction – the denial of having caused damages or harm – is a 
counter that shifts to another type of interaction in my terminology: the 
reaction takes the form of a (re-)definition of the problem – it does not 
exist! The other reactions, in turn, are responses that, in my terminology, 
“stay” within targeting and counter the attribution, as opposed to a reaction 
shifting to another form of interaction. While vi) and vii), as formulated by 
Montada, do not seem directly applicable to many CSR cases, the core of 
the two reactions corresponds to arguments by companies that, for 
example, they had just entered into the market or production of a certain 
product, had just taken up production in a certain locality, that they had not 
been aware of or capable of dealing with the problem – or society’s 
changing expectations.201 Thus, these two reactions may be grouped 
together with the first three as forms of denial of responsibility, i.e. 
reactions that simply deny responsibility without seeking to deny or 
otherwise re-define the problem as posed and without seeking to divert 
blame and responsibility onto others. The assignment of co-responsibility 
to others and the displacement of responsibility onto others, in turn, are 
reactions re-targeting others, in part or in whole denying and diverting or 
re-attributing responsibility. In other words, we may distinguish between 
two overall types of reactions that do not shift to another type of 
interaction: denials and diversions.  
 
                                          
200 Leo Montada, ‘Denial of responsibility’ in Ann E. Auhagen and Hans-Werner 
Bierhoff (eds.), Responsibility, pp. 82-84. 
 
201 See e.g. Philip Watts, ‘The international petroleum industry: economic actor or 
social activist?’ in John V. Mitchell (ed.), Companies in a World of Conflict. 
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Not all targets, however, are equally willing and able to deny and divert. 
First of all, as noted above, subordinate agents within a commodity chain 
may be vulnerable targets, but they also tend to be dependent upon their 
more dominant business partners. Thus, if targeted, they may seek to 
cautiously deny and/or divert (to their subordinates), but they are in a 
difficult position where persistent denials may end up being costly, and 
where diverting responsibility onto the dominant actors may not be a wise 
course of action. The dominant companies, in turn, are in a better position, 
vis-à-vis their subordinate business partners, to expend energy in denying 
and/or diverting responsibility, but the extent to which they choose to do so 
in part depends upon their own potential vulnerabilities: companies that are 
vulnerable on a number of counts, cf. the previous subsection, may not be 
able to persistently and exclusively rely on denials of responsibility, nor 
may they be able to publicly and directly persist in diverting responsibility 
onto unfortunate others.  
 
However, in many such cases, we may see an alternative reaction that does 
not involve a denial or diversion of responsibility but instead an attempt to 
deny or reduce blameworthiness, i.e. reactions that ‘confirm the actor’s 
responsibility for their actions but give reasons why they acted or had to 
act the way they did, reasons which are intended to deny or reduce 
blameworthiness.’202 Such reactions, however, will often involve not only 
an acknowledgement of responsibility but also a shift in the process to 
another type of interaction, i.e. modelling the solution – where, it is worth 
noting, actual and economic responsibility may in practice and less 
publicly be diverted onto others. 
 
As far as different stages in a process are concerned, a number of 
propositions can be made concerning targeting. We may, again, follow 
Young’s observation that the early stages tend to be characterized by 
fluidity and openness, and this applies not only to the problem definition 
but also to targeting. Here, the selection of the “right” targets and the 
quality of targeting are essential to the formation of an agenda, coupled 
with the availability of economic coercion (below). If less prominent and 
less vulnerable targets are selected, an agenda may fail to develop and it 
may turn into a drawn-out war of positions, which may place unexpected 
strains on the resources of the attributing party or parties. Moreover, this 
                                          
202 Montada, ‘Denial of responsibility’, p. 82 and 84-85. These arguments include 
references to benevolent intent, to positive effects or benefits, to the “victim” being 
informed and consenting, etc. 
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may be exacerbated by a poor quality in targeting, and a combination may 
result in the slow death of a process.  
 
This being said, however, it should be pointed out that in cases where trade 
sanctions or other forms of economic coercion are available, the above 
may look very different. The selection of targets as well as the reactions of 
these may be shaped by the particular form of economic coercion 
available. Moreover, in many cases, the preconditions are not a clean sheet, 
and situations may, in other words, often be much less fluid and open: 
attributors and targets as well as audiences and publics will in many cases 
have a history, an experience and a recollection of earlier or similar 
precursors. It could therefore be argued that targeting in the concrete case  
will increasingly be characterized by i) a tendency in the selection of 
targets where the targets are the usual suspects, some of which become 
symbols (either the prominent do-gooders or the obstinate no-gooders), 
and by ii) a tendency toward more acknowledgements and shifts to other 
types of interaction due to growing constraints in terms of denying or 
diverting.203 Similarly, where a broader agenda has been developing on 
certain issues related to corporate responsibility and/or where the particular 
targets have been in the spotlight before, the likelihood that a reaction to 
new attributions of blame and responsibility results in a shift to modelling 
– even in the early stages of a particular process – is much greater. 
 
In the later stages of a process, assuming that multi-party negotiations or 
some other form of broader modelling efforts have begun, targeting may be 
very significant if i) attempts at forum-shifting and/or issue-linkage are 
made, either by industry or nonindustry players, or if ii) such modelling 
efforts either do not involve a sufficient number of targets, and/or iii) if the 
efforts are torn by conflicts (in which case, outside pressure through 
sustained targeting may interact with the interaction inside the negotiating 
group). If, on the other hand, the targets involved in such modelling efforts 
have been successful in engaging other “stakeholders” and in 
demonstrating a degree of willingness to contribute to resolving the 
problem, actual targeting may become irrelevant in the later stages 
(although the potential of being targeted for a failure of such efforts 
continues to be significant). The rise to dominance of the notions and 
techniques of partnership and stakeholder dialogue, which have been 
important in all three of my cases and well beyond, and which are often 
“debated” in policy-oriented and positive discourses that ask few if any 
                                          
203 This is in line with Keck and Sikkink’s discussion of accountability politics; 
Activists beyond Borders, pp. 24-25. 
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critical questions,204 may be seen to reflect not only broader ideological 
tendencies, but also in the concrete as reflecting attempts at internalizing 
targeting to some extent via the creation of a new forum. This may, of 
course, be referred to as a “learning network” of some sort,205 as the only 
way of moving beyond the blindness of one-dimensional codes and 
traditional decision-making criteria of business, etc.206 Partnerships and 
stakeholder dialogues, however, must also be seen as having potentially 
significant effects on the structural pre-conditions for and patterns of 
interaction related to targeting.207 
 
The above, of course, relates explicitly to modelling the solution. To be 
specific, targeting is seen to relate to modelling in two main ways: one, it 
potentially influences the selection of actors, “natural” partners or parties 
to an agreement or a negotiation group; two, it may significantly influence 
the negotiation dynamics, in particular through forum-shifting and issue-
linkage, but also through the inside-outside pressures mentioned above.  
 
Economic coercion 
 
As argued earlier, and as with the other explanatory elements, we cannot 
simply treat the changes in corporate responsibility in ahistorical and 
apolitical terms and ignore the productive potentials of economic power 
and influence. As Garvey and Newell have argued, ‘What may be labelled 
CSR issues today are often a product of many decades of conflict over 
                                          
204 E.g. Jane Nelson and Simon Zadek, Partnership Alchemy: New Social Partnerships 
in Europe (Copenhagen: The Copenhagen Centre, 2000). One exception is Bryn Jones, 
Citizens, Partners or Patrons? Corporate Social Responsibility and Patronage 
Capitalism (Draft working paper presented to the Work, Employment & Society 
Conference, University of Nottingham, September 2001). Haufler also includes a 
critical discussion in her A Public Role for the Private Sector. 
 
205 John G. Ruggie, ‘The Theory and Practice of Learning Networks’; George Kell and 
John G. Ruggie, Global Markets ad Social Legitimacy: The Case of the ‘Global 
Compact’ (Paper presented at the conference “Governing the Public Domain beyond 
the Era of the Washington Consensus? Redrawing the Line Between the State and the 
Market”, November 4-6, 1999, York University, Canada). 
 
206 Peter Pruzan and Ole Thyssen, ‘Conflict and Consensus: Ethics as a Shared Value 
Horizon for Strategic Planning’ in  Human Systems Management, Vol. 9, No. 3. 
 
207 See Utting, Business Responsibility for Sustainable Development. Cf. also Jones, 
Citizens, Partners or Patrons? 
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resources that constitute ongoing historical struggles for corporate and 
state accountability and should be understood in this context.’208 Moreover, 
recalling the earlier discussion of materialism and idealism, and bearing in 
mind Cox’ suggestion that we may distinguish between three interrelated 
types of social forces, the preceding elements in the present section may be 
said to have emphasized the ideational and normative, discursive aspects of 
interaction, whereas economic coercion entails an incorporation of a more 
material emphasis. 
 
The point of departure, more specifically, for this element of the 
explanatory framework is that economic coercion or pressure is likely, in 
one way or the other, to be significant both to the coming into existence 
and to the particular form of change in corporate responsibility and 
governance, both in and of itself and through interrelating with other forms 
of interaction, e.g. shaping struggles to define the problem above. Yet, if 
the literature on sanctions and economic coercion does not immediately 
seem to lend support to such a point of departure, in the sense of being 
rather skeptical towards the ‘success rate’ of such sanctions, let us begin by 
considering the following findings and arguments of Daniel W. Drezner on 
economic coercion:  
 
‘Game-theoretic models of economic coercion point out that the success 
rate of sanctions may be understated because of selection effects: the most 
successful coercion episodes are likely to end before sanctions are 
imposed. A preliminary test of 195 episodes of sanctions used or 
threatened in the pursuit of economic or regulatory goals supports this 
argument. A majority of these cases ended without sanctions being 
imposed. The correlation between sanctions imposition and a failure to 
generate concessions is statistically significant. […] in focusing only on 
those instances when sanctions have been imposed, policy analysts have 
overlooked the significant number of instances in which the threat of 
coercion did not have to be carried out. These cases are far more likely to 
generate successful outcomes than when sanctions are imposed. 
                                          
208 Garvey and Newell, Corporate accountability to the poor, p. 3. While this is not my 
errand, the theoretical and analytical incorporation of economic coercion (in 
conjunction with the other theoretical elements) may be seen as an alternative 
formulation of “the business case for CSR”: where such a case may be found, it may be 
argued that its coming into existence and/or the acknowledgement of the situation as a 
business case for CSR, in no small measure stems from economic coercion and changes 
in the underlying structural constraints and potentials through this and the other, related 
forms of interaction. See Blowfield and Frynas’ ‘Setting new agendas’ for a more 
elaborate critique, in particular pp. 511-513. 
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Underestimating the utility of economic coercion calls into serious doubt 
the argument that economic inducements are a more useful tool of 
statecraft than economic coercion. This does not mean that sanctions are a 
magic bullet to generate concessions. It does mean that the tool is more 
useful than currently understood.’209 
 
In other words, economic coercion may be more significant than currently 
understood in the sanctions literature, and it is perhaps, as suggested by 
Braithwaite and Drahos, unjustly underrated in comparison to positive 
inducements and systems of rewards.210 Moreover, these observations are 
even more to the point in the present framework and study: the sanctions 
literature is predominantly concerned with nation-states as receivers of 
sanctions, whereas cases of corporate responsibility will tend to involve 
profit-seeking capitalist enterprises as the most likely receivers. There is a 
marked difference between these two types of actors when it comes to the 
frequency with which actual entities within them tend to “go out of 
business.” And, even if survival is not immediately at stake, in general 
terms corporations may be assumed to have comparatively less staying 
power. More importantly, however, the quote from Drezner also 
demonstrates that economic coercion must be seen as more than actual 
impositions. Economic coercion also includes threats. I will even go one 
step further: for economic coercion to be at work in a significant way, 
neither an actual imposition nor an actually articulated threat is necessary; 
if such an imposition exists as a realistic potential or risk, this may be 
sufficient for economic coercion to be at work and to have an effect. As 
argued by Braithwaite and Drahos:  
 
‘The more profound the hegemony of a state, the less it has to resort to the 
threat or use of economic sanctions, yet the more the compliance it secures 
is grounded in the fear of that possibility.’211  
                                          
209 Daniel W. Drezner, ‘The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion’ in International 
Organization, Vol. 57, Summer 2003, pp. 654-655. 
 
210 Indeed, the significance of economic coercion could be seen as much more far-
reaching if we consider it indirectly as a factor in shaping the preconditions and 
existing models in subsequent, concrete situations, cf. e.g. Braithwaite and Drahos’ 
conclusion that ‘Global modelling often proceeds by piggy-backing on a bilateral 
agreement initially settled on the basis of a significant dose of economic coercion.’ 
Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation, p. 541. 
 
211 Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation, p. 536. This is the logical 
extension of Drezner’s observation and, moreover, a logical consequence of the earlier 
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In abstract terms, then, economic coercion may be thought of as a form of 
interaction that is patterned in terms of actual or threatened impositions (as 
well as realistically potential risks of this) of different forms of economic 
coercion, and of the reactions thereto.  
 
Moreover, economic coercion involves a receiver or a target, and this begs 
the question, of course, of how economic coercion differs from targeting. 
As defined above, targeting has to do with focusing in on certain actors, 
with patterns of discursive actions and reactions involving attributions of 
blame and responsibility. Targeting has a very material side to it, and in 
some respects moral and material leverage, to use the terms applied by 
Keck and Sikkink,212 are seemingly empirically inseparable. For example, 
a consumer boycott may involve both moral-discursive actions and 
pressures, while also seeking and/or resting on material pressures. Indeed, 
in many cases, should we not expect the focusing in on and the patterns of 
actions-reactions associated with blame and responsibility as well as 
economic coercion to be closely related? Yes. But does it follow from their 
empirical co-existence and entanglement that ‘the mobilization of shame’ 
and the threat of economic coercion are ontologically and in real terms the 
same? No. They are different kinds of things, and they need not co-exist. 
As argued above, the attribution of blame and responsibility may be 
strongly influenced by mechanisms of economic coercion, but shaming 
does not necessarily involve a great deal of economic pressure – nor does 
the imposition of trade sanctions necessarily involve a great deal of 
blaming. Yet, their empirical co-existence and entanglement do pose 
certain difficulties of a more practical and analytical nature, that we shall 
have to consider in the following. 
 
More specifically, we may distinguish between different types or 
mechanisms of economic coercion that must be assumed to be potentially 
significant to corporate responsibility processes.213 First of all, trade 
sanctions or restrictions related to child labor and core labor rights may be 
                                                                                                                           
discussion in chapter 2 of generative mechanisms and the stratification of reality in 
terms of the real, the actual, and the perceived. See also Haufler’s discussion of risk, A 
Public Role for the Private Sector, pp. 20-26 
 
212 Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders, p. 23. 
 
213 The three types that I focus on and include here are not an exhaustive list of such 
types. One might also include CSR demands of institutional investors and stock market 
reactions to adverse publicity, the rise of shareholder activism, and CSR requirements 
in government procurement policies. 
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significant. As noted earlier, trade issues and the trade regime was found 
by Braithwaite and Drahos to be the most significant linkage targets, and 
trade regulation where import restrictions are tied to working conditions 
are in place in a number of countries, including the U.S. (cf. sections on the 
governance framework and struggles to define the problem). Thus, even 
short of actual impositions, we may expect that the mere threat or risk – as 
in trade practices reviews by the U.S. State Department, for example – may 
be significant in certain cases, in particular where i) the (potential) 
sanctions relate to major markets such as the U.S. and Europe, and where 
ii) the characteristics of the problem – i.e., the conditions – are relatively 
grave (e.g. slavery) and of considerable scale (size and extent of problem).  
 
Second, other (non-trade related) regulatory interventions related to 
working conditions may also be significant. Such regulatory interventions 
include i) the (potential) adoption of new (non-trade related) legislation, ii) 
a (potentially) more effective enforcement of existing legislation (and the 
therewith associated sanctions, such as fines or penalties, business unit 
shut-downs, or confiscations), or iii) legal proceedings (and law suits in 
particular).214  
 
Third, boycotts and adverse consumer reactions may be significant, in 
particular if combined with one of the first two types of economic 
coercion.215 Clearly, the assessment of the risk of adverse consumer 
reactions in the absence of actual calls for a boycott is difficult. Short of a 
comprehensive and accurate picture of how such risks were perceived by 
those potentially at risk,216 the alternative to excluding this – in my 
opinion, important – element from the framework and analysis is to 
conceptualize and analyze risk in terms of the necessary ingredients to its 
potential significance. A necessary ingredient to any reaction is 
                                          
214 Cf. Haufler’s discussion of the risk of re-regulatory intervention in A Public Role for 
the Private Sector, pp. 21-22. For lengthy treatment of the legal dimensions of 
corporate citizenship, see also Halina Ward, Legal Issues in Corporate Citizenship. 
 
215 Adverse consumer reactions may, in part relate to articulated and called-for 
boycotts, but the term also comprises the risk of a de facto boycott, the threat of which 
has not been articulated. I use the term ‘consumer’ here, since intra-industry pressures 
are conceptualized as a reaction to the three types of economic coercion below, and the 
term ‘buyer’ would suggest that these were also included here.  
 
216 Ideally, in assessing such risks, one would in part also attempt to uncover how these 
were perceived in different quarters at the time. Yet, is anyone likely to admit to 
reacting on such risks, if neither imposed nor articulated? Not really.  
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information: if “consumers” know nothing about “the problem”, they 
cannot react. Moreover, the information must not only be accessible, it 
must also be visible on a broad scale and in a persistent manner.217 
Furthermore, we may focus on two main providers of information – the 
media and activist campaigns – and require that both, as precautionary 
measure due to the alternative approach, be actively “informing” in the 
concrete case. With these requirements, we may say that there is a 
potentially significant risk where the receiver is subject to negative media 
exposure and campaign activities, and where both are of a considerable 
visibility, scale and persistency.  
 
Turning to the reactions to economic coercion we may distinguish between 
different types of reactions. There is the possibility that the economic 
coercion is simply ignored, on the one hand, and the possibility that the 
receiver simply caves in, on the other. Caving in may involve bearing the 
burden oneself, of course, but in many cases there will be a significant 
diversion of economic pressures, in particular from dominant to 
subordinate economic agents within the commodity chain. Thus, we should 
pay attention to the potential of intra-industry diversions of economic 
pressures – that will (unlike the diversion of blame) generally necessitate a 
shift to modelling efforts involving intra-industry diversions of pressures.  
 
Furthermore, we may assume that receivers are in different positions of 
power, control and vulnerability, and are therefore faced with different 
constraints and potentials as regards their reactions. That is, subordinate 
actors may be less able to ignore economic coercion – the assumption 
being that they are in a competitive and structural situation characterized 
by less power and more vulnerability than their dominant partners – in 
particular if also faced with intra-industry diversion from the latter. 
Similarly, the more likely and prominent targets (see selection of targets 
above) may be assumed to be in a different position than their subordinate 
partners, enabling some of them to divert pressures to the latter, if not 
entirely ignoring the pressures. Unlike targeting, however, the first two 
mechanisms of economic coercion may be such that the leverage potential 
is very much so related to the subordinate actors as well: legally, they are 
be the ones that may be held responsible in many cases; moreover, they 
                                          
217 Where visibility, broad scale and persistency, in part, relate to the concrete case and 
the characteristics of the receiver. For example, for a small company generating most of 
its revenue in a small geographical area, the front page of the local newspaper may be 
sufficiently visible and broad. We should not, however, expect the global oil or apparel 
industries to feal at risk from such an article alone. 
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may be much more vulnerable to other types of regulatory intervention, 
just as trade restrictions may be much more significant to the 
manufacturing industry unable to export to its major markets than to a 
large retailer sourcing from a number of other countries.  
 
Finally, how may we expect economic coercion to be patterned at different 
stages throughout a process, if we assume that the early stages are more 
fluid and open-ended and that an agenda is still in the early stages of 
formation. To begin with, during the early stages, economic coercion may 
be assumed to primarily combine with (and influence) the other forms of 
interaction in the building and formation of an agenda and in the mounting 
pressures for change. In those cases where shifts to modelling do occur due 
to economic coercion, the modelling will be of an individual actor and/or 
relatively informal and less committing dialogue. The intra-industry 
coercion that this entails will generally pertain to specific company supply 
chains (as opposed to industry commodity chains more broadly). In 
exceptional cases, however, economic coercion may be significant in 
triggering a shift to modelling on a broader and more solution-focused 
scale. For this to be the case, we should expect certain preconditions to 
prevail. On the one hand, that there is a broader or longer history tied to the 
issue and/or the industry than the concrete problem narrowly perceived 
could suggest. On the other, that one of the first two types of economic 
coercion above are in effect in such a way as to place a substantial pressure 
on a broader segment of the industry, thereby forcing an attempt at 
overcoming any collective action problems that may exist. 
 
In the later stages of a process, we may assume that economic coercion 
will primarily be significant in situations of non-involvement – e.g., in 
potentially pressuring stonewalling parties to engage in the process 
(modelling or another form of interaction above) – or in situations where 
negotiations are deadlocked over conflict points or otherwise bogged 
down. As noted earlier, the significance of economic coercion in the latter 
situation is not restricted to the pressure on or risk faced by industry 
players: intra-industry coercion may be assumed to be highly significant in 
this respect in some cases, in particular when de-linkage and forum-
shifting are involved as well. 
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Modelling the solution 
 
In seeking to understand and explain specific changes in corporate 
responsibility and the ways in which e.g. child labor and core labor rights 
are governed, the notion of “learning” could be a useful concept. In 
Virginia Haufler’s contribution, for example, learning is one of three 
factors driving the rise of industry self-regulation, and learning is seen in 
terms of the ‘spread of knowledge, information, and ideas within the 
business community regarding the relative costs and benefits of voluntary 
initiatives.’218 Cutler, Haufler and Porter use ‘learning processes’ in a 
similar way – referring to the social interaction of leaders, management 
literature ‘isomorphism’, educational and environmental similarities, 
industry-specific issues and processes, development of common 
expectations – as one of their factors for explaining the rise of private 
authority in international affairs.219 Both appear to be drawing on some of 
the earlier works on learning, although without any seeming emphasis on 
how learning might relate to changes in identities of actors, as in Nye’s 
notion of complex learning,220 and there seems to be a marked inspiration 
from neo-institutional organizational theory.221  
 
The concept of learning is not without its problems, however.222 I will 
therefore suggest that a notion of ‘modelling the solution’ allows us to 
better capture the form of interaction and its ingredients that the politics of 
corporate responsibility tend to involve: an interaction through which 
“solutions” are devised and “negotiated”, and which is seen to involve 
                                          
218 Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector, p. 27.  
 
219 Cutler, Haufler and Porter, ‘Private Authority and International Affairs’, pp. 7-9. 
 
220 Nye, ‘Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes’. 
 
221 See e.g. D. Eleanor Westney, ‘Institutionalization Theory and the Multinational 
Corporation’ in Sumantra Ghosal and D. Eleanor Westney (eds.), Organization Theory 
and the Multinational Corporation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). 
 
222 Firstly, the concept is associated with a number of analytical problems (cf. Levy, 
‘Learning and Foreign Policy’, p. 282). Secondly, the question of identities and 
interests is often not included (see Wendt, Social Theory, p. 326ff. for discussion of 
social learning that draws on the notion of complex learning). Thirdly, learning has 
connotations of progress and bettering of knowledge and beliefs, and it seems to overly 
emphasize consensus-formation and nonconflictive situations, to the detriment of 
aspects of struggles, conflicts and power relations.  
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struggles to shape and re-shape corporate responsibility and the 
governance of child labor and core labor rights – struggles that involve 
both conflicts and dissensus as well as shared interests and consensus and 
in which power relations are far from irrelevant.223  
 
In abstract terms, we may thus begin to think of modelling the solution as 
that form of interaction which involves negotiating and devising solutions, 
and we may further conceptualize this form of interaction by a number of 
propositions.  
 
First of all, such interaction may occur in a range of organizational forms, 
in a continuum of possibilities ranging from the interaction internal to an 
individual organization to that which involves the interaction between 
several organizations. In other words, it may be a multi-party process, but 
it may also be a process that occurs inside the house, so to speak, but 
which nevertheless also involves a “negotiation” with the perceived 
expectations and interests of external others.  
 
Second, such interaction may differ substantially and dynamically in terms 
of the solution focus, i.e. the degree to which a concern with providing and 
devising a solution predominates. In other words, it includes, on the one 
hand, interaction (internal or multi-party) that is not immediately or 
directly intended to produce (part of) a solution, but which nevertheless 
constitutes a search for answers, such as early and informal dialogues and 
exchanges of information. On the other hand, it includes negotiations that 
are first and foremost intended to produce a solution.  
 
Combining these two propositions, we may thus think of four potentially 
different types of modelling interaction, as illustrated below with 
alphabetical designations used in the following: 
 
                                          
223 The notion of modelling the solution presented here differs from, but was initially 
inspired by Braithwaite and Drahos’ notion of modelling, defined by the two authors as 
‘action(s) that constitute a process of displaying, symbolically interpreting and copying 
conceptions of action (and this process itself). A model is a conception of action that is 
put on display during such a process of modeling. A model is that which is displayed, 
symbolically interpreted and copied.’ Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business 
Regulation, p. 581. 
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Figure 4.3 A modelling matrix 
 
Internal, individual 
process;  
high solution focus  
(B) 
Multi-party process;  
high solution focus  
(D) 
Internal, individual 
process;  
low solution focus  
(A) 
Multi-party process;  
low solution focus  
(C) 
 
Third, a process may involve several streams of such interaction in a 
succession of different types of modelling, and different types of 
modelling and more than one stream of modelling may occur at the same 
time (actually or as real potentials).224  Thus, prior modelling interaction 
may influence the subsequent modelling efforts, and shifts (or the absence 
thereof) from one type of modelling to another are indicative of a 
significant change in the process. More importantly, though, the dynamics 
of actual modelling interactions are in part shaped by the actual or potential 
(non-) occurrence of other modelling efforts. In other words, if solutions 
are devised and negotiated in (B), this cannot be understood (and 
interpreted in terms of explanatory significance) in isolation from any 
actual occurrences in (D), or the potentials and constraints relevant to (D) – 
nor in isolation from any preceding interactions in (A) and/or (C). 
Similarly, interactions in (D) are assumed to be dynamically shaped by the 
actual or potential interactions in (B) (for example, through threats of 
abandoning a given forum and/or going it alone) and/or alternatives within 
(D) (for example, countermodelling efforts and attempts at forum-shifting), 
just as prior interactions in (B) may have brought into existence particular 
models that may significantly shape a solution in (D).  
 
Fourth, the interaction or negotiation involves a minimization -
maximization logic of concessions and interests related to the constellation 
of givens and conflict points. In other words, there will always be i) a 
number of givens, i.e., solution elements, the inclusion or exclusion and/or 
particular form of which are undisputed, unquestioned and/or seen to be 
                                          
224 That is, modelling the solution is not confined to the later stages of a process. 
Rather, the intention is that the framework and analysis cover the whole process, even 
if a multi-party agreement to be explained only began to be negotiated late on. 
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“natural” to the problem-solution complex, and ii) a number of conflict 
points, i.e., objects of contention with dissensus stemming from the wholly 
or partially incompatible material, ideational and/or institutional 
preferences of actors in different positions.225 Central to the configuration 
of givens and conflict points, and hence to the interaction and explanation 
of its outcome, are:  
 
i) inclusions and exclusions of issues or problem characteristics: the 
inclusion or exclusion of issues, in particular the breadth and 
depth of the problem-solution, may have profound (normative 
and material) ramifications for the parties involved;  
 
ii) inclusions and exclusions of actors: this relates both to matters of 
expertise, legitimacy, and the acceptability of a given solution to 
concerned others, but it may also be fundamentally important to 
the creation or existence of a zone of agreement in the first 
place;226  
 
iii) sanctions and compliance or enforcement mechanisms (including 
monitoring and verification): these have not only potentially 
quite substantial normative and material implications (for 
violators, of course, but more importantly for the costs and 
credibility of the solution), but also relate to fears of cheating and 
the sanctioning problem, both among industry actors and between 
industry and nonindustry actors;227  
                                          
225 See e.g. Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, Theories of international regimes, pp. 
59-68, for discussion of the problem-structural approach within regime theory. 
 
226 In addition to the earlier arguments, for a discussion of framing of the problem and 
actor selection, see also Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko, ‘International Regime 
Formation: Findings, Research Priorities, and Applications’ in Young and Osherenko 
(eds.), Polar Politics, , pp. 227-228. 
 
227 The fear of cheating and the sanctioning problem are prominent in the discussions of 
obstacles to international cooperation in the literature on international regimes, cf. 
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 34-35, 48-55,  
76, 105, 115, 170. In particular contractualist, functionalist, interest-based approached 
have emphasized this as a central obstacle as it potentially hinders or prevents the 
pursuit of shared interests and a strategy of reciprocity. Neorealist or power-based 
approaches – e.g. Krasner and Grieco, cf. above – have, in turn, tended to emphasize 
more significant obstacles, because of the difference in underlying assumptions. If we 
assume a situation with industry actors that are in different positions and with divergent 
preferences as to modelling outcomes, and if we add to this the potential presence and 
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iv) the distribution of costs and funding: costs may be significant, 
and the location of the burden may involve distributional 
conflicts among industry and non-industry actors (including 
intra-industry conflicts or diversions, cf. above); moreover, the 
“burden” may come with considerable power in terms of shaping 
the particular form of a solution.  
 
Fifth, the exercise of power through forum-shifting and/or issue (de-) 
linkage may be central to the resolution of the above: both linkage and de-
linkage may seek and/or rely heavily on forum-shifting228 – and vice-versa 
– for the achievement of the underlying purpose. De-linkage, for example, 
may only be possible if a shift of venue is achieved, and reversely forum-
shifting may require the linkage of certain issues to be meaningful in any 
sense. As with linkage, forum-shifting is a mechanism for transforming the 
situation structure. Again, Braithwaite and Drahos’ study is instructive, 
and the two authors provide a distinction between three different strategies 
of forum-shifting: moving an agenda from one organization to another, 
abandoning an organization, and pursuing the same agenda in more than 
one organization.229 Both empirical examples and an approach 
emphasizing hegemonic struggles suggest that two combinations of 
linkage and forum-shifting are particularly central to the explanation of 
changing CSR: tactical issue-linkage of symbolically less powerful and 
highly symbolic issues, implying that the agenda is moved to the forum of 
the latter and/or that the agenda is expanded; de-linkage of less salient 
issues and/or issues that are less compatible with dominant ideas and 
principles in order to narrow the agenda, achieved primarily through a shift 
of forum. 
 
Sixth, modelling interaction occurs within the constraints and potentials 
inherent in the preconditions (i.e., the characteristics of the problem, the 
characteristics of the framework of governance, and the industry 
characteristics) and those produced within the context of the other types of 
interaction (i.e., the concrete struggles to define the problem, targeting and 
                                                                                                                           
direct or indirect involvement of nonindustry players with far-reaching demands 
(modelling outcome preferences), this only serves to underline the possibility of 
sanctions and compliance mechanisms being central to the configuration of givens and 
conflict points. 
 
228 See e.g. Baumgartner and Jones, ‘Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems’, p. 
1047 onwards for a discussion of ‘the venue problem’ and venue bias. 
 
229 Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation, p. 564. 
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economic coercion). In other words, the state of the struggles to define a 
problem, for example, at a certain point in a process will combine with the 
preconditions to shape e.g. the configuration of givens and conflict points.  
 
On the basis of the above, let me finally present a number of more specific 
propositions concerning the modelling of solutions. First of all, we may 
assume that earlier stages tend to a greater degree to involve modelling 
interaction confined to (A) and (C) above, whereas (B) and/or (D) are more 
likely later in the process – with prior history associated with the industry 
and/or corporation and economic coercion being seen as the main factors 
in enabling exceptions to this.  
 
Second, where a shift from (A) and/or (C) to (B) and/or (D) occurs, this 
will occur as a result of prior modelling interaction combined with other 
forms of interaction, and it will take the form of either i) nonindustry 
efforts at modelling solutions, or ii) industry attempts at foreseeing 
modelling by others, where both may in no small measure relate to the 
potential of another stream of modelling and the leverage of modelling 
first-mover advantages with respect to conflict points and forum matters.230 
 
Third, we may assume that the higher the solution-focus and the greater the 
number of parties involved, the harder and more conflictive the bargaining: 
conflict points are ceteris paribus more pronounced and likely to affect the 
interaction in (B) and in particular (D) than in (A) and (C). In other words, 
the more solution-focused and the more actors involved, the more the 
interaction will be patterned by the configuration of givens and in 
particular conflict points, and the more likely that this will manifest itself 
in actual or threatened/potential acts of issue (de-) linkage, forum-shifting 
and/or –competition.  
 
4.5 Summary 
 
In this rather lengthy treatment I have sought to argue that if we are to 
explain the three agreements, indeed changes in corporate responsibility 
and the governance of child labor and core labor rights in concrete cases, 
we need to analyze a complex of preconditions and interrelated processes 
and interaction. 
 
                                          
230 See Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation, pp. 582-593, for a 
treatment of the patterning of modelling according to their terminology. 
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To summarize, the preconditions that are seen to be central to this analysis 
and explanation are the following: 
 
- The characteristics of the problem: existence, extent, gravity, 
breadth and depth, and il/legality; 
 
- The characteristics of the framework of governance: national and 
international regulation, associated patterns of enforcement, and 
prevailing norms and practices of corporate conduct; 
 
- Industry characteristics, structures of power, control and 
vulnerability: inter-nodal differences, intra-nodal similarities 
(dominant and subordinate nodes), intra-nodal differences (dominant 
node: size, corporate branding and image, main markets the U.S. 
and/or Europe) and industry associations. 
 
In the analysis of these, one should seek to clarify and characterize any 
dramatic shifts in the above (whether actual or impending), and emphasis 
should be placed on those constraints and potentials of (de-) politicization 
potentially shaping the processes and interaction. 
 
As far as these are concerned, four forms of interrelated interaction and 
processes were specified, that may be summarized as follows: 
 
- Struggles to define the problem: claims and counterclaims, a 
problem minimization-maximization logic; stat wars and 
relativizations - existence, extent, gravity (il/legality), and breadth 
and depth 
 
- Targeting, struggles over blame and responsibility: controllability 
and intentionality; attributions (the selection of targets, the 
characteristics of targeting) and patterns of reactions (denials, 
diversions (re-attributions)) 
 
- Economic coercion: actual or threatened imposition as well as 
realistic risk of trade sanctions or restrictions, other regulatory 
interventions, boycotts and adverse consumer reactions; diversions 
(intra-industry economic coercion) 
 
- Modelling the solution: types of interaction (organizational form and 
solution focus); configuration of givens and conflict points, a 
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problem/solution minimization-maximization logic (inclusion / 
exclusion of issues and actors, sanction and enforcement 
mechanisms, distribution of costs and funding); forum-shifting and 
issue (de-)linkage. 
 
 125
 
 
 
 
 
5. The politics of corporate responsibility and child 
labor in the Bangladeshi garment industry231 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
On the 4th of July, 1995 - after more than two and a half years of 
controversy and going to and from the negotiating table - a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) concerning child labor in the Bangladeshi 
garment industry was signed between the Bangladesh Garment 
Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), UNICEF 
Bangladesh, and the International Labour Office (ILO) Bangladesh.232  
 
Looking back at the 1990s, the Bangladesh case was quite a prominent one 
in the wider, re-emerging politicization of corporate responsibility in 
relation to child labor and labor rights more broadly. Arguably, it was a 
uniquely important one, both in terms of the significant changes brought 
about in the agreement (such as the ILO’s involvement in monitoring and 
verification) and in terms of the role that the process and the agreement 
have played (and continue to play) in informing certain norms and 
practices related to corporate responsibility and child labor. By all means, 
the Bangladesh case also ranks among the most controversial and widely 
debated of such conflicts. A dominant theme in the process was the 
negative consequences for the child workers of the so-called Harkin Bill (a 
proposal to ban the importation into the U.S. of goods made with child 
labor) and the later boycott threat. The pressure on the Bangladeshi 
garment industry was widely seen as misplaced, and the application of the 
                                          
231 An alternative and shorter version of this chapter was published in an International 
Affairs special issue on Critical Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility; see 
Michael E. Nielsen, ‘The politics of corporate responsibility and child labour in the 
Bangladeshi garment industry’ in International Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3, 2005. 
 
232 The Memorandum and other documents referred to here are on file with the author.  
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pressure was characterized as either self-interested protectionism in 
disguise or as well-intended, but uninformed and misguided. There are 
clear links to broader debates about boycotts, trade sanctions, social 
clauses and the “real” motives of industry critics; more specifically, the 
lessons from Bangladesh subsequently influenced – and have often served 
as the explicit basis for sustaining – some of the views and actions of key 
players in the field, such as UNICEF, ILO and Save the Children, and also 
more widely shared elements of “common sense” concerning child 
labor.233  
 
The analysis below offers a fundamental challenge to some of these 
beliefs, albeit as an unintended consequence of my setting out to explore a 
question which remains virtually un-asked: why did the MoU come into 
existence and take that particular form? To be sure, most treatments of the 
Bangladesh case give answers to this question, but these tend to be 
provided in passing, as background information on journeys departing 
from somewhat different questions and traversing other terrain. For 
example, discussions of the positive and negative consequences of the 
MOU for the children, descriptive and/or prescriptive treatments of new 
approaches to child labor and best corporate practice, the pros and cons of 
linking trade and labor standards, or of boycotts. While these are important 
considerations, one of the effects of the emphasis on them is that, in spite 
of all that has been said and written about this case, the above question has 
not really been asked yet. Except for once, that is: an occasional paper was 
published by UNICEF Bangladesh in 1996. It was written by Babar 
Sobhan and UNICEF’s daily point person in the negotiations of the MoU, 
Susan Bissell, and I shall return to this later.234  
                                          
233 See e.g. testimony of Gabriela Stoikov, Manager of ILO’s International Programme 
on the Elimination of Child Labour (ILO-IPEC), in U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau 
of International Labor Affairs, Public Hearings on International Child Labor, 12 April, 
1994, Official Record (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of 
International Labor Affairs, 1994); Marcus and Harper, Small hands; Bissell and 
Sobhan, Child labour. See also Jo Boyden, ‘Postscript: implementing the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child – who decides about children’s welfare?’ in Allison James 
and Alan Prout (eds.), Constructing and reconstructing childhood: contemporary issues 
in the sociological study of childhood, 2nd Edition (London: RoutledgeFalmer, 2003), 
and Naila Kabeer, The Power to Choose: Bangladeshi Women and Labour Market 
Decisions in London and Dhaka (London: Verso, 2000). 
 
234 Bissell and Sobhan, Child labour. The paper is quite elaborate and provides for an 
excellent reading of a certain perspective on the issues and events, but it also has its 
problems (further below). 
 
 127
5.2 Industry characteristics235 
 
After a few slow years following the inception in the late 1970s of the 
Bangladeshi garment industry, from the mid-1980s onwards the industry 
went through a period of ‘phenomenal growth.’236 By the early 1990s, the 
Bangladeshi garment industry had become the nation’s primary earner of 
foreign exchange - accounting for 52 percent of total national exports in 
1992/93237 - and, arguably, its most important industry. This also entailed a 
high degree of dependency on export markets, with North America and 
Western Europe accounting for more than about 95 percent of the 
industry’s exports, and the world’s importer of apparel – the U.S. – 
accounted for approximately half of industry exports.238  
 
The rise of garment manufacturing in Bangladesh must be seen within the 
context of a much broader, ongoing and fundamental change in the 
territoriality of global garment production and trade.  
 
                                          
235 The term “apparel” covers a broad range of products (accessories, various types of 
garments and clothing). Apparel is frequently used interchangeably with terms such as 
clothing or garment, the latter being understood in their wide sense. Apparel does not 
include other uses of the textile industry’s output, i.e. the household goods (such as 
curtains and draperies, home furnishings, etc.) and industrial goods (such as automotive 
and apparel trimmings) also referred to under one as “fabricated textile products.” See 
U.S. Department of Commerce/International Trade Administration, U.S. Industry & 
Trade Outlook 2000 (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, 2000), p. 33-1. 
 
236 Mojibul H. Bhuiyan and Harvey Shaw, ‘Profile of the Textile and Clothing Industry 
in Bangladesh’ in Textile Outlook International, May 1994, p. 91. 
 
237 The World Bank, Bangladesh: From Stabilization to Growth (Washington, D. C.: 
The World Bank, 1995), p. 27. 
 
238 The World Bank, Bangladesh, p. 76; GATT Secretariat, ‘GATT Trade Policy 
Review: Bangladesh’, World Trade Materials, Vol. 4, No. 4, July 1992, p. 6. See also 
Anisul M. Islam and Munir Quddus, ‘The Export Garment Industry in Bangladesh: A 
Potential Catalyst for Breakthrough’ in Abu N. M. Wahid and Charles E. Weis (eds.), 
The Economy of Bangladesh: Problems and Prospects (Westport, Ct.: Preager, 1996), 
p. 187.  
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Figure 5.1 U.S. apparel imports by regions and selected countries239 
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In the 1980s, this primarily involved a migration of production from the 
“Big Three” Asian countries (Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea) to 
mainland China (hence, the designation “Big Four”) and a number of 
Southeast and South Asian countries. The increasing prominence of China, 
particularly from the late 1980s and through the 1990s, is of course 
remarkable: by the mid-1990s it had become the world’s leading clothing 
exporter.240 If we take a look at the growth and changing geographical 
composition of U.S. apparel imports since the early 1980s, another 
significant shift lies in the growing share of Central America and the 
Caribbean as well as Mexico: from generating a combined 6 percent of 
U.S. apparel imports in 1983, by 1997 the combined share of these 
                                          
239 Based on Gereffi, ‘International trade and industrial upgrading’, p. 50. 
 
240 Peter Dicken, Global Shift: Transforming the World Economy (Third Edition), 
(London: Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd., 1998), p. 291. 
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Southern neighbors had grown to 27 percent, nearly as much as China, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Macao together (33 percent). In this 
picture, the Bangladeshi garment industry accounted for a quite 
insignificant share of U.S. apparel imports.241 
 
The apparel commodity chain may be illustrated as follows: 
 
Figure 5.2 The apparel commodity chain242 
 
 
In a global commodity chain dominated by U.S. and European buyers, the 
Bangladeshi garment industry occupied a subordinate role, in part because 
of its large supply of low cost labor and the low entry barriers associated 
with the production processes carried out in Bangladesh. These were fairly 
simple (mainly the cutting and making, and sometimes trimming, of 
garments), the technology used was uncomplicated, infrastructural 
requirements low (simple factory space, electricity), and the investment 
                                          
241 2.18 percent in 1993, according to Gary Gereffi, ‘International trade and industrial 
upgrading’, p. 50. 
 
242 The figure is based on Appelbaum and Gereffi, ‘Power and Profits’, p. 46.  
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requirements were likewise modest. Production was predominantly 
organized as international subcontracting, through about 250 buying 
houses, and the international buyers not only provided designs and 
specifications, but also undertook the supply of imported fabrics and 
quality monitoring.243  
 
The shift in the early 1980s towards an export-oriented strategy in 
Bangladesh obviously influenced the development of the industry, granting 
the industry a variety of economic concessions from the Bangladeshi state 
such as an exemption of corporate taxation on export profits and a 
concessional duty rate on capital equipment imports.244 Yet, the rapid 
growth and the high share of total export earnings were far from unique to 
Bangladesh, and the rise of garment manufacturing in Bangladesh must be 
seen within the context of a much broader, ongoing and fundamental 
change in the territoriality of global garment production and trade, cf. 
above. This shift was an expression of the changing global sourcing 
patterns of the dominant retailers and “manufacturers,” shaped in part by 
the changes in the underlying competitive dynamics – the retail revolution 
and the double squeeze on “manufacturers”245 – and in no small measure 
by the peculiar dynamics generated by the international trade regime and 
the GATT Multi-Fibers Arrangement (MFA) in particular:  
 
‘International buyers were initially attracted to Bangladesh by its 
favorable situation under the Multi Fibre Agreement. As a least developed 
country it could benefit from the quotas which otherwise limited the supply 
from more traditional garment producers such as Hong Kong and the 
Republic of Korea.’246  
 
In spite of quotas being imposed on certain items in the mid-1980s, the 
Bangladeshi garment industry in general continued to hold a favorable 
position and sustained its rapid growth, cf. above. In 1992, however, it was 
                                          
243 See The World Bank, Bangladesh, for a more elaborate treatment of this.  
 
244 The New Industrial Policy of 1982 implied a fundamental shift from an import 
substituting to an export-oriented industrialization strategy, a shift which was 
reinforced in the Revised Industrial Policy of 1986 and in the Industrial Policy of 1991. 
This, of course, mirrored similar shifts in so many other countries at that time.  
 
245 This has been analyzed extensively elsewhere; cf. Appelbaum and Gereffi, ‘Power 
and Profits’. 
 
246 The World Bank, Bangladesh, p. 76.  
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the likely negative effects on the Bangladeshi garment industry of the 
likely phasing out of the MFA which constituted the real worry for the 
Bangladeshi manufacturers.247  
 
In a poverty-ridden and largely agricultural economy, in which the more 
traditional exports were stagnant, by the early 1990s the garment industry 
had become extremely important, both by virtue of its centrality to the new 
private sector, export-oriented development ideology and corresponding 
institutional framework and, of course, by its material importance to the 
nation’s exports. So much so, in fact, that the industry association, the 
BGMEA, was now a central political player. In the words of the World 
Bank, ‘the special status which the industry earned by its impressive early 
contribution to exports enabled the emergence of BGMEA as a strong 
industry association that could command the direct attention of the 
political establishment […]’248 Moreover, in some cases the links between 
industrialists and the political elite were even very direct: Redwan Ahmed, 
who became President of the BGMEA in 1993, was not only a garment 
manufacturer but also a member of parliament for the ruling right-wing 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).249 Furthermore, since the 
administration of export quotas had been placed in the hands of the 
BGMEA, the association also had a remarkable degree of politico-
administrative power over its members, controlling the right to do lucrative 
business, in that ‘you have to be a member of BGMEA to have the right to 
legally export clothing made in Bangladesh.’250 
                                          
247 The MFA was a multilateral system of ‘voluntary export restraint’ agreements first 
signed in 1973. Negotiations to phase out the MFA had been underway since the mid-
1980s as part of the GATT Uruguay Round, and an agreement was reached in late 
1993. For an in-depth analysis, see Geoffrey D. Underhill, Industrial Crisis and the 
Open Economy: Politics, Global Trade and the Textile Industry in the Advanced 
Economies (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998). 
 
248 The World Bank, Bangladesh, p. 78. 
 
249 The Telegraph (Dhaka), ‘US team calls on BGMEA president: no child labour in 
any garment factory’, October 14, 1993. For a broader analysis of the role of business 
in Bangladeshi politics, see Fahimul Quadir, ‘Legitimization, Patrimonialism, and 
Regime Consolidation: The Myth of Market Reform in Bangladesh’ in Ananya 
Mukherjee Reed (ed.), Corporate Capitalism in Contemporary South Asia: 
Conventional Wisdoms and South Asian Realities (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan Ltd., 2003).  
 
250 Samuel Grumiau, Garments “Made in Bangladesh” - The Social Reality Behind the 
Label (Brussels: ICFTU, 2000), p. 3; Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI), 
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The industry also had its vulnerabilities, however, and faced a number of 
uncertainties relevant to the process analyzed below. To begin with, the 
growth of the industry was based on production processes and working 
conditions directly and clearly linked to consumption in Europe and North 
America – markets on which the industry had become highly dependent 
and where most consumers arguably found the former processes and 
conditions unacceptable. Moreover, the “return of the sweatshop” was 
increasingly on the agenda in the U.S., and several groups were conducting 
child labor and labor rights campaigns (cf. the following chapters). 
Moreover, the Child Labor Deterrence Act, which would ban the 
importation into the U.S. of products made using child labor, had already 
been introduced in the U.S. Congress, and its re-introduction in 1992 was 
important in this case (further below). Moreover, the characteristics of the 
garment industry – a prominent and visible industry, consisting primarily 
of formal-sector, large-scale enterprises geographically located in Dhaka 
and Chittagong – were generally favorable to labor organizing. The Asian-
American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI, part of the AFL-CIO) was already 
engaged in labor organizing in the garment sector in Bangladesh, when the 
process below started.251 What is more, there were some very close links 
between AAFLI and the other U.S. NGO involved in the process, the Child 
Labor Coalition (CLC): AAFLI’s Country Director, Terry Collingsworth, 
was also legal counsel to the U.S.-based International Labor Rights Fund 
(ILRF); the ILRF, in turn, was a member of the Child Labor Coalition, 
whose co-chair was the ILRF’s executive director, Pharis Harvey. 
 
5.3 Characteristics of the framework of governance 
 
As the controversy arose in 1992 Bangladesh had not ratified the ILO 
Convention 138 Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment 
(1973), although virtually all of the other fundamental conventions of the 
ILO were ratified as early as 1972.252 Bangladesh had ratified, however, 
                                                                                                                           
Report on child labor in Bangladesh. Prepared for the U.S. Department of Labor (no 
place: AAFLI, 1994), p. 22. 
 
251 See Marilyn Rock, ‘The Rise of the Bangladesh Independent Garment-Workers’ 
Union (BIGU)’ in Jane Hutchison and Andrew Brown (eds.), Organising Labour in 
Globalising Asia (London, Routledge, 2001). 
 
252 ILO Conventions 29, 87, 98, 105, and 111 were ratified on June 22, 1972. 
Convention 100 was ratified in 1998, and Convention 182 in 2001; cf. International 
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the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on September 2, 1990.253 In 
addition, child labor was regulated by a number of laws and ordinances, ‘a 
confusing maze of conflicting provisions relating to the regulation of child 
labor.’254 However confusing, though, the national framework pertaining to 
child labor in Bangladeshi garment factories was ‘generally in agreement 
with similar provisions’ of the ILO C138.255 There was one notable 
difference, though, which played into the process below: unlike the ILO 
C138, Bangladeshi laws on child labor did not allow for light work of 
older children.256   
 
In other words, a regulatory framework was in place, but it was not 
enforced – a situation far from unique to Bangladesh.257 The Bangladesh 
Department of Labor and Inspectorate of Factories lacked ‘sufficient 
                                                                                                                           
Labour Organisation, Ratifications of the ILO Fundamental Conventions (As of 25 Sep 
2003) (at www.ilo.org, accessed on September 25, 2003). 
 
253 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of 
Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties (As of 07 July, 
2003) (at www.unhchr.ch, accessed on September 25, 2003). 
 
254 AAFLI, Report. A National Labor Law Reform Commission was established in 
1992, but this did not play into the MOU process.  
 
255 The Embassy of Bangladesh to the U.S., ‘Written testimony’ in U. S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Public Hearings on International Child 
Labor, April 12, 1994 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of 
International Labor Affairs, 1994). 
 
256 Bissell and Sobhan, Child labour, p. 14. The key laws relevant to child labor include 
The Mines Act (1923), The Employment of Children Act (1938), The Factories Act 
(1965), and The Shops and Establishments Act (1965). With respect to child labor in 
the garment industry, The Factories Act of 1965 and The Employment of Children Act 
of 1938 (as amended in 1974) both prohibit the employment of children below the age 
of 15 in factories, and the first also contains provisions limiting the work day to 5 hours 
between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. for young workers. Cf. e.g., U. S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of International Labor Affairs, By The Sweat and Toil of Children (Volume I): 
The Use of Child Labor in U.S. Manufactured and Mined Imports, (Washington, D. C.: 
U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 1994), p. 32. 
 
257 Cf. Assefa Bequele and Jo Boyden (eds.), Combating Child Labour (Geneva: 
International Labour Office, 1988). 
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resources, staff and logistical support to adequately perform the task of 
monitoring child labor laws.’258 In the words of an ICFTU report:  
 
‘A hundred or so labour inspectors for a population of 125 million 
inhabitants is negligible, even if it must be acknowledged that the financial 
resources of the public authorities in Bangladesh are commensurate with 
the poverty which predominates the country. The Ministry of Labour is 
counting on civil society (unions, NGOs, the press and so forth) to bring 
violations of labour laws to its attention, but rarely does it act 
effectively.’259  
 
As far as the dominant norms of corporate responsibility and the state of 
self-regulatory initiatives at the time, with respect to the Bangladesh case it 
is worth noting that the “second wave” of recent developments in this area 
was only emerging in the early 1990s. As noted, along with Reebok, Levi 
Strauss claims to have been a first mover in taking a new stand on child 
labor and other labor practices. This was to some extent connected to the 
Bangladeshi garment industry, where Levi Strauss developed a program of 
its own that was quite similar to the eventual MOU.260 As for the other 
international buyers, when the process started rolling in late 1992, there 
were no signs of formal policies on the issue. Thus, the understandings and 
practices of corporate responsibility in relation to child labor may be 
characterized primarily in terms of a more or less tacit acceptance that 
‘that’s just the way things were done over there.’261 
 
                                          
258 U.S. Department of Labor (Bureau of International Labor Affairs), By The Sweat 
and Toil of Children (Volume I), p. 32-33. 
 
259 Grumiau, Garments, p. 16. 
 
260 William Maroni (responsible for government affairs and public policy at Levi 
Strauss), testimony, in U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor 
Affairs, Public Hearings on International Child Labor, June 28, 1996 (Washington, 
D.C.: U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 1996); Karl 
Schoenberger, Levi’s Children: Coming to Terms with Human Rights in the Global 
Marketplace (New York: Grove Press, 2000), pp. 139-140. 
 
261  Meryl Davids, ’Global Standards, Local Problems’ in Journal of Business Strategy, 
January/February, 1999. 
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5.4 Characteristics of the problem 
 
The number of children working in the Bangladeshi garment industry in 
1992 is difficult to ascertain with any degree of precision.262 Reasonable 
estimates range between 50,000 and 100,000 children (the Government of 
Bangladesh as the source of the higher figure). This was only a tiny 
fraction of the total number of working children in Bangladesh, the work 
of the children in the garment industry was generally not hazardous, and 
the AAFLI survey (referenced frequently in this chapter) furthermore 
found no incidences of bonded labor in the industry.  
 
As Naila Kabeer has forcefully argued (mainly focusing on adult workers), 
in spite of the working conditions in the garment industry, in some respects 
employment in the industry also entailed a positive social potential for the 
women workers at the micro-level and at the macro-level, in terms of 
gender relations and traditions in Bangladesh.263 Thus, in a context of 
deeply patriarchal traditions and a general undervaluing of the girl child, 
working in the garment industry might even be seen as preferable by the 
children and their parent(s). Moreover, the prevalence of child labor in the 
industry must be seen within the context of deep and widespread poverty, 
the poor state of the education system and the general absence of day-care 
options (related both to the absence of social services as well as changes in 
the social and geographical foundations of kinship associated with flows of 
migration).264 The industry workforce consisted predominantly of women, 
and female child workers were found to account for roughly 60 percent of 
                                          
262 To begin with, statistics on child labor are generally notoriously difficult, cf. e.g. 
Fyfe and Jankanish, Trade unions and child labour, pp. 13-14. The problem is 
aggravated in the concrete case by the fact that the Bangladeshi manufacturers started 
to lay off children already before the spotlight really turned on the problem in late 
1992. What is more, the figures reported at the time should be approached with more 
than a little caution as they also reflected the narrow self-interests of those reporting 
them. Statistics on child labor in the Bangladeshi garment industry, in other words, 
were part and parcel of the politics of child labor and corporate responsibility analyzed 
below. 
 
263 Kabeer, The Power to Choose. 
 
264 Primary education in Bangladesh was both free and compulsory, the education 
system was of a very poor quality, school accessories still had to be paid for, and 
formal education was often (perceived to be) of little use in future. See e.g., U.S. 
Department of Labor (Bureau of International Labor Affairs), By The Sweat and Toil of 
Children (Volume I), p. 33; AAFLI, Report, p. 14. 
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the child workers. A common explanation for child labor was that ‘mothers 
bring their children to work in the garment factory and the owner kindly 
allows the children to earn some money by helping out.’265  
 
Thus, we find that child labor in the garment industry can be characterized 
in ways that – to some – makes it acceptable in some forms and under 
certain conditions, i.e. as a “necessary evil” at some stages of economic 
development and in the face of widespread poverty. Such a characteristic, 
it might be said, implies an injustice and the existence of certain ideals 
from which the unjust practice is nevertheless to be temporarily exempted. 
As the Director of the ILO’s IPEC put it in 1994: ‘Few human rights 
abuses are so unanimously condemned, while being so widely practised, as 
child labour.’266  
 
However, as a characteristic of child labor in the garment industry, the 
above may be seen as problematic on a number of counts. That is, in a 
number of respects, the above does not bring out the problematization and 
conflict potential inherent in the conditions: the work of underage children 
in the industry was clearly illegal, and production in the garment industry 
did entail widespread violations of basic labor rights.267 Even if the ILO 
C138 had been ratified or national laws had provided for light work, the 
work of the older children would generally not have qualified as such, 
among other things because ‘Where children work long hours [...] the work 
they do, cannot qualify as “light” by the standards of Convention No. 
138.’268 More broadly, working conditions in the garment industry have 
been characterized as generally involving working 10-14 hour days, often 
without breaks and with only half a day off in a week, late payments and 
sometimes no payment at all, overtime being frequently required and rarely 
entailing extra pay, frequent violations of employment formalities such as 
being given no employment letter (enabling employers to terminate 
workers without the statutory termination benefits), physical working 
environments characterized by poor lighting and ventilation and often hot, 
                                          
265 AAFLI, Report, pp. 13-14. 
 
266 Stoikov, Testimony. 
 
267 See e.g., U.S. Department of State, Bangladesh Economic Policy and Trade 
Practices (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1994). 
 
268 Stoikov, Testimony. 
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crowded and locked factory buildings, and the ‘imposition of harsh forms 
of discipline and supervision.’269  
 
Beyond legality and the broader context of labor rights violations, 
however, the above moreover characterizes child labor in the garment 
industry as a “lesser” problem, when – on a number of counts and with a 
view to the politicization and conflict potential – it was precisely the 
opposite: a key characteristic of child labor was that it was prevalent in the 
country’s leading and most important export industry. This relates to the 
industry’s vulnerability and susceptibility to external pressure, of course, 
but it also indicates that the potential for forcing change in this ‘limited 
sphere’ was perhaps quite considerable; the problem was certainly much 
more visible; and factory work has tended to be perceived as more 
exploitative. And, it may be pointed out, the explosive growth of the 
industry had been accompanied by an actual and equally marked, 
numerical increase in the incidence of child labor in it.270  
 
Furthermore, the link between child labor and poverty may be said to cut 
both ways (that is, while children’s earnings may be important in poor 
households, child labor, in turn, perpetuates poverty), and rather than a 
natural law related to stages of economic development, the 
persistence/eradication of child labor is a matter of social forces for and 
against it. Thus, the simple logics of household poverty and the absence of 
day-care options may not be as straightforward as sometimes suggested. 
The survey conducted by AAFLI, for example, found that adult 
unemployment in the immediate family of child workers was quite 
common, and that ‘Very few (less than 15%) of the child workers 
interviewed had an immediate family member (father, mother, brother, 
sister) working in the same factory.’271 Moreover, in relation to day-care 
options, the report noted: ‘Interestingly, section 47 of the Factories Act of 
1965 requires that in any factory with more than 50 women workers, the 
owner is required to provide a child care room for the children of the 
                                          
269 Rock, ‘The Rise’; AAFLI, Report, pp. 12-14; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of 
International Labor Affairs, By The Sweat and Toil of Children (Volume I), p. 30. 
 
270 This is not to suggest that the children employed in the industry would otherwise 
have been attending school. It is important, however, to point out that there was a 
change in the real social relations of production and not merely in the discursive 
politics of child labor. 
 
271 AAFLI, Report, p. 13. 
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workers. None of the workers interviewed for this report was aware of any 
factory that met this requirement.’272  
 
As for the material interests in using child labor, children were generally 
paid less than adults in the industry, but this wage differential was 
‘primarily because of the jobs held by the children, who tend to be given 
the less skilled jobs [...] In cases in which a child worker is able to obtain 
promotion to a job as a sewing machine operator or ironer, they are paid 
the same wages as adult workers.’273 While the direct labor cost advantages 
of using child labor were thus rather limited in the sense of being confined 
to certain types of tasks, other facets of child labor - e.g. child workers 
being more easily disciplined - have been claimed to be important.274 
Moreover, in competitive labor market systems, child labor may serve as a 
substitute for adult workers, putting a downward pressure on adult wages 
and enabling local manufacturers to increase their sometimes meager 
profits, not only in terms of adult unemployment (cf. above) but also in 
terms of serving to obstruct labor organizing. As the following comment of 
a garment manufacturer illustrates, not all garment manufacturers were that 
keen supporters of trade unions: ‘If it is necessary to kill workers, they will 
be killed, but there will not be a trade union in this factory.’275  
 
All of the above, of course, may be somewhat irrelevant if child labor is 
seen more or less exclusively as a practice rooted in local culture and 
traditions, the implication being, of course, that rather than a divergence in 
practice from a shared ideal, there are fundamentally different sociocultural 
values. Obviously, child labor was widely accepted and condoned in 
Bangladesh, and gender values and traditions in particular played an 
important role in shaping the characteristics of child labor in the garment 
industry. The sovereignty of culture argument, however, has often been 
used as an excuse for many horrors, and its invocation often leads to a very 
abstract discussion. While one may find such a discussion very interesting, 
it also tends to draw attention away from any discussion of how the growth 
of the garment industry and its entry into a transnational production chain 
                                          
272 AAFLI, Report, p. 13; underlined in original. See also Bissell and Sobhan, Child 
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273 AAFLI, Report, p. 12. 
 
274 See e.g. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, By The 
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275 Cited from Rock, ‘The Rise’, p. 40. 
 139
also involved some profound changes in the rationalities of the 
Bangladeshi politicians and manufacturers: child labor in the garment 
industry co-existed with some – much more significant – changes in values 
with the widespread acceptance of “new” and “alien” values associated 
with global capitalism and a neoliberal world order – values that, in some 
quarters, are seen as highly contentious and in no small measure tied to the 
powerful material and political forces underlying the continued use of child 
labor.  
 
5.5 A chronology of events 
 
In late 1992 the spotlight was turned onto the use of child labor in the 
Bangladeshi garment industry.276 Two events played a crucial role in this. 
The first was the introduction – or, more precisely, the use of this in 
Bangladesh – in the U.S. Congress in August of 1992 of the Child Labor 
Deterrence Act (also referred to as the Harkin bill) to ban the importation 
into the U.S. of products manufactured using child labor.277 In October, the 
Chief of the Economic Commercial Section of the U.S. Embassy in 
Bangladesh, Phillip Carter III, wrote to – and subsequently met with 
representatives of – the BGMEA. Then-BGMEA President, Mohammad 
Mosharraf Hossain, subsequently sent a letter to BGMEA members, 
transmitting Carter’s warnings of the pending Harkin Bill and the serious 
mood in the U. S. Congress as well as the possibility of another GSP 
petition, and urging them to ‘take note of the above developments for 
                                          
276 Child labor in the Bangladeshi garment industry had not gone entirely unnoticed, 
and there had been skirmishes between American trade unions and the local 
manufacturers. See e.g. Denis Campbell, ‘Young Guardian: Slaves to our appetites – 
The exploitation of child workers around the world’ in The Guardian (London), 21 
June 1989; Robert A. Senser, ‘On Their Knees’ in America, Vol. 167, Issue 7, Sept. 
1992. 
 
277 The bill had been introduced earlier, but had not yet been passed. See Congressional 
Record, ‘Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions (Senate, August 5, 
1992)’; Congressional Record, ‘The Introduction of The Child Labor Deterrence Act of 
1989 (House of Representatives, 24 May 1989)’; Congressional Record, ‘Statements 
on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions (Senate, 24 May 1990)’; Congressional 
Record, ‘Introduction of the Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1991 - Hon. Donald J. 
Pease (Extension of Remarks, House of Representatives, 15 Nov. 1991)’. 
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information and appropriate necessary action to maintain smooth flow of 
our exports to the United States.’278  
 
The second was an NBC Dateline segment broadcast on December 22, 
which charged Wal-Mart with mislabeling Chinese clothing to avoid 
import quota restrictions and with buying clothing from Bangladesh made 
by illegal child labor.279 In the run-up to the program, on December 12, the 
BGMEA had sent a letter to Wal-Mart’s Vice President, Arthur Emmanuel, 
assuring the company that ‘all necessary steps had been taken to ensure 
that BGMEA garments would be child free. The BGMEA also indicated to 
Mr. Emmanuel that it was going to open some schools for the working 
children in areas where there was a high concentration of garment 
factories.’280  
 
Terry Collingsworth from AAFLI was already in Bangladesh, where he 
had met with Carter from the U.S. Embassy to discuss child labor and the 
garment industry. On December 26, 1992, Collingsworth met with the 
President of the BGMEA and proposed a collaborative effort to combat the 
problem.281 A few days before the NBC program aired, Pharis Harvey of 
the ILRF (and CLC) had written to Wal-Mart’s President, David Glass, 
requesting further information about the company’s buying practices and 
policies. ‘Reeling from the negative exposure from the Dateline program, 
Mr. Glass responded with a detailed letter which included commitment by 
Wal-Mart to establish “a fund for factories and/or garment associations in 
order to help educate the children of Bangladesh.”’282  
 
                                          
278 Mohammad Mosharraf Hossain (BGMEA President), letter to BGMEA members, 
November 14, 1992. 
 
279 Don Longo, ‘Wal-Mart must address some ‘press’ing issues’ in Discount Store 
News, January 4, 1993, vol. 32, no. 1, p. 14; The Wall Street Journal, ‘Wal-Mart Stock 
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280 AAFLI, Report, p. 21. 
 
281 AAFLI’s proposal is described in more detail in section 5.9. Terry Collingsworth, 
Telefax to Pharis Harvey, March 23, 1993. Cf. also The Telegraph (Dhaka), ‘US labour 
body offers to train garment workers’ and ‘Garment manufacturers likely to clean low-
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employing children’, December 31, 1992; The Bangladesh Times, ‘AAFLI, BGMEA to 
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At this point, however, the garment manufacturers were already 
‘contemplating to clean up low-age workers from their factories’ and – 
according to Rosaline Costa, a Bangladeshi human rights activist – as 
many as 5,000 children had already been displaced in December of 
1992.283 This “cleaning up”, however, did not involve the provision of 
educational alternatives or any substitute income for the children, and the 
concern with the potentially worse fate of the displaced child workers soon 
became an important issue as the debate continued. Both the Harkin bill 
and the NBC segment caused considerable debate in Bangladesh as well as 
in the U.S., and representatives of the BGMEA and the government of 
Bangladesh engaged in talks with a number of different parties, including 
the U.S. Embassy and AAFLI. Wal-Mart, Levi Strauss and other 
international buyers of Bangladeshi garments sent representatives to ‘visit’ 
the country in the beginning of 1993.284 Neither Wal-Mart nor Levi Strauss 
chose to pull out of Bangladesh, however. Instead, Wal-Mart actually 
increased its buying in Bangladesh and announced a new set of sourcing 
standards, whereas Levi Strauss developed what it sees as a model program 
of its own.285  
 
In March of 1993 the Child Labor Deterrence Act was re-introduced in the 
U.S. Congress, giving rise to further debate and talks, and in late spring an 
informal working group was formed with representatives from the 
government of Bangladesh, the BGMEA, UNICEF and the ILO, AAFLI, 
and several local NGOs.286 The working group had a wider mandate on 
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child labor than just the garment industry. The group did, however, meet 
periodically to discuss the issue of child labor in the garment industry, and 
– although this did not entail negotiations of an MOU as such – among 
other things UNICEF conducted a study and also prepared a project 
proposal. The proposal was never accepted, though, and the group’s work 
was made difficult, among other things, by polarized views and 
discussions on the Harkin bill, as well as by the quite vague position and 
promises of the ILO.287  
 
In early July 1994, the Child Labor Deterrence Act was introduced once 
more. The BGMEA announced that factory owners would cease to employ 
all child workers by October 31 and provide schooling for them.288 
However, neither schooling nor alternative employment nor income for the 
child workers was forthcoming, and concerns over the potentially negative 
effects on the children were raised again. When October came, an appeal 
on behalf of a number of child workers was directed to UNICEF and the 
ILO (and the broader public), and the lay-offs were postponed. 
Subsequently, the negotiations that would eventually lead to the MOU 
began in a group consisting of representatives of the BGMEA, the ILO, 
                                                                                                                           
Bangladesh Media Reaction - March 31, Memorandum 02432, March 31, 1993; United 
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287 See Bissell and Sobhan, Child labour; AAFLI, Report. See also The Daily Star 
(Dhaka), ‘BGMEA can help avert adverse effect of Harkin Bill’, August 3, 1993; The 
Morning Sun, ‘Harkin Bill ‘won’t hit local industries’’ and ‘Harkin Bill a reflection of 
protectionism’, August 3 and 9, 1993; The Telegraph (Dhaka), ‘Harkin Bill to damage 
garment industry in Bangladesh’, August 10, 1993; The New Nation, ‘AAFLI working 
against interest of workers’, August 10, 1993; Nur Khan Liton, ‘Fair deal for the kids: 
Harkin’s Law will do more harm than good to Bangladesh’s working children’ in 
Dhaka Courier, September 10, 1993; The Telegraph (Dhaka), ‘No child labour’, 
October 14, 1993. 
 
288 Congressional Record, ‘Introduction of the Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1994 - 
Hon. George E. Brown, Jr. (Extension of Remarks, House of Representatives, July 1, 
1994)’; Agence France Presse (AFP), ‘Bangladesh’s garment industry to end use of 
child labour’, July 5, 1994; Rahman Jahangir, ‘US pressure forces Dhaka to free 36,000 
child labourers’ in Saudi Gazette, July 6, 1994; Agence France Presse (AFP), 
‘Bangladesh garment exporters ban child labour’, July 24, 1994; U.S. Department of 
Labor (Bureau of International Labor Affairs), By The Sweat and Toil of Children 
(Volume I), pp. 34-35; Grumiau, Garments. 
 143
UNICEF, the U.S. Embassy and AAFLI.289 The negotiations, accompanied 
by a continued media attention on the industry, involved a number of 
thorny issues and disagreements, and they were further slowed down by 
the sweeping victory of the Republicans in the U.S. mid-term elections as 
well as by the fact that two different versions of an agreement were in 
play.290  
 
On January 30, 1995, Pharis Harvey (executive director of the ILRF) and 
Linda Golodner (President of the National Consumers League), co-chairs 
of the Child Labor Coalition, representing more than 10 million members, 
wrote to Redwan Ahmed, President of the BGMEA:  
 
‘[…] we have recently learned that very little if any progress has been 
made since last October, and that the BGMEA has expressed reluctance to 
allow independent monitoring of compliance with the program. This is 
disturbing [...] If the BGMEA does not intend to participate in the program 
as designed, then it can expect that organizations such as the Child Labor 
Coalition will be forced to publicize the continued use of child labor in the 
making of garments in Bangladesh.’291  
 
Ahmed and the BGMEA did not reply, and at the Annual General Meeting 
of the BGMEA on March 11 a decision on the agreement was postponed 
until late May – in spite of a tremendous publicity opportunity for the 
BGMEA to sign and present an agreement in conjunction with the 
forthcoming visit of the U.S. First Lady, Hillary Clinton, to Bangladesh. 
According to the BGMEA, however, the agreement could only be accepted 
at an Extra-Ordinary General Meeting.292 
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More communication ensued from D.C. to Dhaka, the tone increasingly 
sharp, and the threat now taking the form of a boycott in case the 
agreement was not formalized in May.293 On May 17, the BGMEA 
Extraordinary General Meeting ended with a rejection of the agreement (by 
311 of 352 members) – and the BGMEA once again announced that it 
would terminate all child workers by October 31.294 The Child Labor 
Coalition then called for the boycott, and the BGMEA came under heavy 
pressure from various quarters.295 The BGMEA stood firm for a couple of 
days, at one point even threatening a “counter-campaign” abroad, but then 
– at an Emergency Executive Committee Meeting on May 24 – the 
BGMEA decided to return to the negotiating table.296 Ironically, this 
coincided with UNICEF headquarters announcing a vow not to buy from 
companies that exploit children – a vow which, as it were, followed a CBS 
exposé on child labor in the production of surgical instruments and other 
items in Sialkot, Pakistan (and the exposé was one of the first major events 
in the ensuing controversy over child labor in the soccer ball industry, cf. 
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the next chapter).297 The talks continued throughout June, and eventually 
the agreement was signed and presented on the 4th of July, timed in part to 
show appreciation of the important role of the U.S. Ambassador in the 
process.298 
 
5.6 Struggles to define the problem 
 
One of the most significant aspects of the struggles to define the problem 
in this case is that, throughout the process, it was defined almost 
exclusively in terms of child labor. Of course, child labor was used and this 
was largely acknowledged and undisputed, but why this narrow definition, 
when other basic labor rights issues could also have been on the agenda?299  
Certainly, AAFLI did have an interest in defining the problem in broader 
terms that included other labor rights issues and concerns - and these were 
brought up in the discussions, including in the December 1992 meeting 
with and proposal to the BGMEA, cf. above. Indeed, as Pharis Harvey 
recollects, the AFL-CIO were actually ‘not that happy with child labor 
being a major part of Terry’s work [...]’300  
 
For a number of reasons, however, there was no concerted or sustained 
effort to change the agenda in this way. To begin with, the NBC exposé 
focused on Wal-Mart and illegal child labor in Bangladesh (and most of 
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the ensuing media attention in Bangladesh likewise focused on child labor 
only). It was to some degree a coincidence, however, that the focus was on 
Bangladesh and child labor, since the initial interest of the NBC crew was 
in Wal-Mart’s ‘Buy America’ campaign:  
 
‘So this reporter with a television crew goes into a Wal-Mart. Underneath 
the banner ‘Buy America’ there’s these shirts, and he starts looking at 
them, and they all say ‘Made in Bangladesh’ – ‘Made in Bangladesh’! [...] 
if they had said ‘Made in Mexico,’ he would have gone to Mexico.’301  
 
The NBC Dateline segment certainly was important in putting child labor 
in the Bangladeshi garment industry on the agenda, and it thereby also 
contributed to defining the problem as one of child labor. On the other 
hand, the focus was not entirely coincidental and unrelated to actual 
conditions on the ground: after all, children were actually working; the 
work was to a considerable extent illegal under national and international 
law; child labor was widespread in the large-scale formal sector production 
of the nation’s main export industry (thus, highly visible and more readily 
seen as exploitative) – in a direct causal link to U.S. companies and 
consumers. As far as the Bangladeshi media and debate were concerned, 
the treatment of the issue was very much driven by the threat of the Harkin 
Bill – a threat related to child labor. 
 
Indeed, the potential enactment of the Harkin Bill played a key role in 
relation to the narrow definition of the problem. Although the Bill was 
neither directed at the garment industry nor at Bangladesh specifically, it 
was used and affected the situation on the ground in Bangladesh in a 
number of ways. For one thing, it constituted a source of leverage – a 
leverage that was tied directly and narrowly to child labor – over the 
Bangladeshi garment industry on labor issues, both for Carter from the 
U.S. Embassy in Dhaka and for AAFLI’s Terry Collingsworth:  
 
‘He’s in there, trying to talk to people about organizing, and what does he 
see? It’s full of children! Now, Terry is a very good labor rights activist, 
and he said, “We can’t have this.” He also sees that this is a wedge.’302 
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 More importantly, the Harkin bill led to a very polarized debate, in which 
the negative consequences of the elimination of child labor quickly became 
a dominant theme. This was a point on which UNICEF, IPEC, the majority 
of the local NGOs involved and the local manufacturers agreed, focusing 
the debate on the depth of the problem (causes and consequences) rather 
than the breadth (related labor rights issues) and a potential broadening of 
the agenda. By re-defining the problem under this theme, the focus was 
arguably shifted somewhat away from the real and pre-existing 
exploitation of children in the industry and the responsibility of the 
manufacturers in this, and the BGMEA used it as part of the delaying 
tactics in the drawn-out process. Moreover, the Harkin bill and the 
emphasis on negative consequences also had a significant impact on the 
discussions of the size of the problem, that is, how many children were 
actually working in the industry. Thus, the figures reported during the 
process varied widely, from the occasional denials by the BGMEA that the 
problem existed to claims that up to 250,000 children were involved. The 
logic of this number game or stat war was in a sense turned upside down 
and closely tied to the above:  
 
‘Those who want to emphasize that the Harkin bill will result in the 
displacement of large numbers of children cite very high figures.’303  
 
Moreover, this dominant theme and re-definition of the problem had some 
profound impacts on targeting and the struggles over blame and 
responsibility in this process, as we shall see shortly.  
 
5.7 Targeting  
 
During the process there were two primary targets - Wal-Mart and the 
BGMEA. As we have seen above, Wal-Mart was a target in the initial 
stage, but after this Wal-Mart and other international buyers did not play a 
central role as targets. The BGMEA, in turn, was a target from the very 
beginning, and from early on it was the sole target. This made sense for a 
number of reasons. Not only did the BGMEA have a considerable control 
over the entire formal sector garment industry in Bangladesh through its 
administering of export licenses, but the local manufacturers were also 
vulnerable and susceptible to pressure from the very beginning:  
 
                                          
303 AAFLI, Report, p. 6. 
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‘While Hossain and the other BGMEA members have demonstrated 
through their past conduct that they are willing to do and say almost 
anything to maintain the cheapest possible labor costs, AAFLI has a 
unique opportunity to force them to make substantial improvements. They 
are genuinely concerned that the AFL-CIO will take action under GSP or 
the Harkin bill if the BGMEA does not comply with the minimum standards 
in the law. AAFLI should keep the pressure on to ensure actual 
implementation of the proposal.’304  
 
Furthermore, it might be said that the BGMEA represented the entire local 
industry, whereas targeting a few specific international buyers would 
amount to only a fraction of the industry.  
 
It is furthermore worth noting that the government of Bangladesh was not 
targeted directly. Part of the reason was that the government both lacked 
the resources and the political will to act effectively, and it had been so 
ineffective for so many years in enforcing its own laws. Yet, the Harkin 
bill constituted a threat not just to the garment manufacturers but also to 
the national economic interests of Bangladesh. As mentioned above, 
however, the BGMEA had very strong political ties and seeking to change 
the practices of its members indirectly through the government - even if it 
could be argued that this would be compatible with the export-oriented 
policy of the government - would most likely not have led anywhere. As 
AAFLI put it, when commenting on the drawn-out negotiation process: 
 
‘Another problem is the close relationship between the BGMEA and the 
government’s ruling BNP party. BGMEA President Ahmed is a Member of 
Parliament from the BNP party. Some of the most powerful BNP 
politicians either own garment factories or members of their immediate 
families do. The result of these close connections is that the BGMEA is not 
getting significant pressure from the government to act. Instead there are 
spectacles like Minister of Information Huda’s speech that the Harkin bill 
is an “international conspiracy.”’305  
 
Moreover, as the above suggests, the orientation and prioritization of 
central IGOs such as the ILO and UNICEF was toward eliminating the 
worst and most hazardous forms of child labor first, and the two IGOs did 
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305 AAFLI, Report, p. 17. 
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not enter the public blaming of the garment industry. In the words of Fyfe 
and Jankanish, ‘It makes strategic sense to concentrate on the removal of 
child workers from hazardous work and forced labor [...]’306 Furthermore, 
the focus was not on child labor in export industries, ‘first because it 
represents a small proportion of the child labour problem and secondly 
because work carried out so far confirms the need for a multidimensional 
approach to this complex issue.’307 Thus, the ILO at this point (mid-1994) 
was not even considering the option of getting involved in independent 
monitoring and verification – which the Bangladesh MOU entailed. 
 
As far as the reactions by the Bangladeshi garment industry are concerned, 
these were intricately related to the above re-defining of the problem as 
Harkin bill/negative consequences/malicious critics (as opposed to the 
exploitation of children in the industry and the responsibility of the 
manufacturers in this). This served not only as criticism of the Harkin bill, 
but simultaneously to delegitimize AAFLI and other labor rights activists, 
charging them with an international conspiracy against the Bangladeshi 
garment industry, U.S. protectionism, and with being against the interests 
of the children in question: AAFLI and the CLC were charged with being 
uninformed about the realities in Bangladesh and with not listening to the 
children and families – in spite of the fact that AAFLI and the CLC were 
both rather well-informed, that key individuals (such as Pharis Harvey and 
Terry Collingsworth) were far from unfamiliar with the lives and working 
conditions of workers in developing countries, and that the project that 
Terry Collingsworth of AAFLI had proposed to the President of the 
BGMEA as early as December 26, 1992, in fact did have as a major 
concern the fate of the child workers (further below).308 All of this enabled 
the BGMEA to approach the controversy the way it did, and it constituted 
the background for the industry’s repeated threats to terminate the child 
workers within short periods of time – the blame had been diverted:  
 
‘So, when the garment manufacturers got scared and fired all these kids, 
everybody blamed us. And I turned blue in the face saying to people, “Why 
are you blaming us? The garment manufacturers knew all along they were 
using and exploiting children. They could have done something about it for 
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‘Malpublicity’. 
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years. They didn’t. It was their choice to fire people. […] Now you are 
blaming us? I don’t think so.” But nobody sees it that way.’309  
 
Would this have occurred, one might wonder, had the two international 
organizations – UNICEF and IPEC – not been “specialized” (i.e., working 
from a mandate narrowly focused on children), or if they had played a 
different role in the debate?  
 
Finally, the critique of the industry’s labor practices was largely “Northern 
driven” – coming primarily from AAFLI and the CLC. This is a frequently 
used characteristic in the discourse on corporate social responsibility, in 
some cases pointing to an exclusion of key “stakeholders” by powerful 
interests, in other cases delegitimizing – rightly or wrongly – the critics as 
not acting in the best interests of the intended beneficiaries. The latter was 
also the case in the Bangladesh process, cf. above. Yet, the repercussions 
against Rosaline Costa in this process, for example, also point to another 
facet of “Northern driven” criticism which is less often discussed: namely, 
the intimidation, repression and physical violence, which local critics often 
face, and which may be part of the reason why “Northern” critics are not 
always too keen on naming their “Southern” partners.310 
 
5.8 Economic coercion 
 
To begin with, let us look at economic coercion between companies. As we 
have seen, Wal-Mart was targeted initially in the NBC segment, and had 
already received inquiries from the ILRF. As was also mentioned, the U.S. 
corporations did not become involved in the negotiations and talks that led 
to the MoU, but they were generally concerned with the risk of being 
accused with child labor. That the fear of losing important international 
buyers was important to the BGMEA seems obvious and is apparent from 
early on in the process. As mentioned, both Wal-Mart and Levi Strauss, for 
example, sent senior representatives to Bangladesh. Yet, neither of the two 
companies left Bangladesh.  
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The threat of trade sanctions against the industry from the U.S. under the 
Child Labor Deterrence Act was a much more important, key driver in this 
process. If such sanctions were imposed, the effects on the industry would 
have been devastating, and it was an important factor in the negotiation 
process:  
 
‘The entire public debate [in Bangladesh] seems to center on whether or 
not the [Harkin] Bill will be passed, and accepts as a foregone conclusion 
that if the law is passed, the garment industry will not be able to meet the 
requirements.’311  
 
As mentioned, this was used from the very beginning by the U.S. Embassy 
and by AAFLI to put pressure on the BGMEA, and initially the 
forthcoming inauguration of the Clinton Administration was used to 
heighten the uncertainty of the situation for the BGMEA. Each of the 
subsequent reintroductions caused not only debate but also renewed 
uncertainties for the BGMEA, and gave AAFLI renewed leverage. At the 
same time, the potential negative consequences of the bill were used by the 
BGMEA as a power resource: in late 1992, 1993 and again in July 1994 
the threat of its passage was followed by announcements by the BGMEA 
that it would start terminating all child workers in the industry. Moreover, 
each time the bill failed to gain passage the uncertainties diminished, and 
the threat became less effective. As the 1994 AAFLI report put it:  
 
‘While waiting for the fate of the Harkin bill to be decided, it is difficult to 
motivate the BGMEA to take action or the NGO sector to devote resources 
to a problem that to date is only a potential problem. The possibility of the 
Harkin bill’s passage has been virtually the exclusive force in focusing 
attention on the problem of child labor, but now the momentum is stalled 
along with the Harkin bill.’312  
 
In late 1994, just after the MOU negotiations had begun, the Republicans 
took Capitol Hill, and the Child Labor Deterrence Act ceased to constitute 
a driving force in the Bangladesh process. A few months later, the CLC 
became involved in the process and, after four months of stepping up the 
pressure, the BGMEA’s postponement and rejection of the MOU, 
eventually called for a boycott. Thus, in the end, it was the use of this 
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second type of economic coercion that forced the BGMEA back to the 
negotiating table within a few days. 
 
In short, the threat of the Harkin bill was instrumental in driving the 
BGMEA to engage in any kind of talks at all, and the later boycott threat 
was also of fundamental significance. Yet, the use of economic coercion 
was highly contested (it still is, of course, and it is not uncommon for 
arguments against this to be based on the “lessons” of Bangladesh). Bissell 
and Sobhan, for example, have argued that the softer tactics involved in the 
“formation of trust” were central in the process: ‘Perhaps the most 
important investment of time during the course of the project was in the 
development of a rapport with industry representatives.’313 This is 
illustrative of a more general dichotomy between the use of softer tactics 
(trust-building, dialogue, learning, etc.) and blunter ones (e.g., trade 
sanctions, boycotts, lawsuits, etc.). This begs the question of what it takes 
to make ‘global capital more responsible’314 – and whether there would be 
any “inside” or any “trust-building” or “dialogue” at all without the 
“outsiders” employing more “radical” means? As a former senior official 
from the U.S. Labor Department put it:  
 
‘The fact of the matter is that Terry [Collingsworth] was going to all of 
these people and getting the door slammed in his face. It’s not that the 
companies didn’t know it. It’s not that anybody didn’t know. And they were 
not interested in responding. In any way, shape, or form... And they knew 
what was happening. They were being approached. They had no incentive 
to change their way of working. None at all. So, what is incentive? It seems 
to me that this day and age, there is only one incentive: money. And if their 
purse is threatened, they will come to the table and begin talking. And 
that’s what we did. Nothing else got those people to the negotiating 
table.’315  
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Or, as Pharis Harvey put it, ‘trade sanctions are a very blunt instrument, 
but we were dealing with some very blunt people, and we got their 
attention.’316 Or again, in the words of Terry Collingsworth:  
 
‘[…] my role was to scare the industry. I mean, we were the activists and 
we were there talking about what we would do if they didn’t clean up their 
act... UNICEF was a terrible negotiator, because they did not accept the 
bad faith of the industry. They took what the industry said at face value, 
and I’d be sitting there, just shaking my head, saying, “You’re kidding! Do 
you believe that?” I would say back to UNICEF - and I have - “Well, fine. 
Please tell me what your alternative is!” Because they seem so willing to 
put their head in the ... and trust that the government says they’re going to 
fix the problem. They’ve been saying that for 20, 50 years!’317  
 
Soft vs. tough tactics, then, is a false dichotomy, and in this case the 
BGMEA was ‘led’ to compromise by both. Without the threat of the 
Harkin bill, however, negotiations of the MoU may never have gotten 
underway, and without the boycott an agreement would probably not have 
been reached. Of course, the uses of economic coercion in this case and the 
negative consequences for the children have been identified as among the 
“lessons” from Bangladesh. Very often, this involves – as it did during the 
process – claims that this was simply self-interested U.S. labor 
protectionism in disguise and/or that the CLC was, at best, naïve and 
uninformed:  
 
‘While not wanting to question the CLC’s commitment to the abolition of 
child labour, it was clear that they were poorly informed about the 
prevailing economic conditions in Bangladesh, the reasons why children 
work and the steps that need to be taken to address this issue in a way that 
truly safeguards the child. Without this basic information, one could argue 
that it was inappropriate for the CLC […]’318  
 
The latter is basically an unsubstantiated characteristic, which results from 
– at best – being unaware of the close links between the CLC, AAFLI and 
the U.S. Embassy in Dhaka. As for protectionism in disguise, it appears 
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that any kind of trade-labor linkage is presumably and automatically 
protectionism? Should one not consider the fact that AAFLI was working 
to establish BIGU in Bangladesh, that child labor was seen as a problem 
and a leverage, which could provide AAFLI with access to the factories? 
In Bissell and Sobhan’s impression,  
 
‘AAFLI had been trying to open a field office in Bangladesh for some time 
[…] AAFLI sought to work (and head) the monitoring cell of the CLWG 
[Child Labour Working Group] which would have provided them with 
immediate access to garment factories.’319  
 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that AAFLI’s December 1992 proposal to 
the BGMEA did include the provision of educational alternatives, and the 
above characteristics virtually never mention this proposal – in spite of the 
local media coverage after the meeting. 
  
Finally, as noted earlier, this critique of blunter instruments and the 
emphasis on negative consequences served to misplace the moral 
responsibility for both the previous exploitation and the displacement of 
children into worse situations: what about the Bangladeshi government, the 
garment manufacturers, the international buyers? 
 
5.9 Modelling the solution 
 
As mentioned, Terry Collingsworth of AAFLI already tabled a fairly 
elaborate program in the December 26, 1992, meeting with the BGMEA. 
In light of what happened subsequently – both what was discussed above 
as well as the particularities of the modelling process – and AAFLI’s role 
in modelling, the proposal is an interesting early attempt at modelling a 
solution. Its main elements were:320 
 
- The establishment of a central organization to coordinate the work 
of other NGOs and the government in setting up schools for the 
child workers. 
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- The BGMEA ‘would provide access to the workers to inform them 
of the program, physical space for the classrooms where possible, 
and some degree of financial support.’ 
 
- The BGMEA ‘would permit access to the adult workers for AAFLI 
to provide education and training. Again, the BGMEA would 
provide physical space and some degree of financial support, as well 
as cooperation in arranging times when the workers could attend our 
programs.’ 
 
- The BGMEA would meet regularly with an AAFLI representative to 
be presented with information about labor law violations of BGMEA 
members, and BGMEA would then have opportunity to correct the 
problems ‘before AAFLI used all available means to force 
compliance with the law.’ 
 
According to Collingsworth, Hossain was appreciative of the cooperative 
attitude, and said that ‘the BGMEA would cooperate in all respects with 
the program I had proposed.’ However, the meeting did not lead to any 
immediate cooperation between the BGMEA and AAFLI, but instead what 
ensued was a drawn-out process.  
 
In this, the defining of the problem in terms of child labor and the 
emphasis on the negative consequences for the displaced children were two 
important factors in shaping the givens of a potential solution: the 
agreement would eventually center on child labor, and the provision of 
educational alternatives for the child workers and a survey to find them 
were more or less natural components. This was proposed by AAFLI from 
the very beginning, much in line with dominant ideas on childhood and 
child labor. Furthermore, it might be noted that the targeting of the 
BGMEA throughout the process, and the fact that other targets were not 
important through most of the process, implied that the BGMEA was a 
“natural” partner to any possible agreement, and this had implications for 
the eventual scope of the agreement.  
 
The critical issues or conflict points, in turn, in the modelling process were 
i) education for all or education for the youngest and light work-school for 
the older children; ii) funding - by whom, how, and for what; iii) 
monitoring - by whom? 
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When the negotiations re-started following the boycott in May, 1995, two 
versions of an agreement were still on the table. Briefly put, one version 
(which became the MOU) would move all underage child workers to 
school; the other version would move the younger children to school, but 
introduce a combination of work and education for those above the age of 
11. The U.S. Embassy and Department of Labor, the CLC, the ILRF, and 
AAFLI were willing to accept either version:  
 
‘We in the Child Labor Coalition are prepared to accept either Option #1 
or Option #2, as long as either option provides sufficient oversight from 
international agencies in the survey and in monitoring compliance, and is 
carried out in a way that provides schooling for all retrenched child 
laborers.’321  
 
While consistent with international law, the school/work for older children 
version would not have been consistent with Bangladeshi law. An 
exception could have been sought, but this would have required more time 
than some of the parties involved saw fit: although the BGMEA appears to 
have been willing to accept either solution earlier on, in the final stages the 
BGMEA expressed concern that this version would not be acceptable to 
the international buyers.322 Thus, the BGMEA and the government of 
Bangladesh opted for the pure education version, and the MoU ended up 
with this formulation: ‘October 31, 1995 is the target date for all workers 
who have not attained 14 years of age to be terminated from employment 
and placed in school programmes [...]’323  
 
The issue of monitoring was another conflict point. By 1995 independent 
monitoring had become a fundamental demand of AAFLI, the CLC, the 
U.S. Embassy and Department of Labor. The BGMEA, on the other hand, 
was reluctant to accept this intrusion, in particular if it was to be headed by 
AAFLI, which had offered to monitor the program, and which was 
suggested as an obvious candidate for doing so by the CLC.324 Indeed, the 
delaying tactics of the BGMEA were closely related to this reluctance. In 
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the MOU that had been rejected in May 1995, however, the BGMEA had 
already achieved important concessions:  
 
‘At BGMEA’s insistence, the MOU provided that AAFLI and the other 
international organizations would not be permitted to do the inspections 
themselves. Instead, a Board of Directors, which included BGMEA, would 
hire a staff of inspectors to do the verification, and the MOU expressly 
provided that the information gathered could only be used for the purpose 
of implementing the MOU.’325  
 
Furthermore, AAFLI was excluded from the negotiations, and the BGMEA 
pointed to UNICEF and the ILO as the only actors acceptable for the role 
as external monitors, in spite of the fact that, until then, the ILO had not 
been willing to accept the role.326 In the final stages, however, the U.S. 
Embassy and Department of Labor played an important role in pushing not 
only for independent monitoring but for the involvement of the ILO in 
this.327  
 
The eventual inclusion of the ILO-IPEC was, in part, tied to funding 
aspects. Until quite late in process, crucial aspects of funding had not yet 
been decided upon. Shortly after the negotiations were re-opened in May 
of 1995, the ILO decided to become involved in monitoring, although it 
was still uncertain if it would be a formal partner to the agreement:  
 
‘The ILO, of all people, has agreed to do the monitoring... Currently the 
MOU would be signed by BGMEA and UNICEF. ILO is checking with 
Geneva to see if they can sign.’328  
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There were several reasons for this late entry, including tripartite nature of 
the ILO, but the involvement of the U.S. Department of Labor played a 
crucial role in this. A main concern there at the time was independent 
monitoring, and senior Labor Department officials had strong ties to and 
sympathies for the ILO. Moreover, the wider political backing for some of 
the Labor Department’s work restricted this to child labor, and the ILO-
IPEC, in turn, ‘was also a place you could put your money and have the 
discussions.’329  
 
Until quite late in process, however, crucial aspects of funding had not yet 
been decided upon - most importantly, the percentage of the BGMEA’s 
contribution to stipends had not yet determined at this point. From early 
on, the BGMEA sought to link a possible program to development 
assistance funds from the U.S., but this was rejected at the time.330 An 
early proposal by UNICEF had also suggested levying a small tax on 
garments to finance action on child labor in the industry, but this was not 
accepted with references to the pressures of international competition. In 
the late stage of the process, the U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh was 
‘working on increasing the original amount’ of the U.S. contribution to the 
program.331 As mentioned above, UNICEF was involved in relation to the 
education aspect from early on, conducting a massive study of educational 
alternatives and making the aforementioned project proposal, and 
eventually UNICEF ended up contributing financially to the education 
program. What is more, during the final stages of negotiations, the 
BGMEA was forced to contribute to this:  
 
‘UNICEF will contribute US$ 175,000 in 1995, and additional support 
later, and BGMEA will contribute to the UNICEF sponsored school-
programme US$ 50,000 per year, towards the costs of educating 
underaged workers.’332  
 
More importantly, perhaps, the BGMEA would make contribute with 50 
percent of the cost of income maintenance stipends for displaced child 
workers sent to school, up to a maximum of USD 250,000 per year for 
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three years. As noted above, the size of the BGMEA’s funding 
responsibility appears to have influenced its preferences of model, and it 
should be added that reports indicate that the BGMEA members starting to 
fire children as soon as the negotiations were resumed in late May, 1995, 
and continued to do so up until the survey was conducted. Still, the number 
of children being found would go above the commitments of the BGMEA 
to stipends, and more funding would be needed.333 Thus, it is worth noting 
that in spite of program components such as the survey and the monitoring 
– intended to counteract negative consequences and enhance the 
effectiveness of the solution – the funding responsibilities of the BGMEA 
and the rationalities and concrete actions of its members appear to have 
worked against this. The questions related to funding of the eventual 
program appears, in other words, to have been central in relation to 
determining both the pace of the solution as well as its practical 
implications for child workers at different ages.  
 
5.10 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter set out to explore why the 1995 MOU came into existence 
and took on that particular form.  
 
In broad terms, there were signs of an emerging politicization of corporate 
responsibility in the early 1990s. Yet, the analysis suggests that while it 
may be relevant to speak of CSR as going beyond the law in terms of the 
changing boundaries of responsibility of dominant retailers and branded 
marketers, the leap from illegality to compliance is not a less significant 
one: working conditions in Bangladesh’s leading export industry were far 
from being in compliance with national and international law, the 
applicable regulation was not enforced, and corporate labor practices were 
a far cry from the good examples that one may find in the CSR literature. 
 
More specifically, the re-introductions of the Harkin bill were of 
fundamental importance in driving the process. It was a leverage, which 
was used on the ground in Bangladesh to put pressure on the industry, in 
particular by AAFLI, which was already engaged in labor organizing in the 
industry. It was also a significant threat that caused a polarized debate with 
profound implications for the way the problem was defined: the potentially 
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negative consequences of the Harkin bill cum an elimination of child labor 
for the child workers became a dominant theme early on, blame was 
redirected at the industry’s critics, the agenda became narrowly focused 
and locked in on child labor alone, and the logics of the stat war that 
played out were turned upside down. Hence, while being attentive to the 
negative consequences of eliminating child labor (and other problems) is 
highly important, the above analysis also pointed to some negative 
consequences of being so: it may serve to redefine the problem, to narrow 
the agenda and/or to transfer moral culpability from corporations to critics.  
 
When negotiations were slow, and the Harkin bill had ceased to be an 
effective driver, the Child Labor Coalition entered the process to keep up 
the pressure, and arguably the close links between AAFLI, the ILRF, and 
the CLC played into this. The BGMEA, in turn, constituted an obvious 
target: it was vulnerable and susceptible to pressure, and it was a potential 
way to overcome collective action problems. Moreover, as the negotiations 
dragged on with delays and postponements and a rejection by the BGMEA 
of a draft agreement, the CLC boycott threat was crucial in bringing the 
BGMEA back to the table.  
 
Hence, two forms of economic coercion were centrally significant in this 
case, and the analysis thus challenges some of the more or less established 
“truths” about the Bangladesh case, some of which are of much wider 
relevance and use. To begin with, considering the lengthy process and the 
pushing and shoving it took to move the BGMEA in this case (which is far 
from unique), the praise of softer tactics and the critique and/or rejection of 
tougher ones is as naïve as trade sanctions are blunt. Compromising often 
takes moderate compromisers and more radical critics, and it is often the 
critique that sets the wheels turning – and keeps them going. If more 
moderates would explicitly accept this, perhaps businesses and 
governments could be made to stretch just a little further. In extension, 
warnings against tougher tactics sometimes come in the form of a mantra: 
“Do not rush into a boycott!” When based on the Bangladesh case, such a 
mantra becomes problematic – claims that the Child Labor Coalition or 
AAFLI did so in Bangladesh are simply historically incorrect. Moreover, 
the mantra ignores the issue of what to do if the “target” refuses to talk in 
the first place, or if the talks begin to seem endless (and hopeless). 
 
The analysis also found that, in the final stages, the choice between the two 
versions of the agreement was determined by Bangladeshi laws on child 
labor being stricter than international law, and by the industry’s concerns 
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with losing international buyers. In these negotiations, the exclusion of 
AAFLI and the entry of the ILO (IPEC) to a considerable extent resulted 
from the delaying tactics and reluctances of the BGMEA in combination 
with the specific political preferences and realities as well as funding 
practicalities of the U.S. Department of Labor. 
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6. The big game: corporate responsibility and child 
labor in the production of soccer balls 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Remember Silvers’ description at the very beginning of this dissertation of 
the conditions under which children were allegedly toiling in the 
production of hand-stitched leather soccer balls? Could you imagine a 
starker contrast between those abysmal conditions and the other reality of 
those soccer balls – the passion, the glamour and the big business of the 
world’s biggest sport?  
 
This chapter focuses on the controversy over child labor in the soccer ball 
industry and the ‘Partner’s Agreement to Eliminate Child Labour in the 
Football Industry in Pakistan’ between – as formal signatories – the Sialkot 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCI), the ILO and UNICEF. The 
so-called Atlanta Agreement, to reiterate, was signed and presented at the 
sporting goods industry’s Super Show in Atlanta, Georgia, on the 14th of 
February, 1997. 
 
6.2 Industry characteristics 
 
Approaching the big business of soccer and soccer balls 
 
The balls produced by the children at the center of this controversy are also 
the central objects of contention on millions of pitches across the globe: 
soccer is the world’s biggest sport with more than 240 million regularly 
playing the game, more than 1.5 million teams and 300,000 clubs, the U.S. 
being the nation with the highest proportion of soccer players (18 million, 
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not including children and unregistered players).334 Moreover, major 
sporting events attract considerable media attention and marketing money 
– and increasingly so – and soccer events are certainly no exception. The 
viewing figures for the FIFA World Cup, for example, more than doubled 
between 1986 and 1994, growing slightly in subsequent World Cups, and – 
as FIFA notes with pride – the 2002 World Cup in Korea and Japan was 
‘the most extensively covered and viewed event in television history.’335   
 
In the mid-1990s, the Pakistani town of Sialkot and the hundreds of 
villages in the area surrounding it had obtained a quite remarkable position 
in the manufacture of hand-stitched soccer balls:  
 
‘Pakistan is the source of approximately 75% of the world’s annual sales 
of hand-stitched soccer balls, a market totaling close to $1 billion/year in 
retail sales.’336  
 
A second tier of ball producers consisted of manufacturers in China, India 
and Indonesia, followed by a third group of producers with only very small 
shares of global production. The balls were predominantly made for 
European and North American ball marketers, and the main geographical 
markets for soccer balls were Europe and North America.  
 
The different nodes in the soccer ball commodity chain may be described 
as follows. The ball marketers constitute the dominant node in the chain 
and include most of the world’s largest sporting goods companies and 
numerous smaller ones (in terms of revenue). They focus on product 
development, design and marketing, relying on different strategies for 
marketing their balls to the retail sector, clubs, associations and other 
businesses. Ball marketers typically did not own their own production 
facilities, but instead contracted out the production to manufacturers in 
Sialkot and elsewhere, and often the ball marketer would have a long-
running relationship with one core supplier – while keeping a few others 
                                          
334 FIFA, FIFA Survey: approximately 250 million footballers worldwide, press release, 
April 3, 2001. 
 
335 FIFA, 41,100 hours of 2002 FIFA World Cup TV coverage in 213 countries (at 
www.fifa.org, accessed March 24, 2004). 
 
336 Sporting Goods Manufacturers Association (SGMA), Soccer Manufacturers Pledge 
to Eliminate Child Labor: THE PLEDGE, press release, February 14, 1997. 
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on the side, just in case...337 In 1994, all major brand companies were 
sourcing their balls in Pakistan (on Nike and Reebok, which were new 
entrants, see further below), but several ball marketers sourced their balls 
in other countries as well, i.e., engaging in a price averaging similar to that 
known from the apparel industry. In some cases licensees or import 
companies functioned as intermediaries dealing with the manufacturers.338 
There are no indications that retailers, clubs, etc., were engaged in sourcing 
directly from manufacturers in the early 1990s. The manufacturers, in turn, 
typically relied on a multi-tiered network of subordinates for making the 
balls (further below).  
 
In addition, there was a multi-layered set of business, industry and sports 
associations, facilitating and promoting either local industry or sports 
participation and the interests of sporting goods companies. This included 
the World Federation of the Sporting Goods Industry (WFSGI) at the 
global level, and in the U.S. the Sporting Goods Manufacturers 
Association (SGMA) and its soccer subcommittee, the Soccer Industry 
Council of America (SICA) were the main characters. Members included 
associations and individual corporations – ball marketers and 
manufacturers alike – but it is worth noting that, even at the national level 
of the SGMA, many smaller ball marketers did not find a membership 
worthwhile.339 In other words, these organizations may be characterized as 
fora in which the interests of ball marketers and manufacturers were to 
some extent defined and driven by the lead companies in the respective 
categories. Looking to Sialkot, the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (SCCI) was the main industry body – and one in which the local 
                                          
337 Interview with President of ball marketing company, New York City, 25 March 
2003. The Danish ball marketer, Select Sport, appears to have been an exception with 
its partial ownership of its sole ball supplier since 1976, Anwar Khawaja Industries, 
Ltd. Cf. Erland Vendelbo, ’Interview med Eigil Nielsen: Fantasten og de titusinde 
fodbolde’ in TIPS bladet, Vol. 49, No. 30, April 11, 1997, p. 7. 
 
338 Adidas, for example, sourced balls through a Japanese company, Molten, cf. U. S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, By The Sweat and Toil of 
Children (Volume IV): Consumer Labels and Child Labor (Washington, D. C.: U. S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 1997); Craig S. Smith and 
A. Craig Copetas, ‘For Adidas, China Could Prove Trouble --- Dissident Says Political 
Prisoners Sewed Souvenir Soccer Balls’ in Wall Street Journal, June 26, 1998. 
 
339 Interview with President of ball marketing company, New York City, 25 March 
2003. 
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sporting goods industry was one of the two major, dominant industry 
groupings.  
 
In addition to these industry organizations, of course, there were the soccer 
organizations proper – the whole array of national associations (the English 
FA, the U.S. Soccer Federation, etc.), the regional confederations such as 
UEFA, and the global FIFA. Soccer being the world’s biggest sport, and 
the 2002 FIFA World Cup being the most extensively covered and viewed 
event in television history, cf. above, soccer had also become big business.  
 
Figure 6.1 World Cup television rights revenues340 
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Moreover, in FIFA’s own words, ‘the FIFA World Cup has become quite 
simply the biggest single-sport event in the world and therefore makes it 
the perfect platform for marketing licensed products. [...] The licensing and 
merchandise of sports properties has been transformed from a relatively 
small and fragmented sideline into a highly sophisticated US$ 17 billion 
global industry.’341 Another indication of the increasing marketing value of 
such international sporting events, and the amount of dollars being poured 
into exploiting these, is the growth in licenses and proceeding sales 
associated with the World Cup. Thus, in relation to the 1994 World Cup, 
the estimated worldwide retail sales of licensed products were USD 550 
million. By 1998 the figure had grown to 1.2 billion (the largest ever for an 
international sports event at the time), and by 2002 to USD 1.5 billion.342 
                                          
340 Figures from FIFA, FIFA World Cup & Television. 
 
341 FIFA, FIFA World Cup Licensing Programme; FIFA, 2002 FIFA World Cup 
Licensing Programme. 
 
342 FIFA, FIFA World Cup Licensing Programme; FIFA, 2002 FIFA World Cup 
Licensing Programme. 
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Soccer balls in Sialkot 
 
The first ball out of Sialkot to be approved for match play by FIFA was 
made by Anwar Khawaja Industries in 1967, but it was not until the run-up 
to the 1982 World Cup that the “football craze” really began, as Pakistan 
supplied its first World Cup ball.343 Somewhat ironically, perhaps, the  
organization and social relations of production that existed when the 
subsequent child labor controversy arose had been created after a return to 
more decentralized forms of production, in part following labor-friendly 
legislation a couple of decades earlier.  
 
Traditionally speaking, the sporting goods industry had consisted of 
relatively small production units, but during the 1960s the formation of 
larger industrial units was encouraged, among other things through an 
Export Bonus scheme facilitating the importation of technologically 
advanced machinery – part of a broader policy shift from the import-
substitution and high protection of the 1950s toward an export-promotion 
strategy, which nevertheless contained considerable protection of the 
domestic industry. Child labor was reportedly not very common during the 
centralized, factory-production period. 
 
During the 1970s, as in many other countries, there was an increase in 
government ownership, management and regulation within industry. This, 
and particularly the growing “labor unrest” and new labor legislation in 
Pakistan, had profound impacts on the Sialkot industry: 
 
‘The social organization of industry in Sialkot dramatically changed once 
again during the Bhutto period. Unions, demanding increased 
representation, higher pay, periodic bonuses and better working 
conditions, organized strikes at many of the Sialkot factories. 
Concurrently, the government passed a number of far-reaching labor laws 
                                          
343 The manufacture of sporting goods in the Sialkot area in the Punjab Province dates 
back to the 19th Century, and at some point this came to include the production of 
soccer balls. In the latter half of the 1960s Western sporting goods companies began 
shifting their production of soccer balls to Sialkot - with plenty of low-cost labor and a 
manufacturing tradition enabling the production of very high quality products. See 
Anita M. Weiss, Culture, Class, and Development in Pakistan: The Emergence of an 
Industrial Bourgeoisie in Punjab (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 127; Human 
Rights Commission of Pakistan, Child labour in Pakistan, pp. 5-6; Schrage, Promoting 
International Worker Rights, pp. 13-14. 
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designed to reform the “national economic life” in Pakistan, to balance 
the inequities which had developed over time. The effects of these laws and 
increased union power in Sialkot was not what the government nor the 
labor leaders had intended: instead, many factory owners decentralized 
their operations and sent their employees home to work once again, 
thereby limiting opportunities for collective discourse and dissent. This 
was possible due to the very nature of the industry which had been highly 
decentralized since its inception given its labor-intensive character. [...] 
Most of the new labor laws were inapplicable to units employing less than 
ten full-time workers. Amenities such as education benefits, social security, 
old age pensions and medical insurance only had to be given to salaried 
employees, not to those (not in the majority) working on a piecework basis. 
Factory owners rarely had to contend with labor organizations as their 
workers were now so dispersed.’344  
 
From the perspective of the manufacturers, the “decentralization” of 
production made sense for another reason: the global demand for balls 
tends to vary considerably in cycles correlated with the major international 
tournaments. Thus, for many manufacturers the farming out the most space 
and labor consuming part of the production constituted one strategy for 
externalizing some of the risks associated with volatile demand cycles – 
i.e. reducing capital requirements and fixed investments in buildings, etc. – 
without foregoing the business opportunities associated with the marked 
spurts in demand. Furthermore, the stitching of the balls was the most 
labor intensive, lowest paid and least skill intensive part of the production. 
Externalizing this process, therefore, was a way for the manufacturers to 
enhance their own profits and/or their prices to foreign buyers by 
flexibilizing, minimizing and putting an additional squeeze on these less 
profitable but nonetheless major cost components. 
 
Thus, as the controversies over child labor in the soccer ball industry began 
to emerge, the production was predominantly organized in terms of multi-
tiered networks involving manufacturers, middlemen and stitchers. The 
manufacturers typically handled warehousing and inventory, the printing 
of panels, the cutting of pieces, packaging and quality inspections. The 
actual stitching of the balls - and this was where the working children were 
found - was predominantly farmed out by the manufacturers through one 
or more middlemen, the largest of which in turn handled up to 300 
                                          
344 Weiss, Culture, Class, and Development in Pakistan, pp. 135-136. See also Farhad 
Nomani and Ali Rahnema, Islamic Economic Systems (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1994), 
p. 122. 
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stitchers. The middlemen were typically in the business of collecting ball 
parts from the manufacturers, distributing these to their stitchers, 
compensating the stitchers, and finally collecting the balls and returning 
them to the manufacturer for further processing and packaging. The 
stitchers would stitch together the ball panels and glue on the bladder. 
They were typically paid on a piece rate basis by their middleman, and 
most of the work was conducted in village homes or workshops. Piece 
rates depended on the quality of the ball, with wages for high quality balls 
being almost the double of those for lower quality balls.345 Furthermore, in 
its 1995 survey, The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) 
found that  
 
‘While the rates paid to the contractor are fixed by the factories according 
to the quality of the balls, there did not seem to be any uniformity of rates 
paid by contractors to workers. The contractors claimed that their margin 
of profit per ball was no more than 2 to 4 rupees. While it cannot be said 
that any particular fact indicated exploitation by the contractors, there did 
seem to be an element of arbitrariness on the part of the contractor in 
fixing the rates. That contractors do hold a position of patronage over the 
stitchers is obvious. They can distribute work at their discretion. In many 
cases contractors provide the premises for workshops where workers can 
sit and work.’346  
 
According to the so-called Raasta report, the stitchers were being paid 
$0.50 to $0.75 per ball, whereas on average children were paid about $0.50 
to $0.55.347  
 
By the mid-1990s the Sialkot ball industry had emerged as the global 
manufacturer of hand-stitched balls. In the late 1970s, the above course of 
a growing state presence in the economy was reversed as the private sector 
was once again assigned a leading role in industrialization - still, under a 
mix of export-promotion and import-substitution. Deregulation and 
liberalization continued throughout the 1980s, with a growing emphasis on 
structural adjustments and the influence of IMF/World Bank 
                                          
345 U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, By The Sweat and 
Toil of Children (Volume IV), p. 101. 
 
346 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Child labour in Pakistan, p. 12. 
 
347 Raasta Development Consultants, An Assessment of the Working Child in the Soccer 
Ball Industry, Sialkot (No place: Raasta Development Consultants, 1996), p. viii. 
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conditionalities. By the early 1990s, the strategy involved ‘comprehensive 
liberalization, deregulation, privatization, and investment promotion,’348 
and the government placed high hopes on growth through exports: the 
Eighth Plan (1993-1998) thus projected an ‘average increase in export 
volumes of nearly 11 per cent, principally in higher value-added textile 
products, light and medium engineering goods and sport and surgical 
goods.’349 In other words, the highly export-oriented sporting goods and 
surgical instruments industries in Sialkot played a relatively significant 
role in the economic strategy of the Pakistani government:  
 
‘Manufacturing industries like Sialkot’s play an important role in 
Pakistan’s economy. In 1995-96, football exports brought in nearly Rs. 1.3 
billion, while the value of surgical instruments exported was nearly Rs. 1.5 
billion. In 1993-94, when demand was boosted because of the 1994 World 
Cup tournament in the United States, around 35 million balls were 
exported, to a value of nearly Rs. 3.2 billion.’350 
 
Being an exporting ball manufacturer in Sialkot implied membership of the 
earlier mentioned Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCI), 
since all importers and exporters in Pakistan were required to be members 
of ‘a professional trade, commercial or industrial association.’351 In the 
mid-1990s the SCCI had around 3,000 members, most of them connected 
with sporting goods and surgical instruments as well as a few other 
industries.352  
                                          
348 Robert E. Looney, The Pakistani Economy: Economic Growth and Structural 
Reform (Westport: Praeger, 1997), p. 9. 
 
349 WTO Secretariat, ‘Trade Policy Review Body: Pakistan’ (Report by the Secretariat - 
Summary of Observations), World Trade and Arbitration Materials, Vol. 7, No. 2, Mar. 
1995, p. 21. 
 
350  International Labour Office, ’The Sialkot Story: Making villages ”child labour 
free”’ in World of Work – The Magazine of the ILO, No. 19, March 1997, p. 14. 
 
351 WTO Secretariat, ‘Trade Policy Review Body: Pakistan’, p. 21. 
 
352 Nasir Dogar, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility & The Sialkot Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry’ in André Gorgemans (ed.), Official International Handbook 
for the Sporting Goods Industry, 2004: Corporate Social Responsibility (Verbier: 
World Federation of the Sporting Goods Industry, 2004), p. 26; The Sialkot Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry, Profile (at home.scci.com.pk/profile.asp, accessed March 
23, 2004); U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, By The 
Sweat and Toil of Children (Volume IV), p. 114. 
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During and after the process analyzed below, the Pakistani ball 
manufacturers were experiencing a number of pressures apart from the 
child labor issue as well as the usual time and price pressures: pressures 
from retailers and ball marketers seeking to minimize inventory meant that 
inventory responsibility was increasingly being pushed onto the ball 
manufacturers, and lead times were being drastically reduced.353 
Furthermore, the Pakistani manufacturers - especially those at the low-cost, 
low-quality end - were under increasing competition from low-cost 
manufacturers in other countries, especially India and China. Chinese 
manufacturers in particular were becoming an important threat, albeit not 
so much during the process as after the Atlanta Agreement. This was 
related not only to the broader political and economic changes in China but 
also to technological change: Chinese ball manufacturers were leading the 
invention and improvement of machine-stitching, and as the quality of 
machine-stitched balls coming out of China improved, this put additional 
pressure not only on the smaller, low-quality end but also on the medium-
quality, middle-sized Sialkoti manufacturers.354  
 
Brands at war - the ball marketers 
 
As mentioned above, ball marketers included most of the world’s largest 
sporting goods companies – e.g. Adidas (and subsequently Nike and 
Reebok) – and numerous smaller ones (measured in global sales, that is), 
e.g. Mitre, Umbro, Select, Puma, American Challenge, Brine, Wilson, 
Baden Sports, Inc., Seneca Sports, Inc., Franklin Sports, Inc., etc. Looking 
at the marketing strategies of ball marketers, a distinction can be made 
between two fundamentally different types. The first one was 
predominantly chosen by a great number of smaller companies mainly 
selling less expensive, lower-quality balls. These did not sell through retail 
at all but relied instead on direct sales to other business (promotional 
balls), smaller clubs and local communities and institutions; they did 
virtually no advertising, but relied instead on personal selling and highly 
targeted promotions; and they were not involved in the more costly layers 
of sponsoring.  
 
                                          
353 Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights, p. 15. 
 
354 The Economist, ‘After the children went to school: ending child labour can have 
unexpected consequences’, The Economist, April 8, 2000. 
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In the second type of strategy companies relied on a combination of retail 
distribution, advertising and high profile sponsorships of national teams, 
national and/or subnational leagues, and football clubs. This group 
included some of the major companies in the industry with their long-
established brands, such as Adidas, the long-entrenched global leader in 
balls and supplier of the FIFA World Cup match balls since 1970.355 This 
group of companies also included several smaller ones, typically 
occupying strong market positions in one or a few countries for historical 
and national reasons, and typically supplying balls of above-average 
quality. The Danish ball marketer, Select Sport, is a good illustration of 
this. With an annual sale of 1 million balls, the company was nowhere near 
the size of Adidas (nor Nike and Reebok if measured by corporate turnover 
or marketing expenditures, obviously). Since its inception in 1946, the 
company has been one of the industry’s pioneers in product development, 
and its balls have long been considered among the best in the world. The 
company held an 80 percent share of Danish market for soccer balls, these 
being sold both through retail and to clubs and associations. Top clubs and 
national teams played an important role for the company’s marketing 
efforts: in addition to being the long-standing official supplier of the 
Danish national team, 14 other national teams also used the Danish balls, 
and Select was furthermore supplier to the majority of top clubs in 
Denmark and to quite a few international top clubs.356 UK-based Mitre – 
which was acquired by the Pentland Group in 1995 – is another example, 
holding a 60 percent share of the UK’s £40 mn. football market and being 
the official ball supplier of the Premier League and all but two Premier 
League clubs at the time.357   
 
The controversy over the use of child labor, including allegations of child 
slavery, in the production of soccer balls, coincided with one of the most 
dramatic periods in the history of soccer and soccer balls as both Reebok 
and Nike decided to start marketing soccer balls. In 1994, neither of them 
was marketing soccer balls. As noted by Himelstein, ‘Before 1994, Nike 
had all but ignored the multibillion-dollar world soccer market, depending 
                                          
355 FIFA, Official FIFA World Cup Match Footballs (at www.fifa.org, accessed March 
24, 2004). 
 
356 Vendelbo, ‘Interview med Eigil Nielsen’; Lise L. Hjorth, ‘Børnearbejde en dårlig 
forretning’ in Berlingske Tidende, March 26, 1997. 
 
357 Christian Aid UK, A Sporting Chance: Tackling child labour in India’s sports goods 
industry (London: Christian Aid UK, 1997). 
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instead on its core basketball and running-shoe franchises and apparel for 
growth.’358 By 1994, however, Nike Inc. Vice President and General 
Manager, Tom Clark, proclaimed that  
 
‘One of our big objectives here in the U.S. and around the world is to 
position ourselves in soccer. And that’s not something that happens 
overnight. There are some companies that have been there and strongly 
positioned for a number of years. We have the talent for product 
innovation and also for the marketing presentation that we are now 
starting to focus on soccer. Not just in the U.S., but all around the world. 
We are in the early stages of that, but by the year 2000 [...] we’re going to 
be a dominant player in soccer.’359  
 
The two new-comers were both heavily reliant on their sales of athletic 
footwear, in particular on the U.S. market. As this was expected to slow 
‘dramatically’, the two were looking to other categories and their 
international divisions for growth.360 Soccer, being the world’s biggest 
sport and a growth area too, was an important vehicle for international 
expansion and sales growth. With the 1994 World Cup in the U.S., a 
period of intensified competition and sky-rocketing sums of marketing 
dollars ensued.361 Both Nike and Reebok were very aggressive in this war 
of the brands, with Nike in particular pouring loads of money into soccer 
and especially the battle for high-profile sponsorships:  
 
‘And with Nike’s vast resources, that effort is changing the economics of 
the game. Over the past three years, it has spent hundreds of millions of 
dollars to gain sponsorship of world-class teams and players. It has 
launched a series of global ad campaigns promoting its newfound soccer 
                                          
358 Linda Himelstein, ‘The swoosh heard ‘round the world’ in Business Week, Issue 
3526, May 12, 1997. 
 
359 Cited from Andrew Gaffney, ‘Nike, Inc.’ in Sporting Goods Business, Vol. 27, No. 
2, February 1994. 
 
360 Bernstein Research, NIKE and Reebok: The Sneaker Wars Heat Up, February 19, 
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 173
allegiance, and it has beefed up its already extensive international 
infrastructure to handle demand for soccer and other sports gear in the 
next century. This is spending the likes of which world soccer has never 
seen.’362  
 
In December of 1996, Nike agreed to pay an astounding USD 200 million 
to become the new sponsor of Brazil’s national team for the following 10 
years (not including an undisclosed amount compensating Umbro for the 
remaining two years of its contract with Brazil).363 While those ball 
marketers following the first type of strategy described above were 
obviously also affected by these new entries, the escalating sponsorship 
costs, and the fierce competition between especially Adidas and Nike, the 
effects were more significant to those following the second type.364 In the 
words of Steve Preston, CEO of Umbro International:  
 
‘This period of ‘94 to ‘98 has been absolutely a nightmare for anyone in 
[soccer].’365  
 
The entry of Nike and Reebok was significant for a somewhat different 
reason, too. Unlike the other ball marketers, both of these companies had 
adopted codes of conduct following critiques of the working conditions 
and labor practices at their foreign suppliers. Moreover, Nike had already 
for some time been a main target for labor rights activists,366 while Reebok 
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363 Linda Himelstein, ‘The game’s the thing at NIKE now’ in Business Week, Issue 
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was widely considered a pioneer in the corporate world with its Human 
Rights Programs – both in the sense of being truly progressive in the eyes 
of some, and ‘the most hypocritical of them all’ in the eyes of others...367   
 
6.3 Characteristics of the framework of governance 
 
As was the case in Bangladesh, Pakistan had signed most of the core labor 
rights conventions when the controversy broke out in the mid-1990s – and 
Pakistan had, similarly, not ratified the ILO Minimum Age Convention.368 
Pakistan had, however, signed the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child in 1990, and Pakistan had also ratified the older ILO Convention No. 
59 Concerning Minimum Age for Employment in Industry.369 Given the 
nature of the work in stitching soccer balls and Pakistan’s laws on 
education, under the Minimum Age Convention (138) Pakistan would be 
permitted to set the minimum age of employment as low as 14, to allow 
light work for children of 12 years of age, and to limit the applicability and 
scope of the convention - for example by excluding certain types of 
employment. The national legislation in place did precisely these things. 
 
Under Pakistan’s Constitution of 1973 children under the age of 14 were 
prohibited from working in ‘any factory, mine or any other hazardous 
employment.’370 According to the studies carried out during the process 
                                          
367 Klein, No Logo, p. 422. 
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370  Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights, p. 29. 
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below, stitching soccer balls generally involved minor hazards and took 
place not in factories but in homes and small workshops, and was therefore 
not subject to the prohibition in the Constitution. Shortly before the 
controversies, however, Pakistan had passed the Employment of Children 
Act in 1991 and the Bonded Labor System (Abolition) Act in 1992.371 
Under the latter, ‘all bonded persons including children stand freed and 
discharged from any obligation to render any bonded or forced labour. All 
bonded debt is also extinguished.’372 Bonded child labor nonetheless was 
still widespread in Pakistan in the mid-1990s, and there were several media 
reports indicating the existence of bonded labor in the production of soccer 
balls. However, all of the key studies came to the conclusion that bonded 
labor (adult and child alike) was not generally characteristic of the social 
relations in the production of soccer balls.373  
 
The Employment of Children Act (1991) in turn prohibited the 
employment of children under 14 in certain occupations and in workshops 
where certain processes were undertaken. This prohibition, however, did 
‘not apply to labour by children in an establishment where such processes 
are carried out as family labour, or to any school established, assisted or 
recognised by the government’ - in line with the Minimum Age 
Convention.374 In other words, a substantial part of the child labor involved 
in the stitching of soccer balls was actually permitted under the law, either 
that which was carried out under parental supervision or that which 
qualified as light work: ‘When performed in the home or under the 
supervision of a parent, the stitching may constitute permissible family 
                                          
371 Embassy of Pakistan to the U.S., written testimony. 
 
372 Embassy of Pakistan to the U.S., written testimony. 
 
373 Cf. Human Rights Watch, Contemporary Forms of Slavery in Pakistan (United 
States: Human Rights Watch, July 1995); Raasta Development Consultants, An 
Assessment; Federal Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Labour, Manpower and Overseas 
Pakistanis, International Labour Organization, and International Programme on the 
Elimination of Child Labour, Summary results of Child Labour Survey in Pakistan 
(1996) (Islamabad: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Labour, Manpower and 
Overseas Pakistanis, International Labour Organization, and International Programme 
on the Elimination of Child Labour, October 9, 1996); Human Rights Commission of 
Pakistan, Child labour in Pakistan, p. 13, did mention loans extended to stitchers by 
middlemen, but these were generally not of such a nature so as to meet the criteria for 
qualifying as debt bondage. 
 
374 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Child labour in Pakistan, p. 2. 
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work for children of any age [...]’375 In the absence of parental supervision, 
children under 12 were not permitted to work, whereas light work for 
children aged 12 to 14 was permitted (again, in line with the Minimum 
Age Convention). The Employment of Children Act defined light work as 
follows: children under 14 should work no more than 3 hours without a 
break, a maximum of 7 working hours per day, and no work between 7 in 
the evening and 8 in the morning.376  
 
In short, a considerable part of the work being carried out by children in 
the stitching of soccer balls was exempted from the prohibitions 
concerning child labor and therefore perfectly legal under relevant local 
and international law. At the same time, a substantial part of the work 
carried out by children was in violation of both the internationally 
recognized standards as well as national legislation.  
 
Once again, the issue of enforcement then arises. According to Elliott 
Schrage, a human rights lawyer and the key advisor to industry in the 
process below:  
 
‘It was clear, however, that the Government of Pakistan had made little 
effort to monitor compliance with the law by soccer ball manufacturers or 
their contractors.’377  
 
Moreover, although the two new laws were introduced in the early 1990s, 
they were of little effect in practice. According to the U.S. State 
Department, the Employment of Children Act of 1991 ‘did little to 
promote much-needed enforcement mechanisms and remains essentially 
unimplemented.’378 In many respects, the lack of enforcement of labor 
legislation related to many of the same aspects that were discussed in the 
previous chapter on Bangladesh, such as limited capacity and resources of 
a relatively poor state, corruption, etc. Political will and the political 
climate for labor rights activists and the media obviously also played in: 
workers rights in general were (and are) ‘significantly restricted by the 
                                          
375 Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights, p. 30. 
 
376 Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights, p. 29. 
 
377 Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights, p. 29. 
 
378 U.S. Department of State, Pakistan Economic Policy and Trade Practices (1993 
Country Report) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, February 1994). 
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Government of Pakistan and by Pakistani employers,’379 including through 
changes in the organization and social relations of production, cf. above. 
Finally, compared to Bangladesh it is also clear that Pakistan had for a 
long time placed a relatively higher priority on national security and 
defense spending vs. spending on health care and education, due 
particularly to the tensions with India over Kashmir (further below).  
 
Child labor, legal and illegal, was used in the production of soccer balls, 
and changes in the organization of soccer ball production were partially the 
industry’s response to labor organizing, the demands and legal rights of 
workers. It seems reasonable to claim that the involvement of children in 
the stitching of soccer balls was a well-known phenomenon in Sialkot and 
that most ball manufacturers therefore were not unaware of this practice.380 
As far as the ball marketers were concerned, Nike and Reebok had both 
adopted codes of conduct at the beginning of the process, but they were not 
yet engaged in soccer balls as controversy arose. None of the others appear 
to have had codes in place at the time, labor practices instead being 
governed – implicitly or explicitly – through the manufacturer’s 
contractual or informal obligation to abide with applicable laws. Hence, the 
following responses from Mitre and Adidas to mid-1995 allegations of 
child slavery:  
 
- ‘Mitre, who supply balls for the FA Cup Final, insisted that they 
take every step to ensure their footballs are made legally. Marketing 
director Duncan Bembridge said his company had contracts with 
manufacturers in Pakistan which banned the use of child labour. He 
said: “If there is evidence that our balls are made with child labour 
we will act on it – but I have yet to see that evidence. Making soccer 
balls is still a manual operation, and producing them in Pakistan is 
very cost-effective.”’ 
 
- ‘Adidas also vowed to launch their own inquiry. Spokesman Peter 
Csanadi said: “These reports are a surprise to us and we need to 
                                          
379 Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights, p. 29, note 72. 
 
380 As the HRCP noted, the involvement of children in the stitching of soccer balls was, 
especially in the villages, quite visible, and in an April 1995 exposé, one of the larger 
manufacturers acknowledged that ‘contractors were known to employ child stitchers.’ 
(Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights, p. 22). Justifications for the use of 
child labor as well as changes in labor practices will be discussed further below. The 
purpose here is to provide a brief characteristic of these as the controversy began. 
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find out exactly what’s going on. It could be that counterfeit Adidas 
balls are being produced.” […] “There is a law against these 
practices and we keep to the law. We hope others are doing the 
same.”’ 381  
 
Contrary to what the ball marketers might have expected, however, the law 
did not at all apply to every working child, cf. above. 
 
Apart from the above, the ball marketers generally were not active on the 
issue of child labor or on other labor rights for that matter. The Danish ball 
marketer, Select Sport, appears to have been an exception, claiming that it 
was engaged in “development work” and actually in the process of 
preparing a concrete initiative to further deal with child labor and related 
problems before the HRCP study and the 1995 media reports appeared.382 
Such a claim is difficult to substantiate, of course, but industry 
representatives have indicated that Select was an early mover and managed 
to establish a rather unique program (further under modelling).383  
 
6.4 Characteristics of the problem 
 
When the first media reports started coming out on child labor in the 
production of soccer balls, varying claims about the problem were 
forwarded. Child labor was common in Pakistan. There were, however, no 
systematic studies of the use of child labor in the production of soccer balls 
at the time:  
 
‘[…] no extensive research has ever been carried out at the official level to 
give a correct estimate of the number of children involved, nature of work 
they are involved in, their socio-economic background, or the different 
forms of exploitation suffered by them.’384  
 
                                          
381 Quotes from Double, ‘Cup stars’; see also survey in U. S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of International Labor Affairs, By The Sweat and Toil of Children (Volume IV). 
 
382 Vendelbo, ‘Interview med Eigil Nielsen’. 
 
383 Interview with top level industry spokesperson. 
 
384 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Child labour in Pakistan, p. 2. 
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This was quite similar to the situation in Bangladesh discussed in the 
previous chapter. For reasons discussed further below, however, during the 
process some parts of the soccer ball industry developed a rather strong 
interest in credible documentation on the problem. Thus, while the usual 
denials were there, there was no “stat war” in this case, and a few widely 
acknowledged reports were actually published during the process by the 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (1995), by Raasta Development 
Consultants (July 1996), and by the ILO-IPEC (December 1996). 
 
According to a national survey, the total number of economically active 
children between the age of 5 and 14 in Pakistan in 1996 was 3.3 million, 
of a total population of 40 million.385 Two thirds of these working children 
were occupied in subsistence and commercial agriculture, in forestry, 
hunting and fishing industries. Child labor was also common in the 
informal sector and in the brick kiln, carpet, leather and surgical 
instruments industries. Approximately 70 percent of the working children 
in Pakistan performed work as unpaid family helpers. An estimated 60 
percent of the child labor in the country occurred in the Punjab Province, 
where Sialkot is located.  
 
More specifically, the ILO-IPEC study found that approximately ‘7,000 
children between the ages of five and 14 years work full-time in football 
stitching [...] Many thousands more work part-time in both industries 
[football and surgical instruments] outside school hours.’386 In numerical 
terms, this was obviously only a tiny fraction of the 3.3 million working 
children. On the other hand, the HRCP survey estimated that between 20 
and 25 per cent of the stitching work in the industry was performed by 
children, and the ILO-IPEC concluded that children made up 17 per cent of 
the football stitching workforce.387  
 
Because of the way in which the production of soccer balls in the Sialkot 
area was predominantly organized, child labor was only in exceptional 
                                          
385 Federal Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Labour, Manpower and Overseas 
Pakistanis, International Labour Organization, and International Programme on the 
Elimination of Child Labour, Summary results, pp. 5-7. Although the survey was 95 per 
cent confident of the estimate, the aforementioned reservations concerning child labor 
statistics still apply. 
 
386 ILO, ’The Sialkot Story’, pp. 14-15. 
 
387 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Child labour in Pakistan, p. 11; ILO, ’The 
Sialkot Story’, p. 15. 
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cases found to exist in factories.388 This entails a number of fundamental 
differences compared to the Bangladeshi garment industry situation. First 
of all, the employment of children was not necessarily prohibited and 
illegal (cf. more detailed discussion in relation to the framework of 
governance). Second, some of the characteristics given in the previous 
chapter of child labor in the factory – the normally higher visibility of 
factory work and particularly for exports, as well as the tendency to view 
this as more hazardous and exploitative – are features that enable a 
characterization of factory work by contrasting this to other employment 
situations and working conditions, such as in the home or in a small 
workshop. However, non-factory work may be more hazardous and 
exploitative, and some media reports focusing on child labor in the 
production of soccer balls, including the one by Silvers cited earlier, 
certainly implied that the child labor in this case was highly exploitative, 
abusive and hazardous. Although debt bondage was a widespread and 
common phenomenon in certain industries in Pakistan, and the specific 
instances reported on by Silvers and others were never refuted, neither the 
ILO-IPEC nor the HRCP found evidence that bonded labor was a problem 
in the soccer ball industry. 389 As far as visibility was concerned - well, the 
sport, the ball marketers, and the products in this case were quite simply so 
extremely visible on a global scale, that it made little difference whether 
child labor occurred in factories or elsewhere. 
 
More specifically, the HRCP found – and the ILO-IPEC study generally 
confirmed these findings – the following to be characteristic of child labor 
in the soccer ball industry: 
 
- children were stitching balls of all qualities 
- both boys and girls were involved in the stitching, although girls in 
lesser numbers 
- very few of the respondents had learned the skill of stitching from 
parents or family members; most had started paid work after a few 
weeks of training 
- children as young as 6 or 7 were found to be stitching in the villages; 
adults interviewed said they had started working at the same age 
                                          
388 The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan in its survey, for example, did not find 
any children at work in the factories visited (p. 10). 
 
389 Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights, p. 20; Human Rights Watch, 
Contemporary Forms of Slavery; ILO, ’The Sialkot Story’, 15. 
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- children found stitching in the city area workshops were mostly 12 
years or older 
- an average working day of 8 to 10 hours 
- in the workshops, there were no formal breaks, but a short lunch 
break was given; the working environment was ‘dreary’ with very 
little light 
- in the homes, children had more flexibility and freedom, although 
that meant their working days might also go on “for longer 
stretches” and the children were ‘often reprimanded by the adults for 
getting up from work’ 
- no incidences of physical abuse were observed, although this could 
not be ruled out 
- no evidence of bonded labor was found, but the team noted that 
‘contractors do hold a position of patronage over the stitchers’ and 
that there seemed to be ‘an element of arbitrariness on the part of the 
contractor in fixing the rates’ 
- no evidence of wage differentials between adult wages and that paid 
to children.390 
 
Both the HRCP and the ILO-IPEC survey found children to be working 
full-time and long hours, but the child stitchers did not face any major 
health or safety hazards. On the other hand, some critical observations 
were made concerning the working conditions and environment (cf. 
above), and the HRCP did not find these to be the least consistent with the 
local industry’s claim that stitching was ‘performed in an informal and 
casual environment where the children worked in the evening while 
watching television’. Rather, the HRCP concluded that:  
 
‘We were not convinced that these children did not feel any burden of 
labour. It is certainly not work casually performed “while watching 
television” as stated by the representatives of the Chamber of Commerce. 
We did not see television set in any of the homes we visited.’391  
 
The prevalence of child labor cannot be understood in isolation from the 
fact that approximately one third of the population in Pakistan lived in 
absolute poverty. 392 Household poverty was also an important force in the 
                                          
390 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Child labour in Pakistan, pp. 10-12. 
 
391 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Child labour in Pakistan, p. 7 and 15. 
 
392 Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights, p. 20. 
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soccer ball industry, but the survey evidence was mixed and other forces 
must be taken into account as well:  
 
‘Many parents stated that the economic survival of the family did not 
depend on the earnings of children. However, this was not the case 
everywhere, and in as many cases poverty was given as the major factor 
which brought a child to work.’393  
 
Thus, in addition to household poverty, the social acceptance of child labor 
and the comparatively lower health and safety hazards involved in stitching 
soccer balls, the ILO-IPEC survey also found the poor state and perceived 
usefulness of the education system to be among the justifications for child 
labor.394 The lack of public sector resources and the high ratio of children 
to adults in Pakistan were obviously part of this, but as some critics have 
pointed out, public sector revenues and spending in the end come down to 
deliberate political choices and priorities determined by the prevailing 
power relations:  
 
- ‘The budget allocated to education does not exceed 2.25 percent of 
GNP because of the major portion that is reserved for defense 
purposes. This is mainly due to long-standing unsettled border 
disputes with India. According to Haq and Haq (1998), Pakistan 
and India together spend over US$12 billion a year on defense. If 
these levels were cut by 5 percent a year over the next five years, it 
could release as much as US$22 billion in a peace dividend - over 
four times what is required for global universal primary education 
for the next five years [...]’395 
 
- ‘In an historic move, the government also levied taxes on the 
agriculture incomes of big landowners for the first time. […] 
Although agriculture accounts for 26 percent of Pakistan’s GDP, 
taxation of agricultural income historically has been blocked by the 
large landowners who dominate the national assembly.’396 
                                          
393 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Child labour in Pakistan, p. 16. 
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As far as the manufacturers’ and contractors’ demand for child labor was 
concerned, the HRCP did not find evidence of a wage differential between 
adults and children, and the ILO-IPEC study was actually rather positive 
on this point, noting that ‘For between eight and nine hours of work every 
day, the child football stitchers earn roughly half the adult minimum wage 
of Rs. 1,650 per month for unskilled work, and the instrument polishers an 
average of nearly Rs. 1,300. These proportions compare favourably to 
other sectors of child labour in Pakistan.’397 On the other hand, the HRCP 
concluded that ‘It was noted that in most families having child workers, 
there was an adult who could work instead and, perhaps, at better 
wages.’398 
 
6.5 A chronology of events 
 
Although the involvement of children in the production of soccer balls was 
not the world’s best kept secret – it had been reported on in the New York 
Times as early as 1990399 – it was not until 1994 that the first early signs of 
an emerging politicization of corporate responsibility and child labor in the 
production of soccer balls appeared. At the international child labor 
hearings held by the U.S. Department of Labor that year - on April 12, to 
be specific - Pakistan was mentioned almost as frequently as Bangladesh. 
There was only one broad reference to the sporting goods industry in 
Sialkot, but after the hearings the Labor Department received a letter from 
Kailash Satyarthi concerning child labor in Pakistan in which he pointed, 
among other things, to the use of child labor in the soccer ball production 
in Sialkot. This came to be included in the Labor Department’s report of 
that year.400 This did not make big headlines at the time, but it coincided 
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with the FIFA 1994 World Cup being played in the United States and with 
a considerable and growing attention to the issue of child labor in Pakistan, 
especially in relation to hand-knotted carpets. Iqbal Masih, the local teen 
activist and former bonded child laborer, was already becoming a global 
icon for the cause. In fact, he received Reebok’s Human Rights Youth in 
Action Award in December that year.401   
 
In early 1995, the first significant media report appeared on the issue: a 
CBS exposé, which aired on April 6 in the U.S. As Tom Cove (Vice 
President, Government Affairs, of the U.S. Sporting Goods Manufacturers 
Association, SGMA) recalled,  
 
‘[…] a CBS news magazine came to Super Show to do a show on soccer 
balls. Major ball manufacturers proudly showed off their wares. Only later 
did those same manufacturers realize that they were being set up as “bad 
guys” in the geo-politics of labor rights. The segment that ran on national 
television later that spring excoriated the soccer industry for its alleged 
exploitation of child labor. It focused on the Sialkot region of Pakistan, 
where more than two-thirds of the world’s soccer balls are produced. This 
marked the beginning of an aggressive campaign against the industry to 
change the way it monitors production practices worldwide.’402  
 
With respect to the soccer ball industry, the segment included one of the 
largest local manufacturers, Sublime Sports (a supplier to both Adidas and 
Reebok), acknowledging that ‘contractors were known to employ child 
stitchers’ – with Adidas promising to look into it, and Reebok saying that it 
would cease doing business with Sublime awaiting an investigation.403 
Moreover, the segment also focused on another local industry and one of 
its international buyers: surgical instruments and UNICEF.404 Furthermore, 
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the exposé was broadcast on the very same day that Pakistani PM Benazir 
Bhutto arrived for a nine-day visit to the U.S.405 Finally, the segment also 
focused on Iqbal Masih – 10 days later he was murdered in Pakistan, 
causing a lot of anger, controversy and negative media attention across the 
world.406 
 
The use of children in the production of soccer balls began to attract more 
attention in the U.S. and elsewhere. In England, a number of newspaper 
articles contrasted the big business of soccer – and the enslaved children 
making the balls.407 A few months later, in June 1995, a delegation of the 
Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, accompanied by a team from 
the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation’s Television Division, visited 
Sialkot. Having obtained ‘unflattering’ and ‘unbreakable’ evidence on film 
that children were being ‘brutally exploited’ in the production of soccer 
balls, the group was attacked by armed men and had their camera (and 
footage) stolen.408 A Norwegian exposé did, however, subsequently run on 
Danish, Swedish and Norwegian national television.409 
 
In Pakistan, Sublime’s reaction appears to have been the exception to the 
rule, as the industry’s reaction otherwise consisted of denials of child labor 
in the production. Furthermore, local children’s’ rights activists and media 
with an interest in child labor were being repressed, and every effort was 
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made to question the validity of those reports that did appear.410 The first 
written study of child labor in the production of soccer balls was, however, 
published shortly after these events by the respected Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan. This, it might be recalled, was right around the 
time when the MOU was finalized in Bangladesh. 
 
The international buyers of balls from Pakistan were beginning to 
acknowledge that the industry had a problem. Companies began to react 
individually in various ways to the problem, and collective action began to 
emerge at two levels. In July, a Task Force on Global Manufacturing 
Practices, with members of Adidas America, Reebok, and Umbro USA, 
was formed under the Soccer Industry Council of America (SICA), a 
committee of the U.S. Sporting Goods Manufacturers Association 
(SGMA). At the global level, at an August meeting in the World 
Federation of the Sporting Goods Industry (WFSGI), the Federation’s 
newly elected President, Stephen Rubin (also Chairman of the Pentland 
Group plc., which had just acquired Mitre), announced that fair trade and 
ethical sourcing would be cornerstone initiatives of his chairmanship, and 
the WFSGI moved to establish a Committee on Ethics and Fair Trade 
(CEFT), ‘a core group of concerned members charged with developing 
specific programs to educate WFSGI members, to reach out to potential 
experts and to nurture the creation of specific projects.’411 The WFSGI 
committee subsequently organized a conference on the issue of child labor, 
which was held at the WFSGI’s headquarters in Verbier, Switzerland, on 
November 3 of that year.  
 
The Verbier Conference, as it is called, brought together a range of 
significant organizations to discuss the issue of child labor in the industry. 
Apart from industry representatives, participants included representatives 
of the International Save the Children Alliance, Save the Children, Anti-
Slavery International, Terre des Hommes, the Fairtrade Foundation, the 
International Olympic Committee, UNESCO, UNICEF, and Gabriele 
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Stoikov from ILO-IPEC.412 The conference did not result in any concrete 
initiatives or collaborative efforts.413 It did, however, bring together for the 
first time those organizations that would eventually become partners to the 
Atlanta Agreement.  
 
At the same time, by early November SICA had ‘retained the services of a 
noted human rights professional and professor of human rights and 
business ethics at Columbia University’ (Elliott Schrage), having requested 
‘from experts a proposal to benchmark existing child labor monitoring and 
certification programs, survey soccer ball industry stakeholders, conduct an 
educational needs assessment of child stitchers, and recommend a program 
to prevent the use of child labor in soccer ball manufacturing.’ It had also 
commissioned a report from Pakistani-based Raasta Development 
Consultants, which was published in June, 1996.414  
 
The latter half of 1995 was rather “quiet” in terms of negative media 
exposure of child labor in the soccer ball industry. There was, however, a 
virtually exploding debate on sweatshops in the U.S. from the beginning of 
August, and a few months later the executions of Ken Saro-Wiva and 
others in Nigeria triggered some very strong reactions across the globe 
against the Nigerian regime and its business partner, Royal Dutch Shell. 
Furthermore, some of the major players in the soccer ball industry were 
targeted for their poor labor practices records in relation to some of their 
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other products.415 Also, it should be pointed out that sport, and soccer in 
particular, was becoming a prominent object of contention in high-politics 
in England: ‘Sport is fast becoming the battleground for what threatens to 
be the bloodiest general election of modern political times […]’416 
 
From the beginning of 1996, there was a significant surge in both union 
and NGO activities as well as continuous media reporting on child labor in 
relation to the soccer ball industry. As the WFSGI put it in its description 
of 1996, ‘the soccer industry in particular was singled out in a series of 
television broadcasts and magazine articles for allegedly tolerating child 
labor [...]’417 In February, the article by Jonathan Silvers – cited at the 
beginning of this chapter – ran in the Atlantic Monthly, and in early March 
the U.S. Trade Representative announced the recommendation to partially 
suspend Pakistan’s benefits under the GSP program, sporting goods being 
one of the three sectors to loose out,418 and an additional media report 
followed in April, while the responsible Minister in Pakistan downplayed 
the problem of child labor there.419 At the same time, soccer in the U.S. 
stepped into a new era with the April 6 debut of Major League Soccer, the 
first new U.S. pro league in ten years.420 
 
Union activity was picking up at different levels. At the global level, the 
ITGLWF had commissioned London-based Parachute Pictures to film 
working conditions in a number of countries, including specifically the 
Sialkot region for the stitching of soccer balls, for showing at the ITGLWF 
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7th World Congress in Melbourne from April 15 to 19.421 The pictures of 
children stitching soccer balls in Pakistan were not only shown at the 
Congress, but also broadcast in a number of European countries, and the 
video was also used at the International Labour Conference in June. FIFA 
was approached already in April on the issue, and on May 29 the ITGLWF 
together with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU), the International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, 
Professional and Technical Employees (FIET, now UNI Commerce), and 
the Trade Union Congress of the UK (TUC) launched a campaign on child 
labor and labor rights in the production of soccer balls in Sialkot.422  
 
This coincided with – indeed, was explicitly and strategically related to – 
the European Football Championships, which were getting underway in 
England, beginning on June 8. As with every other major tournament, Euro 
96 drew massive attention to the game, and a marketing mini-guerra played 
out: ‘During last year’s European championships, for instance, Nike 
bought up all the billboards around stadiums where matches were held, 
effectively undermining the event’s official sponsor, Umbro.’423 The trade 
union campaign was discussed at a FIFA Committee meeting on May 30, 
and a few days later the organization publicly announced its willingness to 
play a role. On the very same day, June 3, the ILO announced that the 
upcoming International Labour Conference would focus on child labor, 
homeworkers and the unemployed. The International Organization of 
Employers at its General Council meeting adopted a Resolution on Child 
Labor and issued a Policy Statement on the Social Clause.424 During Euro 
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96 and the ILC, the trade union campaign got some attention, and a 
meeting between FIFA and international trade union secretariats was held 
in London on June 17.425 Shortly after the meeting, an announcement came 
out that the ILO would be involved in a ‘first-ever survey on the use of 
child labour’ in the sporting goods and surgical instruments industries in 
Sialkot – to counter what an anonymous Pakistani official called the 
‘exaggerated’ claims and propaganda forming ‘part of a conspiracy’ by 
‘vested interests’ associated with its ‘rival neighbour, India, and 
unspecified Western organizations.’426 
 
In addition to this trade union campaign, the Norwegian Confederation of 
Trade Unions had approached the AFL-CIO President in February on the 
issue of child labor in the production of soccer balls. By late March this 
letter had made its way to the ILRF via AAFLI, and the ILRF was slowly 
starting up work on the FoulBall campaign (below).427 At that time several 
articles appeared in the U.S. media, and the public debate on sweatshops 
and corporate responsibility in the U.S. virtually exploded - again.428 
Furthermore, the aforementioned report from Raasta Development 
Consultants was completed. The findings in the Raasta report were in the 
main consistent with those of the earlier report from the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan, cf. above.  
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On June 28, the ILRF’s FoulBall campaign was officially kicked off at a 
publicity stunt on the lawn outside the U.S. Department of Labor, just 
before the International Child Labor Hearings and with the presence and 
support of U.S. Secretary of Labor, Robert B. Reich, and other prominent 
figures, including representatives of Nike and Reebok.429 Reich also sent 
letters to FIFA as well as John Riddle, President of the SGMA (and Chair 
of the WFSGI’s CEFT), expressing his concern about the ‘use of illegal 
child labor in the stitching of soccer balls’ and offering the assistance of 
the Labor Department.430 The hearings that day included very frequent 
mentions of the issue of child labor in the production of soccer balls in 
Pakistan, including in the testimonies and written statements by Reich and 
several members of Congress, representatives of the ILRF/FoulBall, the 
National Consumers League, the SGMA, Nike, Reebok, and the ILO. 
 
As the interaction between FIFA and the trade unions moved along – with 
a draft code of labor practice being in place in early July – and as the 
FoulBall campaign was attracting considerable attention to the issue across 
the Atlantic, child labor – including in the soccer ball industry – was a 
growing concern of Pakistani politicians and public officials.431 
 
Furthermore, individual companies were moving along with their separate 
initiatives, and SICA had publicly announced its commitments at the 
Department of Labor hearings.432 Following the Raasta report, SICA issued 
a call for proposals for a pilot program related to child labor in the industry 
in Sialkot, and – a few days after the formation of the Apparel Industry 
Partnership, with the participation of Nike and Reebok – there was yet 
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another industry get-together at the ISPO Trade Show in Munich, 
Germany, August 6 to 9, 1996: 
 
‘[…] over 60 representatives of soccer ball suppliers and global brands 
met to discuss the initiative and determine how the industry should 
proceed. In a wide ranging meeting lasting several hours, representatives 
from Europe, North America, Asia, from industrialized countries and 
developing nations candidly exchanged views on the industry’s 
responsibilities to eliminate child labor and the desirability of imposing 
standards on companies that their governments were unwilling or unable 
to apply. All companies agreed that child labor was neither appropriate 
nor necessary for the manufacture or assembly of soccer balls. All agreed 
that the allegations of child labor were damaging to the industry.’433  
 
A follow-up to the Verbier Conference was furthermore scheduled to take 
place at the Pentland Conference Center in London in late November of 
1996.  
 
In late August however, it became public that FIFA and the trade unions 
had reached an agreement, and in early September FIFA and the unions 
presented the so-called FIFA Code of Labour Practice. Trade unions, 
NGOs and the U.S. Department of Labor soon praised the Code as a 
significant step ahead, but it also drew public criticism from various 
industry players.434 The FIFA Code was subsequently presented at the 
Pentland Conference, but it was never accepted by the industry. FIFA, 
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furthermore, subsequently denied that the Code was ever fully accepted by 
them – in spite of the fact that FIFA’s own press release from September 3, 
1996, as well as the media coverage surrounding the presentation of the 
Code certainly give that impression. 
 
Shortly before the Pentland Conference, the U.S. Department of Labor 
published its 1996 report on international child labor, which included a 
partial focus on soccer balls. Save the Children published a policy paper on 
child labor, and the ILO and UNICEF announced that they had agreed to a 
‘joint fight against child labour.’435 Moreover, just before the Conference, 
the WFSGI and SICA had gone on a mission to Pakistan ‘to build support 
among manufacturers around the outline of a program to address child 
labor.’436 And, finally, Reebok issued a press release on November 19 
saying that the company was going to label its soccer balls with “Made 
without Child Labor”: ‘It is believed this represents the first time a 
guarantee of this kind has been placed on a widely distributed consumer 
product.’437 
 
On November 21 and 22, 1996, the WFSGI hosted the conference at the 
Pentland Conference Center in London – formally, the ‘Continuing the 
Way Forward’, but commonly referred to as the Pentland Conference – 
with a wide range of participants beside industry representatives: 
representatives of the International Olympic Committee, the ILO, 
UNICEF, Anti-Slavery International, the Fair Trade Foundation, Oxfam, 
the SCF (UK), the Foul Ball campaign, the governments of Pakistan, the 
UK, and FIFA. Unlike the Verbier Conference a year earlier, a decision 
was made at the Pentland Conference to proceed with an initiative to end 
child labor in the soccer ball production in Sialkot. Furthermore, although 
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the FIFA Code was presented at the Conference, a decision was made to 
authorize the development of another code under the auspices of the 
WFSGI.438  
 
During the ensuing couple of months, the Atlanta Agreement was drafted. 
Shortly after the Conference, there was a short skirmish related to what 
kind of monitoring would be acceptable - Pentland’s/WFSGI’s Stephen 
Rubin having publicly stated that the industry’s intentions were to go for 
some system of self-monitoring.439 Furthermore, Nike announced that its 
supplier was going to eliminate all outsourcing of stitching, and Phil 
Knight was thus able to express his pride in the company’s taking a 
‘leadership position’ in the industry – a few weeks before Nike, in early 
December, signed the record-setting USD +200 million deal to sponsor 
Brazil’s national team for the next 10 years (cf. above).440 In addition, the 
ILO survey focusing on – among other things – the soccer ball industry in 
Sialkot was completed.441 Finally, it might be pointed out that the 
somewhat broader context of the drafting process saw the re-election of 
U.S. President, Bill Clinton, as well as a discussion of trade and labor 
standards at the WTO Ministerial meeting in Singapore.442  
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The Atlanta Agreement was signed and presented at the industry’s Super 
Show in Atlanta, Georgia, on the 14th of February, 1997.443 
 
6.6 Struggles to define the problem 
 
Looking more closely at how the struggles to define the problem played 
out, the first key trigger event, the CBS exposé, which was broadcast in 
early April of 1995 in the U.S., may serve as a point of departure. Schrage 
provides a good summary of how the exposé presented the problem in the 
soccer ball industry:  
 
‘The youngest stitcher was a six year-old boy. The report cited estimates 
that up to 25,000 children worked as stitchers in Sialkot for about two 
dollars per day, less than the Pakistani minimum wage. According to the 
report, children were paid less than adults and the child stitchers did not 
attend school.’444  
 
To begin with, it might be noted that the existence of the problem was 
rather insignificant in this case. There were occasional blank denials, of 
course, in particular issued by Pakistani manufacturers and officials in the 
early stages of the process, when this was – still – a tenable approach: 
 
‘While reports on child labour in the past were usually ignored by the 
government, the recent reports did evoke some reaction. The reports 
themselves, however, became controversial. In this process, the credibility 
of everyone involved has come under a shadow of doubt.’445  
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The CBS exposé, however, showed one of the leading manufacturers 
acknowledging the use of child labor, and the international ball marketers 
that were singled out generally resorted to alternative tactics to resolve 
themselves of moral culpability, claiming that i) this was not what they 
saw/were shown when visiting their manufacturers, ii) they were not aware 
of the extent to which production relied on subcontracting, iii) corporate 
responsibility and child labor was a relatively “new issue,” or iv) they had 
trusted or contractually obliged their manufacturers to “behave” (and were 
not aware of the fact that national child labor laws in Pakistan did not 
prohibit all children under 14 from working). It could also be, of course, 
that some ball marketers were perfectly aware of the conditions under 
which their balls were being produced and accepted this. Whether they did 
so for purely selfish economic reasons, for the good of the poor families, or 
for accepting that that was simply the way things worked - these were 
subsequently arguments that were difficult to sustain explicitly, especially 
when the industry was faced with accusations of using child slavery. 
Furthermore, the HRCP survey, shortly thereafter, documented the 
existence of a problem, and traveling the road of blank denials was not a 
fruitful one: there were flat denials coming out of Pakistan later in the 
process, but given the HRCP study and the continuing stream of media 
reports, these seemed rather ludicrous and bore little impact on the ways in 
which the problem was defined in this case. 
 
With respect to the extent of the problem, the CBS estimate of 25,000 child 
stitchers appears to have been somewhat of an exaggeration. This 
observation, however, is based on the benefit of hindsight, and it should 
not blur the fact that during most of the process, all actors were basically in 
the dark as far as the extent of the problem was concerned: any claim was 
as good as the previous, at least until the ILO estimate (7,000 children 
stitching full-time) in late 1996. Arguably, this constituted more of a 
problem for the targets of critique – primarily the international ball 
marketers - than for those doing the criticizing, and key industry players 
therefore had a certain interest in the provision of systematic and reliable 
“evidence” (but the industry had other and more serious problems, which 
meant that “evidence” was important, cf. below). In spite of this lack of 
evidence, however, the extent of the problem was not a central object of 
contention in this case. Primarily because the industry from very early on 
acknowledged the existence of a problem in Sialkot and began moving on 
this, i.e. the SICA discussions in Chicago and the Verbier Conference. This 
basically changed the situation and shifted the struggles toward other 
aspects of problem-definition (below).  
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Part of the story is, of course, also that there were no reports of children 
being pushed out into the streets, and the industry’s moves did not take the 
form of a “stat war” similar to that in the Bangladesh case. While re-
defining the problem by blaming the foreign critics for harming the 
children was perhaps a viable option in that case, the conditions in the 
soccer ball case were fundamentally different: the international ball 
marketers in this case had a collective problem – when labor practices in 
Sialkot were politicized - of rather unusual proportions because such a high 
share of the global production of soccer balls took place in Sialkot.  
 
The chronology of events above further showed that there was a steady 
stream of significant and generally critical media reports – and that two 
major international campaigns were launched specifically on the soccer 
ball industry in Sialkot. More importantly, both the media reports and the 
campaigns consistently targeted the international ball marketers and/or 
FIFA, and this agenda formation and politicization of the use of child labor 
to a very high degree took place in public spheres outside of the producing 
country. Thus, not only did the international ball marketers have a 
collective problem of unusual proportions – the process of politicization 
was also highly transnationalized, and the international ball marketers were 
actually and actively and repeatedly called to answer in this process. 
Compared to the Bangladesh case, then, the central industry players were 
different, and the conditions for making claims and counterclaims in the 
struggles to define the problem were different as well (and increasingly 
so).  
 
Looking at the struggles to define the nature and scope of the problem in 
this case, the problem as defined in the CBS exposé was circumscribed in a 
number of ways. First of all, the problem was child labor, and it was not 
defined in terms of labor rights more broadly. Second, the problem was 
geographically and sub-sector specific – the soccer ball industry in the 
Sialkot area – as opposed to the global sporting goods industry, for 
example. The exposé did, of course, profile Iqbal Masih and it also focused 
on child labor in the surgical instruments sector, but it did not focus on 
soccer ball production elsewhere, nor did it focus on Nike shoe production, 
for example. These specific features of the CBS exposé were generally 
characteristic of the ways in which the problem was defined until the trade 
union campaign in mid-1996 (this will be analyzed further below). The 
international ball marketers - publicly, at least – did not seek to contest the 
problematic nature of the involvement of children in the production of 
soccer balls. None of the ball marketers argued that child labor was an 
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acceptable practice, a phenomenon that was acceptable because of the local 
conditions, poverty, etc. Nor did any of them try to downplay the 
problematic nature of the alleged practices by referring to worse forms of 
child labor in Pakistan or elsewhere. Instead, child labor was accepted as 
problematic, and the corporate representatives expressed their surprise and 
concern, and promised to look into it. 
 
Furthermore, the boundaries of the nature of the problem - child labor, 
soccer balls, Sialkot - in the CBS exposé were also what characterized the 
central concern and emphasis in terms of actual activities by industry 
players. While the Task Force established under SICA in the U.S. did carry 
the title ‘on Global Manufacturing Practices,’ the nature of the problem 
and the activities taken were very focused: ‘When allegations of child 
labor in soccer ball assembly came to the attention of the U.S. soccer 
industry, SICA moved quickly and decisively to assess the situation and 
address any problems in a responsive and responsible manner’ (tellingly, 
Schrage refers to this as the Child Labor Project Task Force).446 Under the 
global federation, WFSGI, the Committee on Ethics and Fair Trade 
(CEFT) was established, and this subsequently organized the Verbier 
Conference ‘on Human Rights.’ Here, working conditions more broadly 
were discussed, but the problem of child labor in Sialkot was nevertheless 
the dominant and central issue, as illustrated by the following quotes: 
 
- ‘In particular, we need to prevent our day-to-day commercial 
activities from being a pressure-point for newspapers wishing to 
increase sales by writing sensationalist articles. [...] Whilst we are 
all concerned with forced labour, slavery, bondage, work-linked 
debts and so on, we know that our most important and, indeed, most 
urgent initiative must be to look at the problem of child labour.’447 
 
- ‘[The organizations] present at the Conference organised on 3-4 
November in Verbier, Switzerland, agreed on the urgent need for the 
abolition of extreme forms of hazardous and exploitative child 
labour and the rehabilitation of the children concerned. Concerning 
the many other forms of child labour, the United Nations 
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organisations and the NGOs welcomed the WFSGI’s initiative to 
further explore the issue as it affects the industry and to develop 
practical measures in the best interest of the children affected.’448 
 
Recalling the implications of the dominance of the negative consequences 
for the children in the previous chapter, it is interesting to note that in the 
present case this did not serve to basically redefine the problem nor did it 
work against a broadening of the agenda. Quite the contrary, as the quote 
above illustrates, the potentially negative consequences for the child 
stitchers was rather a somewhat given and integral element of how the 
problem was understood from early on – with explicit references to the 
“lessons from Bangladesh” at the Verbier Conference. The main question 
was what to do about it (further under Modelling).  
 
Finally, in relation to negative consequences, a virtual non-issue during the 
entire process was the potential impacts on female workers resulting from 
changes in the organization of production. When child labor and the 
responsibility of the international ball marketers became increasingly 
politicized, most companies chose to centralize production in order to 
prevent and control for the use of child labor (an obvious advantage, 
especially if one is issuing guarantees and placing labels on one’s product). 
For practical and cultural-religious reasons, however, this excluded not 
only the children but also a large number of female workers from 
employment in the soccer ball production. 
  
Moving on to consider the gravity of the problem, the CBS exposé – on the 
one hand – did paint a rather grim picture, primarily through an emphasis 
on the very young age of the children, the very low wages and lack of 
education. Furthermore, the exposé also included a profile of Iqbal Masih’s 
story, and it included child labor in other occupations. Many media reports 
as well as the HRCP and ILO surveys made similar combinations, but to 
very different effects. In the ILO case, as referenced in the World of Work, 
the clear effect was to downplay the gravity of the problem in the soccer 
ball industry. In the CBS exposé and many other media reports, the effect 
was rather the opposite: even though the CBS and some other reports made 
no direct allegations of bonded labor and physical abuse in the soccer ball 
industry, the more dramatic story composition and narrative and the 
combination with Masih may very well have led many viewers to draw 
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their own conclusions about the lives of child stitchers. Taken literally, 
though, the CBS exposé did not make such allegations, and in that respect 
it presented the problem in less grave terms than many of the ensuing key 
media reports and the campaign claims. It did not take long, however, 
before such claims were made explicit:  
 
‘The children, often engaged in a modern form of slave labour, spend long 
hours in workshops around Sialkot, a Punjabi town near the border with 
India. By a historical quirk, Sialkot is the source of most of the world’s 
hand-stitched footballs, its produce snapped up by household names such 
as Adidas, Reebok and Mitre. Many of the children are unable to attend 
school because their families need the 10p an hour they earn. The balls, 
which cost up to Pounds 50, feature in football games in which the stars 
are paid as much as Pounds 10,000 a week.’449 
 
During the first half of 1996, the critical media reports and the two 
campaigns clearly and generally differed from the CBS exposé above: the 
problem was one of enslaved children working under brutal conditions in 
the soccer ball industry, the gravity of the problem frequently contrasted 
with the big business and glamour of the sport (as in the quote above). In 
addition to the article by Silvers (cited at the beginning of this chapter), 
another prominent – indeed, still referred to by most industry 
representatives as the article – example was a June article by Sydney 
Schanberg in Life Magazine:  
 
‘As our jeep approaches the roadside shed in Mahotra, a village in 
northern Pakistan, I can see a dozen children and men stitching hexagonal 
leather pieces into Nike soccer balls. Twelve-year-old Tariq squats in 
front, having come out of the dark interior for air. At his feet are several 
white balls with the distinctive Nike swoosh that will soon be finding their 
way to stores and playing fields in the United States. [...] Afzal Butt, the 
19-year-old foreman whose brother owns this village factory, quickly 
warms to the smell of business. “I can get you as many as 100 stitchers if 
you need them,” he says. “Of course, you’ll have to pay off their peshgi to 
claim them.”’450  
 
                                          
449 Lees and Hinde, ‘Scandal of football’s child slavery’; see also Double, ‘Cup Stars 
earn thousands as slave kids get 5p an hour making footballs’. 
 
450 Schanberg, ’Six Cents an Hour’. 
 201
Claims of bonded child laborers being involved in the production of soccer 
balls in Sialkot were also forwarded as part of the two campaigns:  
 
‘“It is a shame on soccer that its central item is the product of an industry 
where almost every factory has a punishment room for kids who are hung 
upside down, starved, caned or lashed when they make a mistake or upset 
their masters,” said Neil Kearney, the General Secretary of the 
[ITGLWF].’451  
 
Yes, there are similarities to the previous Silvers quote, and, it might be 
noted, on April 28, an article by the same Silvers ran in The Independent – 
including a section, which was virtually identical to that introductory 
quote.452 Similar claims were forwarded in the statements and campaign 
materials of the FoulBall campaigners, which were reiterated in a number 
of media reports, including on CNN, for example:  
 
‘Thirty-eight members of Congress, led by Rep. Joseph Kennedy, D-
Massachusetts, joined the protest Thursday. They wrote to the 
International Olympic Committee saying that soccer balls to be used at 
Olympic Games in Atlanta were produced by bonded workers as young as 
6.’453 
 
Obviously, this was a difficult situation for the industry (and, it might be 
added, at a point in time where the competitive dynamics within the 
industry were being fundamentally reshuffled, cf. above). The industry was 
faced with some very explicit and direct allegations of a very grave 
problem, and it was virtually impossible to prove that bonded child labor 
was not and had never occurred in the production of soccer balls. What the 
industry could do to counter these serious charges, however, was to present 
“the truth” about the problem of child labor in the soccer ball production as 
a whole, even if doing so necessitated publicly acknowledging a number of 
less pleasant - but arguably not as grave, by comparison - aspects of the 
production practices. Furthermore, in order to be convincing, the counter-
                                          
451 Agence France Presse, ‘Euro 96’; Hetherington, ‘Police hunt’; Taylor, ‘Balls for 
Euro 96’; The Irish Times, ‘Child labour’. 
 
452 Jonathan Silvers, ‘When they were young’ in The Independent (London), April 28, 
1996. 
 
453 ILRF, campaign material and June 1996 press release, Coalition Launches FoulBall 
Campaign. The quote is from CNN, ‘Coalition protests child labor in Pakistan’, July 
15, 1996, on U.S. News Story Page (at www.cnn.com, accessed on January 14, 2004). 
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claims would have to be based on sources of information that would be 
seen as more credible than those reporting of bonded labor. One such 
source was the more elaborate study by the Human Rights Commission of 
Pakistan, which had been published shortly after the CBS exposé. The 
HRCP report painted a far from rosy picture of the working conditions of 
the children, but more importantly the HRCP also reported that there was 
no evidence of neither bonded labor or of physical abuse of and violence 
against the children.454 The findings of the HRCP were generally 
considered to be quite reliable, and the HRCP study was different from the 
previous and subsequent media reports, of course, in that it was based on a 
relatively systematic survey of the areas and industries, on which the 
HRCP had chosen to focus.  
 
The HRCP study, therefore, was suitable for legitimating arguments in the 
process of claims-making and countering claims, and it was used for 
precisely such purposes in the discussions of the gravity of the problem. 
Thus, at the U.S. Department of Labor hearings, for example, Tom Cove of 
the SGMA was actually the one who provided the most detailed account of 
the problem of child labor in the production of soccer balls, relying 
extensively on the studies by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 
and the one by Raasta Development Consultants, thus directly and 
indirectly discrediting the media reports alleging bonded child labor:  
 
‘[…] there is no credible evidence to support allegations that physical 
punishment of child stitchers is a regular or systemic feature of the 
stitching industry. Neither HRCP nor Raasta reported any evidence, or 
even reports of physical abuse by children who stitch or by their families 
on behalf of their children. Of course, and I want to emphasize this, this 
does not mean that abuse does not take place or never takes place. But we 
believe these findings place sensationalized press reports into a more 
truthful context. There is no credible evidence to support allegations of 
bonded, forced or slave labor in the stitching of soccer balls. Both HRCP 
and Raasta determined that  stitchers occasionally receive cash advances 
for work not yet performed, but that this practice does not, and I repeat, 
does not constitute bonded labour [...]’455 
 
This is not to suggest that the industry had no other reasons for being 
interested in the characteristics of the child labor problem. The point is, 
                                          
454 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Child labour in Pakistan, pp. 12-13. 
 
455 Tom Cove (SGMA), testimony. 
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rather, that this seeming peculiarity in the discursive struggles to define the 
problem – that industry representatives were the ones trying to provide the 
public with the most detailed account of the child labor problem – was 
essentially a gravity minimization strategy driven by the numerous, 
relatively serious charges. 
 
In addition to this shift related to the gravity of the problem, another shift 
occurred with the launch of the trade unions campaign in 1996. Although 
child labor was a focal point, the trade unions did not exclude other core 
labor issues:  
 
‘The [ITGLWF] called on football’s governing bodies to adopt a code of 
conduct to ensure that balls are manufactured with a stamp of approval 
from UEFA or FIFA were produced by factories which do not use child 
labour and observe basic workers’ rights.’456  
 
At the meeting between FIFA and the trade unions in London in mid-June, 
1996, the involvement of children in the production of soccer balls in 
Sialkot was discussed in conjunction with other fundamental labor rights 
and in relation to a “FIFA Code of Labour Practice” – an agreement on 
which was presented to the public in early September, cf. above. In other 
words, the problem was broadened considerably to comprise core labor 
standards in addition to the focal point, child labor. This was reflected in 
the way some of the media reports in the latter half of 1996 defined and 
presented the problem.457 For reasons discussed further in relation to 
modelling, however, the FIFA Code was not accepted by the industry. 
 
Finally, as the chronology above illustrated, the process in this case 
involved several cases of physical intimidation and violent repression 
leveled against those taking critical interest in child labor, whether local or 
foreign, and whether trade unionists, labor rights and human rights 
activists. Indeed, in the broader context, Iqbal Masih was murdered, and 
Ehsan U. Khan was forced into exile.458 While these repressive campaigns 
did not succeed in putting a stop to the initial exposés, the HRCP study nor 
                                          
456 The Irish Times, ‘Child labour’. 
 
457 Cf. e.g. Bowley, ‘Fifa plans’; Harverson, ‘Sports groups to set child labour rules’. 
 
458 Anderson, ‘Pakistani Journalists’; Silvers, ‘Child Labor in Pakistan’; Schanberg, 
’Six Cents an Hour’; U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 
By The Sweat and Toil of Children (Volume IV). 
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the subsequent reports, the links that actually existed between foreign 
activists and journalists and locals were better kept secret or 
backgrounded.459 
 
6.7 Targeting 
 
Throughout the process the Pakistani manufacturers were “given” a lot of 
attention, and in the majority of press reports one or more ball 
manufacturers were specifically singled out and mentioned. In that sense, 
the Pakistani manufacturers were targeted throughout the process.  
However, this generally served as a means for the media and the 
campaigners to get at the real targets - the ball marketers and FIFA.  
 
Looking at the media reports, there was a general tendency to focus on one 
or a few ball marketers, typically the market leader(s) and, in the U.S., the 
two North American sporting goods industry leaders and giants, Nike and 
Reebok.460 Secondary ball marketers, in turn, were sometimes mentioned, 
but generally in a listing of companies pointing to the collective nature of 
the industry’s problem, and they were not targeted at length. This implied 
that most of the less “branded” companies following the first type of 
strategy described earlier – little or no emphasis on high-profile advertising 
and sponsorships – were hardly mentioned in media at all during the 
process. They, and to some extent also the secondary ball marketers, were 
therefore able to follow a strategy of ‘staying below the radar screen’ 
during the entire controversy.461 Thus, the 1995 CBS exposé, as 
mentioned, confronted representatives of Reebok and Adidas with the 
statements of their ball supplier, Sublime. In Denmark, the Norwegian 
documentary was directed against the Danish ball marketer, Select Sport.  
 
As noted earlier, the Danish ball marketer, Select Sport, appears to have 
been an exception, claiming that it was engaged in “development work” 
                                          
459 Interview with Collingsworth; interview with Tim Noonan, Director, Campaigns 
and Communications, ICFTU, March 25, 2004; cf. also letter from Satyarthi to the US 
Department of Labor mentioned at the beginning of section 6.5 A chronology of events. 
 
460 Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights, p. 22; Silvers, ‘Child Labor in 
Pakistan’; Schanberg, ’Six Cents an Hour’, for example, focused on Nike in particular, 
but referred also to Reebok, Adidas, Mitre, Umbro, Brine, Cobra, and FIFA. 
 
461 Interview with President of one such ball marketing company, New York City, 25 
March 2003. 
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and actually in the process of preparing a concrete initiative to further deal 
with child labor and related problems before the HRCP study and the 1995 
media reports appeared, whereas other ball marketers claim to have been 
surprised by existence of child labor in the production, the explanations 
being that i) this was not what they saw/were shown when visiting their 
manufacturers, ii) they were not aware of the extent to which production 
relied on subcontracting, iii) corporate responsibility and child labor was a 
relatively “new issue,” or iv) they had trusted or contractually obliged their 
manufacturers to “behave” (and were not aware of the fact that national 
child labor laws in Pakistan did not prohibit all children under 14 from 
working). It might also be, of course, that some ball marketers were 
perfectly aware of the conditions under which their balls were being 
produced and accepted this. Whether they did so for purely selfish 
economic reasons, for the good of the poor families, or for accepting that 
that was simply the way things worked – these were subsequently 
arguments that were difficult to sustain explicitly, especially when the 
industry was faced with accusations of using child slavery. 
 
It is hardly surprising to find that this way of structuring the stories, in a 
basic victim-perpetrator dichotomy, was important during this process. The 
Dateline segment on child labor in the Bangladeshi garment industry 
similarly focused on Wal-Mart as the perpetrator. The difference lies in the 
fact that during the process leading to the Atlanta Agreement, the stories – 
targeting the international buyers – kept on coming in the Western media, 
whereas in the Bangladesh case they did not. One of the reasons for this 
was arguably the quite early targeting of the BGMEA by AAFLI and 
others in the Bangladesh case, whereas in the soccer ball case both 1996 
campaigns focused on FIFA and ball marketers. While the campaigns 
played a role in shaping the media stories, however, more importantly the 
broader context of this process was very different from Bangladesh 
process: in late 1995, several high-profile cases contributed to creating a 
lot of debate on corporate responsibility in many countries, and in the U.S. 
sweatshops ranked considerably higher on the agenda of the media, 
politicians, activists, etc. from August of 1995 (cf. next chapter).  
 
Furthermore, the ball marketers – in contrast to Wal-Mart – very early in 
process responded in ways suggesting that they were susceptible to 
pressure and going to take action on the problem (the SICA Chicago 
meeting, the establishment of CEFT), and this has to be seen also within 
the context of the entry of Nike and Reebok as ball marketers. Both were 
obvious targets for the media and activists - both were very well known, 
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one already a prime target of activists and the other profiling itself on 
human rights and so on. Furthermore, soccer was important to both 
companies, and particularly Nike spent a lot of marketing money during 
the process on this area. What is more, the intensified competition among 
companies following the second type of strategy described above - those 
that were being targeted in the media - combined with this new presence of 
companies with a “human rights record” in the industry implied that the 
media reports and campaign activities appeared in a period of significant 
uncertainty - about the future of the business as well as the potential threat 
of the marketing war (above) also starting to focus on child labor.462 Nike 
and particularly Reebok did take a more aggressive stance on child labor in 
their marketing activities than did most others (further below), thus adding 
to the uncertainty (and susceptibility to pressure) of other ball marketers. 
 
Both of the campaigns launched in 1996 proclaimed FIFA as the primary 
target.463 The FoulBall campaign also directly targeted the ball marketers 
as well as the SGMA/SICA and the WFSGI. Prominent U.S. politicians, 
including Labor Secretary Reich, supported the campaign publicly and 
wrote letters to both FIFA and the SGMA.464 The FoulBall campaigners 
were also very active in trying to engage - and enrage - at the lower 
political levels, i.e. schools, children playing soccer and “soccer moms.”  
 
While FIFA was subject to rather little media attention prior to the 
campaign activities of the international trade unions and the FoulBall 
coalition, once the trade unions campaign had been launched and the 
preparations for the FoulBall campaign were well underway, FIFA was 
often included in addition to one or a few ball marketers. But why target 
FIFA at all? Why not target the ball marketers directly, or the WFSGI for 
that matter? First of all, because FIFA’s licensing program was seen as a 
potential to obtain an economic sanctioning mechanism against the ball 
marketers/manufacturers in an otherwise quite “voluntary” world, and 
FIFA itself was susceptible to pressure for image and very material reasons 
(discussed further in relation to economic coercion and modelling).  
 
                                          
462 Andy Bernstein, ‘Mixing human rights and marketing, Reebok sparks debate in 
soccer world’ in Sporting Goods Business, Vol. 30, No. 18, December 15, 1997. 
 
463 The international trade unions also approached UEFA, but UEFA deferred back to 
FIFA; interview with Tim Noonan. 
 
464 Reich, letter to Riddle, June 28, 1996. 
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Finally, it should be noted that the Pakistani government and authorities 
were generally not directly targeted, although the lack of enforcement was 
obvious and sometimes explicitly underlined. The CBS exposé in April of 
1995, of course, was broadcast on the day Bhutto arrived to the U.S., and 
in that sense indirectly targeted the Pakistani government. The growing 
focus on the soccer ball and other industries, of course, indirectly put an 
increasing pressure on politicians and various public servants. In mid-
1996, this became quite apparent:  
 
‘Pakistan has ordered local authorities to raid factories employing 
children […] Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has also asked officials […] 
One Pakistani official sais: “Never before have we had so many people 
demanding certificates […]” […] Labour Minister Ghulam Akbar Lasi has 
asked the commerce ministry to launch, within a month, a special mark 
scheme for carpets and footballs […] Mr. Mian Habibullah, chairman of 
Pakistan’s export promotion bureau, said recently: “Having labour laws is 
not enough. We have to enforce these laws to show the world that we are 
not encouraging child labour in our country.”’465 
 
6.8 Economic coercion 
 
In relation to child labor in the Bangladeshi garment industry, economic 
coercion in the form of trade-related measures contributed significantly to 
shaping the interactions and various aspects of that process. It was also 
noted that at some point this ceased to influence the process, and in the 
first half of 1995 was replaced by another form of economic coercion, the 
boycott. During the Atlanta Agreement process, the Child Labor 
Deterrence Act was re-introduced, without being passed though. There are 
no indications, however, that this played any role in the process. None of 
those interviewed mentioned the bill in relation to this process, and when 
asked directly about it, all of them (the Department of Labor official, NGO 
and trade union representatives, and representatives of companies and 
industry associations) stated that it had not played a role. This is consistent 
with the findings in the previous chapter: the dynamics associated with the 
bill in this period, as the threat of the bill being passed, decreased, and thus 
so did the leverage it had previously provided for some actors. 
 
                                          
465 Bokhari, ‘Pakistan to crack down’. 
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Furthermore, the review initiated in 1993 of Pakistan’s benefits under the 
U.S. GSP program led the U.S. Trade Representative to recommend a 
partial suspension of the benefits – including sporting goods – at crucial 
point in time during the process (early March of 1996).466 This was part of 
the broader controversies over trade and labor rights, where the 
Government of Pakistan was struggling for better conditions for some of 
its industries, such as garments, while complaining about the protectionism 
in disguise by some Western powers.467 Although these trade and labor 
rights controversies and the potentially negative impacts on exports must 
be seen as part of the broader context in which the Pakistani industry’s 
reactions were formed, there are no indications that this played a marked, 
specifiable role as in Bangladesh, and there are no signs that it was directly 
used in any way. State-backed trade-related measures were, in other words, 
quite insignificant in this case.468  
 
As the chronology of events showed, the industry’s use of child labor was 
subject to considerable negative publicity, of escalating intensity during 
1996 where two campaigns were furthermore launched (the ILRF’s 
FoulBall campaign and that of the international trade unions; further 
below). The direct economic costs in terms of lost sales and costs 
associated with handling the aftermath of negative publicity are, of course, 
difficult to ascertain with any degree of precision. There are a number of 
indications that the very direct and immediate material costs were 
negligible for the majority of dominant node companies. To begin with, 
some claim that there was no effect on sales in the period, and that they 
were altogether able to ‘stay below the radar screen’.469 Others point to the 
costs associated with the handling of the aftermath of negative publicity 
                                          
466 United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President, Kantor 
recommends. 
 
467 WTO Secretariat, ‘Trade Policy Review Body: Pakistan’. 
 
468 The allegations of forced labor in the soccer ball industry could eventually have 
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(customers, reporters, legal fees) – costs that, in light of annual corporate 
turnovers, were not dramatic in any way.470  
 
Yet, even if the very direct and immediate effects on sales and associated 
crisis management costs were rather negligible, the pressures generated 
were not insignificant. First of all, it may be recalled that Nike and Reebok 
were both entering the ball marketing arena, the ambitions set high and the 
resources supporting those strategic ambitions being of such proportions 
that they were transforming the business, cf. above. In other words, the 
material stakes for these two companies were significant – in the medium 
term, in the broader picture of soccer, and in the even broader picture of 
their corporate brand images. Moreover, both companies had a track record 
as far as corporate responsibility and labor rights were concerned. While 
Reebok was, cf. the Chronology above, taking an early lead within the 
industry on these matters, Nike was one of the most prominent targets of 
labor rights criticism in general and in particular through 1996 (cf. also the 
following chapter). Both companies were publicly lending support to the 
ILRF’s FoulBall campaign.  
 
Second, the entry of Reebok and Nike certainly put pressure on many of 
the existing ball marketers. It may be recalled that the period was 
characterized by one CEO as a nightmare, and the uncertainties 
surrounding future business and associated with the growing signs of 
marketing warfare, both in terms of practices and spending, were not 
negligible. While in direct and immediately material terms, the negative 
publicity on labor practices was perhaps negligible for most ball marketers, 
at the same time it added a layer to the uncertainties associated with the 
entry of Reebok and Nike. If few companies could match the marketing 
spending of these two, certainly they could not out-spend and out-
communicate them on child labor and labor rights either –  and certainly 
not try to do both at the same time.471 
                                          
470 E.g., Vendelbo, ‘Interview med Eigil Nielsen’. 
 
471 As the U.S. Department of Labor relayed one company’s response to the 1996 
survey: ‘Brine noted that they do not have a separate mechanism for informing 
consumers that a soccer ball is not made by children, as their brand name alone should 
stand for not using child labor. Brine raised the concern that creating a special “not 
made with child labor” designation will lead to exploitation of the situation, and that 
smaller manufacturers that are financially unable to mount a large no child labor public 
relations campaign are bound to suffer even if they do have a no child labor 
commitment.’ U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, By 
The Sweat and Toil of Children (Volume IV), p. 122. 
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Taken together, the situation was one in which some dominant node ball 
marketing companies had a strong interest in collective action. As the 
Chronology showed, and as will be analyzed in more detail in the 
following section, the pressures had resulted in discussions and initiatives 
being taken within the industry, and there was a certain momentum for 
collective industry action in mid-1996. Yet, the pressure was unevenly 
distributed across dominant node companies within the industry, and it was 
not sufficient in and of itself. It took something more, and this came with 
the international trade unions and their campaign successfully shifting the 
pressure onto FIFA – or, more precisely, the outcome of their talks with 
FIFA:  
 
‘The number of industry leaders who recognized the need for an industry-
wide collective response reached a critical mass in September 1996 with 
the announcement of a FIFA Code of Labour Practice.’472 
 
And, for a variety of reasons, FIFA was susceptible to pressure. FIFA was 
obviously concerned with the image of the sport, the sporting events (and 
itself, the sporting organization). More importantly, major sporting events 
such as the World Cup were not only a central part of what sporting 
organizations such as FIFA do, they had become a major source of income, 
cf. above. Thus, in direct terms it may be that soccer balls per se make up a 
rather insignificant portion of FIFA’s licensing business in economic 
terms, and that the number of balls carrying an official FIFA label made up 
an equally small share of global ball sales. In the broader picture, however, 
the licenses and proceeding sales associated with the World Cup – FIFA’s 
platform – were not negligible, the estimated worldwide retail sales of 
licensed products related to the 1998 World Cup amounting to USD 1.2 
billion.473 In other words, negative publicity and campaigning on labor 
practices in the production of soccer balls would have effects beyond the 
balls alone. The platform for the more significant licensing arrangements, 
the sporting events, would potentially be hurt.  
 
Moreover, campaigners were actually threatening to directly target those 
companies sponsoring the events:  
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‘FIFA’s million dollar corporate sponsors such as Coca-Cola, McDonalds 
and FujiFilm will be objects of this [FoulBall] coalition’s concern.’474 
 
In sum, the shift in target selection that occurred in 1996, and the 
susceptibility of FIFA to the pressures, was highly significant in this 
process.  
 
6.9 Modelling the solution 
 
Looking at the chain of events, the steady stream of critical exposés and 
campaign efforts may be said to have set in motion three different, but 
possibly interrelated processes of modelling solutions to the problem: 1) 
companies reacted individually; 2) the trade unions negotiated with FIFA; 
and 3) companies reacted collectively as an industry. In the end it was the 
latter that resulted in the Atlanta Agreement – the particularities of which 
the present study is concerned with – but it is obviously necessary to 
consider the potential impacts of the first two on the third one. 
 
To begin with, however, what might be said at the outset to have 
constituted the givens of a potential collective industry effort to resolve the 
problem?  
 
First, if a collective industry action were to emerge, it was given that it 
would be concerned with the problem of child labor. More specifically, it 
appears to have been given that a potential effort would seek to eliminate 
and prevent all children from stitching – i.e., even legal forms of child 
labor would not be an option, and a combined work-study program for the 
older child stitchers - such as the one considered in Bangladesh - would not 
be an option either. As Schrage – the industry advisor during the process – 
put it:  
 
‘Irrespective of the degree of legal risk or inconsistency with corporate 
policy, the sporting goods industry could not afford to be associated with 
any form of child labor, prohibited or not. […] The brands realized that the 
apparent legality of child work in soccer ball assembly under local law 
would not shield soccer ball importers from their critics. The juxtaposition 
of American and European children playing soccer while Pakistani 
children worked to make their soccer balls was guaranteed to generate 
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media attention. Consumers had begun to question the origin of the soccer 
balls they purchased.’475 
 
Second, one of the lessons of Bangladesh was that the problem would have 
to be dealt with in an orderly, responsible manner – although the industry 
was under increasing pressure to resolve the problem, and to do so quickly, 
the industry could not be seen as immediately throwing children out onto 
the streets and into worse situations:  
 
‘To ban child labour with immediate effect would cause untold hardship to 
families and children themselves. In fact, research has shown that when, as 
an example, 30,000 children were removed from the garment industry in 
Bangladesh, none of them ended up in school!’476  
 
It would have to be a closely controlled and managed phasing out of child 
labor.  
 
Third, it was a given that a collective industry effort would also take into 
consideration some of the other lessons from Bangladesh. That is, the 
causes and consequences of child labor would have to be addressed – the 
provision of educational alternatives, rehabilitation, and compensation for 
lost income, etc. This, however, did not include the potentially negative 
consequences for the adult women workers, which was rather a given non-
issue until the operationalization stage.   
 
Fourth, the use of child labor would have to be prevented and controlled 
for in the Sialkot soccer ball industry as a whole – and in an effective and 
credible way.  
 
Fifth, it was arguably also a given that for a collective industry effort to 
come into existence at all, it would have to be an effort which was narrow 
in scope – it would focus on child labor, but not include collective action 
and program elements addressing other fundamental workers rights; it 
would focus on soccer balls, but not on sporting goods production as a 
whole; and it would focus on Sialkot, but not on soccer ball production 
elsewhere. As Doug Cahn – VP of Reebok’s Human Rights Programs – 
put it:  
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476 Rubin, ‘Introduction’, p. 3. 
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‘As hard as this has been to do, it has been easy compared to other kinds 
of workplace problems because it is a single issue, in a single city and a 
single country. […] It is hard for us to generalize, because this is a small 
part of our business. We saw an opportunity to drive the rest of the 
industry. As a result, we were more willing to take the profits and roll them 
back into redress for children. It would be different if it were part of our 
core business in thirty different countries. In a way, I am admitting that 
this one is easy for us, as hard as it has been. If this were footwear, we 
would have to approach it differently.’477 
 
There were, however, a number of “obstacles” to such a collective 
reaction. To begin with, as was discussed earlier, many ball marketers were 
not singled out nor even mentioned during the entire process and were able 
to ‘stay below the radar screen’ throughout. Many of them were not even 
members of collective industry bodies at the national level, such as the 
SGMA. From this perspective, then, there was a rather limited, if any, 
interest in a collective industry reaction – and some, even today and even 
though they too signed on to “The Pledge”, look at the Atlanta Agreement 
with considerable distaste, as the big brands’ (and most notably, Reebok’s) 
chance of showing off in big politics. The central point is that in order for a 
collective industry effort to materialize, then, there would have to be some 
degree of agreement among the bigger companies. There were, however, a 
number of fundamental disagreements and conflicting views. More 
specifically, although the lessons from Bangladesh (above) were explicitly 
part of the understandings of the problem, there were competing views as 
to the implications of these.  
 
First of all, although a “responsible” solution was understood to prevent 
the use of child labor while at the same time addressing the underlying 
causes and the potentially negative consequences, there were fundamental 
disagreements as to who should be responsible for addressing these – the 
companies/industry or government? And some companies feared that even 
engaging with these issues rhetorically as an industry might result in their 
being held responsible for these and a whole range of other “problems.” As 
Cahn subsequently described the discussions at the SICA meeting in 
Chicago (1995) when the decision was made to take the first collective 
steps:  
 
                                          
477 Doug Cahn, cited from Harvard Law School Human Rights Program, Business and 
Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Discussion Held at Harvard Law School in 
December 1997 (Cambridge: Harvard Law School Human Rights Program, 1999). 
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‘We had to jump several hurdles to get all the buyers on board. There was 
a conversation on a steamy July afternoon at a trade show in Chicago. A 
Reebok colleague and I proposed to the Soccer Industry Council of 
America – a U.S.-based trade association – that it adopt a resolution 
calling for the Council to study the issue and make recommendations. As 
innocuous as the proposal might have seemed, the Council hotly debated 
taking on this new role and opening up what, for them, might be a 
Pandora’s box. The vote was 7 to 3 in favour and that was a hard-fought 
step.’478  
 
Furthermore, the implications and practical issues of operationalization 
related to other of the above givens were – to say the least – unclear. 
Although a given element of a collective effort would be a general 
elimination of - and control for – the use of child labor in the soccer ball 
industry in Sialkot, there were disagreements as to the – material, 
ideational, and institutional - implications of this in terms of the 
organization of production and the organization of monitoring. And, 
although it was a given that the elimination of child labor would have to be 
managed and phased out, the timing and management of this were unclear. 
 
Thus, although there were a number of basic givens and advantages 
associated with collective as opposed to individual reaction, these obstacles 
were not overcome until rather late in the process. Critics have, of course, 
pointed to the announcement of the FIFA Code as a trigger of industry 
anger and re-action, while others prefer to portray the industry as taking an 
early lead – by referring to SICA and WFSGI reactions in 1995. There is 
some basis for the latter claim, in the sense that overcoming the above 
disagreements, as to the distribution of responsibilities seen by some as 
falling within the purview of governments, would take time. Furthermore, 
SICA had commissioned – among other things – a factual assessment of 
the conditions on the ground, a relevant basis for reacting responsibly. On 
the other hand, it is very clear that until the FIFA Code was agreed upon, 
companies had reacted either on their own or, when reacting collectively, 
actions had amounted to little more than rhetorical expressions of 
commitments, e.g. (in mid-1996):  
 
‘One, the U.S. soccer industry is committed to revising manufacturing 
practices by its business partners in Pakistan to eliminate the 
subcontracting of stitching which, as you know, is the avenue by which 
                                          
478 Doug Cahn, cited from Harvard Law School Human Rights Program, Business and 
Human Rights. 
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children improperly enter the industry work force. Two, the U.S. soccer 
industry is committed to working with the government of Pakistan and 
internationally respected nongovernmental organizations in Pakistan to 
promote educational opportunities for children and to ensure that children 
no longer involved in stitching soccer balls do not simply move to other, 
more hazardous forms of employment. And, three, the U.S. soccer industry 
is committed to exploring the development of a monitoring program to 
ensure that so long as subcontracting continues, facilities are inspected for 
the presence of any children working.’479 
 
While some companies had been pushing for more concrete collective 
action on child labor, it seems reasonable to conclude that the FIFA Code 
was instrumental in removing the reluctance toward this in other corporate 
quarters – it tipped the balance and was therefore significant to both the 
creation and the nature of collective industry actions as well as to the 
timing and pace of development. This observation finds support not only in 
the chronology of events above and in the arguments of some of the critics 
that were part of the controversy and participated in the Pentland 
Conference. Consider also the statement by Elliott Schrage above 
concerning the FIFA Code and the reaching of critical mass in September 
of 1996 (again, Schrage was the industry advisor during the process). In 
extension, individual company initiatives – e.g., the changes in the 
organization of production of Nike and Reebok’s balls, Reebok’s 
announcement of a child labor free label – do not appear to have been 
significant in pushing toward collective action.  
 
As far as the nature and pace of development was concerned, to derail the 
FIFA Code the industry would have to come up with something concrete 
that went beyond the child labor issue, and it needed to do so quickly. 
Otherwise, the legitimacy of the child labor initiative – the Atlanta 
Agreement – could more easily be contested. Thus, the announcement in 
November 1996 that the industry, under the WFSGI, would develop a new 
model code of its own – a voluntary, watered-down and less 
comprehensive one which would not include economic sanctioning 
mechanisms.  
 
Furthermore, the industry would have to come up with something concrete 
to deal effectively with the child labor issue, and it needed to do so 
quickly. Arguably, to counter criticisms for derailing the FIFA Code, the 
                                          
479 Tom Cove, testimony. 
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industry would have to take on some of the responsibility for addressing 
the underlying causes of child labor and the potentially negative 
consequences of its elimination. This became clear at the Pentland 
Conference:  
 
‘NGO critics questioned the limited scope of a program aimed solely at the 
production of soccer balls by child labor, but no other worker rights. 
NGOs also argued that the worst thing the industry could do would be to 
simply remove child stitchers without providing additional support […]’480  
 
It would be difficult to legitimate a superficial prohibition/elimination 
project in which the industry pushed these responsibilities away, onto other 
parties. In that sense, the FIFA Code affected the nature of the Atlanta 
Agreement by tipping the balance within the industry on these matters. 
Thus,  
 
‘The Partners sought to avoid the situation that had occurred in 
Bangladesh in 1993, when two thirds of the estimated 60 thousand 
children working in clothing factories in Bangladesh had been fired […] 
The Partners agreed that a social protection program should be 
implemented simultaneously with the prevention and monitoring program 
offering viable alternatives to the estimated 2,750 Sialkot child-stitchers 
under fourteen. […] The Social Protection Program would target the 
children removed from work by offering rehabilitation, traditional 
education, and in-kind assistance. The Social Protection Program would 
also seek to provide families of child stitchers with alternative means to 
replace lost income, through micro-credit loans or by employing adult 
family members, and attempt to change individual, family and community 
attitudes about the desirability of child labor.’481  
 
The monitoring and prevention element of the Atlanta Agreement entailed 
a basic shift in the organization of production. The highly dispersed and 
decentralized nature of the subcontracting system, of course, would have 
made monitoring both practically difficult and quite costly. More 
importantly, however, it made it impossible for the ball marketers and 
manufacturers to obtain any measure of control over, and certainty of, the 
prevention of child labor – and therefore no credibility whatsoever in 
claiming the problem had been dealt with, in refuting new allegations, etc. 
                                          
480 Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights, p. 37. 
 
481 Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights, p. 40. 
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This control and credibility problem had already led Nike and Reebok to 
announce varying degrees of centralizations in the production of their 
balls. All companies basically faced this same problem, but few – if any – 
shared the particular reasons Reebok had for dealing with it in the more 
absolute way -  by bringing all stitching in-house (as opposed to the 
establishment of stitching centers). Thus, ‘The Partners concluded that to 
know who was actually stitching the soccer balls and to remove stitchers 
under the age of fourteen stitching could not be allowed to take place at 
home.’482 Did this mean that the ball marketers were to become involved in 
the Sialkot industry as joint venture partners, sharing in the required capital 
investments? No. The burden was pushed onto the Pakistani industry:  
 
‘All costs associated with the Prevention and Monitoring Program, 
including constructing new stitching facilities and establishing internal 
monitoring departments would be borne by the participating 
manufacturers. The manufacturers would also contribute to a fund that 
would finance the independent monitoring.’483  
 
In addition to this change in the organization of production, the monitoring 
and prevention element required the introduction of record-keeping 
techniques – the formal registration of all stitching contractors, locations, 
and workers (including documentation of age). 
 
As in the Bangladesh case, the monitoring element involved conflicting 
interests as to who would be involved in steering and implementing it. As 
early as September, 1995, SICA had requested a proposal to benchmark 
existing child labor monitoring and certification schemes, cf. above. Such a 
benchmarking would have included the Bangladesh MoU and IPEC – and 
the latter did participate in the Pentland Conference and had been 
represented by its Director, Gabriele Stoikov, at the Verbier Conference. 
IPEC furthermore had an interest in being part of developing 
demonstration projects and new model programs.484 After a short skirmish, 
following the announcement by one industry leader that the industry was 
considering some form of self-monitoring, the industry announced that it 
                                          
482 Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights, p. 39. 
 
483 Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights, p. 42. 
 
484 Gabriele Stoikov, ‘Child Labour: The Challenge for the Business Community’ in 
World Federation of the Sporting Goods Industry (eds.), The Way Forward. 
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was engaged in discussions with UNICEF, the ILO and Save the Children 
as possible partners:  
 
‘The Partners agreed that they needed an independent, outside monitor. 
SICA issued an RFP (request for proposals) for organizations able to 
monitor child labor in Sialkot on the ground, and reviewed a range of 
possible monitors, including international security, quality testing, and 
accounting firms. While the industry favored a private entity, the partners 
ultimately turned to the ILO to perform the monitoring. Industry 
representatives were initially concerned by the ILO’s institutional links 
with organized labor. The Pakistani manufacturers, however, were 
uncomfortable with some of the government ties to the private monitoring 
firms.’485  
 
Although the U.S. Department of Labor does not appear to have played as 
important a role in the choice of the ILO here as in Bangladesh, the choice 
of the ILO did open up for a considerable funding contribution of USD 
500,000.486 
 
As far as UNICEF’s role and status as a formal partner to the Agreement 
was concerned, UNICEF had also participated in the “multi-stakeholder 
dialogue” at the two industry Conferences, at Verbier represented by a 
Deputy Director from Geneva.487 The industry had already acknowledged 
its needs for non-industry partner(s) in relation to the social component, 
and UNICEF could fulfill some of these needs – expertise, credibility, 
funding, etc. Though UNICEF was involved in the negotiations of the 
Atlanta Agreement after the Pentland Conference, the views of UNICEF in 
Pakistan were not favorable towards the initiative, as there were seen to be 
more pressing problems and priorities. According to involved industry 
sources, even the day before the Agreement was presented in Atlanta it 
was still unclear whether UNICEF Pakistan would be a formal partner, and 
it reportedly took a telephone call from New York headquarters to make 
this happen!488 
                                          
485 Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights, p. 39. 
 
486 Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights, p. 42. 
 
487 Bilge O. Bassani, ‘The UNICEF Perspective on Child Labour’ in World Federation 
of the Sporting Goods Industry (eds.), The Way Forward. 
 
488 This was corroborated in a couple of interviews (unnamed here), and further 
supported by the fact that in a February 7, 1997 draft agreement, which had been 
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As far as the third of the formal partners – the Sialkot Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, SCCI – is concerned, one might ask why the 
WFSGI was not a formal partner instead (or, as well)? After all, it was 
neither the SCCI nor the ball manufacturers that drove the process toward 
the Atlanta Agreement. Industry sources point to the importance of local 
grounding with respect to enlisting and ensuring local commitment of the 
production industry, with respect to the overall credibility of the 
Agreement, and with respect to legal formalities and operational aspects of 
“placing” the project. In addition, Schrage points to the fact that the 
negative publicity constituted a threat not only to the international buyers 
but also to the viability of Sialkot as a soccer ball manufacturing site as 
such.489 This, however, does not explain why it was decided that the 
WFSGI was not to be a formal partner – and such a decision must have 
been made consciously, considering its active engagement in the process.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that – again – the producing country government 
did not become a partner to the “solution.” Again, a matter of resources 
and priorities and a political unwillingness to interfere with a relatively 
important export industry meant that it was certainly not going to take the 
lead: ‘While the government would likely be a cooperative partner to any 
industry-led initiative, it was unreasonable to expect it to be a catalyst for 
change.’490 Unreasonable or not, such expectations were not held anyway 
by the dominant industry forces. Quite the contrary, it would seem: ‘There 
is also the notable absence of the government of Pakistan. It wasn’t 
deemed to be a constructive partner in this, and perhaps would have made 
it much more difficult to achieve an agreement.’491 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
‘approved’ by the U.S. Department of Labor, UNICEF was still referred to in brackets 
(i.e., [ ]) in the pre-amble, in the signatory field, and the specific responsibilities of 
UNICEF were still unspecified (‘[TO COME]’); Partner’s Agreement to Eliminate 
Child Labour in the Soccer Ball Industry in Pakistan, Draft of February 7, 1997 
(approved by Department of Labor). 
 
489 Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights, p. 25, 37. 
 
490 Schrage, Promoting International Worker Rights, p. 38. 
 
491 Reebok’s Doug Cahn, cited from Harvard Law School Human Rights Program, 
Business and Human Rights. 
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6.10 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has explored the background of the Atlanta Agreement, the 
purpose being to contribute to explaining why it came into existence in the 
first place, and why it took on that particular form.  
 
To begin with, as the previous chapter demonstrated, there had already 
been a growing politicization of corporate responsibility, child labor and 
labor rights, both broadly speaking and specifically in relation to Pakistan 
as the process began. Moreover, child labor in Pakistan – and particularly 
the very grave forms of bonded child labor that were widespread – was 
attracting considerable attention across the world, and the murder of Iqbal 
Masih caused strong reactions across the world. The fact that the murder 
happened just a few days after the initial CBS exposé and that Iqbal had 
received the Reebok Human Rights Award just a few months earlier was 
further conducive to the production of what was largely a negative 
attention on the industry. And the use of child labor was widespread within 
the Pakistani ball industry where it constituted a significant part of the 
farmed out ball-stitching process. While bonded child labor does not 
appear to have been general feature, such allegations were prominent and 
systematic and detailed studies of the use of child labor in the industry 
were either difficult to access (the HRCP 1995 study) or non-existent until 
rather late in the process (the mid-1996 Raasta report). Moreover, while 
the work of the children was mostly illegal under relevant international 
law, national legislation actually allowed for certain forms of child labor – 
albeit, once again, even those forms that were illegal continued to persist in 
the absence of even the scantest enforcement efforts by local authorities.  
 
Adding to this, the analysis found that the use of child labor constituted a 
serious and shared problem for the Pakistani ball manufacturing complex 
(accounting for an exceptional share of global production) and for the 
international ball marketers, and both groups were vulnerable to a 
politicization of child labor. Equally important, though, was the recent 
entry of sporting goods giants, Nike and Reebok. First, it was dramatically 
transforming the competitive dynamics within the industry at the time, 
adding considerably to the uncertainties and pressures faced by soccer ball 
companies. Second, both Nike and Reebok were global leaders within the 
sporting goods industry, both were U.S.-based, and both had an established 
‘human rights record’, all of which influenced the subsequent politicization 
of corporate responsibility and child labor in the industry. 
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Central to the explanation of the Atlanta Agreement is the shift that 
occurred in 1996. The issue had been placed on the international agenda in 
1995 when a couple of high-profile media reports in the U.S. and Europe 
exposed the industry’s use of child labor in the production of soccer balls. 
These triggered a series of additional media reports in the U.S. and in a 
number of European countries as well as a variety of reactions from the 
industry, both on an individual company basis and collectively. The latter 
included, most importantly, the establishment of a task force and the 
commissioning of a study under the U.S.-based SGMA’s soccer 
subcommittee, SICA, and the hosting of the Verbier conference under the 
WFSGI. While these reactions obviously played a role later on in the 
process, in 1995 there were no signs of any concrete and significant 
collective effort to solve the problem on the ground. This, in a sense, 
changed the preconditions for the subsequent developments: the industry’s 
engagement and the lack of a concrete and collective industry effort to 
begin dealing with the problem on the ground constituted an enhanced 
space and basis for further politicization. From the beginning of 1996 a 
barrage of negative media reports and the launch of two campaigns placed 
the industry and FIFA under renewed and increased pressure. Still, the 
pressure was highly unevenly distributed across the industry, and there was 
no broad agreement within the industry to embark on a collective effort to 
solve the problem: while commitments from the U.S.-based SICA 
resembled the subsequent Agreement, collective industry reactions did not 
include concrete actions on the ground. FIFA, however, caved in to the 
pressure and engaged in negotiations with the international trade unions of 
a comprehensive code of labor practice: the campaigns threatened the 
image of FIFA and other football associations, the events they organized, 
and the ‘good name’ of the sport in itself – the image coming with 
considerable and exploding commercial interest attached to television and 
licensing money.   
 
The shift, then, built on changed preconditions and consisted of a 
successful shift in the definition of the problem – as the trade unions were 
able to broaden the agenda to include other fundamental worker rights in 
addition to child labor – and a shift in the choice of target – as the trade 
unions focused on FIFA instead of ball marketers and manufacturers. The 
real significance of the shift, however, resides not in the FIFA Code as 
such, but in the effects that the commencement and completion of these 
multiparty modelling efforts had: it triggered the industry’s 
countermodelling efforts that resulted in the Atlanta Agreement. 
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Most importantly, the FIFA Code constituted an undesirable model for the 
industry and for some of the key and previously reluctant industry players 
in particular. This changed situation created the critical mass within the 
industry which was the necessary basis for the industry to move forward 
collectively. In addition, the FIFA Code did not entail a focused and 
‘responsible’ approach to the problem of child labor, understood as 
elements to address both the causes and the consequences of the problem, 
and so the industry arguably still needed some form of collective initiative 
to deal ‘responsibly’ with the problem of child labor. Finally, the trade 
unions had not only been able to broaden the agenda but also to complete 
negotiations based on this, and the counter-modelling by the industry 
therefore needed to include the development of a solution broader than 
child labor alone (the post-Atlanta Agreement WFSGI code). 
 
In addition to this, part of the explanation of the Atlanta Agreement and 
why the shift in 1996 was so central resides in the highly uneven nature of 
the targeting and economic coercion in the process, i.e. in the distribution 
of blame and responsibility as well as economic pressures. The ball 
marketers were the main targets in the media exposés throughout the 
process – but in a highly uneven fashion, where the local soccer ball 
market leaders and the global sporting goods giants, Nike and Reebok, 
attracted most attention, and where many other companies were able to 
stay ‘below’ the radar screen. And it was the two U.S.-based newcomers to 
the soccer ball business, Nike and Reebok, that appeared to be the most 
vulnerable. While the negative publicity threatened their reputation and 
broader market position, it did not threaten their actual market position 
within soccer balls. They had, however - Nike in particular – invested 
heavily in the area, and it constituted an important future business area. 
Moreover, the nature of the reaction to the FIFA Code meant that in the 
final stage of the process the industry was in a sense targeting itself, i.e., 
the countermodelling efforts involved what might be characterized as an 
implicit auto-targeting without which taking ownership of the solution to 
the problem would have been difficult. Moreover, this auto-targeting and 
countermodelling also implied that, to the extent that economic coercion 
was significant in the final stage, it was largely between the companies 
within the industry and closely related to support and funding for the 
Agreement. Finally, it goes with the above picture, of course, that trade 
sanctions were insignificant in this process. Had this type of economic 
coercion been available, it would have constituted a potentially quite 
significant threat to ball manufacturers and marketers alike, given 
Pakistan’s share of global production.  
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With respect to explaining the particular form of the Atlanta Agreement, 
the struggles to define the problem were significant in a number of 
respects, some of which relate directly to the events analyzed in the 
previous chapter. First of all, the causes of child labor and the potentially 
negative consequences of eliminating the problem clearly were important 
parts of how the problem was perceived and defined by the industry and its 
critics from the very beginning, including with explicit references to the 
‘lessons from Bangladesh’. In the end, the Atlanta Agreement replicated 
the Bangladesh MOU, with certain adjustments. Second, while the 
problem was rather narrowly defined in terms of child labor in the early 
stage of the process, and while child labor continued to constitute a focal 
point throughout the process, when the shift occurred in 1996 neither FIFA 
nor the industry sought to counter this by resorting to a ‘negative 
consequences for the children’ approach. Third, as in the Bangladesh case, 
the struggles to define the problem were relatively insignificant in the final 
stage of the process following the completion of the FIFA Code: the 
countermodelling efforts did not seek to redefine the problem – they 
redefined the solution to suit different interests. Fourth, it should be noted 
that while there were a few attempts to raise gender aspects – i.e., the 
potential implications for the adult female workers from a change in the 
organization of production – this was not taken into consideration until 
after the Atlanta Agreement had been presented. Finally, the gravity of the 
problem was a central conflict point in this case, in no small measure 
intertwined with the attribution of blame and responsibility, shaping the 
industry’s reactions in this respect: most media reports and the two 
campaigns presented allegations that bonded child labor, or child slavery, 
was being used in the production of soccer balls. Child labor did constitute 
a significant part of the stitching process, which in turn was geographically 
dispersed and therefore difficult to effectively oversee, and bonded child 
labor was quite common in Pakistan. When the Raasta report – 
commissioned by SICA in 1995 – was completed in mid-1996, the 
industry responded to these claims by engaging in a minimization strategy 
that relied on serious and systematic studies and involved the provision of 
the most detailed characteristics of the general nature of problem.  
 
Finally, the analysis found that the form of the Agreement was shaped on 
some counts that may seem curious or perhaps less noteworthy in the 
specific and concrete, but which – in light of the previous chapter – stand 
out. First of all, the two IGO partners to the MOU were also partners to the 
Atlanta Agreement. In this case, however, the ILO appears to have been 
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keen on partnering up, whereas UNICEF – the local officers of which 
played an important role in the Bangladesh negotiations – only signed up 
to the Atlanta Agreement in the very last minute. Second, the U.S. 
Department of Labor was once again heavily involved in the final stages of 
the Agreement, suggesting that funding practicalities and the DOL and 
ILO-IPEC relation found to be significant in the previous chapter was, in 
that particular historical space, relevant beyond the Bangladeshi garment 
industry. Third, and related, the share of public funding was quite 
significant. This is not to suggest that funding from companies and 
industry associations involved in soccer was irrelevant, but it is interesting 
to note that initiatives that are debated and praised under the rubric of 
private and voluntary are based to such an extent on government funds. 
But then again, the U.S. Labor Department cannot directly engage in the 
enforcement of international child labor and labor rights standards in other 
countries, can it? 
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7. Sweatshops “at home” and abroad: the White House 
Apparel Industry Partnership 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
‘Sweatshops have indeed returned to the United States. A phenomenon of 
the apparel industry considered long past is back, not as a minor 
aberration, but as a prominent way of doing business.’492 
  
Following a period in the mid-20th century during which sweatshop 
conditions in the U.S. apparel industry had been almost eliminated, the 
return of the sweatshops began to be noted again in the late 1970s. From 
the late 1980s onwards, sweatshops and corporate responsibility were 
increasingly part of the public debate within the United States, to the extent 
that one observer has dubbed 1995-1996 ‘The Year of the Sweatshop.’493 
 
This chapter seeks to explain the particular form and coming into existence 
of the November 1998 AIP/FLA Preliminary Agreement between some of 
the members of the so-called White House Apparel Industry Partnership 
(AIP), an anti-sweatshop task force consisting of a small number of private 
actors, which was announced by U.S. President Clinton in August 1996.  
 
                                          
492 Edna Bonacich and Richard P. Appelbaum, Behind the Label: Inequality in the Los 
Angeles Apparel Industry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. 2. 
 
493 Andrew Ross, ‘After the Year of the Sweatshop: Postscript’ in Andrew Ross (ed.), 
No Sweat: Fashion, Free Trade and the Rights of Garment Workers (New York: Verso, 
1997). 
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7.2 Industry characteristics 
 
The apparel commodity chain was described and analyzed in chapter 5, but 
certain aspects were only briefly mentioned or “postponed” in that 
analysis, in particular the changing territoriality of apparel production 
within the U.S. and a more elaborate treatment of the main characteristics 
of, and structural pressures related to, the U.S. apparel companies. 
 
To begin with, the import penetration rate in the U.S. apparel market had 
been steadily increasing since the 1960s. In spite of consistently sustained 
annual increases in domestic U.S. apparel production (measured in USD 
terms), this was reflected in declining overall employment in apparel 
within the U.S.494 The drop in the total number of apparel employees 
within the U.S., however, blurs some significant shifts in apparel 
production and employment within the U.S.  
 
First of all, there was a shift in the organizational structure of production. 
In spite of the drop in total employment, the number of companies in the 
garment industry grew from a U.S. total of 13,259 in 1977 to 15,007 in 
1995, and there was a significant trend in the major metropolitan areas and 
a number of states towards a markedly lower number of employees per 
company.495  
 
Second, the territoriality of U.S. apparel production changed: in some areas 
employment figures dropped considerably, in some there was stagnation, 
and in others still employment grew or even boomed.  
 
                                          
494 Cf. Robert J. Ross, ‘The New Sweatshops in the United States: How New, How 
Real, How Many, and Why?’ in Gary Gereffi, David Spener & Jennifer Bair (eds.), 
Free Trade and Uneven Development: The North American Apparel Industry After 
NAFTA (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002). 
 
495 Robine van Doren, ‘TexMex: Linkages in a Binational Garment District? The 
Garment Industries in El Paso and Ciudad Juárez’ in Gary Gereffi, David Spener & 
Jennifer Bair (eds.), Free Trade and Uneven Development: The North American 
Apparel Industry After NAFTA (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002), p. 165; 
see also Ian M. Taplin, ‘Recent Manufacturing Changes in the U.S. Apparel Industry: 
The Case of North Carolina’ in Edna Bonacich et.al. (eds.), Global Production: The 
Apparel Industry in the Pacific Rim (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994). 
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The table below illustrates the fall and rise of New York and Los Angeles, 
respectively.  
 
Table 7.1 Garment industry employment in the New York and Los 
Angeles areas496 
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The above is illustrative of the broader regional changes in the U.S. 
garment industry – the decline of the North East and the boom in 
California – in a period where the total number of garment industry 
employees in the U.S. dropped from 1,142,047 in 1967 to 652,129 in 
1995.497 In the Southern states, the number of apparel jobs declined or 
stagnated in a number of states from the 1970s onwards, while growing 
moderately in others.498  
 
The retailers 
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of profound structural shifts 
were making their mark on the retail end and the rest of the apparel chain. 
                                          
496 Based on van Doren, ‘TexMex’, p. 165. 
 
497 Van Doren, ‘TexMex’, p. 165; Bonacich and Appelbaum, Behind the Label, p. 16 
 
498 Evelyn Blumenberg and Paul Ong, ‘Labor Squeeze and Ethnic/Racial 
Recomposition in the U.S. Apparel Industry’ in Edna Bonacich et.al. (eds.), Global 
Production: The Apparel Industry in the Pacific Rim (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1994), pp. 309-325. 
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Some of these had been long under way, whereas others were more recent. 
In broad terms, however, they all contributed to what was one of the most 
important structural characteristics in the apparel chain: the growing power 
of retailers vis-à-vis the apparel companies, producers and the workers at 
the bottom of the hierarchy. The following table lists the 10 largest U.S. 
retailers in 1991. 
 
Table 7.2 Top 15 U.S. retailers499 
 
1991 Sales 
Rank (1987) 
Company 1991 Sales, 
USD bn. 
(1987) 
1991 Gross profit, 
percent 
(1987 gross) 
1 (3) Wal-Mart Stores 43.9 (16.0) 20.8 (23.1) 
2 (2) Kmart Corp. 34.6 (25.6) 25.0 (27.6) 
3 (1) Sears Merchandise Group 28.3 (25.9) 29.5 (32.6) 
4 (4) J.C. Penney 16.2 (15.3) 33.1 (33.8) 
5 (6) Dayton Hudson Corp. 16.1 (10.7) 27.1 (24.3) 
6 (7) May Dept. Stores Co. 10.6 (10.6) 30.9 (27.2) 
7 (8) Woolworth Corp. 9.9 (7.1) 32.6 (NA) 
8 (10) Melville Corp. 9.9 (5.9) 37.6 (38.6) 
9 (5) Federated Dept. Stores 6.9 (11.1) NA (26.3) 
10 (NL) Macy’s 6.8 (-) NA (-) 
 
The structural composition, pressures and constraints characteristic of U.S. 
retail in the early 1990s should be seen in light of a longer, two-stage 
transformation that had been under way since the 1960s:  
 
‘In the 1980s, the department store in turn came under siege. [...] The 
breakup of the American mass market into distinct, if overlapping, retail 
constituencies has created a competitive squeeze on the traditional 
department stores and mass merchandisers, who are caught between a 
wide variety of specialty stores, on the one hand, and large-volume 
discount chains, on the other. The former, who tailor themselves to the 
upscale shopper, offer customers an engaging ambience, strong fashion 
statements, and good service; the latter, who aim for the lower income 
buyer, emphasize low prices, convenience, and no-frills merchandising.’500  
 
                                          
499 Based on Appelbaum and Gereffi, ‘Power and Profits’, p. 51. 
 
500 Gary Gereffi, ‘The Organization’, p. 105. 
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As indicated in the quote, the retail revolution involved some considerable 
shifts in the competitive opportunities and pressures for the different retail 
categories:  
 
- The discount retail business was booming, and the companies in this 
category were growing ever larger and capturing increasing shares 
of the total U.S. retail market, and by the early 1990s Wal-Mart, 
Kmart and Target had captured over 70 percent of the discount store 
business in the U.S.501  
 
- There had been an increasing competitive squeeze on department 
stores and mass merchandisers.502 
 
- In addition to the growth in discount retail, the competitive squeeze 
on department stores and mass merchandisers came from the growth 
of a wide variety of specialty stores.  
 
These structural trends continued to make their mark throughout the 1990s. 
There was a sustained growth and concentration in the discount and 
specialty retail categories, and with the structural pressures furthermore 
pushing for some concentration among department stores as well (e.g., 
Federated and Macy’s), this worked to the effect that a very small number 
of companies were controlling an increasing share of apparel retail sales in 
the U.S.:  
 
‘By 1995, the five largest US retailers - Wal-Mart, Sears, Kmart, Dayton 
Hudson, and JC Penney - accounted for 68% of all apparel sales in 
publicly held retail outlets. The next top 24 retailers, all billion-dollar 
corporations, represented an additional 30% of these sales [...]’503  
 
In other words, 29 corporations controlled 98 per cent of apparel retail 
sales in the U.S.  
 
                                          
501 Gereffi, ‘The Organization’, p. 105. 
 
502 Two of the listed mass merchandisers, for example, Woolworth and Montgomery 
Ward, closed down their retail operations. As for the department stores, Macy’s, for 
example, ran into severe trouble, filed for bankruptcy protection in 1992, and was 
subsequently (1994) acquired by Federated; cf. Bonacich and Appelbaum, Behind the 
Label, p. 86.  
 
503 Gary Gereffi, ‘International trade and industrial upgrading’, p. 44. 
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Generally speaking, since the 1970s U.S. retailers had increasingly been 
bypassing the apparel companies, either through buying houses or by 
engaging in direct sourcing or their own production.504 A number of 
apparel marketers/manufacturers, in turn, moved into retail (particularly 
specialty retail), in part a response to the growing power of retailers and 
the competitive pressures; as Bonacich and Appelbaum note, ‘The 
convergence of retailer and manufacturer in a single firm is a logical 
outcome of competitive pressures in the industry, because it effectively 
eliminates one major layer of profit taking.’505 In addition to the growing 
concentration and power of retailers (above), the shift in the different retail 
categories in the 1980s and early 1990s was furthermore central in 
exacerbating the downward squeeze on apparel prices (experienced by 
apparel companies, producers and workers) and the growing significance 
of such sourcing practices – through the competitive squeeze on 
department stores and mass merchandisers a similar low-cost logic also 
became increasingly important in driving the sourcing practices of 
companies in these categories.506  
 
The apparel marketers and manufacturers 
 
Adding to the above the tendency toward larger and more concentrated 
textile firms in U.S., and the presence of quota systems limiting foreign 
sourcing of inputs for apparel production, we find that the apparel 
marketing and manufacturing nodes were being squeezed from both “ends” 
of the chain. This double squeeze contributed significantly to shaping the 
changing realities of apparel marketers and manufacturers. Compared to 
the retail end, the marketing/manufacturing complex was highly 
fragmented, and in the early 1990s, there were ‘only’ five billion-dollar 
companies in the industry, as the table below illustrates. While smaller in 
                                          
504 For an illustration and discussion of the production frontiers for global sourcing by 
US retailers and the apparel industry, see e.g., Gereffi, ‘The Organization’, pp. 110-
113; Lucie Cheng and Gary Gereffi, ‘U.S. Retailers and Asian Garment Production’ in 
Edna Bonacich et.al. (eds.), Global Production: The Apparel Industry in the Pacific 
Rim (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), p. 65. 
 
505 Bonacich and Appelbaum, Behind the Label, p. 28. 
 
506 See Gereffi, ‘The Organization’, pp. 110-111; Bonacich and Appelbaum, Behind the 
Label, p. 23. 
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comparison to the retailers above, the top five nevertheless ‘accounted for 
23 percent of the U.S. apparel industry’s total wholesale volume [...]’507 
 
Table 7.3 Top 10 U.S. apparel companies, 1991508 
Sales 
Rank 
Company 1991 Sales,  
USD bn. 
1991 Gross profit, 
percent 
1  Levi Strauss 4.90 Not available 
2  Sara Lee 4.10 Not available 
3  VF Corp. 2.95 30.9 
4  Liz Claiborne 2.01 39.8 
5  Fruit of the Loom 1.63 30.8 
6  Leslie Fay 0.84 29.8 
7  Crystal Brands 0.83 29.8 
8  Kellwood Co. 0.81 17.3 
9  Phillips-Van Heusen Co. 0.81 35.2 
10 Russell Corp. 0.80 31.2 
 
Two fundamental structural tendencies characterized the industry in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, and these became increasingly pronounced 
during the 1990s: One, there was a steady move to offshore production. 
Two, there was a growing emphasis on product development, marketing 
and retail combined with an increasing disengagement from actual 
production, i.e. the latter was increasingly contracted out.509 
 
Some of the apparel majors were, from the beginning, branded marketers 
or “manufacturers without factories” sourcing exclusively or heavily 
outside the U.S.510 In addition to Nike and Reebok, Liz Claiborne (another 
task force member) had been one of the pioneers in this.511 In the mid-
1990s, however, the other companies listed above were still directly 
engaged in apparel production, albeit most of them had been moving 
                                          
507 Appelbaum and Gereffi, ‘Power and Profits’, p. 47. 
 
508 The table is based on Appelbaum and Gereffi, ‘Power and Profits’, p. 47 
 
509 Gereffi, ‘International trade and industrial upgrading’, p. 48; Appelbaum and 
Gereffi, ‘Power and Profits’, p. 55; Edna Bonacich and David V. Waller, ‘Mapping a 
Global Industry: Apparel Production in the Pacific Rim Triangle’ in Edna Bonacich 
et.al. (eds.), Global Production: The Apparel Industry in the Pacific Rim (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1994); Bonacich and Appelbaum, Behind the Label, p. 29. 
  
510 Gereffi, ‘International trade and industrial upgrading’, p. 46. 
 
511 See Bonacich and Waller, ‘Mapping a Global Industry’, p. 90. 
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steadily to offshore production, involving rounds of plant closings in the 
U.S.512 In other words, although by the end of the 1990s most of them still 
had their own production facilities in the U.S. and abroad, during the 1990s 
many of the leading apparel manufacturers increasingly came to resemble 
branded marketers, sourcing their product from other companies, and 
increasingly ones located outside of the U.S. Furthermore, there was not 
only a trend toward the convergence of branded marketers and 
manufacturers around the format pioneered by the former, but also a trend 
toward the convergence of retailer and apparel marketer/manufacturer, the 
latter moving primarily into specialty retail. 
 
Not all companies followed similar paths, however. First, for many smaller 
and medium-sized apparel manufacturers with less established brand 
names (or none at all), shifting to production of private labels and licensed 
products provided a viable growth (or survival) strategy, and some private 
label production remained in the U.S.513 Second, the move to off-shore 
production was particularly marked in the case of many of the lead 
companies above, because – although they all marketed products that did 
have some fashion content – they all ran high-volume and relatively 
standardized productions.514 In contrast, lower volume and/or high-fashion 
apparel productions were faced with radically different market conditions, 
                                          
512 Even counterfeiters in the US were moving into offshore production:  ‘The crooks 
can legally import no-name T-shirts or jeans. They then manufacture fake labels or 
smuggle them through customs.’ Stephanie Simon, ‘Brash world of bogus goods thrives 
in L.A.’ in Los Angeles Times (Home Edition, July 5, 1995. See also Frederick H. 
Abernathy et.al., A Stitch in Time: Lean Retailing and the Transformation of 
Manufacturing – Lessons from the Apparel and Textile Industries (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), p. 181; Jennifer Bair and Gary Gereffi, ‘NAFTA and the 
Apparel Commodity Chain: Corporate Strategies, Interfirm Networks, and Industrial 
Upgrading’, in Gary Gereffi, David Spener and Jennifer Bair (eds.), Free Trade and 
Uneven Development: The North American Apparel Industry After NAFTA 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002), p. 42; David Spener, ‘The Unraveling 
Seam: NAFTA and the Decline of the Apparel Industry in El Paso, Texas’, in Gary 
Gereffi, David Spener and Jennifer Bair (eds.), Free Trade and Uneven Development: 
The North American Apparel Industry After NAFTA (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 2002); Schoenberger, Levi’s Children, p. 68. 
 
513 Bonacich and Appelbaum, Behind the Label, p. 30. 
 
514 Ian M. Taplin, ‘Strategic Reorientations of U.S. Apparel Firms’ in Gary Gereffi and 
Miguel Korzeniewicz (eds.), Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 219. 
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time and transportation constraints and pressures, setting entirely different 
logics for the location and organization of production activities:  
 
‘At one time a significant proportion of manufacturing in Los Angeles was 
done in-house, the manufacturers employing their own workers to make 
clothing in their own factories. Today few do, in part because of a decline 
in the more stable men’s sector and the dominance of the fashion-sensitive 
women’s sector in Los Angeles. In New York City, where women’s wear is 
less dominant, more manufacturers do produce in-house, and the term 
manufacturer is reserved for them; the term jobber is used for apparel 
firms that rely entirely on independent contractors to sew their garments. 
In Los Angeles the use of independent contractors for apparel fabrication 
is, however, so common that such fine terminological distinctions are not 
made, leaving the term manufacturer to describe all firms that design 
clothing destined to be sold wholesale to retailers, even if all the work is 
contracted out.’515 
 
7.3 Characteristics of the framework of governance516 
 
The U.S. has been characterized as the ‘most obvious outlier’ in terms of 
core labor standards, having ratified only the ILO’s Abolition of Forced 
Labour Convention of 1957 (Convention No. 105) by the early 1990s.517 
The domestic regulatory framework in the U.S. is multi-layered, given the 
federal structure. The key federal instrument is the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA) of 1938, which established a number of basic labor standards. 
In the period following World War II a number of regulatory additions on 
workers’ rights came into existence in the U.S., most importantly a number 
of significant setbacks related to core labor standards, as also observed by 
                                          
515 Bonacich and Appelbaum, Behind the Label, p. 28. 
 
516 Not disregarding the inherently global reach of the U.S. apparel industry and the 
implications of the AIP, the present analysis must necessarily be constricted, and the 
following will focus on the U.S.  
 
517 Kimberley Ann Elliott, ‘International Labor Standards and Trade: What Should Be 
Done?’ in Jeffrey R. Schott (ed.), Launching New Trade Talks (Washington, D.C.: 
Institute for International Economics, 1998), p.171. The US ratified Convention 182 on 
December 2, 1999 (International Labour Organisation, List of Ratifications of 
International Labour Conventions: United States (at www.ilo.org, accessed on June 16, 
2004)). 
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the OECD, commenting on striker replacement and anti-union 
discrimination in the U.S.518   
 
The FLSA still contained provisions establishing a minimum wage, 
specifications concerning hours worked, compensation and conditions for 
overtime work, provisions concerning child labor in nonfarm jobs 
(including a prohibition of the employment of youths aged 15 and younger 
in manufacturing), requirements related to employer record keeping, as 
well as requirements concerning “industrial homework” in specific 
industries (including women’s apparel and other, but not all, branches of 
apparel production). Furthermore, the FLSA contained a so-called “hot 
goods” provision, which granted federal authorities the power to prevent 
the sale and shipment of goods across state borders, had these goods been 
made in violation of the law. However, ‘Rarely used, the “hot-goods” 
power has not proved a powerful deterrent.’519  
 
Furthermore, given the extensive use of subcontracting within the apparel 
industry, it is important to note that the “manufacturers” – and the retailers 
for that matter – were never legally liable for the labor rights violations of 
their contractors. For a few decades, however, as the sweatshops were 
pushed to the margins of the apparel industry, this was dealt with in terms 
of self-regulation:  
 
                                          
518 OECD, International Trade and Core Labour Standards (Paris: OECD, 2000), pp. 
107 and 115. The three most significant ones were, firstly, the Taft-Hartley Act (1947) 
that was pushed through Congress by a powerful anti-union bloc that was able to 
override President Truman’s symbolic veto. A ‘catastrophic legislative defeat for 
labor,’ Taft-Hartley in effect swept away a number of workers’ rights, including 
provisions for banning strikes and making it legal for employers to refuse negotiating 
collective bargaining agreements with workers’ representatives. Secondly, in 1962, 
President Kennedy signed a decree granting federal employees the right to collective 
bargaining - but not the right to strike. Thirdly, in 1981, PATCO (a small, conservative 
union) launched a strike, which was forcefully countered by the Reagan Administration 
that declared the strike illegal (which it was under Taft-Hartley), replaced the striking 
workers with air force personnel, imprisoned strike leaders, and barred the strikers from 
future public employment. See Paul Buhle, Taking Care of Business: Samuel Gompers, 
George Meany, Lane Kirkland, and the Tragedy of American Labor (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1999), pp. 126-130; Niels O. H. Jensen and Ole Strömgren, 
Arbejderbevægelsen i USA: En arbejderbevægelse uden socialisme (Copenhagen: 
Fremad, 1988), pp. 41, 45, and 61. 
 
519 Ross, ‘The New Sweatshops’, pp. 111-112. 
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‘During the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, the men’s and women’s clothing 
workers’ unions gradually developed the ability to control the abuses of 
the contractor system by compelling the manufacturers […] to accept 
“joint liability” for union standards in contractor shops.’520  
 
In addition, a large number of undocumented immigrants were working in 
the apparel industry within the U.S. The workers rights of these 
immigrants were also protected under federal law, the FLSA’s protections 
applying to all workers. However, the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986 made it illegal for employers to knowingly hire undocumented 
workers. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 1992 between 
the Department of Labor and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
implying an agreement to cooperate upon discoveries of undocumented 
workers, although immigration and labor laws and authorities undoubtedly 
still had ‘somewhat conflicting missions.’521 
 
Turning to the enforcement of the regulatory framework in the 1990s, it is 
widely acknowledged that – given the size of the industry and the 
sweatshop problem (cf. above and next section) – labor authorities were 
severely understaffed. As mentioned, while total employment in the U.S. 
apparel production declined, there was also an overall increase in the 
number of companies. Combined with staff cuts in the Labor Department’s 
Wage and Hour Division, this led several analysts to speak of a de facto 
deregulation in relation to the basic rights and conditions set out in the 
FLSA, although the Act remained in effect:  
 
‘Wage and Hours Division investigators of the Department of Labor face 
increased numbers of workplaces (“establishments”) with a relatively 
smaller staff. Each investigator was responsible for fifty-seven hundred 
workplaces in 1983, eighty-six hundred in 1996, and seventy-five hundred 
in 1999. [...] From 1957 to 1995, each investigator’s potential 
responsibility increased from about 46,000 workers to about 153,100 
workers.’522  
 
                                          
520 Ross, ‘The New Sweatshops’, pp. 111-112. 
 
521 Bonacich and Appelbaum, Behind the Label, p. 237. See also Celia W. Dugger, 
‘Raid and Release -- A special report: A Tattered Crackdown on Illegal Workers’, The 
New York Times, June 3, 1996. 
 
522 Ross, ‘The New Sweatshops’, p. 111. 
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This de facto deregulation, in combination with the changes in industry 
discussed above and the weakened position of organized labor, was subject 
to criticism, in particular from commentators connecting this de facto 
deregulation to what they characterized as de factor Third World labor 
market conditions within the U.S. (to which we turn shortly):  
 
‘Poorly regulated labor markets, particularly weak government 
enforcement of workplace health and safety and few sanctions on 
employers for illegal employment practices have resulted, since the 1980s, 
in a rebirth of sweatshops in regions where immigrant labor is available. 
In regions such as southern California, Miami and New York/New Jersey 
many contractors have been able to use a Third World labor force in what 
amounts to de facto Third World labor market conditions.’523  
 
In addition to the more conventional enforcement, involving inspections 
and legal action against labor law violators, a few new legislative and 
enforcement initiatives saw the light of day in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.524 A June, 1989, federal strategy, spearheaded in Southern 
California’s garment industry, relied basically on the “re-discovery” of the 
abovementioned hot goods provision of the FLSA. Briefly put, the threat 
of having goods confiscated, that had been manufactured in violation of the 
law, destined for inter-state commerce, amounted to an alternative form of 
joint liability and was used as leverage by the Department of Labor. It 
furthermore served as a substitute for the absent joint liability of 
manufacturers (and in some cases retailers) for labor violations at 
                                          
523 Taplin, ‘Strategic Reorientations’, pp. 215-216. 
 
524 An example of the more conventional approach includes a law suit filed by the 
Department of Labor in mid-1991 against Saipan-based garment companies, suppliers 
of, among others, Levi Strauss and The GAP. See e.g., Stephen K. Yoder, ‘Saipan 
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Efron, ‘Sweatshops expanding into Orange County’ in Los Angeles Times (Home 
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sweatshop tool’ in Los Angeles Times (Home Edition), November 28, 1989; Sonni 
Efron, ‘1938 law resurrected in war on sweatshops’ in Los Angeles Times (Orange 
County Edition), November 28, 1989. 
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contractors. According to the Department, the applicability of the provision 
depended on the ‘good faith’ of the buyer.525  
 
The Department of Labor later introduced another element as well: 
compliance agreements. The compliance agreement program was multi-
layered, but in the more serious cases the manufacturer would be asked to 
sign onto an agreement involving its commitment to monitor and keep 
records of the contractor’s compliance and to inform the Department of 
violations. Such information was not always passed on, and the signing of 
the compliance agreement was considered an act of good faith, wherefore 
signatories were exempt from lawsuits and sanctions under the hot goods 
provision. In late 1992, Guess? Inc. became the first company to sign such 
an agreement.526 
 
In addition to these enforcement “innovations”, new legislation was 
introduced in California. Most significantly, a bill introducing joint 
liability was passed in the Californian Assembly Labor Committee, in spite 
of fierce resistance from industry and the Assembly Conservative Caucus. 
The bill was later vetoed by California’s Republican Governor.527 Also in 
California, the Targeted Industries Partnership Program (TIPP) - targeting 
garment manufacturing and agriculture - was created as a pilot program in 
November of 1992 (and extended in 1994). Involving the (federal) Wage 
and Hour Division of the Department of Labor and three Californian 
agencies, the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, the Division of 
Occupational Safety and Health, and the Employment Development 
Department, TIPP  was based ‘on the assumption that violations are in 
large part the result of ignorance, and that education is a key component of 
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any solution.’ In addition to a number of educational efforts, TIPP also 
involved raids or sweeps of manufacturing sites.528 
 
Finally, the state of affairs with regards to the industry’s ventures into self-
regulation has already been dealt with to some extent. By 1992 only a 
limited number of companies mentioned in this chapter had adopted codes 
of conducts: Levi Strauss, Nike, Reebok, and Phillips-Van Heusen.529 In 
addition, in late 1992 Guess? Inc. was the first company to sign a 
compliance agreement with the Labor Department. Wal-Mart followed suit 
in 1993 after the Bangladesh exposé, and many other companies in the 
apparel industry also adopted codes over the next couple of years.  
 
7.4 Characteristics of the problem  
 
To begin with, one of the characteristics of the sweatshop issue by 
definition rested in its relative breadth: compared to the (narrow) emphasis 
on child labor in the previous chapters, the sweatshop issue was much 
broader, both in terms of the labor rights included and in terms of the scope 
of its implications in the industry. Moreover, some of the most egregious 
conditions were exposed ‘at home’ – especially in the Los Angeles area 
and New York City – and official surveys throughout the 1990s 
documented the existence of a sizeable and widespread problem. Indeed, 
the sweatshops had returned to the U.S., ‘not as a minor aberration, but as 
a prominent way of doing business.’530   
 
But what exactly is a sweatshop? To begin with, an injustice that had been 
relegated to margins of the U.S. apparel industry, the sweatshop may be 
characterized as a problem that was widely considered “solved”, only to 
return, albeit in a somewhat new form:  
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‘One can argue that in the return of the sweatshop we are witnessing a 
throwback to the earliest phases of the industrial revolution. But it is clear 
that what is going on is not only “old” but also very new. The apparel 
industry has managed to combine the latest ideas and technology for the 
rapid production and distribution of a highly diverse and continually 
changing product with the oppressive working conditions of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, now coordinated over a global 
space.’531  
 
A return to the past, in other words, which fundamentally contrasted any 
notion of progress and modernity, not to mention any conceivable message 
that apparel companies might want to convey in their marketing 
communications. Furthermore, the term conjures up some strong images of 
superexploitation of especially immigrants, factory fires, dead workers, 
public outrage and labor organizing and struggles, strikes and violent 
repression - in no small measure related to the garment industry. As Robert 
Ross noted, ‘The sweatshop is seared into cultural memory.’532 In short, a 
very powerful metaphor with strong cultural and historical roots and 
connotations. 
 
Yet another key characteristic is evident. Different definitions and 
conceptions abound (and some of the key conflicts in the process below 
were played out over some of these differences). One approach may be 
characterized as a more restrictive, legalistic one, where the term is 
reserved for the working conditions at businesses that regularly violate 
(state and federal) labor laws, principally the provisions of the FLSA. In 
the words of Ross:  
 
‘By removing the word sweatshop from the realm of metaphor and 
subjective moralism to that of a legal test, the GAO [General Accounting 
Office of the U.S. Congress] definition leaves many low-paying jobs with 
“lousy” conditions unsullied by the label. [Furthermore,] By reserving the 
term sweatshop for those workplaces that do not meet even the low 
standards of public law, the definition denotes “superexploitation,” that is, 
something even more extreme than “low pay.”’533  
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This was a common definition of sweatshops, although far from being 
accepted across the board (as pointed out by Ross). Indeed, it was widely 
contested by protagonists of an alternative, broader notion of sweatshops, 
which includes the issue of a living wage and a critique of the restrictive 
understanding:  
 
‘An emphasis merely on violations of the law fails to capture the full extent 
of what has been happening. [...] In offshore production, some 
manufacturers may follow local laws, but the legal standard is so low that 
the workers, often including young teenagers, live in poverty, although 
they are working full time. The same problem arises in the United States. 
Even if a factory follows the letter of the law in every detail, workers may 
suffer abuse, job insecurity, and poverty. [...] Thus we wish to broaden the 
definition of sweatshops to include factories that fail to pay a “living 
wage,” meaning a wage that enables a family to support itself at a socially 
defined, decent standard of living.’534  
 
The return of the sweatshop to the U.S. began to be noted in the late 1970s. 
There was, however, relatively scant reliable data available as the 
controversies started to take off in the early 1990s. During the process, 
however, a number of official surveys were conducted. Again, statistics are 
difficult and should be taken with a grain of salt, and this is no less true for 
sweatshops in the U.S., constituting a moving target of registered shops 
and a great number of unregistered ones. Robert Ross has presented a most 
reliable estimate of the overall size of the problem, basing his calculations 
on official surveys and on the restrictive definition of sweatshops (hence, a 
conservative estimate). Ross estimated that in the garment industry there 
were ‘more than four hundred thousand workers laboring in sweatshop 
conditions in the United States in 1998.’535  
 
If this figure seems incomprehensibly high, considering the high rates of 
noncompliance reported in the official surveys the problem may be one of 
comprehension rather than Ross’ calculation techniques. A 1994 TIPP 
survey in Southern California, for example, found that only 2 of 69 
randomly selected, inspected companies were in compliance, yielding the 
rates of violations shown in the table below. 
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Table 7.1 April 1994 TIPP survey: violation rates536 
 
Type of violation % of companies in violation of the law 
Health and safety 92.8 
Record-keeping 72.5 
Overtime 68.1 
Minimum wage 50.7 
Cash payments 30.4 
Illegal work at home 14.5 
Child labor 2.9 
 
Needless to say, perhaps, but given the marginalization and near-abolition 
of sweatshops in the industry, this marked a very real change indeed, both 
relatively and absolutely. 
 
In terms of the (domestic, U.S.) geography of sweatshops, two areas 
figured prominently, reflecting the overall territoriality and territorial 
dynamics in the industry: New York City and the Los Angeles area. These 
were also characterized as the two counterfeiting capitals in the U.S., and 
arguably part of the sweatshop problem resided in this part of the 
underground economy, an aspect occasionally used by “manufacturers” 
and industry trade bodies to reject responsibility and deny or question 
alleged ties to sweatshops.537 As for New York City, the decline in apparel 
employment and the trend towards smaller companies (in terms of number 
of employees) was mentioned earlier.  
 
Yet, the studies cited by Ross show an absolute and relative increase in the 
number of sweatshop workers. In a 1997 survey, for example,  
 
‘[…] the Department of Labor found that 63 percent of the [random 
sample, New York City] firms violated the minimum-wage and overtime 
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and 70 percent violated the 
record-keeping requirements of the law. In Chinatown, 90 percent of the 
firms violated the monetary provisions of the law.’538  
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With an estimated 70,000 to 90,000 sweatshop workers in Southern 
California, however, New York was no longer the prime site for 
sweatshops in the U.S.:  
 
‘Los Angeles can indeed be described as the “sweatshop capital of the 
United States.”’539  
 
Not surprisingly, then, thee most important domestic sweatshop scandals 
involved conditions in these two areas (further below).  
 
7.5 A chronology of events 
 
As mentioned, the return of the sweatshops in the U.S. began to be noted in 
the late 1970s, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s the sweatshop issue 
drew more attention, and a few legislative and enforcement initiatives 
emerged. Organized labor represented only a fraction of the apparel 
workers in the major sweatshop areas, but was voicing its concerns from 
early on, although the major organizing drive and campaigning efforts 
came later.540 
 
In 1993 the new U.S. Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich, was sworn in, and 
the Department of Labor continued and arguably stepped up its hot 
goods/compliance agreement campaign in Southern California, issuing 
directives to 157 apparel manufacturers that were instructed to ‘stop doing 
business with contractors violating labor laws.’ Of the 157 companies, 17 
reportedly ‘consented in writing to comply with the law,’ whereas the rest 
agreed informally. Simultaneously, several activist groups were waging 
campaigns against different companies. All of this coincided with the 
considerable attention and activities related to the completion of the 
NAFTA side agreements negotiations and their approval in the U.S. 
Congress in late 1993.541  
                                          
539 Ross, ‘The New Sweatshops’, p. 103-104. See also Bonacich and Appelbaum, 
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540 See e.g., Harry Bernstein, ‘Labor: sweatshops a complex problem’ in Los Angeles 
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541 See e.g. Stuart Silverstein, ‘Fashion firms told to police contractors’ in Los Angeles 
Times (Home Edition), June 11, 1993; Sarah Henry, ‘Labor and lace: can an upstart 
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In mid-April of 1994, however, a survey of the garment industry conducted 
under TIPP in California was released, which reported of ‘rampant labor 
abuse’ (cf. table 7.1 above). Of the 69 garment manufacturers and 
contractors that were inspected, seven were ordered closed and ‘all but two 
of the firms were breaking either federal or state laws or both.’ 
Announcing a stepped-up enforcement effort and an expanded use of the 
hot goods provision, Maria Echaveste, head of the Labor Department’s 
Wage and Hour Division, stated that ‘one of the key enforcement strategies 
will be to pressure the contractors’ customers: big and often well-known 
garment marketers and manufacturers.’542  
 
By September, the implications of this became very clear. On September 9 
of 1994, the Labor Department formally announced an expanded and more 
aggressive approach: it would step up its hot goods/compliance agreement 
efforts and these would be expanded 1) by aiming at major retailers along 
with manufacturers, and 2) outside of California.543  
 
At the same time, the National Labor Committee (NLC) launched a 
campaign naming a number of U.S. companies – most notably Liz 
Claiborne (future AIP member), Wal-Mart, and Fruit of the Loom – for 
their involvement in the violation of women’s and worker rights, including 
child labor, in Honduras. At a Senate Hearing on September 21, NLC 
Director Charles Kernaghan accompanied a young Honduran girl, Lesly 
Margoth Rodriguez Solorzano, who testified - in front of the network 
cameras (and subsequently featured on World News Tonight and CNN) - 
that ‘she began making Liz Claiborne clothes at the age of 13 under brutal 
conditions. “I wish that the people in the U.S. knew what pain these 
sweaters cost us,” the girl said.’544  
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Shortly thereafter, in the run-up to the national mid-term elections, the 
Labor Department hosted a Retailer Roundtable in October, directly 
encouraging U.S. retailers’ involvement in improving compliance, and a 
coalition of labor and community activists and scholars announced the 
beginning of a ‘regionwide, multi-union’ organizing drive targeted at the 
‘hundreds of thousands of immigrant industrial workers’ and aiming to 
‘transform union organizing in Los Angeles.’545 
 
During the first half of 1995 the controversy over child labor in the 
Bangladeshi garment industry was at its highest with the threats of a 
boycott and the completion of the Memorandum of Understanding. The 
first media exposés, in the U.S. and Europe, also appeared on child labor in 
the production of soccer balls, accompanied by numerous articles on 
bonded child labor and slavery and the outrage over the murder of Iqbal 
Masih. In late 1994 and early 1995 more companies signed compliance 
agreements with the Labor Department, and in late June the formation of a 
self-regulatory group was announced following an agreement between the 
Department of Labor and a number of L.A. manufacturers.546 At the same 
time, the NLC launched a 2-month tour across the U.S. with two young 
maquila workers from Honduras and El Salvador, respectively, bringing 
their stories of the harsh sweatshop conditions under which they sewed 
GAP clothing.547 On the very same day that NLC campaign and the two 
                                                                                                                           
Labor, September 21, 1994; National Labor Committee, Charles Kernaghan (at www. 
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as ‘like letting a few foxes guard the henhouse.’ Quote from John M. Glionna, 
‘Garment gumshoes’ in Los Angeles Times (Home Edition), July 13, 1995. Cf. also 
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girls arrived to San Francisco – on August 2, 1995 – where they joined 300 
garment workers in a protest outside The GAP’s headquarters, labor 
authorities raided a garment workshop in the Los Angeles suburb of El 
Monte: 
 
’In the pre-dawn hours of August 2, 1995, state and federal law 
enforcement authorities raided a squalid apartment complex surrounded 
with razor barbed wired, releasing 72 Thai immigrants from virtual 
slavery. For up to seven years, the 67 women and 5 men, forbidden to 
leave the guarded compound, had been forced to sew garments for U.S. 
brand-name manufacturers and retailers for only $1.60/hour. They were 
forced to work from 7:00 a.m. to midnight, six days a week to pay off the 
smugglers for their cost of passage. Even after they had paid back their 
captors, the workers were unable to leave and were forced to continue 
working. The workers were kept in check not only with the barbed wired, 
but also with threats of rape and retribution against family members still 
in Thailand.’548 
 
That this was a sweatshop was clear for all to see, and the scandal of 
slavery behind barbed wire implicated a number of household brands: 
garments with well-known labels were found at the site and so was 
paperwork indicating that the goods were distributed to a number of 
equally well-known retailers. The discovery created a public outrage and 
obviously attracted considerable media attention, both in relation to the 
discovery itself and to the events that followed: the sweatshop issue and 
the debate about the responsibility of retailers and manufacturers for the 
working conditions in the actual manufacturing exploded.549  
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Secretary of Labor Reich subsequently called a meeting with the retailers 
to be held in early September and the Labor Department publicly named 
14 manufacturers allegedly contracting from the El Monte sweatshop as 
well as 18 retailers where the apparel was thought to have been sold. 
Several major retailers were on the list, including (units of) May 
Department Stores, Federated Department Stores, Macy’s, Sears, Limited 
Inc. Moreover, the California Labor Commissioner’s office issued a 
number of subpoenas, including to (units of) the Dayton Hudson Corp. and 
Montgomery Ward.550 Corporate representatives as well as executives from 
the National Retail Federation (NRF) and the International Mass Retail 
Association  (IMRA) responded ferociously to the Department of Labor’s 
actions, and the NRF demanded a meeting with the Department’s Wage 
and Hour Division’s Administrator, Maria Echaveste, which took place on 
August 17.551 On September 12, Robert Reich met with representatives of 
the retailers in New York City, demanding their involvement in policing 
for sweatshops and threatening to continue to publish lists with company 
names. The industry representatives were, in Reich’s words, ‘furious [...] 
They yell, they complain, they threaten.’552 Coinciding with that meeting, 
UNITE put an ad in The New York Times calling on the Department of 
Labor to establish a high-level unit to ‘address sweatshops, propose 
solutions, and facilitate partnerships between business and NGOs to fight 
sweatshops.’553  
 
At the September 12 meeting, the NRF came up with a proposal for a 
solution, a six-point ‘Statement of Principles on Supplier Legal 
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553 Bobrowsky, Creating A Global Public Policy Network, p. 14, n. 14.  
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Compliance.’ Signed by 128 retailers, the Statement contained the 
participating retailers’ agreement to refer specifically to the hour and wage 
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as well as their intention to 
work with labor officials in enforcing the law.554 As enforcement efforts 
and investigations of El Monte links into the Los Angeles area garment 
industry continued, Reich continued to publicly pressure the retailers 
through the media. Appearing on radio and television shows with basically 
the same message that he had conveyed at the New York meeting, he 
further stated that the NRF Statement did not go far enough and that ‘If it 
gets to the Christmas season and we publish a list of major retailers who 
have merchandise on their shelves produced in sweatshops, I would say 
consumers to some extent will be concerned [...and officials] have no 
compunction at all to publicize the names of retailers.’ Reich also 
informed that the Department was considering the publication of a list of 
companies that were policing against sweatshops and complying with the 
law:  
 
‘The Day after Thanksgiving, just as the Christmas shopping season begins 
in earnest, the agency plans to announce names of “good guy” apparel 
retailers and manufacturers. [...] The intent is to squeeze out the rogue 
contractors by providing a public relations bonanza for “retailers and 
manufacturers that have gone the extra mile in seeking to prevent 
sweatshop abuses,” Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich said.’555  
 
The American Apparel Manufacturers Association (AAMA) stated their 
support for such an initiative, but the retailers, still furious, continued to 
argue that the responsibility lay with the Labor Department and the 
manufacturers dealing with the contractors. Reich subsequently hosted a 
meeting at the AAMA, once again urging the industry players to become 
involved in policing for sweatshops, and furthermore published a list of 
those manufacturers that had signed compliance monitoring agreements. 
Shortly thereafter, Reich spoke at the first meeting of the “new” AFL-CIO 
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and together with its new President, John Sweeney, visited the Manhattan 
garment district to join protests against sweatshops.556  
 
On December 5, 1995, Labor Secretary Reich released the Department of 
Labor’s first ‘Fair Labor Fashion Trendsetter List’ (Trendsetter List), 
listing 31 companies, manufacturers and retailers, that had committed 
themselves to taking responsibility for monitoring for sweatshops. The List 
was subsequently revised and published a number of times during the 
process, and along with the Department of Labor’s approach more broadly 
(and the underlying cuts in the DOL budget) was soon criticized by 
industry representatives (and the NRF in particular) as well as unions and 
labor rights NGOs: Liz Claiborne, The GAP, Guess? and other companies 
on the List were already quite unpopular in the latter, non-corporate 
quarters, and the critique gathered further momentum as clothing for some 
of the companies on the List was repeatedly found the be made in 
sweatshops. ‘Don’t be fooled by the DOL’s new Trendsetter List,’ 
Sweatshop Watch urged prior to the publication of the December 1996 
List, ‘consumers should realize that prominent manufacturers on last 
year’s list used sweatshops at the time of and even after they were touted 
as trendsetters.’557  
 
In late 1995, however, the sweatshop campaign came to a temporary stand-
still, at least as far as the federal government was concerned: the House 
Republicans had for some time been threatening to shut down the federal 
government, and eventually most of the federal government was closed 
down. By early January of 1996, Labor Secretary Reich and President 
Clinton pointed to the consequences of the balanced budget impasse for the 
sweatshop eradication efforts, painting a rather serious picture of the 
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effects: ‘”Ninety-five percent of all workplace safety activities have been 
shut down, and all sweatshop enforcement has stopped [...]”’558 
 
The organizations behind the informal Coalition to Eliminate Sweatshop 
Conditions had formed Sweatshop Watch following the El Monte raid. The 
organization was involved in aiding the El Monte workers, and in 
November the organization and around 100 Thai and Latino garment 
workers launched a Retailer Accountability Campaign. The organization 
sent letters to a number of retailers, two of whom agreed to meet with the 
workers and the organization. At the meetings in December, the companies 
rejected the demands and refused any further negotiations. The Retailer 
Accountability Campaign nonetheless ran on, alongside a number of other 
Sweatshop Watch activities. These focused not only on retailers but also 
on manufacturers such as Liz Claiborne and The GAP and several others, 
which were explicitly named in articles charging them with sweatshop 
abuses. The Sweatshop Watch Newsletter also, from the beginning in late 
1995, reprinted excerpts from UNITE’s magazine, UNITE!, and reported 
widely on that union’s efforts as well as the campaigns of the National 
Labor Committee (NLC). UNITE was (and is) an organizational member 
of Sweatshop Watch, and was furthermore central in establishing the NLC, 
which it continued to fund in part.559 
 
By late 1995, the campaign on sweatshops and The GAP launched by the 
NLC in mid-1995 produced some results. On December 15, The GAP 
agreed with the NLC to establish independent monitoring of its contractors 
in El Salvador, the first time that a U.S. apparel company had agreed to 
independent monitoring.560 Aforementioned Liz Claiborne, Inc. was also 
subject to further pressure in December, when the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation’s newsmagazine, the fifth estate, presented its exposé focusing 
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on the company (the exposé was broadcast in January 1996). In addition to 
reiterating the allegations from the 1994 U.S. Senate hearing, the segment 
provided more bad press suggesting that the company’s code and fact 
finding mission were not really that effective:  
 
‘The reporters came away with footage of adolescent girls and young 
women streaming into barbed-wire compounds patrolled by armed guards. 
They recorded the grim anecdotes of teenage workers forced to toil at 
sewing machines late into the night. And they heard tales of girls being 
routinely tested for pregnancy and fired if their results were positive.’561 
 
At the same time, Californian labor authorities raided an El Monte-related 
shop in early 1996 and reported evidence that this was contracting for The 
Limited - a prominent List-member - leading Maria Echaveste of  the 
Labor Department’s Wage and Hour Division to state that ‘I think the state 
went a little too fast to the press with this [...] We can’t yet draw 
conclusions whether monitoring by The Limited is working or not [...] 
Based on The Limited’s prior track record, we expect they will work 
cooperatively with us and make sure these violations don’t occur again.’562 
 
During the first half of 1996, the court cases related to El Monte 
progressed steadily, with back pays being secured and heavy prison and 
damages sentences being passed, with additional claims for back wages 
and further law suits against El Monte related manufactures following.563 
Furthermore, in early 1996 the Clinton Administration presented its budget 
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proposal, including a request for USD 118.7 million for the Department of 
Labor’s sweatshop efforts, an increase of 19 percent over FY 1996 (which 
nevertheless failed to materialize).564  
 
At the same time, Labor Secretary Reich was beginning to talk about 
corporate responsibility, e.g. on February 14:  
 
‘[Ted] Koppel: Are you proposing some form of socialism here, Mr. 
Secretary? Reich: I’m talking about corporate responsibility. Millions of 
Americans are trapped in the old economy. If the public sector can’t help 
them because it has to balance the budget, then the private sector is going 
to have to do more. Corporate responsibility extends beyond maximizing 
shareholder returns. There’s also a responsibility to employees and to 
communities.’  
 
This sparked some strong reactions, including within the Administration. 
As Reich recounts the reactions of Treasury Secretary Rubin to Reich’s 
calls for corporate responsibility:  
 
‘”The phrase is too inflammatory [...] Look, I spent most of my life on Wall 
Street. I’ve dealt with executives of big businesses for several decades. I 
can tell you, you’re just asking for trouble.”’565   
 
On April 29, 1996, Charles Kernaghan, executive director of the National 
Labor Committee, dropped another bomb, which resulted in an explosion 
in media coverage and political activities around child labor and 
sweatshops, setting the issue ‘finally on the national agenda as never 
before’ (as the NLC itself put it).566 Bringing the 15-year old Honduran 
girl, Wendy Diaz, with him to testify before the U.S. Congress – the 
Democratic Policy Committee on Child Labor, to be specific – Kernaghan 
delivered some serious accusations of child labor exploitation and 
sweatshop abuses against Wal-Mart and Kathie Lee Gifford, a television 
celebrity and talk-show host (ABC’s Live with Regis and Kathie Lee), 
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designer and owner of an apparel line sold under her name at Wal-Mart.567 
While Wal-Mart was one of the ‘usual suspects,’ the often noted irony was 
that Kathie Lee was a self-proclaimed children’s issue protagonist, the 
clothes sold at Wal-Mart under her name carrying the message: ‘A portion 
of proceeds from the sale of this garment will be donated to various 
Children’s Charities.’568 Kathie Lee responded – crying “live” on her own 
nationally televised show (something which is still vividly recalled by 
those whom I have interviewed) – defiantly at first, denying any 
knowledge of such sweatshop conditions in the production of goods 
bearing her name.569 The contrasts between a television celebrity cashing 
in $9 million per year for designing clothes and the 31 cents per hour 
earned by the Honduran garment workers, working under armed guards 
and sometimes straight through the night, were staggering. Gifford 
allegedly threatened to sue Charles Kernaghan, stating that ‘Millions of 
dollars have gone to help children, and I truly resent this man impugning 
my integrity.’570 
 
Just a few days later, the Department of Labor added further fuel to the 
sweatshop fire, when it released the first-ever national report on garment 
worker abuse, showing that non-compliance with federal minimum wage 
or overtime laws were nearly at 50 per cent.571 The Department of Labor 
shortly thereafter launched an investigation into a New York City-based 
manufacturer of Kathie Lee clothing which had not paid its workers for 
weeks. At that point, Kathie Lee had announced that she would see to the 
establishment of a monitoring program, but the second Kathie Lee scandal 
                                          
567 Kathie Lee and Wal-Mart had been directly approached twice in March; cf. Krupat, 
‘From War Zone to Free Trade Zone’, p. 59. 
 
568 Hemphill, ‘The White House Apparel Industry Partnership Agreement’, p. 121. 
 
569 She also pointed to her charitable donations, of course: in 1995 she reportedly 
donated 1 of the $9 million in profits on her clothing line to the Association to Benefit 
Children (an organization providing shelters for crack-addicted children and children 
with AIDS). See Gibbs and Dickerson, ‘Cause Celeb’; Hemphill, ‘The White House 
Apparel Industry Partnership Agreement’, p. 121. 
 
570 NLC, Charles Kernaghan. Gifford statement on May 1, cited from PBS Online 
NewsHour, Naming Names, July, 16, 1996, (Transcript) (at www.pbs.org, accessed 
February 23, 2004). 
 
571 U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Secretary Releases Nationwide Garment Report 
Revealing Sweatshops Persist in U.S. Apparel Industry (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Labor, Press Release, May 3, 1996). 
 253
in less than a month merely contributed to the media frenzy and pressures 
from a variety of actors, on Kathie Lee and the industry as a whole.572 On 
May 24, Kathie Lee’s husband, Frank Gifford, made a visit to the garment 
district, handing out envelopes with cash to the workers and  USD 9,000 to 
the garment union.573  
 
On Capitol Hill a battle was raging over a proposal to raise the minimum 
wage, and on May 28 the potentials in the Kathie Lee sweatshop scandals 
were apparently discussed at the highest levels of the Department of Labor. 
As Reich tells the story:  
 
‘”You should call her,” Maria [Echaveste of the Wage and Hour Division] 
suggests. “To commiserate? Why? I’ve never even heard of her,” I say, 
provoking another round of laughs. “To make a deal,” says Maria. “You 
offer her a way of saving face. She joins our No Sweat crusade and 
becomes a spokesman for corporate responsibility. In return, you praise 
her leadership and courage. It’s a win-win.”’574  
 
Having had dinner with the Gifford’s and their PR expert on May 30, the 
following day Reich and Kathie Lee announced that she had committed 
herself to the Department’s war on sweatshops, and the two furthermore 
announced that they would host a ‘Fashion Industry Forum’ soon ‘to 
expand the crusade against sweatshops.’575 A great publicity stunt for the 
Giffords and Reich alike: ‘Tonight’s evening news is brimming with it. 
Editors and producers across America are running with it. The event will 
fill tomorrow’s papers.’576 
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Kathie Lee subsequently met with the President of UNITE, Jay Mazur, and 
shortly thereafter with a group of people – Wendy Diaz, Charles 
Kernaghan of the NLC, representatives of the Committee for the Defense 
of Human Rights in Honduras as well as the People of Faith Coalition, and 
Jay Mazur of UNITE – at the residence of Archbishop Cardinal O’Connor 
in Manhattan, where Kathie Lee accepted the need for independent 
monitoring.577  
 
In mid-June the Kathie Lee scandals were accompanied by more bad press 
on other celebrities or celebrity endorsers, including Nike’s Michael 
Jordan. Kathie Lee, in turn, had publicly committed to recruiting ‘other 
famous endorsers [...] to help pressure manufacturers to police labor 
practices more closely.’578 As detailed in the previous chapter, on June 28 
the FoulBall campaign was launched prior to the child labor hearings at the 
Department of Labor. The hearings hit right in the eye of the sweatshops 
debate. On the same day, the Department of Labor announced that the 
Fashion Industry Forum would take place on July 16. In the meantime, 
New York’s Governor, George Pataki, signed bipartisan legislation, which 
basically extended the hot goods provisions used by federal authorities to 
the state level. On July 15 both Kathie Lee Gifford and Secretary Reich 
testified at yet another hearing on child labor and sweatshops,579 and on the 
                                          
577 UNITE, Statement from Jay Mazur, President of UNITE Regarding Kathie Lee 
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Elsevier (UK) Ltd). 
 
579 U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Department’s Fashion Industry Forum Set For 
July 16  (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, press Release, June 28, 1996); 
U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Secretary Reich Congratulates New York Governor, 
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Department of Labor, press release, July 2, 1996); U.S. Department of Labor, Reich 
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Owed by Sweatshop that Produced Kathie Lee Line (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Labor, press release, July 11, 1996); Robert B. Reich, Testimony of 
Robert B. Reich, before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human 
Rights, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 7/15/96, 
at www.dol.gov, accessed on February 17, 2004; Kathie Lee Gifford, Testimony of 
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following day the Department of Labor finally hosted the Fashion Industry 
Forum. In addition to garment workers, (international and U.S.) trade 
union and NGO representatives, a number of fashion designers and 
representatives of major trade associations (NRF, IMRA, AAMA), the 
event attracted more than 300 industry representatives. Indeed an 
impressive an unprecedented gathering around the issue of sweatshops in 
the industry, which – in addition to the debates at the Forum – spurred the 
public debate and the media even further.580 
 
Just over two weeks later, on August 2 – nicely timed to coincide with the 
one-year anniversary of the El Monte scandal – President Clinton 
announced the formation of an anti-sweatshop task force at a ceremony in 
the Rose Garden - the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP). As mentioned, 
the AIP members were given a two-pronged mandate, with two successive 
six-month deadlines for reporting back.  
 
At the beginning, the AIP industry members were Nike, Inc., Liz 
Claiborne, Inc., Warnaco Group, Phillips-Van Heusen, L.L. Bean, Tweeds, 
Inc., Patagonia, Nicole Miller, Karen Kane Co., Lucky Brands Dungarees 
and Kathie Lee Gifford. In addition, the AIP comprised the following 
members: UNITE, the Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union 
(RWDSU) of the AFL-CIO, the National Consumers League, the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, and the Interfaith Center on Corporate 
Responsibility. Reebok, the (business group) Business for Social 
Responsibility (BSR), the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF), and the 
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580 U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich, Kathie Lee Gifford 
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(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, press release, May 31, 1996); U.S. 
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Industry Forum on July 16; Every Aspect of Apparel Industry to be Represented or 
Participate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, press release, July 12, 
1996); PBS Online NewsHour, Naming Names, July 16, 1996 (at www.pbs.org, 
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Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights (RFK Center) 
joined the AIP shortly afterwards.581  
 
During the remainder of 1996 and into 1997 the members of the AIP task 
force met regularly, with assistance from the Administration. The context 
in which these first months of negotiation took place was, most 
importantly, one marked by the fact that the November election was 
drawing still closer. Throughout the remainder of 1996 there was a spur of 
activity on the part of labor authorities, and tensions between federal and 
state labor authorities were becoming visible. This coincided with 
considerable activity on Capitol Hill, where the Child Labor Free 
Consumer Information Act of 1996 and the Stop Sweatshops Act of 1996 
were introduced in both chambers of Congress.582 
 
On August 8, L.A.-based Guess? ventured into a not very successful public 
offering of some of its shares on the New York Stock Exchange. The 
offering – having already been postponed twice, reducing the number of 
shares from 9.2 million to 7 million and reducing the share price from 
USD 21-23 to 18 – opened flat. In addition to ‘the overall malaise in the 
market for new issues,’ the company’s ‘most immediate problem was a 
lawsuit filed Wednesday [August 7, i.e., the day before the trading 
                                          
581 Joanna Ramey, ‘10 makers, retailers sign on for Clinton’s anti-sweatshop panel’ in 
Women’s Wear Daily, Vol. 172, No. 24, August 5, 1996; Joanna Ramey, ‘Shoes put in 
‘sweat’ crusade’ in Footwear News, Vol. 52, No. 36, August 12, 1996; Bobrowsky, 
Creating A Global Public Policy Network, p. 19, n. 18. 
 
582 Andy Bernstein, ‘Roberta Karp’ in Sporting Goods Business, Vol. 30, No. 11, July 
21, 1997; Stuart Silverstein and Vicki Torres, ‘String of illegal home-sewing sites 
found, regulators say’ in Los Angeles Times (Home Edition), July 31, 1996; Don Lee, 
‘Task force in tatters: State-Federal tensions hinder garment industry crackdown’ in Los 
Angeles Times (Home Edition), August 4, 1996; U.S. Department of Labor, Too Many 
Garment Assembly Firms Break Labor Laws According to New Report Released By 
Labor Secretary (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, press release, August 
23, 1996); Washington Post, ‘No More Sweatshops’, August 24, 1996; MSNBC, 
‘Sweatshop Journal’; U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Department Extends Hot Goods 
Actions to Protect Employees at New Jersey Textile Firm (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Labor, press release, September 16, 1996). The Child Labor Free 
Consumer Information Act, H.R.4125 and S.2094, see Congressional Record, 
‘Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions (Senate – September 19, 1996)’; 
Congressional Record, ‘The Introduction of The Child Labor Free Consumer 
Information Act of 1996 – Hon. George Miller (Extension of Remarks – July 25, 
1995)’. The Stop Sweatshops Act, H.R.4166 and S.2127, see Congressional Record, 
‘Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions (Senate – September 25, 1996)’. 
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began...] by the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees, 
or UNITE, accusing Guess of ignoring sweatshop conditions at its 
suppliers.’583  
 
During the fall, UNITE continued its campaign activities against 
sweatshops and Guess? in particular, and in early October, the Labor 
Department furthermore announced that it would ‘conduct a “thorough 
review” of Guess Inc. after finding that the controversial Los Angeles 
clothing company was receiving merchandise from an alleged large-scale 
sweatshop.’584 Guess? was one of the companies on the Trendsetter List, 
and the company denied UNITE’s allegations, stating that ‘We continue to 
be outraged, after being exonerated by the California Department of Labor, 
that UNITE continues to make unsubstantiated claims about our labor 
practices in communication with our customers.’ UNITE, in turn, 
responded that the only reason Guess had been cleared by the Californian 
authorities was that ‘state law there does not hold manufacturers legally 
responsible for contractor’s actions.’585 Meanwhile, the broader debate on 
sweatshops continued, and on October 21 the Department of Labor issued 
its annual child labor publication - The Apparel Industry and Codes of 
Conduct: A Solution to the International Child Labor Problem? - noting an 
increase in codes of conduct but also considerable gaps in their 
implementation and enforcement.586  
                                          
583 Los Angeles Times (Southland Edition), ‘Guess stumbles down Wall Street runway’, 
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584 Silverstein, Stuart and George White, ‘Labor Department to investigate Guess’ in 
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(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, press release, October 22, 1996); Pharis 
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Further trouble for Guess ensued in late November with the announcement 
that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had prepared a case 
against the company. While the company denied all allegations, the NLRB 
was considering taking legal action against the company ‘for unfair labor 
practices that are considered “egregious.”’587 At the same time, labor 
authorities were issuing statements that overall compliance was improving, 
and in late November, the Department of Labor released its 1996 
Trendsetter List. Guess?, however, was placed on ‘probation’588 The List 
drew considerable criticism, cf. above, and through December child labor 
and sweatshops remained high on the agenda.589 UNITE ran a “Christmas 
season retail campaign” coinciding with ads in the major papers by the 
National Retail Federation, warning consumers against sweatshops and 
                                                                                                                           
J. Harvey, Statement of Rev. Pharis J. Harvey, United Methodist General Board of 
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listing the major retailers that had promised not to deal with such 
establishments.590  
 
At this point, Robert Reich left his position as Secretary of Labor, and the 
six-month deadline of the AIP was fast approaching. Two AIP members, 
UNITE and the National Consumers League (NCL) launched a “Stop 
Sweatshops” campaign, supported by Sweatshop Watch and other groups. 
Reports started coming out of serious disagreements among the AIP 
members. A draft agreement was in place by early 1997, but there were 
conflict points. The group ‘has agreed on child-labor and anti-harassment 
practices but remains badly split over wages and hours,’ reported Steven 
Greenhouse in The New York Times.591 As the AIP negotiations dragged 
on, the Labor Department released one of its quarterly garment industry 
enforcement reports, tying Guess Inc. (the “cases” from late 1996) and two 
other Trendsetter companies (Jerell, Inc. and the David Brooks-Robert 
Scott companies of Kellwood) to sweatshops – and a highly critical report 
focusing on Nike’s factories in Vietnam was released on March 20 by 
Vietnam Labor Watch.592 
 
On April 14, 1997, the members of the Apparel Industry Partnership 
presented their ‘Apparel Industry Partnership’s Agreement’ to the 
President at a White House press conference. Containing a ‘Workplace 
Code of Conduct’ and ‘Principles of Monitoring’, this was the task force 
outcome on the first of the two mandates that the group had been given by 
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President Clinton in August of 1996. Urging more companies to join the 
agreement, President Clinton praised the agreement as remarkable, historic 
and an important first step toward improving ‘the lives of millions of 
garment workers around the world.’593 The event and the agreement 
obviously attracted considerable media attention, and the initial response of 
the business and non-business members of the AIP was, broadly speaking, 
one of moderate satisfaction: the agreement was characterized as 
unprecedented, but all parties also emphasized that it only marked the 
beginning, that more companies needed to join, and that several major 
issues were still to be resolved.594   
 
During the months following April 14, the AIP members continued to meet 
regularly.595 In June, however, Karen Kane Co. had become the second 
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company to quit the AIP, and, according to one of the AIP’s corporate 
members, the task force lost its momentum after having presented the 
preliminary agreement in April.596 As mentioned earlier, UNITE had been 
quite aggressive in its attacks on Guess? (among others) and in early 1997 
had launched the Stop Sweatshop campaign. During 1997, the attacks on 
Guess? were intensified, supported by Sweatshop Watch, cf. above, and by 
the growing involvement of students in the anti-sweatshop movement and 
a ‘national back-to-school boycott of Guess.’597   
 
In late 1997, the AIP members were approaching their second deadline, but 
there were some fundamental disagreements within the group. In October 
the National Labor Committee launched a 6 month campaign - supported 
by AIP members ICCR, UNITE, and the AFL-CIO – to encourage 
‘consumers to shop with their conscience during the busy holiday season’ 
– and, arguably, to shame the AIP (and other) companies.598 By late 
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November, the situation in the AIP task force was unchanged, and cracks 
were becoming increasingly visible. At the same time, Alexis Herman, 
Reich’s replacement as Secretary of Labor, announced some new and less 
aggressive anti-sweatshop initiatives. Yet, just before Christmas, the 
Secretary of Labor also announced that major retailers had again been 
linked to sweatshops.599  
 
Moving into 1998, a mid-term election year in the U.S., the AFL-CIO 
presented ‘an ambitious legislative agenda’ calling for another increase in 
the minimum wage and significantly higher employer contributions to 
employee health insurance. In late February, sweatshops and codes of 
conduct were the topics of a U.S.-EU summit, attended by government 
officials as well as a number of corporate and labor/NGO 
representatives.600 Notwithstanding the promotion of the AIP agreement 
and the calls for a coordinated global response at that meeting, the AIP 
members were still in serious disagreement. During the spring of 1998, the 
attacks on the AIP from outside NGOs continued, and a split among the 
labor/NGO members became increasingly apparent. At that time, Reebok 
initiated an independent monitoring pilot. Nike, in turn, had gone through a 
very difficult period and on May 12 Nike’s Phil Knight presented a new set 
of labor initiatives.601  
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In June, the conflicts within the AIP (and the labor/NGO split) were taken 
public:  
 
‘Deliberations of the task force are confidential, but a copy of the 
proposals recently set forth by the unions and human rights groups was 
sent anonymously to The New York Times by a member that, some on both 
sides suggested, wanted the debate aired in public as a way of pressuring 
the industry.’602  
 
More specifically, the June 12 proposal presented some – compared to the 
agreement that was reached in November of 1998 – strong demands on the 
central points of conflict: the living wage issue, freedom of association and 
corporate responsibility in countries and areas where there were problems 
with this, questions related to monitoring and public access to information, 
as well as the funding of the future association.603  
 
The leak caused some controversy and was followed by a subsequent split 
in the AIP: a subgroup (consisting of Nike, Liz Claiborne, Phillips-Van 
Heusen, Reebok, the National Consumers League (NCL), the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights (LCHR), Business for Social Responsibility 
(BSR), the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF), and the Robert F. 
Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights (RFK Center)) formed and 
continued to meet informally until it presented its agreement in early 
November. UNITE, the Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union 
(RWDSU) of the AFL-CIO, and the Interfaith Center on Corporate 
Responsibility no longer participated in the AIP, nor did the rest of the 
companies that had signed on to the April 14 agreement.604  
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On November 2, 1998, the AIP Subgroup presented its ‘Preliminary 
Agreement’ – long after the deadline of the second of deadline of President 
Clinton’s 1996 mandate had passed.605 The agreement was supported by 
the NCL, the LCHR, and the ILRF. Four of the initial AIP company 
members, which had not participated in the Subgroup – Kathie Lee 
Gifford, Nicole Miller, Patagonia, and L.L. Bean – quickly signed on to 
agreement.606 The ICCR and the union members of the AIP – UNITE and 
the AFL-CIO’s RWDSU – rejected the agreement.607  The agreement and 
the new Fair Labor Association (FLA) met with a number of critical 
responses as well as efforts to build an alternative to it: the non-corporate 
members that had left the AIP task force were among the harshest 
critics.608 
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7.6 Struggles to define the problem 
 
Looking at back at the process as a whole, obviously the terrain, on which 
the struggles to define the problem played out, changed dramatically 
during the process. First, the process was one in which sweatshops and 
corporate responsibility was increasingly politicized, both in terms of the 
number of individuals and organizations actively engaged in the politics of 
it, and in terms of its expanding significance at all levels of political life – 
from the high politics in D.C. to campus activism across the U.S. and 
organizing drives in Los Angeles, New York City and Central America… 
Second, and in part related to the first, the worst and most scandalous of all 
the cases in this process actually concerned conditions within the U.S., i.e. 
the El Monte slavery scandal. Third, unlike previous two cases, public 
labor agencies – in conjunction with media reports, campaigning, and so 
on – actually played a rather prominent role in pushing and supporting this 
development by stepping up enforcement efforts, engaging in aggressive 
public relations, and by producing a steady stream of – highly publicized – 
surveys of industry practices, documenting labor rights violations. Again, 
the U.S. Department of Labor was a central player, but in this case in 
relation to problems within its own jurisdiction. Fourth, the fact that there 
was not only a steady stream of media exposes and activists claiming this 
or that injustice, but there was also this steady stream of reports coming 
from the agencies responsible for upholding the law implied that: 1) the 
credibility and legitimacy of campaign and media claims about labor rights 
violations and sweatshops were, if not directly, then indirectly supported 
by the latter; and 2) it became increasingly difficult to deny the existence 
of a general problem of considerable proportions in numerical terms.  
 
Thus, it was rather undisputed from quite early on in the process that 
sweatshops had returned to the U.S., and that such conditions also 
prevailed elsewhere – the factual existence of sweatshops in general terms 
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was not a significant part of the struggles. There were denials of factual 
existence, of course, but generally not with reference to the problem in 
general. Guess?, for example, continued to deny in absolute and factual 
terms the existence of sweatshop conditions in specific cases, but generally 
speaking companies responded to charges in a different way – particularly 
by denying prior knowledge of such conditions at suppliers, by blaming 
suppliers (passing on the buck), and by issuing more or less sincere 
commitments to follow up and act on the reported problem(s). In many 
cases, the form of counter-claim – including the one favored by Guess? -  
was closely related to matters of legal liability and the kind of pressure 
faced (targeting and economic coercion below).   
 
The general existence and gravity of the problem was disputed, though, but 
rather than sweatshop conditions as such, it was the claim that illegal 
sweatshop conditions were a problem which was contested. The 
Conservative Caucus of the Californian State Assembly, for example, 
argued the following in relation – opposition – to the idea of legislating 
joint liability:  
 
‘People do not work in sweatshops to enjoy a break from six-figure 
incomes and expense-account lunches. They work long hours for low 
wages in lousy conditions because they have no better alternative […] If 
public policy denies them that alternative, they can increase the supply of 
workers already competing for low-wage jobs and further depress wages, 
they can turn to crime, or they can try welfare, homelessness and 
starvation […] [Contractors] will not raise wages, reduce hours, and 
install air conditioning, because if they do, some other wicked s.o.b. who 
does not do those things will undercut their prices.’609  
 
If not always in so expressly and directly cynical terms, the same line of 
reasoning was present in many warnings against the dangers of over-
regulation and not meeting the demands of the market, the international 
competition (as in the response of the AAMA to the AIP agreement) – and, 
with respect to sweatshop conditions outside of the U.S., obviously the 
numerous references to local laws, cultures and traditions, and stage of 
economic development and the appropriateness of certain conditions that 
might be considered sweatshop-like elsewhere.  
 
                                          
609 Cited from Bonacich and Appelbaum, Behind the Label, p. 226. 
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Although such lines of reasoning were forwarded repeatedly, by some 
economically and politically rather powerful actors, the main effect, 
however, was not a broader re-definition of the problem during the process 
– i.e., sweatshops did not generally come to be seen as acceptable because 
of these. Quite the contrary, one might say. At the same time, however, 
reasoning in terms of impersonal market mechanisms, economic forces of 
globalization and laws of nature of economic development as decisive 
factors was rooted in some of the most fundamental and dominant 
ideological elements of the time – i.e., elements of a rationality that was 
not just that of the AAMA or the Conservative Caucus in California, but 
which was much more widely shared, even by many of the more “critical” 
players in the process (the Clinton Administration and the DOL, for 
example). In that sense, this line of reasoning did play a fundamental role 
in the process, not by re-defining the problem and making sweatshops 
acceptable, but by explicitly articulating the limits of the possible. There 
was, of course, also a very material side to all of this: the steady move to 
off-shore production. As detailed earlier, several of the big players in the 
industry increasingly de-verticalized and did their contracting-out outside 
of the U.S.  
 
The steady stream of enforcement reports and the rather aggressive and 
highly public(ized) – at least from mid-1994 until the formation of the AIP 
– approach of the Department of Labor and Labor Secretary Reich in 
naming individual corporations and targeting the retailers and apparel 
manufacturers collectively not only meant that factual denials of 
sweatshops became an increasingly difficult road to travel. This added to 
and supported claims in the media, by campaigners, academics, etc., that 
the problem was widespread, of considerable proportions, and – which the 
above counter-claims implicitly acknowledge – structural or systemic.  
 
With respect to the nature of the problem, the enforcement reports 
furthermore showed that there were relatively low non-compliance rates on 
child labor in particular, and in many cases no violations were found at all. 
Thus, while serious when occurring, the problem of child labor was of a 
rather limited extent compared to the previous two cases. Moreover, the 
image of sweatshops was a powerful one with deep cultural and historical 
roots, cf. earlier, and it was increasingly documented as a real and growing 
problem – at home. Adding to this the gravity of the abuses of adult 
workers in some of the more egregious cases, particularly El Monte, and 
the fact that there was a legal framework outlawing (by definition) 
sweatshops in the U.S. and an increasingly aggressive approach to 
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enforcing this, the conditions were simply not there for a debate to be 
focused exclusively or mainly on child labor alone: in this case struggles to 
broaden the agenda beyond child labor, or to de-link other issues and 
narrow it down, were not significant. 
 
Age and gender did play in, to some extent, and was particularly marked in 
the campaigning by the National Labor Committee. For instance in its 
1995 campaign against the GAP, where the two young girls told stories of 
‘being forced by the contractors to work 13 to 18 hours a day. Many girls 
are forced to forgo basic education to work in the sweatshops. And, for 
their hard work, they received sub-poverty wages even by their respective 
countries’ standards. The girls also endured humiliation and abuse: they 
were allowed only two 5 minute bathroom breaks during their 14 hour 
days; to force them to work faster, supervisors hit them and threw shirts in 
their faces; to retain their jobs, the girls must take birth control pills; and 
those who get pregnant were given pills to induce miscarriages.’610 
Obviously, this added to the symbolic power of the allegations, but it was 
also a reflection of the conditions and workforce composition in the 
Central American maquila industries.  
 
Struggles related to the nature of the problem, however, did take center 
stage in the later stages of the process. First of all, the legalistic 
understanding of sweatshops was increasingly challenged by many non-
business actors, including some of the AIP members, as being too narrow, 
particularly on the issue of wages – the legal minimum in contrast to the 
notion of a living wage. Second, there was a struggle concerning the actual 
meaning and substantive implications of the freedom of association: where 
some, including members of the AIP, argued that an inclusion of this in the 
agreement would not be reconcilable with doing business in certain places 
(most notably, China), others argued that it would. Both played a central 
role in relation to the modelling process and the splintering of the AIP and 
will be discussed further below.  
 
Finally, as for the gravity of the problem, the conditions and abuses 
reported in the media and the numerous campaigns were often quite grave, 
as in the quote just above. As in the previous case, a “worst case” of 
slavery played a pivotal role, but not in the same way. The El Monte raid 
could not be de-legitimized as a case of sensationalist journalism, and the 
                                          
610 National Labor Committee, Charles Kernaghan; quote from Sweatshop Watch, 
‘Sweating for the GAP in Central America’ in Sweatshop Watch, Vol. 1, No. 1, Fall, 
1995. 
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conditions revealed were arguably not only as grave as it gets – the slavery 
was right next door. The revelations triggered a public debate and outrage 
and, cf. above, made for a shift toward a more aggressive stance on part of 
the Department of Labor. Furthermore, it laid the grounds for new 
grassroots organizing (e.g., Sweatshop Watch) and the ensuing expansion 
and more aggressive nature of trade union and labor rights NGOs 
campaigning. Indeed, El Monte was foundational to the Year of the 
Sweatshops and to the eventual formation of the AIP task force precisely a 
year after the raid. Why it took a whole year and a series of additional 
exposés and scandals is a relevant question, and one that will be discussed 
in relation to modelling. 
 
7.7 Targeting 
 
A general feature of this process was that – as in the previous case – the 
targets were not the production companies, the contractors, but rather the 
buyers: the retailers and the “manufacturers.” Indeed, public labor 
authorities, organized labor, and large segments of the activist community 
and involved academics were basically in sync on one point, which 
transpired in the targeting throughout the process: sweatshop conditions 
were widespread and resulted from a structural problem for which the 
contractors should neither be seen as the main culprits nor as the ones with 
the key to solve the problem. The manufacturers and, in particular, the 
retailers were the ones in control, exerting the pressures downward in the 
hierarchy, and the ones collectively with the ability to change things. 
 
Thus, although the stepped up enforcement efforts of the various public 
agencies did focus on production sites, the main thrust in the new strategies 
was to get at the buyers – to create joint liability through the hot goods 
provisions and thereby push companies into “voluntary” compliance 
agreements. Obviously, this was essentially a form of economic coercion – 
threatening the confiscation of goods and, for compliance agreement firms, 
heightened risks of legal liability – and will be discussed further below. As 
noted earlier, the approach was used with increasing vigor from 1994 
onwards, and it was combined with an increasingly aggressive approach to 
public communications on sweatshops, in particular by the Department of 
Labor and the Labor Secretary. In this, Robert Reich lunged out at the 
retailers and manufacturers in general and at their collective industry 
bodies, the NRF and the AAMA, as well as specific companies that were 
singled out and named – as “bad guys” in relation to the enforcement raids, 
 270
and most of the leading companies above were at some point tied to 
sweatshop conditions in the U.S. by public authorities. And as “good guys” 
on the Trendsetter List – although being on the List did not provide shelter 
for the companies.  
 
As the chronology of events above illustrated, the campaigning by 
organized labor, labor rights NGOs and students was significant during the 
entire process. As mentioned, a general feature was that these consistently 
targeted specific retailers and/or “manufacturers.” Many campaigns 
focused on some of the not-so-big and less famous companies, such as the 
Jessica McClintock campaign in the early stage, but most of the more high-
profile top companies in the earlier section were targeted in at least one 
campaign during the process. Except for the El Monte scandal, all of the 
major exposés in this case were driven by campaigns and the media 
attention generated – the GAP, Liz Claiborne, Kathie Lee… Obviously, the 
National Labor Committee played a prominent role in this. The December 
1995 agreement with the GAP is often hailed as the first time a U.S. 
apparel company agreed to independent monitoring, and the Kathie Lee 
scandal in mid-1996 was instrumental in setting in motion the events that 
within a couple of months led to the formation of the AIP.  
 
Moreover, the Kathie Lee exposé hit the headlines at a politically critical 
juncture: 1996 was election year, and the Democrats needed the backing of 
the trade unions. Furthermore, within a few days after the initial 
Congressional testimony, the Department of Labor released the first 
national report: 
 
‘Labor Secretary Robert B. Reich today released the first-ever national 
report on garment worker abuse that shows, in a six-month snapshot, that 
almost half the nation’s garment contractors investigated in this fiscal year 
were found to be violating federal minimum wage or overtime laws.’611  
 
This was, however, probably as far as Reich could go in terms of raising 
problematic issues at that point: the course for the 1996 election 
campaign’s economic message had been set, in Reich’s words, for ‘nothing 
but happy talk’ whereas ‘the darker side of the economy - increasing job 
insecurity, widening inequality - must not be mentioned. It will be hidden 
                                          
611 U.S. Department of Labor. Press Release, 3 May 1996. Labor Secretary Releases 
Nationwide Garment Report Revealing Sweatshops Persist in U.S. Apparel Industry. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor. 
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from view for the next six months. I can’t talk about it. I’m locked in the 
cabinet.’612  
 
Finally, it should be noted that industry players themselves did some 
targeting of their own. Obviously, individual companies responded to their 
being singled out in various ways, as discussed in the previous section. 
One of the most common responses was to deny any prior knowledge of 
the alleged problem, of course, and then to re-target the criticism by 
blaming the next node – the “manufacturers” and/or the contractors. As for 
collective industry bodies, a similar approach was taken by the National 
Retail Federation. 
 
7.8 Economic coercion 
 
As in the previous case, trade sanctions – actually imposed or the threat 
thereof – were insignificant in the sense of being a factor driving the 
present agreement into existence and shaping its particular form. Certainly, 
there was in the broader context a growing debate over trade and labor 
standards. Yet, it has to be recalled that some of the big scandals and 
exposés driving the sweatshop agenda by the mid-1990s, were in fact 
centered on working conditions and labor practices within the U.S. 
Tellingly, by the mid-1990s labor rights groups were increasingly 
dismayed with the Clinton Administration’s balancing of trade and labor 
rights concerns (cf. below), and it could therefore be argued that the threat 
of trade sanctions even in a rather vague and indirect form was not a 
central force in shaping business responses to the agenda.  
 
If we turn to “other regulatory interventions”, as mentioned earlier, when 
the AIP was established, there was some movement on the Hill and a 
couple of sweatshop bills were introduced in September of 1996 – the 
Child Labor Free Consumer Information Act and the Stop Sweatshops Act 
(see note 582). The former would have introduced a voluntary child labor 
labeling system for apparel and sporting goods, whereas the latter was a 
proposal to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act so as to make 
manufacturers and retailers legally accountable for sweatshop conditions at 
their contractors. These met with strong resistance from most business 
quarters:  
 
                                          
612 Reich, Locked in the Cabinet, p. 321. 
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‘Politically, the “Stop Sweatshops” bill was anathema to the Republican 
majorities in both houses of the Congress [...] The American retailers 
militantly defend the principle of their separation from and freedom of 
responsibility for the production of garments they sell.’613  
 
Moreover, being introduced so shortly before Congress was to adjourn, the 
bills stood no real chance of being acted upon in 1996. Thus, although 
Democratic Representative Clay explained the late introduction by the fact 
that the sweatshops bill had been postponed to await the AIP process, but 
then introduced because more was needed than the voluntary AIP 
initiative, the introduction was widely viewed as a symbolic token to labor 
in election time.614  
 
Obviously, these bills were not part of the AIP mandate, but the 
movements on the Hill were part of the context in which the mandate was 
put together, and the nature and the fate of the two bills is informing of the 
‘limits of the possible’ in terms of the Administration’s more regulatory 
options: there were some real political constraints in addition to the 
Administration’s preferences for a voluntary and private venture. As one of 
the company members of the AIP put it,  
 
‘There were some voices up on Capitol Hill, some legislators, who were 
beginning to talk about legislation requiring… placing restrictions on 
imports that could be found to be made with sweatshop labor. And in 
response, the White House decided that it would attempt to convene not a 
mandatory initiative but a voluntary initiative. And so it did.’615  
 
More importantly, perhaps, there were a number of regulatory innovations 
and interventions on part of the labor authorities: the re-discovery of the 
hot goods provision, the release of enforcement reports, of Trendsetter 
Lists, the introduction of compliance agreements, etc. For many 
companies, certainly the fines, confiscations and costs following an 
enforcement raid or a law suit may have been significant in the shorter 
term. Yet, if we consider the process as a whole it would seem farfetched 
to claim that these regulatory interventions were a central factor, at least in 
                                          
613 Ross, ‘The New Sweatshops’, pp. 111-112. 
 
614 Barrett, ‘Sweatshop bill’. 
 
615 Interview with Doug Cahn. 
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terms of the direct and immediate material implications associated with 
regulatory sanctions (the fines, confiscations, etc.). 
 
At the same time, many of the activities of those authorities involved are 
perhaps better understood and interpreted on par with, for example, the 
campaigns of labor rights organizations. Along with the legislative 
proposals mentioned earlier, they contributed to adding pressure on the 
industry. In particular during the first term of the Clinton Administration 
and Reich’s term as Secretary of Labor, especially the U.S. Department of 
Labor pursued a rather aggressive strategy, relying heavily upon publicity 
generation related to the release of an updated Trendsetter List, a new 
enforcement report, etc. A strategy, it may be recalled, dubbed a ‘No Sweat 
crusade’ by Maria Echaveste in the conversation with Reich where she 
suggested that he seek to enlist Kathie Lee as an endorser of corporate 
responsibility. Viewed in these terms, the Department of Labor in 
particular was certainly one of the key forces in shaping the sweatshop 
agenda and, through an aggressive public relations strategy, in putting 
pressure on the industry.    
 
The Clinton Mandate given to the AIP task force was, of course, also a 
regulatory intervention, and certainly a central one. As a force of economic 
coercion, however, it was first and foremost significant with respect to 
those few, designated members of task force (further below).  
 
Furthermore, as the Chronology of events above showed, there was a 
literal explosion in the number of campaigns and in the negative publicity 
on the industry and the sweatshops in it. These may, moreover, be said to 
have come in several waves. The El Monte scandal was central in one of 
these, and the Kathie Lee scandals were no less central to the negative 
publicity and campaigning activities in mid-1996. By comparison, the 
working conditions revealed by the El Monte raid were indisputably worse 
than those in the Kathie Lee scandal. Yet, the pressures generated on the 
industry by all of the above – the regulatory interventions, the continuously 
aggressive Secretary and Department of Labor, the campaigns and negative 
media coverage – were quite different by mid-1996 than they had been a 
year before. In addition to a number of high-political reasons discussed in 
the following section, these pressures were instrumental in creating the 
basis for the establishment of the task force in mid-1996. And because of 
this pressure, witness the proliferating codes of conduct at the time as well 
as the number of companies signing on to Compliance Agreements, a quite 
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considerable number of companies could have been “persuaded” to join the 
task force – or some other type of group and process. 
 
As far as the particular constellation of the AIP task force is concerned, 
however, it may be argued that this resulted less from economic coercion 
than from happenstance and personal contacts (being at the Fashion 
Industry Forum, for example, and being in the right conversation) as well 
as the specific political situation within the Department of Labor and the 
Administration. Certainly, the prominent corporate members of the task 
force had all been targeted in campaigns or involved in controversies 
related to child labor and labor rights – indeed, Nike was still very much at 
the centre of attention, cf. the Chronology above – but they had also 
already gone considerably farther within the CSR arena than had the 
majority of apparel industry companies. 
 
7.9 Modelling the solution 
Givens  
As mentioned, in early August of 1996 the members of the AIP task force 
were given a two-pronged mandate by President Clinton. At the time, there 
were a number of aspects that were more or less given.  
 
First, a fairly broad agenda – i.e., the inclusion of a broad range of issues – 
was a given for a more collective initiative in mid-1996. During the 
process, the struggles to define the problem had not established a narrow 
agenda or point of departure, e.g. in terms of primarily child labor or a 
particular subset of labor rights.  
 
Second, with respect to child labor, an important exclusion in depth was 
also a given. Curiously (especially in light of the previous two chapters and 
the “lessons from Bangladesh”), the fact that aspects such as social 
protection and rehabilitation, which by then appeared to have become 
standard concerns of “best practice” in cases of focused interventions on 
child labor, were not raised or discussed at all.616 
                                          
616 When asked directly about the reasons for this, several interviewed task force 
members seemed kind of surprised, and it appears that the discussions were quite 
simply based on the shared presupposition of both companies and NGOs alike that this 
was not part of what a code of conduct should do. As one NGO member of the AIP 
stated, when asked if and why these matters had not been part of the code discussions: 
‘No, it’s not part of it.’ (Interview with Linda Golodner). Hence, according to several 
members, child labor was the easiest issue to deal with. As Harvey put it, ‘We didn’t 
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Third, the inclusion of monitoring and verification, in one form or another, 
was a given element in a potential effort at the time. This would not have 
been the case just a few years earlier, but from mid-1995 onwards, 
monitoring and verification had become a central element in partnership 
agreements and the broader debate on corporate responsibility. Previous 
agreements, and perhaps most importantly the GAP-NLC agreement on 
independent monitoring from late 1995, had set new precedents, and for 
the AIP initiative it would have been highly problematic to aim at an 
agreement which did not – as a minimum – include some semblance of 
independent monitoring. Hence, it was an integral part of the mandate’s 
taking steps to ensure that sweated labor was not used, and the task force 
would have to deal with the issue of what to do with the results of the 
monitoring of the code, how to inform the wider public on this.617  
 
Fourth, although a voluntary and private code of conduct initiative and 
effort was perhaps not the given and natural form, there were a number of 
reasons why the mandate was produced at that particular time and took on 
that particular form. To begin with, by mid-1996 it had also become 
increasingly clear that – in spite of the growing political focus and the new 
tactics employed by labor enforcement agencies – there was little 
improvement in compliance with basic labor laws within the U.S. apparel 
production. Furthermore, as noted, private company codes within the 
industry were proliferating at that point in the mid-1990s, and the previous 
chapter also evidenced the interest of trade unions and others in the 
development of codes at the time. Also, the Department of Labor had just 
conducted its 1996 “child labor” hearings, focusing on the apparel industry 
                                                                                                                           
have to fight on it much. The issues became not whether child labor was good or bad, 
but how to define it, how to deal with youth labor, whether Convention 138 provided a 
significant enough guidance for youth labor, and what kind of protection for youth 
labor – particularly on hazardous occupations. And what age to set the child labor limit 
at.’ (Interview with Pharis Harvey). 
 
617 Labeling was also considered in relation to the AIP mandate. In June, Secretary 
Reich had asked the ILO to consider a “No Sweat” labeling program, and he had also 
sought to make this part of the formal AIP mandate. Labeling was not explicitly in the 
mandate, but it was not ruled out either. Instead, the mandate referred in somewhat 
vague terms to “options to inform”: ’First, they will take additional steps to ensure that 
the products they [companies] make and sell are manufactured under decent and 
humane working conditions. Second, they will develop options to inform consumers 
that the products they buy are not produced under those exploitative conditions.’ See 
Ramey, ‘Reich’s sweatshop war goes offshore’; Barrett, ‘Sweatshop bill’. 
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and codes of conduct, and a report was being prepared on precisely that 
topic. As a senior DOL official put it:  
 
‘Codes of conduct was clearly becoming a big issue. Was being talked 
about a lot, it was being talked about tripartite, it was being talked about 
in the context of the ILO, the whole labor standards, the social clause and 
the WTO was really heating up. So politically, on the international level, 
this was an enormous issue.’618  
 
The nature and the timing of the mandate, however, need to be understood 
within the broader political context. Given the recent shut-down of the 
federal government and the dominance of balancing the budget as a 
concern within the Administration, boosting big government funds for 
labor authorities was arguably a mute issue for both political and economic 
reasons – certainly in the sizeable amount it would take to re-regulate so as 
to effectively deal with the widespread and systemic nature of the 
sweatshop problem in the industry. Yet, the Clinton Administration had 
already demonstrated a preference for a private, self-regulatory approach 
on labor rights in relation to international trade:  
 
‘In 1994 President Clinton separated trade policy disputes from U.S. 
pressure for improvement in Chinese human rights, effectively establishing 
separate negotiating tracks for these arguably related issues.’619  
 
As mentioned, the Model Business Principles were an attempt to counter 
the criticisms particularly on these matters, and the idea behind the AIP 
was very similar in nature. The AIP was just as voluntary, only now the 
private actors were asked to draw up the solution, rather than the 
Administration handing out a set of principles for U.S. multinationals. 
Furthermore, in spite of the more aggressive approach of the Department 
of Labor, this too subscribed to ‘voluntary compliance agreements’ – 
explicitly basing the strategy of its No Sweat campaign on its own lack of 
resources to police the industry. In other words, this was not merely a 
matter of a politically and economically constrained Administration: it also 
positively preferred playing the role of facilitating an ‘innovative’ (private 
and voluntary) partnership approach to sweatshops, bringing the warring 
parties together and assisting them in finding a solution to the problem. 
The Administration was in effect seeking to take the political opportunity 
                                          
618 Interview with former Department of Labor official. 
 
619 Hemphill, ‘The White House Apparel Industry Partnership Agreement’, p. 131. 
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in the growing “need” for standardization by facilitate the brokering of a 
new “model” code of conduct. 
 
Moreover, 1996 was an election year, and Clinton needed to secure the 
backing of organized labor for the election. As Terry Collingsworth of the 
ILRF put it:  
 
‘[…] in the one field that mattered, the linkage between trade and labor, 
and whether you would get negotiating authority and trade agreements 
and so on that had labor standards, Clinton was just like all the 
Republicans. He wanted to trade first, talk about labor second. So that he 
was not advocating for this in that one arena that mattered, and then the 
way to throw bones to the labor movement and the human rights movement 
was to try to put these little band-aids on. Like trying to support an 
initiative like the Apparel Industry Partnership, FLA.’620  
 
This, in part, may account for the timing of the mandate. After all, one 
might wonder why a task force was not established a year earlier, in the 
wake of the El Monte scandal. Obviously, the El Monte scandal did attract 
the attention of the Administration and the Department of Labor alike, and 
shortly thereafter UNITE had furthermore suggested that some high-level 
commission be established to address the sweatshop issue, propose 
solutions and facilitate partnerships (cf. above).  
 
However, it also has to be recalled that the Clinton Administration had 
presented its Model Business Principles (MBP) in March of 1995. In the 
period following El Monte, the MBP might still have been seen as a 
potentially successful initiative by the Administration. By mid-1996, 
however, it had become clear that this was not going to be the case. 
Furthermore, although Reich and the Department of Labor had been 
putting some pressure on the apparel industry since 1994, during 1996 
sweatshops became much more politicized, particularly with the Kathie 
Lee Gifford scandals:  
 
‘In the summer of 1996, the NLC hit the publicity jackpot when, following 
Charlie Kernaghan’s testimony at a congressional hearing, TV celebrity 
Kathie Lee Gifford’s Wal-Mart clothing line was linked to child labor and 
human rights abuses, first in Honduras, and then by UNITE workers to 
wage violations in a New York City sweatshop. Gifford’s saccharine TV 
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personality and her precious association with children’s charities were a 
perfect foil for revelations about child labor.’621  
 
So, in the wake of the National Labor Committee’s exposé of Kathie Lee 
and Wal-Mart, Labor Secretary Reich moved on the issue to make a deal 
with Gifford, and then hosted the unprecedented Fashion Industry Forum 
in mid-July where the Administration could ‘feel this out’ and where the 
ground was laid for the AIP ceremony a couple of weeks later.  
 
Splits and compromises: conflicts unresolved 
 
As the Department of Labor also noted in its 1996 report, ‘Creating a 
corporate code of conduct is an easy task.’622 The Administration’s Model 
Business Principles from 1995 were available, as were many other codes of 
conduct – individual company ones as well as multi-stakeholder ones – and 
shortly after the White House ceremony in August, it might be noted, the 
FIFA Code was announced – and hailed by Robert Reich and senior DOL 
officials. Yet, if codes were ‘hot’ and exploding in numbers, they also 
varied considerably in their approaches to the range of issues included, 
implementation, monitoring and verification.623 There was no generally 
accepted and authoritative code, and the task of fulfilling the Clinton 
mandate was far from easy.  
 
Already before the April 1997 agreement the divisions were publicly 
visible. Moreover, the agreement was merely a preliminary compromise, 
leaving the major conflict points unresolved, in what was characterized as 
‘a fragile, highly compromised agreement contingent on developing a 
strict implementation program.’624 After a long period of deadlock, there 
was a decisive turn in mid-1998 as the so-called June 12 proposal was 
leaked to the media and eventually resulted in the break-up of the task 
force:  
                                          
621 Andrew Ross, ‘Introduction’ in Andrew Ross (ed.), No Sweat: Fashion, Free Trade, 
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622 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, By the Sweat & 
Toil of Children (Volume III), p. 116. 
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‘The employers’ response to this final proposal […] was to accuse UNITE 
of obstructing an agreement and to declare that they would no longer 
continue to negotiate if UNITE was at the table. Four of the NGOs 
accepted this condition and proceeded to negotiate […]’625  
 
The non-industry members that walked out were UNITE, the RWDSU, 
and the ICCR.626 As noted, a subgroup of the task force then continued to 
meet and eventually produced the November 1998 agreement. 
 
There were numerous conflict points involved in this, three of which were 
particularly significant in the process and in terms of explaining the nature 
of the agreement. First of all, there was the matter of freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining, also referred to as ‘the 
China issue’: how would a potential agreement deal with countries in 
which those rights and freedoms were not enjoyed by workers, and where 
the companies signing up to the agreement therefore would most likely not 
be in a position to abide by potentially strict language in an agreement? 
Obviously, for the companies in the task force and within the apparel 
industry more broadly, this was a major issue given the significance of 
China as a leading production site, cf. earlier. For some of the non-industry 
task force members, in turn, this was the central concern:  
 
‘So, does signing on to this code of conduct mean that we have do 
withdraw or refrain from purchasing goods and manufacturing in China, 
so that was an unacceptable… It was unacceptable to the businesses 
around the table to make that declaration. […] And it was unacceptable to 
the trade unions, as I understand it, to not deal with the China issue.’627  
 
Hence, the parties were caught in a situation where one side would have to 
compromise on a central concern, with profound implications for the 
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Harvey (ILRF) the mandate to continue negotiations, and the labor members left the 
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compromising party. Industry players were not willing to accept strict 
language with universal applicability on this point, if it meant staying out 
of China. UNITE, in particular, was equally unwilling to make concessions 
on this point:  
 
‘They never would seriously deal with the issue of freedom of association. 
For us, for the union, that’s a fundamental issue. One of the basic ILO 
core labor standards, what we call internationally recognized labor rights. 
They couldn’t deal with it. Meaning, it led to what was often called the 
China Question. […] There is no freedom of association in China. Every 
company on the Apparel Industry Partnership was producing in China. 
You know, big time. So, our position was, “Well, okay. So if you are 
producing in China, then you are not allowing people freedom of 
association. And if freedom of association is in the Code, then you don’t 
meet the Code.” Rather clear-cut. That was unacceptable. They couldn’t 
deal with that. […] You know, “Well, are you just going to write off 
China?” “No, we’re not going to write off China. But what’s the point 
here, if… You either stand for these values, or you don’t.”’628  
 
The 1997 compromise left the matter unresolved, leaving in the open the 
actual and substantial implications of the moderate formulation agreed 
upon. In essence, the 1997 compromise merely postponed the hard 
bargaining:  
 
‘Task force members expect battles over doing business in China. Labor 
and human rights groups called on companies to pull out of that fast-
growing industrial giant because it restricts freedom of association and 
collective bargaining, two violations of the code of conduct. [...] Labor 
union officials say they expect a struggle with companies over the steps 
their Chinese factories should take.’629  
 
The split in 1998 was in no small measure related to the inability of the 
task force members to come to an agreement on this point. The June 12 
proposal, leaked to put pressure on the negotiating parties, thus contained 
the following language: ‘If, despite the best efforts of employers to adhere 
to these and other appropriate special guidelines approved by the 
Association, no Participating Company is able to demonstrate progress 
toward implementation of those provisions of the Code addressed by the 
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country guidelines, the Association shall determine whether production 
under such circumstances is consistent with the Workplace Code and 
Principles of Monitoring.’630 This was not acceptable to the industry 
members: ‘In other words, if companies were doing all they could and the 
problems persisted, then the host government would be put on notice that 
there could be consequences for its failure to protect internationally 
recognized workers’ rights. The companies would not hear of this. Nobody 
was going to tell them where they could or could not produce. Why, we 
were telling them they had to get out of China! […] In fact, the companies 
were not being told they had to get out of China, and they knew that. […] 
To the contrary, if they were going to take the code seriously, the 
companies had to become a force for change and for enforcement of 
workers’ rights. That meant that the firms had a responsibility to engage 
the Chinese government […]’631  
 
Yet, the 1998 break-up also demonstrated that there were disagreements 
among the task force non-industry members: not all shared the intransigent 
stance of UNITE. According to Harvey, who represented the ILRF in the 
negotiations, ‘[freedom of association] was the primary reason that 
UNITE pulled out of the negotiations. They seriously wanted to bar 
companies from producing in countries where freedom of association was 
not allowed by law. […] I think all the rest of us saw that that was not a 
workable solution. That there were good things that we could do in China, 
and that we shouldn’t hold the whole process hostage to that one issue.’632  
 
Hence, when UNITE left the task force, the negotiation structure basically 
changed, and a compromise was reached: requiring employers to recognize 
and respect the right of employees to freedom of association and to 
collective bargaining, the Code contained special country provisions to 
‘[…] hold companies and their subsidiaries, contractors and subcontractors 
accountable for recognizing worker organization for the purpose of 
collective bargaining, and for not collaborating in official or unofficial 
suppression of such worker organizations.’633 As noted (in Chapter 1), the 
ILRF listed this as one of the strengths of the AIP/FLA Code, while at the 
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same time listing as one of the Code’s weaknesses the fact that it ‘[…] 
does not force companies to leave a country where laws don’t respect 
freedom of association, although actual production in that country must 
meet the standards of the FLA for the company to be certified.’634  
 
A second conflict point concerned wages and the matter of a living wage. 
As Pharis Harvey puts it, ‘the living wage issue was a very hard one. It 
took a lot of intense negotiations to reach […] some resolution on the 
living wage issue that we could all live with. All but ICCR and UNITE.’635 
As noted earlier, there were different notions of what constitutes a 
sweatshop, the less restrictive one placing considerable emphasis on wages 
in particular. Hence, while the conflict reflected differences of 
understandings within the task force of the nature of “the sweatshop”, 636 
for the non-industry members of the task force, this was a central concern, 
in particular for the ICCR:  
 
‘They’re basically a shareholder activist organization. And they negotiate 
with companies to establish a fair wage policy, and they felt that they 
couldn’t sign on to the FLA code, if it didn’t have a fair wage component. 
And that the component that we settled on, which was to come back and 
address that issue after a year or two – which we are now starting to do – 
wasn’t adequate for them, because the companies would say, “Well, why 
did you join this effort? Why are you arguing that we ought to have a fair 
wage, when you’re part of an initiative that doesn’t have any?”’637  
 
For the industry members, in turn, the living wage issue was seen as going 
beyond the responsibility of private companies and the aim of eliminating 
sweatshops, as an attempt at redefining the nature of the problem (and the 
purpose of the AIP), and – obviously – the material/economic and 
administrative ramifications of an agreement containing language on a 
living wage were quite significant:  
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‘The NGOs started out demanding a requirement that businesses pay 
workers a “living wage,” or enough to meet basic needs. The companies, 
says Karp, were unanimously opposed to the idea. When asked why, she 
argues with a stern face that if large U.S. companies raise wages in a 
developing country, they can cause inflation, or drive other businesses 
away. Beyond that, it’s not clear, country to country, what a “living wage” 
would be, she insists: “We’re not going to go through and do an analysis 
of what is a living wage. We are in a business. We were saying [during the 
negotiations] that we weren’t even going to join this if it says we have to 
pay a living wage.”’638  
 
Again, the 1997 agreement left the conflict unresolved in a compromise 
that was somewhat vague, but not easily reached:  
 
‘A compromise was proposed: Would the companies simply acknowledge 
that “wages are essential to meeting employees’ basic needs”? A 
seemingly harmless admission, and eventually the companies consented, 
but not without a fight, says former Department of Labor official 
Echaveste […] “I sat about six hours negotiating one sentence,” she says. 
“You’re sitting in that room and you want to go and break some heads, 
because of course what you earn has to do with how you provide for your 
family!” […] Karp took a hard line on the wage issue, but she also played 
a conciliatory role […Echaveste:] “She kept saying [to the NGOs] that the 
Apparel Industry task force could not be so far out that no one would 
follow,” she says. “At the same time, she would say to the industry that this 
can’t be just form over substance.”’639  
 
And, again, the compromise reached merely postponed the hard 
bargaining:  
 
‘the key issue of paying a sustainable living wage requires further work by 
the Partnership and Association. In its WORKPLACE CODE OF 
CONDUCT, the Partnership at first acknowledges the importance of 
paying employees sufficient wages: '“Employers recognize that wages are 
                                          
638 Jaskunas, ‘The Sweatshop Dilemma’, p. 38. 
 
639 Jaskunas, ‘The Sweatshop Dilemma’, p. 38. 
 
 284
essential to meeting employees’ basic needs,” but only goes as far as 
setting a wage floor well below the sustainable living wage [...]’640  
 
In the deadlocked period from mid-1997 to mid-1998, the companies were 
still reluctant to give in on this point, while the NGOs and unions kept 
pushing. One of the proposals on the table was the establishment of a 
method to determine what constituted a living wage in different locations. 
Yet, agreeing to this would amount to nothing less than agreeing to a living 
wage, and so ‘As a substitute for this proposal, the Department of Labor 
offered to do a survey of publicly available data on the subject and submit 
it to the Fair Labor Association for its consideration.’641 The question still 
remained, however, what the parties would do with the survey. Again, the 
1998 break-up demonstrated that there were disagreements among the task 
force non-industry members – UNITE and the ICCR being, in particular, 
unwilling to accept the exclusion of living wage requirements in an 
agreement – and the change in the negotiation structure once again made 
possible a compromise. Compared to a requirement on the legal minimum 
wage, the industry players had made some concessions, but so had the 
remaining nonindustry members: compared to the June 12 proposal, the 
November 1998 agreement ‘retains the DOL survey and some of the 
language of the final union/NGO proposal. […] The missing words would 
have established a process that examined workers’ basic needs, minimum 
and prevailing wages, and the extent to which the latter meets the former. 
The elimination of this language releases the Association from the specific 
obligation of determining a living-wage standard. In its place is the vague 
charge to review the DOL survey and perhaps other studies and their 
implications, “if any,” for the code.’642  
 
To the ICCR in particular, supporting the November 1998 agreement 
would have been an unacceptable, self-contradictory and potentially 
counterproductive decision:  
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‘The sustainable living wage – a wage which allows workers to live a 
sustained and healthy life – is central to our concept of affirming the 
dignity of every worker and central to our work with individual companies. 
This core issue for our membership is not adequately addressed, yet is 
essential to any effective anti-sweatshop strategy.’643  
 
Finally, the third of the main conflict points was the matter of monitoring 
and verification:  
 
‘While the NGOs conceded that human rights groups don’t have the 
resources to monitor all apparel factories, they insisted that local NGOs 
be involved […] “The last thing you want,” [Karp] argues, “is a bunch of 
accountants from New York walking into a factory in Vietnam and talking 
to underage women.” But Karp’s peers on the partnership, many of whom 
advocated the use of accounting firms as monitors, were wary of the 
prospect of incorporating outside activists into their business. “A lot of 
people interpret this as – you’re forcing on the contractor a representative 
for the workers,” says committee member Stanley Levy, who represents 
apparel maker Karen Kane Incorporated […]’644  
 
For the non-industry members of the task force, this was an important 
enough concern, but it does not seem to have been so essential as to result 
in a walking out from the negotiations in itself: the above issues and the 
double intransigence of industry and some nonindustry members were 
much more central in producing the 1998 break-up. Yet, for some of the 
industry players the notion of external NGO or trade union monitors was 
unacceptable: already before it was presented, the 1997 Agreement was 
criticized not only by the AAMA, but also by the President of the 
California Fashion Association, Lonnie Kane (who happened to also be 
President of Karen Kane Co. and an AIP member). Furthermore, on April 
10, one of the participating companies - Warnaco Group - quit the task 
force: ‘”We don’t want an association monitoring our company,”’ said the 
Group’s CEO, Linda Wachner, voicing a critique similar to that of Lonnie 
Kane – which ‘also dropped out of the partnership at the last minute on the 
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same grounds.’645 By all counts, this was an issue on which the industry 
members were not in agreement, and several task force members pointed to 
one of the companies (Warnaco) as particularly difficult: ’[the industry 
members] had their very heated debates as well. […] there was a good bit 
of happiness when one company pulled out. That had been a very difficult 
company for them to deal with as well.’646 Some of the other companies, in 
turn, were already engaged monitoring and verification activities similar to 
those being discussed, albeit the negotiations would place more general 
requirements on participant companies.  
 
The above, moreover, suggests that, with respect to this conflict point, the 
1998 break-up was less significant in determining the final nature of the 
agreement. First of all, already at the 1997 compromise, the most 
incalcitrant industry opponents of concessions on this conflict point had 
left the task force. They were not the most prominent and powerful 
corporate members of the task force, but their departure enabled the 
remaining ones to make some concessions on this point: in the 1997 
compromise audit firms hired by companies as well as local independent 
NGOs would be allowed to monitor on the two conditions that i) they must 
consult local NGOs or workers representatives (if any), and ii) they would 
have to be accredited by a body to be created to implement the Principles 
of Monitoring. Already at this point, prominent corporate members such as 
NIKE and Phillips van Heusen indicated that they would use internal 
monitors and accounting firms.647 Secondly, while the non-industry 
members to resign from the task force were highly critical of the 
November 1998 agreement, had they achieved significant concessions on 
the above conflict points, they would have been able to justify concessions 
on monitoring and verification. Yet, the break-up was not altogether 
insignificant: the final negotiations involved hard bargaining over the 
specific monitoring requirements and the relationship between internal and 
external monitoring in particular. In the end, the companies accepted 
external monitors in the agreement, but were able to draw some 
concessions on the specifics (cf. Chapter 1). 
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In sum, on the first two conflict points in particular the interests of the 
involved parties were profoundly conflicting, the formal designation and 
mandate as well as the consensus-based decision-making in the 
negotiations further contributing to explain why intransigence emerged as 
a key negotiating tactic during the process. Moreover, the parties were 
locked in a situation where the potentials for inclusions and exclusions 
were such so as to further contribute to this: the agenda and mandate was 
firmly defined in broad terms (i.e., breadth was not significantly 
contestable, and narrowing or de-linkage were not realistic options) – 
instead, the conflicts involved several disputes over the depth and 
substance of key issues, with potentially far-reaching ramifications for the 
parties. It goes with the picture that forum-shifting, which was significant 
in the previous chapter, was not available as an option to the key industry 
players: a company like NIKE had already taken some serious reputational 
blows, and Reebok and the rest were already seen as hypocrites by industry 
critics; the industry players that did quit the task force were, in terms of the 
negotiations, the less significant and powerful ones, but their departure was 
not only part of the final shape of the agreement in terms of the actors 
involved: it was also illustrative of the wider absence of the vast majority 
of retailers and manufacturers. 
 
As far as the 1998 break-up was concerned, obviously, as one corporate 
representative put it,  
 
‘[…] the trade unions dropped out and left quite a large hole on that side 
of the table.’648  
 
This made the final compromising possible. Whether the non-industry side 
could have gained further concessions, had UNITE and the ICCR remained 
at the table, is an open question. The final negotiations did involve hard 
bargaining, and in this final stage, the departure of half of the NGO 
members also gave the remaining ones “added value” to the industry 
members – in particular the ILRF’s Pharis Harvey, who was now the only 
remaining “labor” representative left:  
 
‘[…] I think I only had to threaten to resign about 5 times in that process. 
And I could do that, because I was the only NGO representative that gave 
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the process a semblance of integrity on labor issues. The others were not 
labor NGOs. And I knew, I had to have leverage, and I could use it.’649  
 
Moreover, already in late 1997, UNITE and the ICCR had become heavily 
involved in anti-sweatshop campaigning along with the National Labor 
Committee and others, in part as an attempt at outside-pressuring of the 
inside-dealings, and with the break-up the two were among the harshest 
critics of the task force and the agreement. 
 
7.10 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has explored the background for the November 1998 
agreement between the remaining members of the Apparel Industry 
Partnership. Why did this agreement come into existence and in that 
particular form? 
 
First of all, sweatshops had not only returned to the U.S. (apparel 
production) – the return was accompanied by a growing and, by the mid-
1990s, massive attention spanning both high and low politics, and 
encompassing broad media coverage as well as numerous campaigns, 
exposés and scandals. Part of this was the U.S. Department of Labor and 
certain state labor authorities. In 1994 the Department of Labor shifted to a 
more aggressive anti-sweatshop strategy, and this contributed to placing 
sweatshops in the apparel industry on the agenda - along with numerous 
campaign activities by labor and human rights groups. The Department and 
the Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich, played a key role in the process and 
a particularly prominent one during the first term of President Clinton. The 
new strategy involved a more aggressive approach to enforcement raids, 
the threat or actual use of the hot goods provisions of the FLSA, and the 
so-called voluntary compliance agreements. It also involved a more 
aggressive approach to the use of these in the media and in confrontations 
with the industry, along with new tactics such as naming specific 
companies tied to sweatshops. 
 
Still, the analysis also found that there was a significantly uneven 
distribution as far as blame, responsibility and economic pressure across 
the industry was concerned (i.e., targeting and economic coercion). In a 
sense, the direction of moral and material pressures was seemingly 
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random, at least as far as majority of above concerned. Yet, across the 
board of the campaigns, the approach in naming, blaming and pressuring 
by the public authorities as well as the majority of media reports there was 
a very considerable degree of unanimity or unidirectionality in terms of the 
choice of targets – the dominant nodes, i.e., the manufacturers and, in 
particular, the retailers. Some of these, the analysis found, were in serious 
financial difficulties during process, whereas those enjoying the most 
tremendous growth, the discount retailers, were arguably also the least 
vulnerable in terms of market-based pressures related to social 
responsibility. 
 
Furthermore, the analysis found that, with respect to the early stages of 
agenda formation and the struggles to define the problem throughout the 
process, the extent of the problem did not constitute a major point of 
contention. There was, rather, a steady stream of documentation of quite 
pervasive violations, and this was conducive to the growing politicization 
of sweatshops. The U.S. Department of Labor, particularly during the first 
half of the process, was prominent in providing such hard and authoritative 
facts based on enforcement raids. Documenting some very high 
noncompliance rates and contributing to the construction of the problem as 
general, widespread and systemic within industry, the Department of 
Labor’s activities indirectly supported the problem claims of the media and 
a host of industry critics, irrespective of whether such claims were based in 
concrete and specific instances of corporate irresponsibility or they were 
framed in more systemic or structural terms. And one might add that the 
preceding de facto deregulation and the characteristics of the working 
conditions in the domestic (U.S.) apparel production served as part of the 
preconditions for the above. 
 
On a broader note, the process was significantly driven and shaped by a 
couple of exposés or scandals (and the agency underlying these). First of 
all, the August 1995 raid at El Monte was a bomb that exploded, showing 
the worst-case scenario sweatshop conditions as really existing right in 
middle of Los Angeles. There was extensive and high-profile media 
coverage of the scandal, and it not only gave a boost to existing campaigns 
and organizing drives, but also led to new campaigns and, indeed, the 
formation of new anti-sweatshop organizing from below. Also, more high-
profile skirmishes between the Secretary/Department of Labor and the 
apparel industry followed. Second, the National Labor Committee hit ‘the 
publicity jackpot’ with the exposé of Kathie Lee Gifford/Wal-Mart. The 
Department of Labor moved swiftly to ‘make a deal’ with Kathie Lee, and 
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soon hosted the Fashion Industry Forum gathering an unprecedented 
number of industry and non-industry representatives to debate the 
sweatshop problem - and letting the Clinton Administration ‘feel it out’. 
After several major scandals and cycles of increasing politicization, the 
Apparel Industry Partnership was formed. 
 
Key to explaining the existence and particular form of the 1998 
Agreement, then, is also the establishment of this task force and the nature 
and timing of the mandate handed down by U.S. President Clinton. The 
analysis suggested that this was in part a reflection of the political and 
economic constraints faced by the Administration at the time, but that there 
was more to it than that: the Administration had already displayed a 
preference for voluntary codes (which, at the time, were ‘hot’ and growing 
in numbers); by mid-1996 the earlier Model Business Principles had 
proved unsuccessful, and the Administration was in the midst of an 
election campaign where it needed to secure the backing of organized labor 
on the background of having keenly promoted international trade 
agreements and pleasing Wall Street. Moreover, the mandate was, 
compared to the previous two processes, a peculiar and very different type 
of driver and shaper of subsequent events: the task as well as the giver of 
the task with which the task force was presented implied that the 
negotiations were high profile, subject to public interest, providing its 
members with certain amounts of prestige as well as depriving them of 
some forms of leverage that might have been associated with a less 
prominent negotiation process. And, significantly, the mandate set vague 
but still quite specific boundaries for the negotiations that ensued.  
 
The analysis also found that the deadlock and subsequent break-up of the 
task force in mid-1998, and the formation of a subgroup, were central to 
understanding and explaining the existence and form of the Agreement. 
The above characteristics of the mandate, in conjunction with the struggles 
to define the problem and the characteristics of the problem, were part of 
creating this deadlock: the agenda was locked in terms of breadth, while 
there were several key conflicts over depth. In other words, forum-shifting 
and issue de-linkage as ways for the dominant industry players to pursue a 
minimization of concessions – narrowing the agenda or watering down the 
substance to reduce the ramifications of the concessions made – were not 
truly available to the prominent industry members of the task force. To 
some of the non-industry members, in turn, the depth conflicts involved 
central concerns on which serious compromises could not be made to fit 
their core purposes and constituencies. Hence, while the task force 
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presented its first, preliminary agreement in April 1997, and this 
automatically opened up for the second round of negotiations, the depth 
conflicts had been left unresolved, and the task force entered a period of 
deadlock. The break-up entailing the exclusion of non-industry actors was 
what made the compromises reached in the subgroup possible. 
 
Furthermore, the analysis also found that depth as far as child labor is 
concerned was not even considered here, whereas the previous chapter 
demonstrated how this had clearly been central to the understanding of the 
problem from the very beginning and had been taken for granted elements 
of a potential solution. One could, of course, point to the difference in 
preconditions here: the characteristics of the problem in this case did not 
significantly involve child labor (found only in very exceptional cases 
within the U.S. apparel production). Yet, I would argue that the difference 
involves more than that: industry actors are most likely to take an active 
interest in depth on child labor where this is associated with a narrow and 
focused initiative, whereas if broader initiatives – such as codes of conduct 
– are necessary, this will typically involve other depth and breadth 
concerns. And, with respect to non-industry actors, while some may be 
very focused on child labor, others have an interest in focusing on other 
depth conflicts than those related to child labor. There are, it would seem, 
radically different logics of inclusion and exclusion, and these relate to the 
definition and flexibility of the agenda in terms of breadth and depth as 
well as the type of non-industry actors concretely involved. 
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8. Conclusions  
 
At the beginning of this dissertation, two basic questions were posed 
concerning the existence and the nature of the agreements in three 
prominent cases concerning corporate responsibility and the governance of 
child labor and core labor rights in the 1990s:  
 
? Why did these agreements come into existence? 
 
? Why did they take on those particular forms? 
 
In the preceding chapters, these questions were pursued at length, as the 
three cases were analyzed in all of their detail and complexity. In this final 
chapter, taking a cross-cutting perspective on the three cases and the 
previous findings, I present the overall conclusions.  
 
To begin with, let us consider the first of the above questions: Why did 
these agreements come into existence? There are number of factors, 
which, taken together, help explain why these agreements came into 
existence.  
 
To begin with, activism – real and concrete, not an abstract “risk” – by 
labor and human rights groups was highly and consistently significant in 
triggering attention and controversy, in building and sustaining pressure, 
and in applying pressure at critical junctures in the processes. None of 
these agreements came into existence because corporations were throwing 
themselves into the arms of critics and other parts of society, asking for 
more “stakeholder dialogue” and mutual trust-building. Certainly, there 
was dialogue and trust-building among some parties in each of the cases, 
but the analysis also suggests that reaching compromises took both 
moderate compromisers and more radical critics, and that it was often the 
sharper criticism that set the wheels turning – and kept them going. All 
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three agreements were entered into after some rather lengthy processes, 
i.e., no resolutions were agreed upon overnight. Moreover, in all three 
cases, there were decisive moments when the processes could have come 
to a stop or taken a very different direction indeed: the BGMEA rejection 
of the MOU, the FIFA Code, and the AIP impasse. 
 
But activism is nothing without leverage over, and some degree of 
vulnerability on part of, companies. As the above also suggests, different 
forms of economic coercion - the material threats, which the main targets 
in each of the cases faced - were significant in driving the processes and 
essential to the coming into existence of the respective agreements. There 
were decisive moments where the processes nearly collapsed or, in the 
soccer ball case, nearly “ended” with a quite different resolution than the 
actual outcome. At these critical junctures, the involved industry players 
were faced with significant material threats, without which the three 
agreements might not have come into existence: the threat of a massive 
boycott in the Bangladesh case; the mounting pressure and the emergence 
of an undesirable non-industry solution in the soccer ball case; and the 
imminent threat of near-complete failure of the AIP task force caused by 
the deadlock of two intransigent sides. There is no basis to conclude that a 
difference in the form of the economic coercion has implications for the 
coming into existence of agreements, although the analysis does suggest 
that the more diffuse and less collectively targeting forms might be less 
effective and, at least, impact the nature of agreements. The analysis does, 
however, demonstrate that economic coercion does not have to be actual: 
latent, potential and perceived threats were just as powerful and significant 
in terms of actually producing change, as illustrated by the fact that the 
Harkin bill was never enacted and the subsequent boycott never started…  
 
Moreover, all three cases involved considerable media coverage, and 
overall this was a significant factor in building and sustaining the pressure 
on companies in the soccer ball and AIP/FLA cases. While not wanting to 
downplay the seemingly obvious significance of this category, the analysis 
does provide for some more cautious specifications. First of all, the 
significance of media exposés and negative publicity appears to be 
confined primarily to the early and middle stages of the processes – during 
the final stages they were not significant. In other words, there were no 
situations where a media exposé directly triggered a chain of events 
through which the problem was resolved: rather, in the final stages, they 
had become un-necessary as triggers, and to the extent that negative media 
exposure may be said to have played a role in the final stages, it was only 
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as latent or future potentials related to negotiation breakdown in particular 
– not as actual occurrences.  
 
Secondly, the focus and the pressure – i.e., the targeting and risk of 
economic coercion – in these two cases were highly uneven across the 
board of companies within these industries. Those companies that were 
exposed and most at risk of adverse consumer reactions and, as in the case 
of Nike, were actually subjects of campaigns, were hard pressed to react in 
terms of becoming involved in modelling efforts. In that sense, in addition 
to contributing to the politicization of certain conditions, the media reports 
were significant in terms of the existence of the agreements. At the same 
time, however, the unevenness was arguably also quite significant in 
relation to the particular forms of the agreements, as I will argue below.  
 
Thirdly, the media exposés and reports did not work in isolation from other 
events and activities. Rather, they interacted with – and in many instances 
stemmed directly from or related directly to – the campaign and other 
activities of civil society actors and/or those of public agencies, the U.S. 
Department of Labor (during Reich’s term in particular). As in 
Kernaghan’s “media jackpot” exposé of Kathie Lee Gifford and Wal-Mart, 
the El Monte scandal following raid by labor authorities. Even here, the 
significance of the media blitz depended on other conditions, most notably 
the broader political situation and the existence of a solution to the 
problem.  
 
Finally, negative media attention was less significant in the Bangladesh 
case. Here, the media coverage was predominantly within Bangladesh and 
was predominantly triggered by the re-introductions of the Harkin bill. The 
differences suggest that the particular type of site or arena and the 
particular type of mechanism of economic coercion have some bearing on 
the degree to which media attention is actually significant.  
 
While the above factors are important in accounting for the coming into 
existence of these agreements, we also need to factor in that all three were 
compromises between more or less adversarial parties. As noted, an actual 
or impending breakdown after some time of negotiations was central in 
both the Bangladesh and the AIP/FLA case. These were two very different 
situations, however. In Bangladesh, the industry had already gained 
important victories and was faced with a serious economic threat – the 
industry “just” needed to be pushed back into the final round of 
compromising. In the AIP/FLA case, on the other hand, the industry 
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representatives and some of their non-industry counterparts were caught in 
a double intransigence, and the final round of compromising could only 
proceed after the partial disintegration of the task force. Moreover, 
thinking in terms of potential zones of agreement, one might say that “too 
little” was in the interests of very few, while too far-reaching agreements 
were a no-go for industry players. The latter were, in general terms, not 
willing to go as far as their most demanding critics, save for the salient 
child labor issue where in all three cases the solutions went beyond 
international law. In addition, if we also consider the processes of 
modelling the solutions, the most noteworthy conclusion in this respect is 
that the analysis shows that changes on the part of individual companies – 
even key industry players taking a lead on the issue – did not affect the 
majority of the other companies to such an extent that the necessary critical 
mass for a collective initiative was produced. At best, the leaders produced 
some “followers.”  
 
In conclusion, and in addition to the earlier factors, these agreements were 
first and foremost made “acceptable” through – and might not have come 
into existence, had it not been for – the inclusions and, in particular, the 
exclusions of actors and issues. First of all, the exclusion of critics: in none 
of the cases were the more intransigent or demanding “counterparts” of the 
industry – AAFLI in Bangladesh, the trade unions in the soccer ball case, 
and UNITE and the ICCR in the AIP/FLA case – involved in the final 
stage of negotiations following these critical junctures. Without these 
voluntary or involuntary exclusions, the subsequent compromises would 
have been very different indeed – if reached at all. Second, the inclusion 
and availability of moderate counterparts which were willing to put their 
names on compromises falling within the zone of agreement. Third, the 
inclusions and particularly exclusions of issues or moderations of 
substantial implications through variety of delimitating and minimizing 
exercises – geographical, sectoral, special provisions (i.e., “exceptions”), 
temporal displacement and vagueness of commitments, etc. 
 
In addition to the above, the analysis also showed that in all three cases 
there had been a real and significant shift in the characteristics of the 
problem: all three cases involved indisputably existing problems (i.e., 
conditions), which moreover were of rather significant and growing 
proportions and involved quite high elements of illegality – and clear-cut 
market and governance failures of significant proportions: 
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? Regulation in the form of national legislation was, generally 
speaking, in place and in the main in accordance with international 
law. The conditions and labor practices to a considerable extent were 
illegal under relevant local as well as international laws. 
 
? The enforcement of existing laws, on the other hand, was highly 
problematic. Whether it was “business as usual” in Bangladesh and 
Pakistan, or what was referred to as de facto deregulation in the 
U.S., the relevant public authorities were unable and/or unwilling to 
enforce these laws in practice.  
 
? The prevailing norms in the early 1990s, as far as voluntary self-
regulation on part of the private sector was concerned, did not 
dictate the active involvement of the contractors/manufacturers in 
living up to their responsibilities under the law – or the active 
involvement of the brands and retailers in this. Companies to a 
considerable extent were involved in violating the law and the rights 
of workers.  
 
Had the above preconditions been more blurred, developments might have 
taken different directions altogether: instead of these agreements we might 
have seen scattered individual company solutions. At the same time, it is 
clear that these conditions apply in many other situations where no 
politicization occurred, and had the conditions been more blurred, 
politicization might not have occurred at all. Still, the above were 
significant (pre)conditions in the sense that they formed part of the basis 
for the subsequent developments – a basis implying that industry targets 
were generally forced into the defensive. The conditions were furthermore 
significant in the sense that they were part of the reason why there were 
room and reasons for focusing and politicizing, be it from the activists’ or 
journalists’ perspectives. The gravity of the conditions, however, was not 
decisive in terms of the coming into existence of the agreements. The 
analysis suggests that – in conjunction with other factors – gravity first and 
foremost bears on the tactical options available during actual struggles to 
define the problem. 
 
While the above preconditions were not sufficient in themselves, but 
significant in conjunction with those factors previously mentioned, the 
analysis also suggests that we need to take into consideration other factors, 
and I would point to two in particular. First of all, there are the particular 
circumstances related to activism – sometimes bordering on the 
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coincidental and/or involving personal ties and relations – such as the 
particular situation of Terry Collingsworth and AAFLI in Bangladesh, the 
nature of the work being carried out there, the objectives, etc. This could 
indicate that while understanding industry characteristics is important in 
theoretical and empirical terms, a greater emphasis should be placed on 
mapping and understanding the particular circumstances and interests of 
“critics” in conceptualizing and analyzing targeting.  
 
Second, the fact that the governance failures and problematized conditions 
were part of production for consumption in the U.S. and/or Europe was 
significant. While this is neither sufficient (since other factors played in as 
well) nor necessary (there are, of course, examples of transnational 
politicizations of working conditions in production for consumption 
elsewhere), the analysis does suggest that, to say the least, it raises the 
“risk” of activism and media interest because the production-consumption 
relations entail significant differences in material and moral leverage as 
well as in the proximity and relevance involved in reaching broader 
“Western” consumer-publics. More to the point, the analysis found that the 
U.S. Department of Labor during the Clinton Administration, as it turned 
out, was centrally involved in all three cases. So was the International 
Labor Rights Fund – and, thereby, however indirectly and reluctantly in 
the first of the three cases, was organized labor interests in the U.S. The 
same goes for the National Consumers League.  
 
In conclusion, the analysis suggests that the configuration of social forces 
shaping U.S. “domestic politics” in that particular period – and within a 
broader global context which, in terms of the global security agenda may 
be characterized as an interval between the Cold War and the so-called war 
on terrorism – was significant to the coming into existence of these three 
agreements. Social forces, hegemony and governance are central elements 
in the work of Robert Cox, for example, just as the interrelationships 
between security and economic affairs and between “domestic” and 
“international” politics are well-known issues within the political science 
literature, and this could fruitfully – in conjunction with an emphasis on 
mapping and understanding the particular circumstances and interests of 
“critics” – be pursued in further research on the politics of corporate 
responsibility and governance. 
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Let us now consider the second question: Why did these agreements take 
on those particular forms? 
 
To begin with, the three cases were quite different in terms of how the 
struggles to define the problem played out. In the Bangladesh case, the 
negative consequences became a dominant theme from early on. In the 
soccer ball case, the broadening of the agenda and the subsequent counter-
modelling were central in the process. In the AIP/FLA case, in turn, the 
broad nature of the problem – sweatshop conditions – was virtually given 
from the outset, and instead the struggles revolved around the depth and 
substance of the problem. The characteristics of the problem, cf. above, in 
all three cases implied that the factual existence and extent of the problems 
did not become significant points of contention. Since the existence of 
extensive problems were well-documented – as far as both child labor in 
the Bangladeshi garment industry and the Sialkot soccer ball production 
and sweatshops in the U.S. were concerned – factual denials and numerical 
minimizations were neither very meaningful nor, even in the shorter run, 
tenable tactical options for countering the claims and allegations from the 
critics and the media. Indeed, the extent of the problem was most 
significant in the Bangladesh case, where the logics of the stat war were 
turned upside down. In other words, had the existence and/or extent of the 
problems been seriously disputable, the processes would have developed 
differently. This was not the case, as it were, and the analysis suggests that 
– given such preconditions – when controversies do arise, the struggles to 
define the problem and the modelling efforts will revolve around or shift to 
other facets of the conditions and agenda.  
 
As far as the scope of the agreements and these other facets are concerned, 
however, the analysis also found that the gravity of the working conditions 
primarily influenced the particular tactical options of different parties in 
the claimsmaking process, but gravity was not directly significant in terms 
of shaping the basic scope and focus of the controversies and subsequent 
solutions. While there had been a real change in working conditions and 
social relations of production, and while there was in all three cases a 
rather high degree of illegality involved, in all three cases worse working 
conditions were to be found just around the corner. Gravity did not, in 
other words, serve to focus the agenda on the relatively worse problems. 
This may “just” be a simple fact of politics, rather than an astonishing 
conclusion as such, but it is a conclusion resting on concrete empirical 
studies that illustrates why politics more generally also involve or raise 
concerns about the prioritization, optimality, democracy, and justice 
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associated with such political problem-definition and problem-solving 
efforts. Yet, it would seem that such concerns are even more relevant when 
the central roles are played by nonstate actors and when processes centrally 
involve the societal roles of private, profit-seeking actors and the rise of a 
particular form of private authority, CSR, related to the governance of 
what could be seen as matters of basic social justice. Moreover, the 
conclusion relates back to and lends support to the basic thrust of the more 
constructivist scholars within social problems theory. Rather than leaving 
out gravity in future research, the conclusion should be taken to suggest 
that several central facets of conditions be maintained, while more 
emphasis be placed on how these interrelate in shaping the tactical 
positions, constraints and pressures of the actors. 
 
Of central significance, in turn, the analysis found that – given the rather 
indisputable existence and extent of the conditions – the degree to which 
the breadth of the problem was open to struggle and contestation or not had 
profound implications for the processes and outcomes. A key difference 
between the agreements is the breadth or range of issues they cover, raising 
the question, why broad or narrow problems and agreements?  
 
In some situations, breadth is a potential battlefield. This was the situation 
in both the Bangladesh and the soccer ball cases: in the former, the agenda 
was locked from early on and narrowly so, whereas in the latter the agenda 
was broadened. As the two cases demonstrate, whether this potential is 
actualized depends on the confluence of a range of factors. The nature of 
the mechanisms of economic coercion differed (trade sanctions/material 
leverage tied to child labor compared to campaigning and generating 
negative media attention, in which child labor was a useful focal point). 
Moreover, so did the types of chosen targets (FIFA and the international 
ball marketers compared to Bangladeshi manufacturers) and the “sites” of 
politicization (“Western” media compared to predominantly Bangladeshi). 
Furthermore, the “lessons” from Bangladesh had been incorporated into 
the dominant understanding of the problem from the very beginning in the 
soccer ball case, so the “negative consequences” for the child workers was 
neither available nor a tenable counter.  
 
In other situations, the agenda or problem is broadly defined, and breadth 
is not contestable but rather practically locked and broadly so from the 
very outset. Breadth, in other words, is not a potential battlefield. In the 
AIP/FLA case this related both to the characteristics of the problem, the 
deeply rooted notions of sweatshops and the strong historical-cum-cultural 
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legacy and symbolic power related to these conditions and to the fact that 
the conditions also existed within the U.S.: the agenda and the struggles to 
define the problem were locked in a particular way, comprising a broad 
range of labor rights issues, and this was essentially not something which 
could be contested effectively.  
 
In conclusion, the analysis suggests that if we are to fully understand 
nature of these agreements, we need to consider breadth/range and 
depth/substance as interrelated. The analysis provides a basis to conclude 
that depth/substance will always be subject of contestation, and if/how this 
contest actually plays out is likely to be determined in part by the actual 
form of the other dimension, the breadth. The more issues involved, the 
less substantial will the commitments by companies across the board be. 
The broader the agenda, the stronger the resistance to make concessions, 
and the more likely are serious conflicts over substance to affect the 
process and outcome. This is a general statement, of course, in the sense 
that corporations are in different positions, and therefore the lengths to 
which they are willing to go differ correspondingly, just as the severity of 
the conflicts over substance are equally shaped by the stance of the 
involved non-industry actors, as also evidenced in the last two case studies 
in particular. Hence, the nature of the agreement in the AIP/FLA case is 
not explained solely by reference to the reasons for the broad problem 
definition being “given” in that case: the other part of the story is that 
precisely because of that the industry participants in the task force fought 
so hard (and several actually quit). And, when the broadening actually did 
occur in the soccer ball case, the industry countermodelling efforts – being 
unable to re-define the problem/solution in narrower terms, following from 
the above – necessarily had to be one of combining a focused industry 
commitment on child labor with a broader, but watered-down industry 
code of conduct.  
 
It follows from the above that although the existence of a significant use of 
child labor could be seen as a precondition influencing whether a 
narrowing of the agenda was a tactical option or not, other factors were 
equally, if not more, important in influencing the breadth of the agenda, i.e. 
in the struggles to define the problem and the modelling efforts. 
 
Somewhat curiously, in conjunction with the above, the analysis also 
found that in particular on one of those matters that were included in the 
definition of the problem and in the agreements in the end – child labor – 
there was a tendency to actually go beyond international law. Not just in 
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terms of companies becoming involved in the labor practices of other 
companies, but in terms of the actual and specific rules that were set, such 
as the age limits for child labor and the decisions not to condone light work 
for older children. The analysis clearly found that, contrary to what one 
might have expected, this was not due to demands from the directly 
involved non-industry actors. In fact, even when – as in the Bangladesh 
case – these declared themselves explicitly prepared to accept for instance 
a combination of light work and education for older children in accordance 
with international law, in the concrete it was the industry actors that 
nevertheless opted against such an outcome.  
 
Hence, in order to account for the particular forms of the agreements, it is 
too simple to just point to the salience of child labor: the use of child labor 
and the politicization thereof does not, in itself, enable a de-linkage of 
other issues, cf. above. This may be the case, but that depends on other 
factors. What can be said, however, is that the presence of certain highly 
salient issues is conducive or enabling to a construction of corporate 
responsibility that carries an element of good corporate citizenship, of 
going beyond the legal minimum and which resonates with those 
normative pressures stemming from the broader public that underlie the 
salience of the issues – without necessarily entailing a consistently and 
substantively far-reaching acceptance and operationalization of all 
international legal minimums, and without necessarily entailing 
concessions on points where the material and practical ramifications for the 
companies involved would have been potentially dramatic. 
 
Compromises on breadth and depth, moreover, do not occur without 
compromisers, and so a proper explanation not only involves the inclusions 
and exclusions of issues and moderations of substance, but also of 
actors/partners and, in the end, the organizational set-up and identity of the 
partners to the agreements or some other type of outcome. As noted above, 
in none of the cases were the more demanding “counterparts” of the 
industry parties to the agreements: the compromises were made possible 
and shaped by these exclusions. The effects of the inclusions, on the other 
hand, and of the ILO and UNICEF as partners to two of the agreements in 
particular, appear to have been less significant, at least as far as the specific 
identity of these partners was concerned. Certainly, the inclusion of these 
two agencies as partners in the Bangladesh and soccer ball cases subtracted 
considerably from the attractiveness, from an activist point of view, of 
continuing to campaign on the particular problem (or, the compromise 
reached). On the other hand, the agreements in these two cases were closer 
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to the outcomes that the non-industry players were seeking – though not 
necessarily clear-cut “victories,” they were acceptable – whereas in the 
AIP/FLA case some of the non-industry members were not able to achieve 
an acceptable compromise: the required compromise would have been 
difficult, if not impossible, to “sell” to their constituencies, and it is highly 
questionable whether the remaining members of the task force could have 
allianced their way out of the ensuing counter-campaign. 
 
Overall, the material threats, which the main targets in each of the cases 
faced, were significant in driving the processes and essential to the coming 
into existence of the respective agreements. Except for the Bangladesh 
case involving potential trade sanctions against the entire garment industry, 
the manufacturing node – whether in Sialkot, Pakistan, or in the U.S. – 
received very little direct exposure (and had very little say in the overall 
politics). Yet, the pressure and the vulnerability of the different dominant-
node companies were very uneven. The result being, as it were, that some 
companies engaged in individual initiatives and became active in 
discussions among industry players, while other companies did very little 
except trying to stay below the radar. Furthermore, looking at the 
processes, it is evident that all three cases stretched over longer periods of 
time, involving several phases, and the analysis suggests that was primarily 
due to the uneven vulnerability of industry players discussed above (and 
the waning threat of the Harkin bill) – and the fact that in all three cases the 
material pressures in the initial phases were I) insufficient and ii) unevenly 
distributed, wherefore the necessary critical mass within the industries to 
overcome collective action problems did not exist. This situation of 
emerging but insufficient and unevenly distributed pressures in the initial 
phases – and the absence of strong and effective intervention and display 
of leadership by relevant public authorities – laid the foundation for the 
growing pressures in the middle phases, the situation remained open to 
further struggles to define the problems, and this had profound 
implications for the modelling in each of the three cases. Thus, looking at 
the politicization processes and the combination of targeting and economic 
coercion, there is an apparent paradox here. The cases show that, although 
from an activist perspective there are many good reasons to focus on a 
particular industry, producing the necessary critical mass is far from easy, 
and it often takes sustained focus and mounting pressure over longer 
periods of time - and the less vulnerable players also need to be targeted 
and pressured to produce critical mass. Yet, judging by the three case 
studies, these also tend to be the least attractive targets, both from the 
media as well as the labor and human rights groups’ points of view… 
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Finally, the Bangladesh case does suggest that the actualization of the 
above paradox of uneven vulnerabilities and pressures, and the significance 
of these in terms of the particular form of the outcome, depends on the 
form of economic coercion available and potentially applied. The threat of 
the Harkin bill – and, more generally, the threat of trade sanctions – 
constituted a threat of a collective nature, i.e. potentially affecting all of the 
Bangladeshi garment manufacturers, and it was a markedly less diffuse 
form of economic coercion: the effects of trade sanctions imposed for the 
Bangladeshi manufacturers were relatively clear and predictable compared 
to the consequences of potentially adverse consumer reactions for any 
given company in the other two cases. Had the Sialkot sporting goods 
industry been faced with potential trade sanctions threatening more than 
half of their business, on a collective scale, the unevenness of the pressures 
and vulnerabilities among the ball marketers might have been irrelevant, 
and modelling efforts might have been markedly different from the FIFA-
trade unions and subsequent industry counter-modelling that actually 
occurred. And had the U.S.-based apparel manufacturers been faced with 
such a threat, perhaps the modelling efforts would have stretched beyond a 
few dominant node companies in a task force. In conclusion, trade 
sanctions and similar economic pressures and threats are not necessarily 
desirable, but the analysis clearly suggests that their presence as a threat 
and potential leverage may be significant in terms of the eventual scope 
and organizational form of the outcome. 
 
In addition, the analysis furthermore suggests a number of reasons why 
corporate responsibility and not enhanced government enforcement to 
such a significant extent came into focus. For the media, ineffective 
enforcement was often part of the story, but the “good” story – where the 
drama, the scandal, the newsworthiness lay – generally involved the 
violation of children’s rights, the exploitation of workers and corporate 
perpetrators, often multinational ones. The labor and human rights groups 
involved were quite aware of this, but there was also a quite considerable 
skepticism toward the possibility of achieving real and effective change on 
the part of the governments in question. Moreover, there was a broad 
concern with making corporations and global capital more responsible, and 
the leverage available was over industry players rather than governments.  
 
Indeed, the analysis suggests that the three agreements – and, possibly, 
CSR more generally – were to a surprising extent rather public or state-
backed expansions of private authority, of voluntary and market-based 
solutions to those governance failures problematized. That is, the 
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governance changes that occurred were not only indirectly reflections of a 
broader and more abstract shift in state-market relations and an abstract 
rearticulation of the public and the private, nor was public involvement in 
the rise of private authority in these three cases restricted to broad-based 
political support and encouragement for private and voluntary initiatives. 
Indeed, in the very concrete and as far as the particular form of the three 
agreements was concerned, there was a much more active and direct 
involvement of public sector entities in the inclusion of partners and in 
facilitating the processes, and there was a quite considerable element of 
public funding which was central in shaping the particular form of at least 
two of the agreements.  
 
The role of the U.S. Department of Labor, in particular during Reich’s 
term, was quite outstanding in this respect. The Labor Department, the 
analysis showed, played a central role in the Bangladesh case, in part 
through the U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh, most notably with regards to  
the exclusion of AAFLI from the process and the inclusion of the ILO in 
the late stage. This affected the organizational form, not to mention 
bringing the ILO into this type of activity for the first time as well as 
joining the ILO and UNICEF in this type of partnership program for the 
first time. The analysis showed that this was in part also related to the 
particular personal and political preferences within the Labor Department 
and closely tied to the practicalities of channeling funding as well. 
Certainly, the analysis does indicate that further research on the 
Department of Labor within U.S. politics and in relation to the changing 
form of corporate responsibility in the mid-1990s in particular would be 
worthwhile.  
 
Finally, as noted, changes on the part of individual companies did not 
affect the majority of the other companies to such an extent that the 
necessary critical mass for a collective initiative was produced, nor do such 
changes appear to have influenced the nature of the agreements to any 
discernible extent. At best, the leaders produced some “followers.” Even in 
a broader and less agreement-focused sense, the analysis demonstrates that 
while it is clear that norms and practices associated with corporate 
responsibility changed during the 1990s, neither in the soccer ball industry 
nor in the AIP/FLA case did this translate into effective resolutions of the 
problems on part of the industries in these processes. This is particularly 
clear in the soccer ball case, where “the lessons from Bangladesh” were 
explicitly acknowledged from the very beginning of the process leading to 
the Atlanta Agreement process: yet, the labor practices of the soccer ball 
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industry were still (left) problematic and there was no industry-wide 
consensus on acting to effectively resolve the problems in practice. Hence, 
the analysis – in terms stretching beyond the particular agreements – could 
be made to suggest that the main significance of the changing norms of 
corporate responsibility and the rise of CSR in the 1990s lay in the fact that 
private and voluntary self-regulation as ideas and as certain techniques or 
elements of responsibility (such as independent monitoring, codes of 
conduct) came to be seen as increasingly “natural”: the trenches were 
moving, little by little as far as norms and practices (in principle) were 
concerned, but the governance failures in practice – the conditions of adult 
workers in the Bangladeshi garment industry and the Sialkoti soccer ball 
industry as well as the apparel industry sweatshops in the U.S. – persisted, 
awaiting politicization and controversy. 
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Queens, New York, 25 March 2003. 
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Washington, D.C., 15 April 2003. 
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Vice President of the National Consumers League; Co-ordinator, Child 
Labor Coalition during Bangladesh case 
Telephone, 14 May 2003. 
 
Bakvis, Peter 
Director, Global Unions 
Washington, D.C., 16 March 2003. 
 
Bissell, Susan 
Chief, Child Protection, UNICEF India; point person, UNICEF Dhaka, 
Bangladesh, during MOU process 
Telephone, 3 February 2004. 
                                          
650 An interview with two corporate representatives conducted in early 2003 does not 
appear on the list as it was off the record altogether; this interview was conducted 
during a critical point in the Klasky v. Nike proceedings. Furthermore, two persons are 
listed as anonymous on my decision: they both agreed to be interviewed and cited by 
name, but I have chosen not to do so out of concern for the potential repercussions this 
might have for them. Names and transcripts of the interviews are on file with the 
author. 
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